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Modernization and the Institutionalization of Differentiation: The Quebec Case

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Modernization and the Institutionalization of Differentiation: The Quebec Case.

MODERNIZATION AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF DIFFERENTIATION:

THE QUEBEC CASE

by

CLAUDE LESSARD

Department of Educational Theory

A Thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
University of Toronto

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
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Modernization and the Institutionalization
of Differentiation: The Quebec Case.

Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to study the institutionalization of differentiation in the Quebec of the sixties. In order to do so, a theoretical model of structural change is put forward, specific propositions are derived from it and verified through an analysis of relevant historical material. Quebec society and the modernization of its fiduciary and political sub-systems constitute the empirical referent. Quebec's school reform of the sixties is viewed essentially as a process involving the differentiation of religious and educational roles, collectivities and institutional norms.

Building on Parsons' and Bellah's evolutionary writing, as well as on Rueschemeyer's exploratory essay on partial modernization, its causes and consequences, we seek to situate the post-War Quebec within the framework of partial modernization and the so-called Quiet Revolution within that of a movement toward a more complete form of modernity. Partial modernization is conceptualized as the co-existence of modern and pre-modern or traditional patterns side by side within the same society. A pattern is considered modern to the extent that it increases the level of rationalization of the system in question.

The following variables are seen as crucial for a proper understanding of partial modernization : a) the characteristics of a society's social environment and the place within the hierarchy of control of the patterns which are transmitted to the traditional society by the social environment! b) the relationship between the social environment and the relatively traditional society and the interests of the social environment in the traditional society ; c) the capacity of the traditional society to resist environmental pressures to modernize.

The movement toward greater and fuller modernity is analyzed in terms of specific propositions which seek to interrelate the following four factors : a) the Ineffectiveness of the traditionalized economy and

the structural transformations within the economy ; b) elite-pluralization, the challenge to the traditional political and fiduciary elites and the struggle between them for the control of the State ; c) the transformations of the societal community ; d) the ineffectiveness of the traditionalized political and fiduciary subsystems in their dealing with the transformations of the other societal subsystems. These factors, analyzed within the framework of the Parsonian interchange paradigm, are seen as crucial structural conduciveness factors for the emergence of a value-oriented movement fostering differentiation and modernization.

An effort is made to focus on the political aspect of differentiation, a dimension somewhat ill-treated by both Parsons and Smelser. We thus view the process of differentiation as a process involving consensus- creation and/or consensus-imposition at the level of existing institutional elites. We seek also to associate consensus-creation and/or consensus- imposition with the problems of value-generalization and value-change, as well as with those of the smooth processing of the sequence of differentiation vs its bouncing back and forth. The kind of consensus we see as essential for the institutionalization of differentiation is considered analogous to a language. In this respect, the Quebec case indicates that the production and diffusion by the modernizers In the fifties and the sixties of the "language of adaptation" is crucial for the differentiation process. It indicates also that this was not enough ; political indoctrination, the structuring role played by the Royal Commission on Education, negotiations between key groups, "compromises", co-optation of some members of the traditional clerical elite within the new system, and package deals were also important ingredients of the relative success of the "frontal attack on the sources of dissatisfaction".

MODERNIZATION
AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION
OF DIFFERENTIATION :
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Modernization and the Institutionalization
of Differentiation: The Quebec Case.

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[ii]

Modernization and the Institutionalization
of Differentiation: The Quebec Case.

List of tables

[iii]

[iv]

Modernization and the Institutionalization
of Differentiation: The Quebec Case.

Table of contents

Chapter VII. CONCLUSION [448]

[1]

Modernization and the Institutionalization
of Differentiation: The Quebec Case.

Chapter I

Statement of Problem and Review of the Parsonian Theory of Social Change

[2]

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

The purpose of this thesis is, on the one hand, to put forward a theoretical model of structural change and to derive from it specific propositions and, on the other, to verify through an analysis of relevant historical material these propositions with Quebec society and the modernization of its school system constituting the empirical referent. We shall consider Quebec's school reform of the sixties as essentially a process of differentiation of religious and educational roles and collectivities. Parsonian theory and more specifically. Parsons' (1964, 1966, 1971) and Bellah's evolutionary theories. Parsons' (1956, 1961a, 1961b) theory of structural differentiation will constitute the basic framework from which we shall derive specific propositions to be verified in this thesis.

Parsonian theory has been subject to more or less warranted criticisms for some time now. More often than not, the criticisms center on the following points : 1) Parsonian theory is essentially static : it lacks a theory of social change ; 2) there is no causality in the theory ; values are the basic determinants of action and change in values are

unaccounted for in the schema ; 3) the theory is conflict-less ; 4) finally, all things taken into account, the theory is fundamentally conservative in its implications : Parsons is a sophisticated agent of American capitalism and imperialism and his theory lacks critical and radical potential.

We would like to quarrel with most of these contentions. Although the theory does have some weaknesses and has not yet developed to [3] its full adaptive potential, the criticisms presented in the previous paragraph seem to this author, in their general and global form, unfounded.

This thesis may be seen as a modest attempt to show that Parsonian theory can adequately deal with structural change, as well as value-change, and that, in more than one way, the schema Is not conflict-less and Inherently conservative in its implications.

More specifically, this thesis will seek to put forward a theoretical schema which will permit us to enrich our knowledge and understanding of the realities of partial modernization and of a relatively late movement toward greater or fuller modernity. It will also attempt to explain why the case under study did not simply involve differentiation and value-generalization, but also a shift in the dominant societal values. Finally, we shall seek to associate the Parsons-Smelser's cycle or sequence of differentiation with the political aspect of differentiation, aspect which has been relatively underemphasized and insufficiently treated by both Parsons and Smelser.

Building on Parsons' and Bellah's evolutionary theory, as well as on Rueschemeyer's exploratory essay on partial modernization (in press), its causes and consequences, we shall define partial modernization as the "co-existence of modern and pre-modern or traditional patterns side by side within the same society". A pattern will be considered modern to the extent that it increases the level of rationalization of the system in question. Partial modernization, we contend, can be fruitfully analyzed in terms of the following variables : a) the characteristics of a society's social environment and the place within the hierarchy of control of the patterns which are transmitted to the traditional society by the [4] social environment — some patterns are easier to transmit and incorporate than others ; some subsystems are more receptive to change and innovations than others ; the Parsonian concept of hierarchy of control is most helpful in understanding why this is so — ; b) the

relationship between the social environment and the relatively traditional society and the interests of the social environment in the traditional society : for example, if the relationship between the social environment and the traditional society is characterized by colonial dependencies, we should expect constricted development of the traditional society to the extent that constrained development is the essence of colonialism ; c) the capacity of the traditional society to resist environmental pressures to modernize ; this capacity is obviously associated with a plurality of factors ; with regard to the case under study in this thesis, we would like to stress the importance of the following ; a) due to a historical accident — the Conquest in 1760 by the British army of New France and the subsequent elimination of a key segment of New France's elites — the inordinate importance of the Catholic Church hierarchy within the traditional elite-structure and its capacity to resist and block differentiation as well as to maintain relatively intact a stratification system which gave the greatest amount of prestige to ecclesiastical status ; b) the acceptance by the traditional political eli tes — whether they were members of what Boily (in Desrosiers, 1972) called the French Canadian Haute bourgeoisie or of the upper middle classes — of a collaborative or intermediary role with the Anglo-American capitalist class, this role implying in the long run low societal self-sufficiency and partial modernity to the extent that the Anglo-American capitalist class, in its willingness to modernize Quebec's econorrçy and industrialize the Province, did not, [5] at least until recently, ask for more than an easy and economical access to the Province's natural resources and to a relatively low qualified labour force : the Anglo-American capitalist class brought to the Province not only its surplus capital, but also its technology and entrepreneurship ; in doing so, with the collaboration of Quebec's traditional political elites, it limited the emergence within French Canada of the necessary commitments and skills for economic development ; c) a religious symbol system, typical of what Bell ah (1964) calls historic civilization, and which may be characterized in terms of the Catholic Counter-Reformation and ultramontanism. These factors, in conjunction, are crucial for a proper understanding of French Canada's capacity to resist throughout the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth, the pressures which existed and which pushed for the modernization of its subsystems.

The three sets of variables, in themselves and in interaction with one another, help understand why the modernization of Quebec society has been partial and uneven, probably more so than if modernization had been stimulated from within French Canada. In this regard, the relationship between French Canada and its social environment, characterized by colonial dependencies, the collaborative role played by the traditional political elites and the Church's monopoly over the cultural definition of the collective situation — definition which rejected as illegitimate differentiation, modernization and industrialization —have together retarded the modernization of Quebec[1]s subsystems, more so, than if the Conquest had not been accompanied by the elimination of a key segment of New France's elites, than If the industrialization of the Province had not been stimulated by Anglo-American capital, technology and entrepreneurship, [6] and, finally, more so than if Confederation had not implied centralization at the federal level of the major tools of economic development.

While partial modernization can be seen as a function of the previously discussed variables, the movement toward greater and fuller modernity can be seen as associated with the following variables : a) within the context of continuous economic growth and concomitant transformations within and of the societal community, the growing ineffectiveness, marked by deficits in the interchange system, of the traditionalized polity and fiduciary subsystem ; b) the emergence of a value-oriented movement which challenges the traditional definition of the societal collectivity and of its situation, and back of that, of the Church's monopoly over that definition ; c) the capacity of a modernizing elite to move to the political center, to get access to power, while sharing It with some sectors of the traditional political elites, and to spend its power in the modernization and differentiation of the traditionalized subsystems.

As the reader can readily understand from the above, we wish to analyze in this thesis the movement toward greater modernization essentially in political terms. Two reasons guide us : one, the politics of differentiation are crucial for a proper understanding of the success or failure of an attempt to institutionalize differentiation ; second, it is a factor which both Parsons and Smelser neglect ; though Parsons, in his *Rural Sociology* article (1961b), talks about such things as "the risks involved in cutting loose" or of the "minimal guarantees" which must

be given to the units undergoing differentiation, thus Indicating that there are costs to differentiation and that they have to be negotiated so that [7] the conflicts engendered by differentiation do not block the process or make it bounce back, he does not thoroughly and systematically analyse theses issues. Smelser's book (1959) on the English industrial revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth century suffers from similar defects : Smelser is much more concerned with showing the usefulness of his seven-step model and the seven levels of specificity of the components of action schema than with a complete analysis of the political transformations concomitant to the industrialization of Great Britain : in his book, the State, for example, is assumed to be a neutral arbiter, handling and channelling the dissatisfactions generalized in step two of the sequence ; it does not seem to be an active and Interested party or servant of other Interests, but is unfortunately depicted as "above" the process.

In our effort to go beyond the Parsons-Smelser's treatment of the politics of differentiation, we have found it useful to view the process of differentiation as a process involving consensus-creation and/or consensus-imposition at the level of existing institutional elites.

Parsons (1961b) has acknowledged the importance for the successful institutionalization of differentiation, of the generation of a new definition of the situation which legitimized differentiation and the contribution of the differentiated subsystems to higher-order functioning. He had not however paid sufficient attention to the mechanisms by which this new definition is produced, diffused and accepted or imposed by those in power. Neither has he paid sufficient attention to cases where this new definition of the situation does not simply imply value-generalization, but also a shift in the dominant values of the society undergoing differentiation and modernization.

[8]

In this thesis, we shall try to associate consensus-creation and/or consensus-imposition with the problems of value-generalization and value-change, as well as with those of the smooth processing of the sequence of differentiation vs its bouncing back and forth. We shall consider crucial for what Smelser has called the "Frontal attack on the sources of dissatisfactions", the generation of a minimal consensus at the level of existing Institutional elites. It is our contention that, within

relatively differentiated social systems, consensus is a difficult thing to produce and maintain Intact for relatively long periods of times. We wish to propose to view the kind of consensus we see Important for successful differentiation as analogous to a language. The fact that an actor knows the language another actor is using does not help to make precise predictions concerning the kind of sentences this actor is most likely to produce. It does however help to understand the content of these sentences. The same thing can be said about a very general and simple consensus : it does not imply consensus about specific lines of action.

It may even be said that one of its major functions is to be fundamentally ambiguous with regard to specific lines of action as well as to gain time for the frontal attack or for action. For example, as we shall try to establish in the following chapters, it is of considerable importance for a proper understanding of the process of differentiation under study in this thesis, that a modernizing elite managed to produce and diffuse what could be called "the language of adaptation", sufficiently enough to push to the background the previously dominant "language of survival". Once you are within the language of adaptation, you will tend to accept and legitimize lines of action which seem congruent with the fundamental orientations of that language. Shrewd and machiavellian change-agents [9] know that the way a situation is defined is of crucial importance for the process of change or non-change which may follow. They also know that those who define the situation or produce the new language have a decisive advantage over those who do not and who thus have less ability to "use it properly". Due to the subtleness of the process of consensus-creation, we shall consider the distinction between consensus-creation —which implies that, when it is successful, elites "share" the new definition of the situation — and consensus-imposition — which means that the consensus is very fragile and that some important elites do not "share" the new definition of the situation — as indeed very relative : one may observe situations where, though some elites do not accept the new definition, they nonetheless are somewhat paralyzed and incapable of effectively counteract it. This seems to have been the case of the Catholic Church hierarchy in the Quebec of the early sixties.

In this thesis, we shall thus attempt to put forward a theoretical schema which will permit us to enrich our knowledge and

understanding of the realities of partial modernization, the factors which account for it as well as those which are crucial for a movement toward greater or fuller modernity. In doing so, we shall emphasize the political aspect, and specifically the politics of consensus-creation at the level of elites and of value-generalization and value-change.

Though Parsons has, in his evolutionary books (1966, 1971) paid more attention to evolutionary successes than to failures, blockages and stoppages, we do not assume — nor does Parsons for that matter — that the process of evolution in general and of modernization in particular is unilinear, inevitable and irreversible. In a sense the Quebec of the nineteenth century constitutes a clear example of a process of modernization [10] which becomes blocked and freezes. Indeed, as we shall have occasion to document in subsequent chapters, the nineteenth century was a century during which Quebec society experienced strong and deep value conflicts centering in the final analysis, about the issues of differentiation. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Catholic Church, which must be seen as a force blocking differentiation, was stronger than at the beginning of the century. It took some forty years before things started to change. Thus, not only do we not assume modernization to be irreversible, but we shall analyze a case which indicates clearly that the process can be blocked for a relatively long period of time.

We shall not present much new material, historical or other, concerning Quebec ; we shall put this thesis into a framework which permits us, we contend, to shed a new light on some fundamental characteristics of Quebec's recent evolution and especially on its educational development.

There is a relatively important body of literature concerning traditional Quebec society, the twentieth century transformations within and of some of its subsystems, as well as the so-called Quiet Revolution of the sixties. For example, Maheu and Bélanger (1973), studying student unrest in Quebec within the context of the Quiet Revolution, have argued that this Revolution and its most important manifestations — the school reform and the development of the State apparatus, and especially of state tools for the encouragement of economic development — must be seen essentially as an adaptation to the needs of advanced capitalism and to American neo-colonialism. These adaptations center about the growth of the State and of State capitalism : if they were well

received by French [11] Canada's urban middle class, committed to economic development and seeking to ameliorate its position within Quebec society, as well as by a sizeable portion of the working classes, seeking to increase their share of the fruits of economic development, these adaptations did not result in the alteration of the fundamentally colonial status of Quebec society with regard to its relationship with the rest of Canada and the United States. Borrowing the conceptual apparatus of such Marxist writers as Miliband (1969), Poulantzas (1968) and Touraine (1969), they associate the growth of the Quebec State with the maintenance of the domination of the Anglo-American capitalist class over the destiny of Quebec society.

In an analysis of the mutation of Quebec which must be seen as complementary instead of contradictory, Guy Rocher (1973) views the Quiet Revolution as essentially a cultural revolution, more than a socio-economic or socio-political one. Indeed, for Rocher, the fundamental structural changes occurred at the turn of the nineteenth century and during the first decades of the twentieth as the Province, stimulated by Anglo-American capital, technology and entrepreneurship, started its industrialization, urbanization and transformed its traditional stratification system. What happened in post-World War Two Quebec, contends Rocher, is the adaptation of Quebec's traditional culture to these fundamental structural changes :

> "Ce qui a passablement modifié et ralenti cette dynamique de la société industrielle au Québec, c'est le fait que les transformations de structures ne se sont pas accompagnées d'une égale transformation de la culture. On peut dire que le Québec a vécu une étrange contradiction dans la première moitié du 20e siècle : il adoptait les structures sociales de la civilisation industrielle, mais il gardait la mentalité, l'esprit et les valeurs de la société pré-industrielle. Il y a peu d'exemples d'autres sociétés [12] en voie d'industrialisation à avoir connu une rupture aussi radicale entre les structures sociales et la culture.
>
> Cet écart s'explique évidemment par le fait que 1'industrialisation a été imposée de l'exrieur." (Rocher, 1973 : 17-18)

Rocher goes on to analyze the tensions generated by this contradiction, how they were effectively handled by the "puissances d'unanimité" and how they led to the Quiet Revolution :

"À partir de 1950, la révolution culturelle couvait déjà sous la cendre, avant de surgir finalement au grand jour quelques années plus tard. C'est cette poussée subite d'un changement culturel longtemps étouffé qui explique le rythme rapide et presque sauvage de la mutation culturelle des dernières années... Il faut cependant ajouter— ne fût-ce que pour le noter au passage — qu'en réalité le changement n'a pas été aussi subit qu'on a pu le dire et le croire. Il a été préparé de longue main. Il a été d'abord annoncé par différents groupes marginaux, il a dû ensuite emprunter des voies souterraines avant d'apparaître finalement au grand jour. Certains mouvements d'Action Catholique, la Faculté des sciences sociales de l'Université Laval, le groupe de Refus Global, la revue Cité Libre, la C.T.C.C. (ancienne C.S.N.), 1'Institut canadien des Affaires publiques — pour ne nommer que les principaux — ont été les germoirs oû, durant les années 1940 et 1950, la "révolution tranquille" a trouvé ses premières voix, qu'on peut juger aujourd'hui bien timides mais qui s'élevaient, il faut s'en souvenir, contre un ordre solidement établi et bien peu tolérant de toute dérogation." (Rocher, 1973 : 18-19)

Smelser's seven step model of structural differentiation must be seen as a useful analytical tool for the understanding of the emergence and generalization of dissatisfactions as well as of the successful redefinition of the components of action of a system of action undergoing differentiation. It will permit us to show how the Quiet Revolution was indeed prepared during the forties and the fifties and how some of the [13] fundamental manifestations of the Quiet Revolution were relatively well thought out when the liberal party took power in 1960.

Maheu's and Bélanger's analysis stressing the growth of the State and neo-colonialism as well as Rocher's discussion of the Quiet Revolution as a cultural revolution, although embedded in different sociological frameworks, do not, we contend contradict one another : they complement each other. One of the basic convictions which has guided the development of this thesis is that Parsonian theory, when stripped of unnecessary conservative connotations, can produce a sociological discourse which permits the incorporation of both important conditional and informational factors and which goes beyond the old either-or debate.

We have organized our thesis in the following manner. In this first chapter, we shall present and discuss the Parsonian theory of structural

change and of evolutionary development. Since Parsons has been for a long time concerned with social change and since many of the criticisms directed toward his brand of theory appear to this author superficial and unwarranted, we shall discuss the Parsonian theory of change as it developed from Parsons' treatment of it in *The Social System* (1951) to his most recent neo-evolutionary book. The *System of Modern Societies* (1971). Because this thesis is concerned with an instance of structural differentiation, we shall give particular attention to Parsons' and Smelser's discussion of the conditions of successful institutionalization of this type of change. Building on the review of Parsonian theory to be presented in this chapter, chapter two will be focused on the theoretical problems posed by partial modernization : we shall then attempt to identify the basic characteristics of partial modernization, the fundamental [14] variables which. In Interaction with one another, account for what Rueschemeyer (in press) has called "durable inconsistencies" as well as the conditions which may be seen as crucial for a proper understanding of a societal movement toward a more complete modernity. Chapter two will also attempt to go beyond the Parsons-Smelser's treatment of structural differentiation by emphasizing the importance of the political factor in differentiation, especially in a case where differentiation is associated with a shift in dominant societal values. The chapter will be concluded with the presentation of some twenty specific propositions which the remaining chapters will seek to verify. Indeed, chapter three, after putting forward some key elements of New France society, will attempt to account for the partial modernization of Quebec society from the Conquest to the end of World War Two as well as seek to show how the traditional theocratic value-orientations were reinforced throughout the nineteeth century and the first decades of the twentieth century. Chapter four will be concerned with the strains associated with partial modernization and the ineffectiveness of Quebec's traditionalized polity and fiduciary subsystem, the more so as Quebec[1]s economy and societal community were transformed and modernized during the forties and the fifties. In chapter five, the author, considering the data presented in chapter four as the fundamental structural conduciveness factors, will try to explain how and why a modernizing elite emerged after the Second World War and developed an ideology fostering greater differentiation and modernization of the polity and the fiduciary subsystem. We shall treat the modernizing elite's ideological discourse as an Instance of a value-oriented ideology : indeed,

we contend that the new ideology which was articulated and diffused throughout the elite-structure during the fifties and the early sixties [15] did not simply facilitate the process of value-generalization which is critical for a successful institutionalization of differentiation, but also sought to encourage a shift in dominant values within French Canada, shift which may be expressed in the following way : from theocracy to democracy. Chapter six will attempt to verify the propositions put forward in chapter two and dealing with what Smelser calls the "frontal attack on the sources of dissatisfactions" : indeed, we shall analyze, essentially in political terms, the sequence of differentiation from the handling and channelling step to the routinization one, while paying special attention to the politics of consensus-creation and consensus-imposition and to the factors which explain why the sequence of differentiation has bounced back or at least froze by the end of the sixties and by the time it started affecting the Francophone and Anglophone population living on the island of Montreal. Finally, in our conclusion, we shall pull things together, try to assess the usefulness of the differentiation model, determine whether or not the propositions derived from the Parsonian theory of structural change were empirically verified, and suggest future areas of investigation.

THE PARSONIAN THEORY
OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Return to toc

Parsonian theory and its treatment of social dynamics has been subjected to both praise and criticisms. We, however, share Guy Rocher's evaluation of Parsonian theory and will try to go beyond it by attempting to do what it says Parsons has not done. Guy Rocher writes :

> "La théorie de Parsons souffre d'une autre faiblesse, d'un ordre assez différent. On a souvent affirmé qu'elle privilégie l'équilibre, l'ordre social, la stabilité du statu quo. Nous [16] avons dit plus haut pourquoi nous ne partageons pas cette critique, qui s'attache à des apparences superficielles de la théorie parsonlenne sans atteindre au coeur de la pensée de Parsons. Le reproche que ce dernier mérite plutôt, à notre avis, c'est de n'avoir pas poursuivi l'analyse dynamique des différentes contradictions qu'il a lui-

même introduites dans son système. Parsons a semé dans son modèle du système d'action un certain nombre de contradictions potentielles, susceptibles d'être sources de tensions, de conflits et par là de changement social. Mais il n'a pas su mettre en relief l'existence de ces contradictions et le rôle dynamique qu'elles peuvent jouer." (Rocher, 1972 : 230)

Since much of what has been written about Parsons does not, to us, prove that the authors have gone through the effort of reading and understanding fully the implications of his repeated assertions, and since conceptual abstractness and terminological difficulties are not valid excuses, we shall remain as close as possible to the principal theoretical papers that Parsons, and his collaborators have written on social change and discuss them in their order of publication. The reader may feel that this mode of presentation is unduly repetitive of the same propositions : for us, it indicates both the longstanding interest in social change in Parsons' career as well as the consistency with which he has treated the main theoretical problems of any theory of social change.

The main sources to be used are the following :

- chap. 11 of *The Social System* entitled "The Processes of change of Social Systems" (1951) ;
- chap. 5 of *Economy and Society* entitled "The Problems of Growth and Institutional Change in the Economy" (1956) ;
- Smelser, N.J., *Social Change in the Industrial Revolution* (1959) ;
- "an Outline of the Social System" in *Theories of Society* (1961a) ;

[17]

- "Some Considerations on a Theory of Social Change" in *Rural Sociology* (1961b) ;
- "Evolutionary Universals in Society", *American Sociological Review* (1964) ;
- Bellah, R.N., "Religious Evolution", *American Sociological Review* (1964) ;

- Societies, Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives (1966) ;
- The System of Modern Societies (1971).

Let us start with the treatment Parsons gives to the analysis of social change in The Social System. Though it is an old book, the chapter to be found in it dealing with social change, its sources, directionality and repercussions or outcomes contains some of the fundamental ingredients of the Parsonian theory of social change. It is in many ways a very intriguing treatment because on the surface, it has a Marxian bent that the reader can identify in the usage of such notions as vested interests that appear to be an important component of systemic equilibrium and stability, strains conceived as "disturbance of the expectation system" (Parsons, 1951 : 491), rising expectations and relative deprivation which may be conceived as tension-optimizing factors leading to what Parsons calls a "blow-up", the impossibility of insulation in the long run of a system unit from the effect of a basic change (as when, for example, industrialization is seen as having stressful repercussions on the conjugal family and more so on the feminine role, repercussions that manifest themselves in what Parsons called at the time the glamour pattern and that are now expressed in the Women's Liberation Movement). This carries potentially the whole theory of differentiation, integration and de-differentiation. One also finds in The Social System chapter on social change the idea that change repercussions or outcomes must be mapped out in [18] functional and systemic terms which implies that change breeds further change, as well as a discussion of conditions leading to the "ascendancy of the charismatic revolutionary movement" which rests on what Smelser has labelled the "value-added logic" and which is an important psychosocial qualification of the Marxian model of revolutionary preparations. If we are correctly reading this chapter of The Social System, many seeds of further Parsonian social change theory are right there. Let us explain them more fully in order to dispell some misreadings, while keeping in mind our concern for sociological models which conceive of social systems as inherently tension-creating as well as tension-reducing systems, both with regard to their intra-unit relationships and their relationships with their environment.

Basically, Parsons, in <u>The Social System</u>, raises the three fundamental issues of any theory of social change. These are :

1. What is change ? How should it be conceptualized ?

2. What are the sources or factors leading to change ?

3. Can we ascertain the direction of change ? What are the repercussions or outcomes of change and how are we to systematically investigate them ?

To the first question. Parsons gives the following answer : "So far as it impinges on institutionalized patterns of action and relationships, therefore, change is never just alteration of pattern but alteration by the overcoming of resistance" (1951 : 491) ; as a process of alteration of institutionalized patterns of social interaction, change is distinguished from processes that maintain the boundaries of the system. Parsons writes about these processes : "the definition of a system as [19] boundary-maintaining is a way of saying that, relative to Its environment, that is to fluctuations in the factors of the environment, it maintains certain constancies of pattern, whether this constancy be static or moving" (1951 ;482). Boundary-maintaining processes are thus essentially homeostatic. Furthermore, they are taken as given :

> "From a certain point of view these processes are to be defined as the processes of maintenance of the constant patterns. But of course these are empirical constancies, so we do not assume any inherent reason why they have to be maintained. It is simply a fact that, as described in terms of a given frame of reference, these constancies are often bound to exist and theory can thus be focused on the problems presented by their existence. They may cease to exist, by the dissolution of the distinctive boundary-maintaining system and its assimilation to the environment, or by transformation into other patterns. But the fact that they do exist, given times and places, still serves as a theoretical focus for analysis" (Parsons, 1951 : 482).

If I read Parsons correctly, what he means by the "problems presented by their existence" is that, if homeostatic or boundary-maintaining mechanisms are empirical facts, the basic implication to be drawn for a theory of change is that, in order that there be change, homeostatic

mechanisms have to be overcome. This, to him, is not an easy thing, though it does happen. The notion of watershed, put forward in <u>Theories of Society</u> (Parsons, 1961a : 75), expresses both the difficulty and the possibility of overcoming homeostatic mechanisms :

> "Once it (strain at a certain level) has occurred, the question is whether the impetus to change goes "over the watershed" or under the countervailing impact of the mechanisms of social control, falls back again." (Parsons, 1961a : 75)

The usage of a homeostatic model is not limited to Parsons, Many contemporary Marxists, we surmise, hold a similar position, though [20] not always acknowledging it : their analysis of superstructural entities and their tension-reducing or tension-masquerading functions are in a sense, based on a homeostatic model in which the super-structural entities (schools, entertainment organizations, reformism) are seen as limiting or inhibiting the possibility of change of the overal1 system, while dialectically creating contradictions which promote change. Marxism can thus be said to be to some extent equilibrium-oriented.

Though I do not see how sociology can avoid assuming homeostatic mechanisms, sociologists can be somewhat puzzled by Parsons' contention that "of course these are empirical constancies, so we do not assume any inherent reasons why they have to be maintained" (1951 : 482). Of course, one can say that systems are, by definition, open systems ; the concept of system implying that if we are to characterize a particular system, we must be able to distinguish and differentiate it from what it does not encompass and constitute, i.e. its environment ; the concept of openness implying that a system is always involved in interchanges with its environment and thus in a constant state of tension with it, trying to cope and to come to grips with the threats and opportunities that are to be found in it. In other words, homeostasis may be seen as a functional imperative and functional imperatives are not accounted for in Parsonian theory — nor in the other models using homeostatic concepts — ; they are postulated and used as explanatory tools. One can also say that boundary-maintaining mechanisms do occur empirically though they vary empirically in the strength of their presence.

If systems need to maintain their boundaries or their specificity in the face of a variegated and changing environment, — the changing [21] character of the environment may be seen as threatening in the sense of being potentially disruptive of intra-systemic stability —, there are reasons to believe that homeostatic mechanisms are also needed to cope with intra-systemic tensions. We shall treat this question more fully when we shall discuss the Parsonian answer to the questions of what are the sources of change. Suffice it to say for the moment that the basic dilemmas of action — the pattern-variables — are one example of intra-systemic creative tensions, since the act of opting for one particular horn does not make the other one vanish in the wilderness of the environment. Parsons' discussion of the rise of Fascism in Germany (1942 : 138-147) in terms of the relative institutionalization of traditionalist and rationalist orientations is a good example of an interpretative schema based on the pattern-variables and the strains engendered by their relative institutionalization. It is also a good example of dialectical thinking which cannot be considered secondary or peripheral in Parsonian theory, but must be seen as partly rooted in the pattern-variable schema.

The functional imperatives schema is also an example of intra- systemic creative tensions : indeed, they may be seen as having differing and competing priorities, and thus may be the sources of internal struggles for the control of scarce resources.

We shall conclude our discussion of process as distinguished from change by strongly stating that it is cheer nonsense to argue that if systems have boundary-maintaining properties, they thus do not have entropic tendencies. They have both : it is up to each theorist to emphasize what he or she feels Is most important or the best intellectual strategy for dealing with them. It is thus as valid to argue that mutations are [22] not frequent and that their relative infrequency begs the question of why and leads one to look for homeostatic or boundary-maintaining mechanisms as it is to argue that mutations are so important that we must focus all our conceptual apparatus on the explanation of their genesis. Whatever the strategy chosen, it remains unquestionable that the fact that systems are seen as needing boundary-maintaining mechanisms points to their being inherently entropic.

The distinction between process and change is somewhat parallel to that of "change in" or within systems and "change of" systems. The first

refers to changes in units or subsystems whi1e the second involves important transformations of the system itself. Furthermore, change in the system does not necesslrhly or automatically breed change of the system. On the contrary, change in the system may be necessary for non-change or stability of the overall system. Thus, change in a system can be looked as constitutive of equilibrating or homeostatic processes at a higher level. This distinction between types of change and the logic of their relationship and variability are important ingredients of Parsons' answer to the question what is change. For sociologists committed to developing a more critical social science, the distinction can be of considerable value. Indeed, one can use it not only to categorize different types of change, but also to show how, in clearly specified situations, changes in the system have as an objective consequence, intended or unintended, to prevent or retard more fundamental change, i.e. change of the system. The distinction permits us also to incorporate within the theoretical framework such concepts as the relative cost or cheapness of changes in vs changes of the system.

[23]

To the next point. We have stated that Parsons defines change as alteration of pattern by the overcoming of resistance. This emphasis on the overcoming of resistance has led Parsons to deal with the vested interest issue. It has led others (Gouldner, 1970 : 354-357) to think that in Parsonian theory, vested interests are both a *deus ex machina* and only operate in a status quo reinforcing fashion.

It is clear, however, from Parsons' treatment of the vested interest issue that he is not introducing or borrowing a Marxist concept, but is spelling out a very fundamental implication of his theory of Institutionalization of roles in social systems. Two citations will suffice to get this straight :

> "The first consideration involves what we may call the phenomenon of vested interests. This derives from the nature of the processes of equilibrium in a boundary-maintaining type of system. The specific application of the idea of equilibrium which is of concern to us is one aspect of the phenomena of institutionalization. Institutionalization produces, as we have seen, a form of the integration of the need-dispositions of the relevant actors with a set of culture-patterns which always include in one sense patterns of value-orientation." (Parsons, 1951 : 491)

"The term vested interests seems appropriate to designate this general resistance to change which is inherent in the institutionalization of roles in the social system. The term interest in this usage must, of course, be interpreted in the broad sense in which we used it in chapter 2. It is not confined to economic or material interests though it may include them. It is fundamentally the interest in maintaining the gratifications involved in an established system of role-expectations, which are, be it noted, gratifications of need-dispositions, not of drives in the simple hedonistic sense. It clearly includes the interest in conformity with institutionalized expectations, of the affectively neutral and often the moral type. Of course it also includes the [24] interest in the relational reward of love, approval and estime. The phenomenon of vested interest, then, may be seen as always lying in the background of the problem of social change." (Parsons, 1951 : 492)

These quotations are evidence that for Parsons, it is imperative in a sense that a particular normative culture in order to be relatively well institutionalized be able to generate — it not only contains them as ad hoc, residual factors — vested interests, that is, it must satisfy to some extent the need-dispositions of the individual actors in role.

Since need-dispositions are learned through socialization, there is thus a double sense in which vested interests are said to be inherent in the phenomena of institutionalization of roles. The fact also that Parsons is talking about need-dispositions and not drives also opens up the possibility that vested interests may not always be successfully generated within the system. For if need-dispositions are learned through socialization, for Parsons, socialization is highly variable in its outcome.

There is no contradiction here between the inherent character of the development of vested interests and the variable success of their generation through socialization of need-dispositions. It just illustrates the strategic importance of the generation of need-dispositions and their linking with role-expectations for social system stability.

A.W. Gouldner (1970 : 232-233), criticizing Parsons' treatment of vested interests, has argued that, though it is sound to postulate that human action is oriented toward the optimization of gratification, we have reason to believe that there is such a thing as the declining marginal utility of gratifiers or need-satisfiers. He considers these phenomena as inherently leading to change, instability and/or conflict within [25] a social system, because it reduces the equilibrium efficiency of vested interests as conceptualized by Parsons.

This, it seems to us, is a quite useful assumption to make and may be used to explain the extent to which the personality system constitutes a threat to institutionalized role-relationships and a factor that may undermine their stability. It also helps to understand why Parsons considers vested interests an important component of the institutionalization of roles. In other words, the phenomenon of the declining marginal utility of need-satisfiers does not destroy Parsons' theory of institutionalization : it only makes institutionalization processes problematic and in constant need of being rejuvenated and reactivated. Rituals, with varying success, attempt to do just that. In certain cultures, especially the modern activistic ones, we may find norms which seek to counteract the declining marginal utility of gratifiers or need-satisfiers ; indeed, the general norms of individual contribution to society and achievement may be reactivated in such a fashion as to limit what McLuhan has called for example, the "executive drop-out" ; they may also be used to prevent individuals from "slacking off" and question the rewards associated with their day-to-day contribution to society.

While the previous discussion established that vested interests are not a *deus ex machina* or an instance of conceptual borrowing — however interesting may be the idea of a convergence with Marxism —, there still remains the issue as to whether they have to be only status quo reinforcing and maintaining. It is clear that in the theoretical section of the chapter on social change in <u>The Social System</u>, vested interests are introduced both to account for resistance to change and establish that [26] social systems, like all living systems, are governed by homeostatic mechanisms. However, one does not get totally the same idea after reading through the whole chapter. Indeed, some ambiguity appears. After stating that "the drive toward the optimization of gratification is, because of its significance to motivational process, a fundamental aspect of the tendencies to change from one particular type of social system to another" (1951 : 498), Parsons, consistently with what he has said in previous pages, shows how vested interests of both parents and child have to be moved out of the way if the family is to adaptively go through its cycle, how technological advance creates role-obsolescence and thus the activation of resistance to change by way of vested interests, and how religious fundamentalism is explainable by the "defensive primacy of vested interests, in this case expressive-evaluative in

primary content, over the institutionalized cognitive standards of the society" (1951 : 516). But he also writes :

> "The general tendency to 1ine science and its implications, real or alleged, up with the progressive cause, is perhaps the most important broad generalization which can be made. In general this has been associated with espousal of the groups and the social systems which were struggling for enhancement of their positions in the prestige and power systems, the bourgeoisie at one phase, the proletariat at another, and not least important perhaps the scientists and technologists themselves." (Parsons, 1951 : 518)

He sums up his whole analysis of the impact of technological advance in the following fashion :

> "If one broad generalization about the type of process which we have attempted to trace can be hazarded, it is that the society in which it has become institutionalized is in a relatively precarious state of moving equilibrium with respect to the process. This equilibrium can break down in either of two main directions, both of which [27] if they occur should be interpretated as consequences of the fact that strain in certain parts of the system has mounted to points which cannot be coped with short of major alterations of the moving equilibrium state. One of these centers on the mounting resistance of the vested interest elements to further change, so that the essential process itself is finally chocked off and the society stabilized on a traditionalistic basis... The other direction is that of mounting strain in progressive sectors so that the radically alienated revolutionary movement develops." (Parsons, 1951 : 520)

This second alternative rests upon the presence in the population of sufficiently intense, widely spread and properly distributed alienated motivational elements. Parsons then goes on to use the case of Nazi Germany partly to show that the distribution of alienated motivation within a population is not random but tends to significantly cluster about specific points of strain within the social system.

It would thus seem that Parsons tries to avoid using the concept of vested interest in the sense of positive acceptance of change in a non-fortuitous nor totally gratuitous way. For that reality, he used such terms as "progressive sectors" and "alienated motivational elements". Is this refusal to accept that the words vested interests may imply a progressive

or positive stance toward change of any theoretical importance or is it simply inconsequential linguistic preference ?

We would like to contend that it is a matter of personal emphasis more than a major theoretical point. Though Parsons himself seems to prefer to associate vested interests with resistance to change, at least in The Social System chapter, there is nothing in Parsonian theory which prevents vested Interests from being a factor leading to change. Three remarks are in order to ground the preceding assertion.

[28]

Firstly, let us recall the distinction between "change in" and "change of" the system. When discussing that distinction, we asserted that change in the system may be seen as an Important element of a reequilibrating process of the overall system. This may mean, on the one hand, that resistance to change will be less intense when it is change in the system that is put forward, thought of course, perceptions of the radicalness of a change may not always be correlated with the objective nature of the change, and, on the other hand, that social systems may have institutional ized change in the system, which means that vested interests in that type of change may have developped. Moreover, it is certainly arguable that some elites within some sectors of the society may come to favor change in the system because it is the cheapest type of change. What could be called the "ideology of the economy of revolutionary turmoil" — the belief, more or less dominant among Western liberal elites, that by continous changes in the system, Western societies can avoid the trauma of revolutionary upheavals — may be seen as an ideology favoring change in the system, while maintaining intact the fundamental properties of Western liberal democracies, including the place of liberal elites within them.

Secondly, Institutionalized normative cultures empirically vary in their degree of internal coherence. The observer often finds internal incompatibilities or contradictions, the more so, as we shall see later on, we move on the evolutionary path. These internal incompatibilities indicate that we can find conflicting vested interests. Here again, the pattern-variables can be useful to delineate the nature and structuring of these incompatibilities. Parsons' essay on Fascism (1942 : 138-147) and the deep contradictions within pre-Fascist Germany, associates these phenomena with related vested Interests. Another apt case of normative

[29] incongruence and of conflicting vested interests could be that of the institutionalization of new professions and their interest in changing certain mechanisms of social functioning. For example, modern penal systems seek to protect society from dangerous criminals who disrupt order and property ; criminologists and social psychiatrists seek to change penal systems and transform them into therapeutic communities where individualized rehabilitation may be done. Here, scientific and humanistic values are in a state of creative tension with the law and order ones, and different groups have vested interests that often clash. It seems obvious to point out that the criminological profession, if if is to develop as a scientific profession, must be able to demonstrate that it is more than a sophisticated law and order enforcement agency.

The third point concerns the institutionalization of change in modern societies. Recently, Parsons has argued that modern societies are "substantially more flexible and open to change, even structurally fundamental change" :

> "The other reflection is that modern societies, far from being primarily characterized by the repressive rigidities so often attributed to them..., are in fact substantially more flexible and open to change, even structurally fundamental change, than other types have been." (Parsons, in H. Turk, R.L. Simpson, 1971 : 396)

If one agrees with this appraisal of modern societies' capacity to breed change, does he not also accept the idea that, in such societies, change has been institutionalized, at least partly or in important sectors, and that thus, vested interests in favor of change have developed to some extent ? If we assume that modern societies place a high premium on development and change, it follows that, within such a type of social system, [30] certain groups have come to have vested interests in the development of the society they inhabit. Thus, vested interests can favor change. Although the concept of vested interests is theoretically pertinent to Parsons' theory of institutionalization of roles, this theory can be used, within the context of modern societies, to explain the existence of vested interests which favor change. Our discussion of vested interests thus leads us to the second question : what are the sources of factors engendering change ? Parsons is very clear on this issue. Indeed, he writes :

"The next main consideration is that on general grounds we are able to say there are no one or two inherently primary sources of impetus to change in social systems. This is true both in general and with reference to particular types of social systems." (Parsons, 1951 : 493)

"But the view that there is no simple intrinsic priority in the factors of the initiation of change is inherent in the conception of the social system we have advanced here. The central methodological principle of our theory is that of the interdependence of a plurality of variables... We, therefore, put forward what we may call the conception of the plurality of possible origins of change with the understanding that change may originate in any part of the social system described in structural terms or in terms of variables, and that restrictions of the generality of this statement may be introduced only as the outcome of empirical demonstration that relations of interdependence as such are such that certain parts cannot be independent sources of the impetus of change." (Parsons, 1951 : 493-494)

In other words, past theory construction in this area "begs the question of the empirical interdependencies which have yet to be demonstrated" (1951 : 494). Since our methodological apparatus is not as yet sufficiently developed so that we may be able to weigh the different variables involved in a process of change, the best strategy, in the present [31] State of knowledge, is to systematically use the principle of the interdependence of a plurality of variables and study change processes in a fashion that seeks more to uncover the complex interplay of change-inducing variables than to prove the overriding power of one and only one variable. Parsons mentions some of the variables that may be looked at as sources of change : cultural configurations (development of science or religious beliefs), variations in the ecological and social environment of the social system and strains within the system. For Parsons, strain at the unit level is defined as "disturbance of the expectation system which is an essential part of this integration" (i.e. the integration of the need-dispositions of the relevant actors with a set of cultural patterns) (1951 : 491).

If strains set up re-equilibrating processes, they may also increase and lead to a structural reorganization of the system :

"Another very important possibility lies in the progressive increase of strains in one strategic area of the social structure which are finally resolved

by a structural reorganization of the system. The conception of strain deve-
loped in this study is such that strain in not itself a "prime-mover", it is a
mode of the impingement of other factors on an interaction system. But a
structured strain may well be the point at which the balance between forces
tending toward reequilibration of the previous structure and toward transi-
tion to a new structure may be most evident." (Parsons, 1951 : 493)

Strains, thus, may lead to change ; they are, however, in The So cial
System book, much more looked at as the inevitable and inherent con-
sequence of the introduction of a change that may promote further
change throughout the system or block its dissemination, or even back-
lash on the original source of change strongly enough to erase its gains.

[32]

"Because of the phenomenon of vested interests, as we have called it,
we may assume that the introduction of the change in the relevant part of
the system imposes strains on the actors in those other parts on which the
change impinges. The reactions to these strains constitute the tendencies to
reequilibration of the system, that is, to the elimination of the change and
the restauration of the state of the system before its introduction. But these
forces may be coped with so that the changes become consolidated and per-
haps extended. But unless the system is in the relevant respects exceedingly
loosely integrated, this consolidation will mean that other parts of the sys-
tem than the original area of change have also been changed, so that even-
tually what is reached is a new state of the system as a whole. It may also,
of course, mean that the strains are only partially coped with so that chronic
states of tension come to be institutionalized and more or less stabilized."
(Parsons, 1951 : 496)

The last sentence is interesting because it opens up the possibility
that social systems, because of built-in (?) inefficiency and ineffective-
ness of boundary-maintaining or equilibritating mechanisms, may be
moved to or forced to institutionalize chronic states of tensions. The
Cold War may be seen as an instance of the institutionalization of such
a chronic state of tension : it is a pattern of action which was felt to be
desirable and desired. Desirable because there was, within the interna-
tional societal system, value-pressures that led to intra-system tension.
Desired, because units of the international system came to see that it
was in their interest to push in the direction of implementation of their

unit's value- patterns. Thus, a chronic state of intra-system tension became institutionalized and remained so until it ceased to function paradoxically, to stabilize internally the system units in question. Parsons is quite blunt on this, at least for Russia :

> "Letting things settle down in either of these respects might become highly dangerous to the [33] stability of the regime simply because emergency does produce a kind of integration, and probably a state of continuing emergency is less threatening than its relaxation would be." (Parsons, 1951 : 532)

Other instances of the institutionalization of chronic states of tension within the social system may be found in Parsons. His treatment of the relationship between the family (preference of parents to give a particularistic treatment to their own children) and the school system (which is legitimized by the universalizing equality of opportunity principle) is another instance of a chronic state of tension characterizing modern social systems. Also, his presentation of the modern social system's integrative solutions to the equality-inequality and freedom-constraint problem is evident of the institutionalization of creative tensions between contradictory patterns of normative culture (Parsons, 1970 : 13-72).

Thus, Parsons considers, in The Social System, strains to be "disturbances of the expectation system". Though he defines strains at the unit level, he also hints at the possibility of institutionalized chronic states of tension at other levels of analysis and uses the Cold War as an example. Further developments based on the pattern-variable schema and the functional imperatives, we have seen, follow this path in a stimulating fashion and lead to the proposition that at least modern social systems, are in a chronic state of tension because they have institutionalized different and somewhat incompatible patterns of action. We shall later on demonstrate that this follows directly from the theory and concepts of differentiation and specification.

While social systems may come to have built-in strains because they have institutionalized contradictory patterns of orientation, they [34] may also experience strains because of resource scarcity. Indeed, the units of a particular system may compete with one another for scarce

resources as well as with other systems. Thus, scarce resources and the corresponding competition may and often does strain an interaction system in itself and in its interaction with other systems or structures. It can be hypothesized that the greater the differentiation within a social system, the greater the possibility of competition for scarce resources and strain within that system.

The study of strains is an important ingredient of the theory of social change : so is the determination of the direction of change. On this problem. Parsons reiterates the familiar Weberian thesis of rationalization. In his introduction to Max Weber's The Sociology of Religion, Parsons developed the idea that "rationalization comprises first the intellectual clarification, specification, and systematization of ideas... second, the normative control or sanction. This is so because the teleological reference of the ideas and questions implies that human actions are goal-oriented, in means-ends terms. This in turn implies that human actions should be subject to a fundamental hierarchy of control, and that the higher levels of this hierarchy should lie on the cultural plain. Therefore, all human societies embody references to a normative cultural order which places teleological demands upon them... third, rationalization comprises a conception of motivational commitment" (1967 : 48). In other words, rationalization has cognitive, normative as well as motivational components. To use cybernetic terminology, it is a process through which higher levels of information in the sense of more rationalized and systematized culture are seen as regulating the social and personality systems.

Parsons insists that "when we speak of such a directional trend [35] of change in social systems, we are not directly stating an empirical generalization" (1956 : 501] and even states that the assumption of rational ization as the inherent factor of the general directionality of change "not only says nothing directly about the empirical process, but it in no way says that the trend may not under certain circumstances be reversed" (1951 : 501).

The postulation of rationalization is analogous to that of the optimization of gratification for the personality system. Personalities do not always succeed in optimizing gratification, but, for Parsons, it does not make sense — and clears away all possibility of understanding personality processes — to assume that they do not seek gratification. The same argument holds for socio-cultural systems. Indeed...

"Some such logical construct as this seems to be essential to a conceptual scheme which points toward the development of a theoretical system. Process, as conceived in such a system, cannot be simply a random change from one state of the system to another. It must, through time, have direction, and what we are attempting to do is to say something about that direction. The fact that we have had to look on the cultural level and not in the narrower sense the motivational level for that direction for the social system is a fact of the first importance. That personalities are above all oriented to the optimization of gratification as their fundamental direction principle, while social systems are oriented to cultural change, is an inference from, and in a way of stating, the mutual indedence of the two classes of system. It is a further validation of the importance of this symmetrical asymmetry of the pattern-variable scheme on which we have laid much stress from time to time. The difference goes to the deepest roots of the theory of action." (Parsons, 1951 : 502-503)

There are many implications or specifications that Parsons has derived in subsequent work from this conception of the Inherent directionality [36] of action in general and change in particular. One of them is his evolutionary theory with its dual emphasis on cultural development and continuity in change, for evolutionary development is conceived as involving major cultural breakthroughs, that is the reaching of higher levels of rationalization. Another implication or specification is the Parsonian usage of cybernetic theory and the information — energy dichotomy. These specifications in turn have rendered Parsons vulnerable to the contention that his theory has a strong culture or value-emanationist bias.

We shall postpone our discussion of this contention because it implies a full understanding of both Parsons' evolutionary schema and his utilization of cybernetic theory. Suffice It to say that, in The Social System, the seeds of these developments are identifiable in the postulation of the process of rationalization.

Our discussion of the chapter on social change to be found in The Social System has permitted us to spell out Parsons' answers to the three basic questions to which any theory of change must address itself. These are, it may be recalled : what is change ? what are the factors or sources of change ? what is the direction or outcome of change ? The first question Parsons answered by distinguishing processes that

maintain the boundaries of a system and processes that are alterations of institutionalized patterns of action, this distinction being parallel to that of change in and change of a system. It led Parsons to discuss the vested interest issue : as we have seen, there is nothing in Parsonian theory which limits vested interests to a status quo maintaining function. The second question Parsons answered essentially by stating that there was always a plurality of factors leading or facilitating change : he specifically [37] mentioned cultural configurations or the content of values and norms as well as strain that he defined as "disturbance of the expectation system". Parsons' discussion of institutionalized chronic states of tension is indicative of inherent or built-in strains. Furthermore, we have seen that strains are not only an important source of change, along with other factors, like cultural configurations, but that change breeds strains : Parsons' discussion of technological advance points to the basic fact of uneven change as well as to the methodological necessity — inherent in the systemic approach — to systematically map out change repercussions in all relevant system directions and corners. Finally, we have seen that the concept of rationalization, borrowed from Weber, captures the Parsonian answer to the third question : what is the direction of change ? We have seen that Parsons insists on not presenting this as an empirical generalization, but more as a theoritical device or standard necessary for the judging of particular instances of change. This seems to be the essential ingredients of the Parsonian conceptualization of change, as put forward in The Social System. Let us now focus our attention on subsequent developments that may be seen as specifications, or theorizations following The Social System treatment of social change.

In chapter five ("The Problems of Growth and Institutional Change in the Economy") of Economy and Society written in collaboration with Neil J. Smelser and first published in 1956, Parsons, building on the four function paradigm of systems in general and economic systems in particular, goes beyond his Social System treatment of structural change by : 1- further specifying analytically the causes of change ; 2- introducing the concept of structural differentiation and systematizing the process of structural differentiation in terms of a sequential model Involving seven [38] steps ; 3- reconceptualizing rationalization as "a certain pressure to actualize the value system whish is institutionalized in the system" (Parsons, Smelser, 1956 : 292).

Whereas in The Social System, Parsons gave considerable importance to strains as a source of change, in Economy and Society, Parsons and Smelser talk about a combination of input deficits at the goal-attainment boundary of a system and of the availability of possible facilities at the adaptive boundary of that system as the major impetus or force leading to structural change. Of course, this conceptualization does not contradict the previously discussed treatment of strains : these are, in a sense, manifestations or symptoms of goal-attainment deficits.

This model of the sources of structural change is presented as analogous to the model of learning processes in the individual. Parsons and Smelser write :

> "Though its immediate relevance may seem questionable to the economist, the best authenticated cases of the importance of this combination lie in the analysis of learning processes in the individual. He must be motivated by depriving him of a customary gratification if he continues to act in the old ways, and he must be presented with an opportunity, i.e. realistic facilities, which can be adapted to new ways of behaving. If there is no goal-attainment deficit there is no motivation to change ; if there is no relative facilities, improvement or prospect of it, there is no possibility of doing anything new." (Parsons, Smelser, 1956 : 257-258)

Thus, the social system or sub-systems within it are seen as learning systems and structural change as a process by which the system attains higher levels of functioning or increases its goal-attainment capacity.

[39]

If analytically the combination of input deficits and the availability of facilities is the major impetus to change, empirically this combination may take many varied forms. Each case must thus be carefully empirically scrutinized so that the analyst may identify the historical specifics of the input deficits. Parsons and Smelser, in sum, state a law of system change while distinguishing it from the empirical forms it may take according to the particular system to which it may be applied. Parsons and Smelser choose to give greater importance to the mapping of repercussions of change than to the explanation of its genesis. Very much like In chapter 11 of The Social System, the problem of the genesis of change is solved by the multi factorial argument :

> "There is no one source of the process of institutional change. Throughout this book we have emphasized the relevance of a plurality of vari- ables and factors at every level. Forces inducing change may act on any one of the factors in a system ; the analytical problem is to trace the system-wide repercussions of the change initiated at any given point." (Parsons, Smelser, 1956 : 255)

Parsons and Smelser thus restate their refusal of unicausal theories of social change, while focusing their skills and abilities more in the direction of the problems of the institutionalization of change rather than those of its genesis or initiation in a strict sense.

If the impetus of structural change at the social system level is seen as analogous to the sources of learning processes at the personality system level, the same isomorphism applies to both that type of structural change called structural differentiation and its sequence. Indeed, structural differentiation is defined as the process "whereby one unit or organization differentiates into two which differ from each other in structure and in function for the system, but which together are in [40] certain respects, functionally equivalent to the earlier less differentiated unit" (1956 : 255-256). Taking out the specific economic content and generalizing it, the sequence of structural differentiation can be schematized as follows :   "1- combination of dissatisfaction with the achievements of the system or its relevant sectors and a sense of opportunity in terms of the potential availability of adequate resources to reach a higher level of goal-attainment. 2- symptoms of disturbance in the form of "unjustified" negative emotional reactions and "unrealistic" aspirations on the part of various elements in the population appear. 3- a process of covert handling of these tensions and of mobilizing motivational resources for new attempts to realize the implications of the existing value-patterns takes place. 4- supportive tolerance of the resulting proliferation of new ideas, without imposing specific responsibility for their implementation and for taking the consequences, is found in important quarters. 5- positive attempts are made to reach specification of the new ideas which will become the objects of commitments. 6- responsible implementation of innovations is carried out by persons or collectivities either rewarded or punished. 7- the gains resulting from the innovations are consolidated and incorporated into

the routine functions of the system. In this final phase the new way of doing things becomes institutionalized as part of the structure of the system" (1956 : 270-271).

Neil J. Smelser, in his Social Change in the Industrial Revolution (1959), has used this seven-step model to analyse the differentiation of kinship and occupational roles and collectivities in eighteenth and nineteenth century England. This model, it seems to us, rests on two fundamental propositions : a) when a system of action experiences severe goal-attainment deficits, for structural differentiation to happen, the dissatisfactions [41] with the undifferentiated system have to become generalized ; a sort of escalation tends to occur ; lower social control mechanisms must break down and be overcome if dissatisfactions are to reach the higher levels of specificity of the following four components of action : facilities, organization and mobilization of motivation, norms and values ; b) the process of structural differentiation, once the escalation or generalization of dissatisfactions has occurred, involves the redefinition or the re-specification of the structural components of action previously mentioned. Values are treated as, in a sense, relatively stable for most purposes of analysis, though they are affected by structural differentiation : they are extended or generalized. The different steps in the model correspond to different levels of redefinition or re-specification or the structural components of action.

It is because the seven-step model incorporates or rests upon these two propositions, that we feel it must be seen as something more than a relatively simple device for ordering complex historical data, grounded in the idea of system problem-solving and systemic learning. Care must however be used in working with it. Indeed, the danger seems to point in the direction of an over-voluntaristic bias — the sequential model does look like the scholastic definition of a voluntary act —, in that the system is seen, when disturbed by goal-attainment deficits, as rationally and purposively seeking or hunting for a solution that will increase its functioning. It is very problematic as to whether one can call macro-system phenomenon voluntaristic. The student of differentiation must thus be careful and avoid an over-voluntariStic bias.

The final Important point to be made with regard to the Economy and Society discussion of structural change concerns the process of [42] rationalization. It will be recalled that in The Social System, Parsons

had acknowledged that the trend toward rationalization constituted, within the action frame of reference, the main direction toward which were postulated social systems to move. In <u>Economy and Society</u>, Parsons and Smelser do not abandon this postulate : they associate it with processes of structural differentiation. Indeed rationalization is now conceptualized as ...

> "The tendency of social systems to develop progressively higher levels of structural differentiation under the pressure of adaptive exigencies. Adaptive exigencies are not, it will be remembered, given only in the external situation, but involve the relation between the system and the situation. One aspect of this adaptive relation in every social system is a certain pressure to actualize the value system which is institutionalized in the system." (Parsons, Smelser, 1956 : 292)

This link between rationalization and structural differentiation must be seen as basic to Parsons' neo-evolutionary schema to be discussed further below. The notion of enhanced adaptive capacity that Parsons put forward later on in his intellectual carreer and borrowed from biological theory is implied here. Furthermore, the concept of value-pressure implies that social systems are far from being conceptualized as static and only undergoing change when pressed from the outside. Value-pressure implies that there exists within social systems, an <u>inherent</u> tendency toward change, whatever may be the importance of change in the external situation.

This discussion about rationalization and value-pressure leads us to try to clarify an important point concerning exogenous and endogenous sources of social system change. Institutionalized values are an endogenous source of social system change. They do not however exhaust all of [43] a cultural system's informational capacity. And the cultural system, like the personality and behavioral systems, is outside the social system in Parsonian theory. Thus, what for most sociologists are internal "social variables", become in Parsonian theory, external or exogenous. Also, as Parsons recently acknowledged, the distinction between endogenous arid exogenous variables or sources of change is sometimes empirically difficult to sustain because systems interpenetrate to some extent :

"of course, change may be generated in <u>any</u> part of a system or of its environment. I merely warn about the complexity of defining the boundaries of a social or other action system, with reference especially to the relation of this problem to that of the abstractness of scientific theory. A "society", in the older common-sense meaning, is not a social system in any technically sociological sense, at least not for me. Behavioral organisms, individual personalities, and cultural systems are also part of the <u>concrete</u> entity we call a society in commonsense terms. Of course these interpenetrate with the social system, and it is these zones of interpenetration which pose the more difficult problems of distinguishing endogenous from exogenous factors." (Parsons, in H.Turk. R.L. Simpson, 1971 : 386)

We may sum up our discussion of the Parsons-Smelser effort at conceptualizing structural change in <u>Economy and Society</u> by saying that they have tried to conceptualize change as a positive process of learning : its sources lie in a combination of deprivation and opportunity for change ; structural differentiation is a process by which a disturbed and tensionful system comes not only to reduce its level of tension but to reach a higher level of functioning, that is a positive solution to its goal-attainment problems, positive solutions of which the systemic growth implications are captured by the Weberian concept of rationalization. Furthermore, by putting forward the concept of structural differentiation as the [44] major type of structural change, the authors give the tone and clear the way for much of the subsequent Parsonian theorizing about social change. Indeed, the concept of differentiation is the concept upon which much of Parsons' work rests. Further developments may be seen as seeking to derive systematically the systemic implications of the concept of structural differentiation.

In his "Outline of the Social System" published in <u>Theories of Society</u> (1961a) but written in 1958, Parsons restates many of the points made in <u>The Social System</u>, but in a more systematic and analytic fashion. Building on further conceptualization of the morphological bases of social systems and their equilibration mechanisms, he is able to provide further elements for the understanding of structural change.

These elements can be regrouped, it seems to us, under four headings :

1. The importance of distinguishing different levels of analysis and of ascertaining the contribution of structural change at one level to the equilibration process in higher levels. This is related to the conception of the cybernetic hierarchy of control of structural components of social systems as well as to the distinction between "change in" and "change of" the system.

2. The conception of strains as imbalance in the input-output interchange between various units of the system which permit us to better circumscribe strains.

3. The propositions concerning the impact of change which specify the systemic parameters of a disturbance and the system's response to it.

4. The discussion about structural differentiation and value-change [45] which to some extent goes heyond the Economy and Society treatment.

On the first point. Parsons states that "structural change in the sub-systems is an inevitable part of equilibrating process in larger systems" (1961a : 71). For example, structural change at the role-level will eventually lead to change in the psychological motivation of the individual while being constitutive of equilibrating processes in the higher levels of collectivity, norms and system values. Conversely,

> "At the most general level, it is change in the paramount value system. From this level through the series of differentiation, segmentation and specification, it involves changes in the normative culture of sub-systems, of progressively lower order, that are increasingly specific with reference to function in the larger system and to situation. Through specification we arrive eventually at the role level and, with this, at the psychological motivation of the individual. It is my thesis that any major disturbance will occasion widespread disturbances in individual's motivation at the role level and under the requisite conditions will lead to structural change at least there. But it does not follow either from the presence of widespread symptoms of disturbance, or from important structural changes in such motivational patterning, that the structure of the system at all levels - especially in the paramount value system - has changed." (Parsons, 1961a : 73-74)

The requisite conditions that Parsons mentions in this citation refer to his conception of a boundary as a kind of watershed. Structural change from the most general level down to the most specific level will happen only if the control mechanisms are rendered ineffective at all levels. And it is easier — though not automatic — to neutralize the lower ones when the higher ones are out of the way than the reverse. Note that this statement may be attacked for its strong value-emanationist position. We may alleviate this by simply arguing that the conceptualization of [46] different levels of analysis — value, norm, collectivity and role — implies that each level has a margin of independence and autonomy —the lower levels are not the simple and direct "puppets" of the higher ones which should not be viewed as stringent programs for the lower ones — and that each has its own control mechanism. It is thus not automatic — though it is empirically likely — that a value change will affect all the lower levels. Parsons' discussion, in The Social System, of the "Adaptive Transformation of a Revolutionary Movement" is pertinent here. After noting the "need for adaptive structures in the light of fundamental functional requirements of the social system, and the reemergence of conformity needs associated with the old society as such" (1951 : 531), Parsons concludes that "no revolutionary movement can reconstruct society according to the values formulated In its ideology without restriction" (1951 : 529). This is so because :

> "there is à sense in which gaining ascendancy over a society has the effect of "turning the tables" on the revolutionary movement. The process of its consolidation as a regime is indeed in a sense the obverse of its genesis as a movement ; it is a process of re-equilibration of the society ; very likely to a state greatly different from what it would have been had the movement not arisen, but not so greatly as literal interpretation of the movement's ideology would suggest." (Parsons, 1951 : 529)

Parsons mentions variables which are crucial here : the content of the revolutionary ideology, the degree of its utopianism, the ambivalent motivational structure of revolutionaries, conflict with the outside world, the need to integrate — often through education and progaganda — the sectors of the population which did not participate in the revolutionay transformation, the emergence of new leaders specialized in re-

equilibrating the transformed society and the use of coercion. These variables, internal [47] and external, while not constituting a thorough and systemactic sociology of revolutionary transformations, are presented by Parsons and used to indicate that a value-oriented movement cannot, once it gains power, reconstruct society without making "concessions" or "adaptations". It is in this sense that we feel that Parsons' discussion of the "Adaptive Transformation of a Revolutionary Movement" alleviates the value-emanationist position that may be seen as inherent in Parsons' discussion of the different levels of analysis in relation to the study of structural change.

The preceding discussion may be summarized by a methlogical dictum valuable for all students of social change : be aware of the level of analysis you are working at ; structural change at one level may be seen as part of an equilibrating process at the higher level and structural change at the highest level, in order to move down or cover the whole system, must cope with the control mechanism of all system levels.

This leads us directly to the revised conception of strains as a source of change. Two things have, to be said from the outset : as previously mentioned, what Parsons considers exogenous sources of socio-structural change are, for most sociologists, endogenous sources. Indeed, most sociologists would consider cultural or personality factors as endogenous sources of change, and would limit the exogenous category to the physical and social environment of a particular social system. The second point is that Parsons now emphasized the relational aspect of strain ; whereas in The Social System, strains were "a disturbance of the expectation system" and "a mode of impingement of other factors on an interaction system", they are now seen as "a tendency to disequilibrium in the input-output balance between two or more units in the system" (1961 : 71). This [48] is consistent with the goal-attainment deficit concept put forward in Economy and Society. Parsons writes that :

> "Strain here refers to a condition in the relation between two or more structured units (i.e. subsystems of the system) that constitutes a tendency or pressure toward changing that relation to one incompatible with the equilibrium of the relevant part of the system." (Parsons, 1961a : 71)

Though this conceptualization of strain is grounded in the dynamics of social equilibrium, it fails to deal completely with the possibility of Internal sources of change ; systems experience strain in relating to other systems ; Parsons in a way restates the unsatisfactory position of The Social System : "we were emphasizing relation, and a relation's internal source of instability may derive from external tendencies to change" (1961 : 71). Of course, this is a cautious statement, but there is no proposition that pushes in the other direction — i.e. in the direction of internal sources of instability that do not derive from external tendencies to change —. Parsons' strategy to go around this difficulty seems to stress the relevance of the different levels of analysis : if the social system is boxed in between the cultural system, the personality system, the behavioural system, etc..., internally, it is differentiated and made up of subsystems (economy, polity, societal community, fiduciary subsystem) ; these, in turn, may be broken down into sub-subsystems. Thus, a dynamic analysis always, by definition, implies the analysis of relationships between systems, subsystems or sub-subsystems and entails that the study of Internal Instability at one level must be done by switching to the next lower level of analysis.

While systems experience strain in relating to other systems and while change thus involves a transformation in or of the relation between [49] systems, the impact of such a change must be assessed. On this question. Parsons argues that "impact will vary as a function of at least five ranges of variation in the nature of the impinging process" (1961a : 73). These are : 1- the magnitude of the disturbance, i.e. the magnitude of change from the previous relational state ; 2- the proportion of units in the system at the relevant levels that are affected ; 3- the strategic character of the unit's functional contribution to the system ; 4- the incidence of the disturbance on analytically distinguishable components of the system's structure ; 5- the degree of resistance or the level of effectiveness of the mechanism of control.

These propositions, if read as a general methodological statement, imply that one must not limit oneself to assessing the "absolute" magnitude of a disturbance, but must also "circumscribe" the disturbance in terms of units and structural components affected as well as take into account the system's overall capacity to cope with the disturbance. In a fashion very consistent with the methodology proposed in The Social System and in Economy and Society, Parsons stresses that the systemic

approach implies that when studying an instance of change, one must trace its repercussions or impacts in a non-random fashion mainly by using structural functional morphological categories and the hierarchy of control. He also points to the fact that, in a sense, the impact of change is "relative" to the system's capacity to deal with change. One may be tempted to argue that this capacity can only be determined post-factum, thus considerably reducing the predictive power of the propositions. We do not think that this need be so : though obviously, past systemic dealings with disturbances may help in assessing the system's present and future capacity, the assessment of such [50] variables as presence and distribution of alienation, internal group divisions or competition, ambiguity or contradiction among institutionalized patterns, scarcity of resources, may help predict if a particular disturbance will be "blown up" to important proportions — in a sense, this comes close to stating the Marxist proposition that disturbances, strains or tensions may be used, provoked or optimized in the interest of particular groups or in the interest of institutionalization of variant values — or will be effectively "managed".

Parsons also argues that it is not enough that there be strains or disturbances, or that control mechanisms may be rendered ineffective. The institutionalization of structural change needs also the activation of three other ingredients : a constructive orientation to alienation from the patterns, the production or "importation" of a model of the pattern to be newly institutionalized, and a transitional implementative strategy that consistently and positively sanctions conformity with the new model so that vested interests in the new pattern may develop.

Parsons goes on to use these elements for the study of structural differentiation. Much more than in Economy and Society, he tackles the problem of the relative distinction between structural differentiation and value change. Parsons uses the familiar case of differentiation of occupational roles from kinship roles as an example of structural differentiation. Generalizing what he has to say about that particular process, one may systematize his propositions in the following manner :

1. in order that there be change, some order of relative deprivation must become attached to following the old way. The impingement of

the deprivation must be on the role-Incumbent as well as the collectivity.

[51]

2. symptoms of disturbance must follow, but "in order to prevent the overwhelming consolidation of the negative components of the reactions to disturbance, there must be an adequate range of institutionalized permissiveness and support, in addition to the imposition of deprivations for following the old pattern" (1961 a : 79). In other words and to caricature a bit, it is a good tactic to be not too radical, and to let the old pattern survive while positively sanctioning the new one. Of course, this is a good tactic because resistance is high and that the system is "forced" to be permissive and allow some of its units to remain attached to the old pattern. As we shall see in the second part of this thesis, the differentiation of educational and religious roles and collectivities in the Province of Quebec did not entail the total disappearance of private denominational schools, but only that they become "legitimate competitors of public schools" or "valid alternatives to public schools", while relinquishing their claim of being the only good schools.

3. a positive model for the new patterning must be generated and demonstrated. "One crucial problem concerns the ways in which this new model can be made legitimate in terms of the relevant values" (1961a : 77). When the model of the new pattern is not endogenously produced and thus when it cannot be easily legitimized by "specification of an already firmly institutionalized value system" (1961a : 77), as the Japanese and Russian industrialization indicate, the requisite value-commitments must be generated by political action or indoctrination. The activation of nationalism is underdeveloped countries can be seen as a factor conducive to the acceptance of the functional subsystem values that legitimize the new economic patterns while guaranteeing the integrity of the overall value system.

In these cases, that is when the change model is "foreign" or "imported", [52] "the distinction between the process of structural differentiation and that involving the value system of a society is relative" (1961a ;77).

These are important theoretical developments that go beyond the discussion in Economy and Society and that foreshadow the full achievement of structural differentiation to be found in "Some

Considerations on the Theory of Social Change", written in 1960 but published in 1961.

We may sum up our discussion of Parsons' treatment of structural change in "An Outline of the Social System", by saying that, though consistent with the groundwork laid in The Social System, he further refines his system model by showing the usefulness of distinguishing different levels of analysis, by defining strain as a tendency to disequilibrium or as imbalance in the input-output interchange between various units of the system, proposing systemic parameters for the study of the impact of change, and by arguing that one of the crucial problems of structural differentiation lies in the need of legitimation for the differentiated units. The stress placed on the need for legitimation of the new patterns foreshadows the discussion of the four level normative reorganization. The discussion of industrialization in underdeveloped countries and in such countries as Russia and Japan are worth noting. It comes close, it seems to us, to much of the Marxian theories of colonialism and imperialism. It indicates that structural functional analysis can fruitfully tackle the major problems of this century while remaining quite "objective". Parsons, taking the point of view of an underdeveloped society affected by foreign or imported industrialization, writes :

"If we take economic development, in the sense of industrialization, as the focal content of the process, the two primary foci of the impact of [53] inputs are political and cultural, in the value sense ; they are not, in the usual analytical sense, economic. Both focus primarily on the relations of underdeveloped societies to economically advanced societies." (Parsons, 1961a : 74)

In a footnote, he adds :

"Naturally, in the total picture, specifically economic factors of production are also necessary inputs, from other societies or from other "systems" operating in the territory of the society, like motivation, capital, etc. But because of the relation to the hierarchical structure of social systems, the inputs of political urgency and functional value commitments are far more critical in what Rostow calls the take-off phenomenon than is the availability of adequate factors of production in the strictly economic sense." (Parsons, 1961a : 74)

Thus, though Parsons acknowledges the importance of economic factors, he feels It is necessary to emphasize the political and cultural inputs necessary for the industrialization of underdeveloped societies :

> "The important point analytically is that, without at least two different orders of input beyond normal levels, impetus for major change is unlikely to occur. One order is the <u>real</u> political inferiority, symbolized as "colonial dependency", of the disturbed society. The other is the existence, in the social environment, of a model of instrumentally appropriate reorganization, whose partial functional values can be adopted, initially allegedly without disturbing the highest-level values of the system." (Parsons, 1961a : 74)

Furthermore, since the problems of underdevelopment are located in the L-G axis of social systems, they can be seen as involving major threats to the mechanical solidarity of the society. These threats may be coped with, says Parsons, by dissemination of the view that economic development is instrumental to political power and by the "tendency to maintain the highest level values while permitting major changes in the [54] next level of value specification, i.e. that of the primary functional subsystem" (1961a : 74). Whatever may be the reader's value position with regard to socialism, we think that it is a valid hypothesis to view it, within the context of underdevelopment, as an ideological defense and a way of maintaining a threatened mechanical solidarity. Its functionality does not, it seems to us, invalidate or destroy the humanistic value we may see in it.

Parsons' passing remarks on Japan and Russia hint in the same direction : the more foreign the model of economic development, the more problematic the acceptance of the necessary value commitments and the more critical the role of political and ideological agencies fostering the acceptance of these values while maintaining the integrity of the paramount value system. It can thus be contended that differentiation reaches values.

The article "Some Considerations on the Theory of Social Change" is entirely oriented towards the problem of structural differentiation. Since this type of change is to be studied in this thesis and since the

Rural Sociology article is a critical theoretical development In this regard, we shall dwell at length on what Parsons has to propose in it.

As a start, let us note that structural differentiation is here presented In two different ways : first, it is said to be analogous to the process of growth in the organism which implies that the analyst must pay attention not only to structural differentiation per se but also to "the concomitant development of patterns and mechanisms which integrate the differentiated parts" and which also implies that the problem of structural differentiation runs deep in Spencerian and Durkheimian [55] country ; second, it is presented as "a process of emancipation from ascriptive ties", "a process of gaining freedom from certain restraints while fitting into a normative order which can subject the now independent units to a type of normative control compatible with the functional imperatives of the larger system of which they are a part" (1961b : 220).

These two characterizations not only give the tone to the whole article but also to the subsequent incorporation of structural differentiation within the broad evolutionary schema. They also are associated with the treatment found in The Social System of the inherent directionality of change and of rationalization. Indeed structural differentiation, in order to be successfully institutionalized, involves normative reorganization or development at different levels, from the lower (facilities) to the higher (values) levels : it is thus a process of rationalization, that is, a process through which higher 1evels of information in the sense of a more rationalized and developed culture are seen as regulating the social and personality systems.

As in previous writings, Parsons carefully and insistently grounds his analysis of change in the distinction between structure and process and between stability and change. The distinction between the two pairs of concepts is now perceived to be one of level of system reference :

> "The structure of a system and of its environment must be distinguished from process within and in interchange between the system and its environment. But processes which maintain the stability of a system, internally through both structure and process, and in interchange with its environment, i.e. state of its equilibrium, must be distinguished from processes by which this balance between structure and more elementary process is altered in such a way as to lead to a new and different state of the system, [56] a state which must be described in terms of an alteration of its previous structure.

> To be sure the distinction is relative, but it is an essential and ordered relativity. What I have been saying is that at least two systematically related perspectives on the problem of constancy of variation are essential to any sophisticated level of theoretical analysis." (Parsons, 1961b : 222)

Parsons also insists on the fact that these distinctions do not imply "a predilection in favor of one or the other item in each pair, but in favor of orderly procedure in scientific analysis" (1961b : 222).

Within this conceptual framework, differentiation is analyzed at two levels, the role and the collectivity level, and involves

> "changes in the set of normative patterns governing each of the two units and the relations between them, and finally in the subsystem value institutionalized in these units, if not in the overall value-system of the society, a possibility which is excluded from present considerations by our assumptions." (Parsons, 1961b : 227)

Differentiation thus implies normative reorganization of all subsystems levels, from the unit level to the subsystem value level, but not of the overall system of which the subsystem is a part.

The process of differentiation is described in the following manner :

1. the undifferentiated unit experiences a loss of function ;

2. a new pattern of organization of the dissociated functions is generated ;

3. new ways of taking care of the needs of the original undifferentiated units are substituted to the old ways ;

4. the relationship between the two differentiated units is [57] "organized" : the risks involved in "cutting loose" are "handled" ;

5. a way is found to balance the legitimation of both units at both the collectivity and the role levels so that the inevitable component of conflict of interest is "contained" within a pattern of mutual contribution to higher order system functioning.

Put in more analytical terms, this description of the process of differentiation becomes the cycle of differentiation, i.e. the analytic listing of the basic conditions of successful differentiation : a) the undifferentiated unit or system, for reasons that seem specific to each case, experiences goal-attainment deficits ; b) there also exists an opportunity for change in terms of the potential availability of facilities. Parsons calls this the opportunity factor. With the emergence and activation of relevant leadership, "facilities, previously ascribed to less differentiated units, are freed from this ascription and are made available through suitable adaptive mechanism for the utilization of the higher order new class of units which are emerging" (1961b : 235). As we shall see later on, the above mentioned adaptive mechanisms are critical for the handling of the risks involved and for the regulation of the costs of change ; c) the two new and differentiated classes of units are related to each other in the wider system :

> "This may be called the restructuring of the ways in which the particular unit, collectivity and role, is included in higher order collectivity structures in the society... the essential point is that there must be established a new collectivity structure within which both types of units perform essential functions and in the name of both can draw the kind of support that they need" (Parsons, 1961b : 236) ;

d) the normative standards governing the performance of the new emerging [58] unit must be of a higher order of generality than existed prior to the differentiation. In a sense, the upgrading of the standards of normative control, or their universalization, is functionally required by the lower order process of emancipation from ascription : it protects and guarantees it, obviously, empirically with varying success. Mayhew's (1968 : 105-120) discussion of the residual ascriptive elements to be found in modern and highly differentiated societies, their functionality and their cheapness is important here : it indicates that the upgrading of the standards of normative control, essential for the institutionalization of differentiation, may be met with some resistance. Also, Parsons' discussion of the family firm is indicative of a transitional phase where the normative standards governing the new units are not fully upgraded and where ascription is still present ; e) Parsons, in a manner reminiscent of the old philosophical distinction between matter and

form, distinguishes between value-pattern and value-content and argues that differentiation, in order to be successful, implies that the

"values of the new system, which include both the new and the residual unit, must be different in the content component from that of the original unit, though not, under present assumptions, in the pattern component. The new values must be more extensive in the special sense that they can legitimize the functions of both differentiated units under a single formula, which permits each to do what it does and, equally essential, not to do what the other does." (Parsons, 1961b : 238)

These four conditions of successful differentiation are here presented in order of importance : the adaptive problems associated with the provisions of opportunity come first and must be solved if the collectivity-inclusive, normative upgrading and value-extensive ones are to be adequately handled.

[59]

Four comments may be made. They concern :

1. differentiation and value-change ;
2. the Integrative problems that are associated with differentiation ;
3. the causes of differentiation ;
4. the outcome of differentiation, i.e. enhanced adaptive capacity.

The first comment may be stated as follows : differentiation does imply a value-change of considerable magnitude, even if it is not change of the paramount value system but only of subsystem values. This last qualification does not make the value-change engendered by differentiation less "profound" for the actors living the change. For example, the differentiation of occupational roles and collectivities from kinship institutions has had profound repercussions on our moral-evaluative definitions of such things as the family, feminity and masculinity, work and leisure. Furthermore, when sociologists criticize Parsons for not accounting for value-change, they seem to not understand the Parsons-Smelser schema of the different levels of specifications of

values : it is not because Parsons insists that, at the highest level of generality, values rarely change or change only in the very long run, that, in his theory, they never change. The differentiation schema, we have pointed out, implies value-change at the next level of specification, that of functional subsystem values. Furthermore, his discussion in the "Outline of the Social System", of cases where the change model is not endogenously produced but imported from the outside clearly points to the fact that successful 1nstitutionalizatlon of change implies widespread acceptance of the requisite functional values which In turn may put severe strains on the higher level values. In other words, differentiation, when imported, [60] changes the subsystem values in such a fashion that the paramount value system may be threatened to the point where such ideological defenses as Nationalism and Utopian socialism are activated to counteract entropic tendencies and maintain the value integrity of the system.

The second point is that differentiation, as a process of structural change, is not always successful. The normative reorganization or the integrative problems that are associated with differentiation should not be perceived as an easy systemic feat that is accomplished once and for all. The process may experience setbacks, partial solutions or severe impairments. Differentiation breeds integrative strains and some of them may be more or less adequately handled. Parsons' conceptualization has the merit of pointing out, in a fashion congruent with his structural categories, the various strains that are generated by differentiation and that are associated with the fourfold normative reorganization process. Smelser' seven levels of specificity of the components of action schema is also useful here : it permits one to systematically identify the structural foci of dissatisfactions as well as the structural location of the strains generated by differentiation.

The case of the differentiation between occupational and kinship role and collectivity is illustrative of the difficulty involved in the normative reorganization. Indeed adaptive mechanisms, such as the labor market and the contract of employment, may have difficulty in being institutionalized because they may become perceived as exploitative and alienative. Marx's famous writings on alienative work and labor market-based class conflict constitute the classic statement with regard to the questionable suitability of the adaptive mechanisms that facilitated [61] emancipation from ascription during the first phase of

Western industrialization. Also, the very contemporary problem of the status of women within our modern collectivity structure can and must be understood as an unresolved strain generated by industrialization and focusing on the inclusion problem : in a sense, women have had to pay — as is now becoming widely recognized — a heavy price for the successful differentiation of occupation and kinship. Furthermore, the upgrading of performance and achievement standards in the direction of universalization often has to cope with the functionally positive but residual ascriptive tendencies, as Mayhew's discussion shows. Finally, the recent ideological effervescence that pictures agricultural life as the most suited to a quality of life which has a strong familistic connotation indicates that the process of value-extension may never be totally complete or may have to cope with more or less cyclical Ideological questioning.

There is however more to be said about the model of differentiation and the strains that it produces than, the simple fact that differentiation is a difficult systemic growth process. Two fundamental propositions need to be asserted and insisted upon : *first*, the strains and tensions generated by differentiation are as inherent and intra-systemic as the ones constitutive of the Marxist point of view ; they are different however since differentiation, as a process of social change, is not dialectical ; the strains it produces however are in no way residual or ad hoc phenomena ; the system does not contain them, but produces them ; *second*, these integrative tensions must be coped with if the system is to continue to grow, if further development is to occur ; they are thus, in a sense, behind the crucial evolutionary breakthroughs that Parsons has Identified in his two books on social-cultural evolution. A. Effrat [62] writes :

"This suggests that the crucial evolutionary breakthrough that characterize watersheds between the major evolutionary stages (symbols, written language, universalistic law — to be discussed below) can be seen as responses to and solutions to major integrative problems. These solutions enable significantly more differentiated and expanded systems to be viable and, in a sense, facilitate the birth of new, more complex emergent levels of organization. This point is congruent with Mayhew's presentation of the evolutionary theory in which he emphasized seeing the evolutionary stages as "new levels of consolidation of the relationship between agregrates" and the discussion of the nature of the societies at each stage as focussing on the

> relative integrative and incorporative capacities of various societies and cultures ." (Effrat, in press)

Modern systems theory states that all living systems are not only tension-reducing systems but also basically tension-creating systems. Buckley writes : "We must see some level of tension as characteristic of and vital to such systems though it may manifest itself as now destructive, now constructive" (1967 : 52). It seems to this author that Parsons' model of structural differentiation satisfies this criterion of living systems : differentiation creates tension and opens up vast possibilities of further change, including de-differentiation.

The third point to be made concerns the causes of differentiation. Parsons, in the <u>Rural Sociology</u> article makes specific propositions in this regard : the differentiation between occupational and kinship roles and collectivities seems to have been occasioned by such factors as rapidly increasing population, decreasing availability of new land, technological and market conditions that combined in such a fashion as to render the old patterns unviable. These factors put increasing pressure on the undifferentiated unit and frustrated its goal-attainment performance. [63] The reader might find this causal statement not very original : the point we wish to make is that for Parsons it does not exhaust the phenomenon under study. This is so because the bulk of his analysis, empirically relevant and theoretically well grounded, is oriented toward the systemic learning process that is set into motion once the pressure is sufficiently built-up within the system to break down its internal equilibrium and that seek to account for the fact that differentiation and not further segmentation or sheer disorganization is selected by the system. The "causes" of differentiation are presented as empirical facts while the mileage he makes from then on rests on a carefully built conceptual scheme. The "empirical causes" are that element within the schema that is conceptualized as deficit of input and which has the status of the first element of a value-added model : differentiation is not thus only "caused" or triggered by deficit of input at the goal-attainment boundary, but it is also "caused" (read : facilitated or inhibited) by the provision of opportunity, inclusion, normative upgrading and value extension. One way to get this across is to stress that Parsons wants to account for the <u>institutionalization</u> of differentiation. Within that framework, the "causes" have the status of preliminary and necessary

conditions of the institutionalization of change : they mean that pressure is built up, that equilibrium is broken down but they do not mean that change will follow and more importantly, that enhanced adaptive capacity will be the outcome of it all. Another way of presenting this is to state that the "causes" of structural change are conceptualized in terms of cybernetic theory ; factors of change are cybernetically ordered : the higher-order factors (essentially normative in social systems) must gain control over the relevant conditional factors. These are critical but not sufficient to engender a new state of affairs [64] or to account for the direction of change.

The fourth point we wish to make concerns the following assertion :

> "Here it is possible to state a very important principle, namely that the new kind of unit, eg. collectivity or role, will sub-serve what, from the point of view of the adaptive exigencies of the system of which it is a part, is a higher order function than the unit out of which it differentiated and than does the "residual" unit left by the establishment of the new one." (Parsons, 1961b : 229)

Differentiation thus can lead to enhanced adaptive capacity. This capacity can be characterized in several ways ; Parsons writes :

> "This capacity includes an active concern with mastery, or the ability to change the environment to meet the needs of the system, as well as an ability to survive in the face of its unalterable features. Hence the capacity to cope with broad <u>ranges</u> of environmental factors, through adjustment or active control, or both, is crucial. Finally, a very critical point is the capacity to cope with unstable relations between system and environment, and hence with uncertainty." (Parsons, 1964 : 340)

That differentiation, when it is successful and when integrative problems are solved, increases the adaptive capacity of the system means that the system is more rationalized, better equipped to deal with and control its changing and more or less predictable environment. Enhanced adaptive capacity can also mean that the system can deal effectively with a more unpredictable environment. It finally implies that the higher information system components are richer and more effective in a cybernetic sense and in that sense adaptive capacity comes close to

the spirit of rationalization. This notion of enhanced adaptive capacity leads us directly to Parsons' neo-evolutionism, since it is the main criterion of [65] evolutionary advancement. The question we wish to raise is whether or not enhanced adaptive capacity is an intended or unintended outcome or consequence of differentiation. Given the goal-directed nature of action and the sometime positive response to a system's goal-attainment deficits, enhanced adaptive capacity may be seen as generally intended. It may be also seen as a post-factum discovery : the system under heavy pressure to change, mobilizes its resources and among them, the high information ones. The trial-and-error model may be useful here : many solutions may be tried, while the ones that work out are retained and institutionalized. The biological model of random variation and adaptive selection is implied here and viewed as analogous to the trial-and-error one. Two problems need however to be solved : the first concerns the systemic criteria for selection or recognition of adaptiveness and the second focusses on the justification of adaptiveness per se. *The first* is a formidable one to which we do not wish to address ourselves ; *the second*, we contend, may be solved by the notion of inherent directionality of action in general and change in particular. We have seen that Parsons in <u>The Social System</u>, has argued that it was absolutely necessary to postulate that the personality system was oriented toward the optimization of gratification. Searching for some analogous tendency at the social system level, he considered rationalization to be an inherent factor of the general directionality of social system change. Enhanced adaptive capacity is, we contend, not simply a useful notion borrowed from biological evolutionary theory ; it is also grounded in the postulation of rationalization. We interpret rationalization to mean that social systems are oriented toward cultural change and enhanced adaptive capacity to be the outcome of such process. Increased symbolization or cultural development is in a sense a process of differentiation ; [66] differentiation implies increased autonomy with respect to the environment ; this in turn implies increased adaptive capacity.

Our discussion of differentiation forces us to move in the direction of Parsons' evolutionary theory. Indeed, such notions as enhanced adaptive capacity, rationalization, value-extension or generalization and emancipation from ascription have evolutionary implications. Parsons' article on the "Evolutionary universals" (1964) and his two recent

books — <u>Societies : Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives</u> (1966) and <u>The System of Modern Societies</u> (1971) — are the basic references here. In our discussion of the evolutionary schema, we shall also look at Bellah's (1964) theory of religious evolution, both because Parsons and Bellah's works are related and because the type of change to studied in this thesis makes it imperative that we look at Bellah's theory of religious evolution and by extension, of cultural system evolution.

Parsons neo-evolutionism, like all evolutionism, rests on the definition of a criterion of evolutionary direction and on the construction of a stage schema. On the first point, Parsons writes :

"Our perspective clearly involves evolutionary judgments - for example, that intermediate societies are more advanced than primitive societies, and modern societies are more advanced than intermediate societies —. I have tried to make my basic criterion congruent with that used in biological theory, calling more "advanced" the systems that display greater generalized adaptive capacity." (Parsons, 1966 : 110)

Bellah takes the same position and stresses the increased autonomy associated with enhanced adaptive capacity :

"Evolution at any system level I define as a process of increasing differentiation and complexity [67] which endows the organism, social system or whatever the unit in question may be, with greater capacity to adapt to Its environment so that it is in some sense more autonomous relative to its environment than were its less complex ancestors." (Bellah, 1964 : 358)

Neither Bellah's nor Parsons' stage schema imply that evolution- ary development is unilinear, smoothly continous, or inevitable and irreversible. Nor does the usage of the criterion of enhanced adaptive capacity imply that less adapted systems cannot survive and are thus condemned to disappear. These systems can maintain themselves, to some extent because "they are not, by and large, major threats to the continued existence of the evolutionary higher systems" (Parsons, 1967 : 494). These qualifications help understand the heuristic value of a stage schema : such a schema indeed permits the theorist to "distinguish

between broad levels of advancement without overlooking the considerable variability found in each" (Parsons, 1966 : 26). Stages may thus be regarded, Bellah argues, "as relatively stable crystallizations of roughly the same order of complexity along a number of different dimensions" (Bellah, 1964 : 360). Furthermore, the question of transition from one stage to another as well as that of the specific advancement associated with a particular stage lead to the analysis of the appearance, development and consolidation of what Parsons calls evolutionary universals, i.e. complexes of structures and "associated processes the development of which so increases the long-run adaptive capacity of living systems in a given class that only systems that develop the complex can attain certain higher levels of general adaptive capacity" (1967 : 493). Because evolutionary universals further evolution, they are seen as watersheds and the dividing criteria between the major stages.

It may be argued that Parsons' contribution to evolutionary theory rests [68] on the proposition that the major evolutionary universals "center about critical developments in the code elements of the normative structures" (1966 : 26).

Parsons has developed a threefold schema with two subdivisions in the first two stages. The three stages are labelled primitive, intermediate and modern ; the primitive stage is divided into primitive and advanced primitive, and the intermediate stage into archaic and advanced intermediate. Both to make it more elegant and to avoid giving the impression that contemporary modern societies and especially what Parsons regards as the lead modern society, i.e. the U.S.A., —other Parsonians might be tempted to pick another or more than one lead societies — have fully "realized" modernism, the schema could be extended and involve the subdivision of the modern stage into two sub-stages, the first incorporating the developments analyzed by Parsons in The System of Modern Societies (1971), and the second focusing on things to come. Let us briefly review the content of each stage.

Since Parsons emphasizes the continuity of human evolution with biological evolution, he is forced in a sense to discuss the transition from sub-human to primitive society. Culture, the capacity to symbolize, is here seen as the fundamental differentiating element between sub-human and human society :

> "From his distinctive organic endowment and from his capacity for and ultimate dependence on generalized learning, man derives his unique ability to create and transmit culture. To quote the biologist Alfred Emerson, within a major sphere of man's adaptation, the "gene" has been replaced by the "symbol". Hence, it is not only the genetic constitution of the species that determines the "needs" confronting the environment, but this constitution plus the cultural tradition.

[69]

> A set of "normative expectations" pertaining to man's relation to his environment delineates the ways in which adaptation should be developed and extended. Within the relevant range, cultural innovations, especially definitions of what man's life ought to be, then replace Darwinian variations in genetic constitution." (Parsons 1967 : 494-495)

Man is thus the only cultural animal. From an evolutionary perspective, mankind testifies to a breakthrough to symbolization which in turn implies a radically new mode of adaptation to the environment as well as, from the point of view of theory construction, the conviction that cultural developments are in the long run of decisive importance.

Primitive societies are characterized by a low degree of differentiation at the action system level. All spheres of action are fused together. Religious orientations are dominant. Their fusion with all aspects of primitive life also testifies to the low level of differentiation constitutive of primitiveness. A high degree of normative prescriptiveness as well as a lack of "boundedness", i.e. the uncertain and not clearly delineated socio-cultural boundaries weakly differentiating the primitive societal collectivity from other collectivities, are also important elements of primitiveness. Two developments or evolutionary universal s mark the transition to the advanced primitive stage : social stratification and cultural legitimation. The first, by breaking the equalitarianism of primitive society, facilitates centralization of responsibilities and thus Increases "political" effectiveness. What Parsons calls "explicit cultural legitimation" has to do with the problem of "boundedness" previously mentioned and involves "the emergence of an institutionalized cultural definition of the society of reference, namely a referent of "we"..., which is differentiated, historically or comparatively [70] or both, from other societies, while the merit of we-ness is asserted in a normative context" (1967 : 501). The emergence and institutionalization of a cultural legitimation complex "solves" the problem of boundedness as well

as legitimizes social stratification and some form of political centralization : it also marks the end of the complete fusion between the cultural and the social system. It may be noted that though Parsons feels that "social stratification in its initial development may thus be regarded as one primary condition of releasing the process of social evolution from the obstacles posed by ascription", it does not follow that, though it "remains a major structural feature of subsequent societies and takes a wide variety of forms in their evolution (1967 : 500), it Is forever a positive evolutionary force. Parsons writes :

> "In the transition to full modernity, stratification system becomes a predominantly conservative force in contrast to the opportunities it provides for innovation In the earlier stages." (Parsons, 1967 : 500)

This statement can be interpreted to mean that a particular evolutionary universal, though crucial at the stage it appears and helps define, may, later on in the process of evolutionary development, come to conflict with other more recent, universals, for example, in this case, democratic associationism. It also implies that a universal need not necessarily remain dominant once it has made its evolutionary contribution.

Written language. Its emergence and limited institutionalization are the criteria or watersheds between the advanced primitive stage and the intermediate one. The importance of written language can be easily demonstrated : it considerably increases the differentiation as well as the stability and power of the cultural system. As Rocher notes,

[71]

> "Avec 1'écriture, la culture a pris un caractère plus stable, s'est détachée de la quotidienneté dont elle était auparavant entièrement dépendante. La culture a pu ainsi devenir plus autonome de l'évènement, plus indépendante de la conjoncture, et, par conséquent, s'affirmer comme un système en elle-même. L'écriture a opéré une plus nette différentiation entre la culture et les autres systèmes d'action, ce qui ne peut être, aux yeux de Parsons, qu'un indice de développement." (Rocher, 1972 : 124)

Although written language characterizes intermediate societies, two sub-types of intermediate societies may be distinguished. In the first, made up of archaic societies (Egypt, Babylonia), we find the usage of

written language limited to instrumental concerns (administrative and religious) and to a small group of craftsmen. Craft literacy and cosmological religions are characteristic of archaic societies. Advanced intermediate societies on the other hand are the first societies where we find full male upper-class literacy and a "historic" religion, i.e. "one which has broken through to philosophical levels of generalization and systematization" and which" develops for the first time conceptions of a supernatural order in Durkheim's full sense, one sharply differentiated from any "order of nature" (Parsons, 1966 : 51).

For Parsons, the transition from the intermediate to the modern stage is marked by the development and institutionalization of a certain type of legal system, a general one which may be defined as

> "an integrated system of universalistic norms applicable to the society as a whole rather than to a few functional or segmental sectors, highly generalized in terms of principles and standards, and relatively independent of both the religious agencies that legitimize the normative order of the society and vested interest groups in the operative sector, particularly in government" (Parsons, 1967 : 510).

[72]

Modernity thus involves fundamentally the liberation of law from its previous religious tutelage as well as the greater differentiation of the political and integrative functions.

Generalized universalistic norms are not however the only characteristic of modernity. Indeed modern societies, to warrant the label, need to display also patterns of bureaucratic organization, a money and market complex, and democratic associationism. In The System of Modern Societies, Parsons further spells out the manifestations of modernity, especially with reference to transformations within and of the societal community and the development of the legal, political and social aspects of the citizenship complex. Associational patterns are underlined as well as the contribution of the industrial, democratic and educational revolutions to the present state of modernism.

Parsons' neo-evolutionism is in a sense an extension and refinement of this theory of differentiation. Though in The System of Modern Societies, Parsons considers differentiation as one out of four major types

of evolutionary change the others being adaptive upgrading — "the process by which a wider range of resources is made available to social units" (1971 : 27) — inclusion of "new units, structures, and mechanisms within the normative framework of the societal community" (1971 : 27) and value-generalization, he does recognize that differentiation "has been the most prominent in the foregoing discussion" (1971 : 26). The kinship between this typology of evolutionary processes and the fourfold normative reorganization process involved in a cycle of differentiation, as discussed in the Rural Sociology article, is too obvious to need further development.

If Parsons' neo-evolutionism is couched essentially at the societal [73] level, Bellah's scheme is oriented toward the analysis of religious evolution and at least Implicitly, of cultural system evolution. Because working at that level and with an evolutionary point of view raises the controversial issues of value-judgments and of the assumption of progress, Bell ah is quick to state clearly where he stands. Two citations are important here :

> "What I mean by evolution, then, is nothing metaphysical but the simple empirical generalization that more complex forms develop from less complex ones and that the properties and possibilities of more complex forms differ from those of less complex forms." (Bellah, 1964 : 358)

> "I hope it is clear that there a number of other possible meanings of the term "religious evolution" with which I am not concerned. I hope it is also clear that a complex and differentiated religious symbolization is not therefore a better or a truer or a more beautiful one than a compact religious symbolization. I am not a relativist and I do think judgments of val ue can reasonably be made between religions, societies or personalities. But the axis of that judgment is not provided by social evolution and if progress is used in an essentially ethical sense, then I for one will not speak of religious progress." (Bellah, 1964 : 359)

Having thus cleared away possible misunderstandings, Bellah, defining religion "as a set of symbolic forms and acts which relate man to the ultimate conditions of his existence" (1964 : 359), and considering that "neither religious man nor the structure of man's ultimate religious situation evolves, then, but rather religion as a symbol system" (1964 : 359), develops a five stage schema based on the following three presuppositions :

1. "religious symbolization... tends to change over time, at least in some instances, in the direction of more differentiated, comprehensive, and in Weber's sense, more rationalized formulations." (Bellah, 1964 : 360)

2. "the conceptions of religious actions, of the [74] nature of the religious actor, of religious organization and of the place of religion In the society tend to change in ways systematically related to the changes in symbolization." (Bellah, 1964 : 360)

3. the changes in the sphere of religion "are related to a variety of other dimensions of change in other social spheres which define the general process of socio-cultural evolution." (Bellah, 1964 : 360)

It would be unfair, it seems to us, to accuse Bellah of espousing a value-emanationist point of view because he sees changes in religious action and organization as systematically related to changes in symbolization. Although these dimensions are related and while an imperative of coherence and consistency is at work here, what Parsons calls the principle of the Interdependency of analytically independent components or variables lies behind Bellah's presuppositions. Furthermore, Bellah associates in a more or less systematic fashion, religious developments to other, non-religious and non-cultural ones.

Bellah's five stages are labelled primitive, archaic, historic, early modern and modern. They correspond roughly to Parsons' stages and sub-stages of societal evolution. The following chart summarizes the essentials of Bellah's argument about religious symbolism, action, organization and social implications. Included are also the lower, more conditional factors associated with religious evolution by Bellah.

[75]

	PRIMITIVE	ARCHAIC
Symbol System	monism particularity and fluidity of organization explain the closeness of the world of myth to the natural world.	monism objectivation, systematization of religious world : cosmology.
Religious Action	identification, "participation", acting-out. in ritual, the distance between man and mythical being disappears.	emergence of true cult : the distinction between men as subjects and gods as objects is more definite ; greater element of intentionality as well as **more** uncertainty relatively to the divine response.
Religious Organization	inexistent as separate social structure. Church and society are one.	monopolization by upper-status group of political, military and religious leadership. Specialized priesthoods may differentiate out, but are usually subordinate to the political elite.
Social Implications	reinforcement of solidarity, of view of life as "one possibility thing", provision of little leverage for change.	notion of gods acting over against men with a certain degree of freedom introduces element of openness to new modes of religious thinking.
Factors associated with religious evolution.	emergence of two-class system, craft literacy.	

[76]

	HISTORIC	EARLY MODERN
Symbol System	transcendentalism, dualism, salvation as central preoccupation, demythologization and universalization : possibility of conceiving of man as such.	concentration on direct relation between individual and transcendent reality. individual self : capable of faith in spite of sin. World : valid arena in which to work out the divine command.
Religious Action	action for salvation by a responsible self. mediation of religious law, sacramental system, mystical exercises.	"identity unification". service of god becomes total demand in every walk of life. no mediation.
Religious Organization	emergence of differentiated religious collectivities : roles of believer and subject become distinct ; religious elites develop alongside political ones.	rejection of historic-type hierarchies two-class system : the elect and the reprobate.
Social implications	new level of tension and new possibility of conflict and change : religion as the only stable possible challenger to the dominance of the political elite, legitimation of existing social order.	the self-revising social order expressed in a voluntaristic and democratic society. Religious pressure to construct social systems with built-in tendency to change in direction of greater value-realization.
Factors associated with religious evolution.	from two-class to four-class system ; new levels of urbanization ; upper-class literacy ; bureaucracy ; law ; growth of market system.	break-up of four-class system, development of contract and voluntary associationism. institutionalization of common law.

[77]

	MODERN
Symbol System	collapse of dualism man as dynamic, multi-dimensional self, capable, within limits, of continual self-transformation and capable, within limits, of remaking the world, including the very symbolic forms with which he deals with it.
Religious Action	continuation of early modern trends, each individual must work out his own ultimate solutions.
Religious Organization	increasingly fluid : church as favorable environment.
Social Implications	culture and personality viewed as endlessly revisable offers unprecedented opportunities for creative innovation (as well as for pathological distortions).
Factors	educational revolution? development of exact and human sciences?

[78]

Without going into the details of Bell ah's schema, let us note that he sees essentially the process of religious evolution as leading to greater differentiation, rationalization and generalization. One fundamental outcome is the increased freedom of the personality system in Its relationship to the ultimate conditions of human existence :

> "at each stage the freedom of personality and society has increased relative to the environing conditions. Freedom has increased because at each successive stage the relation of man to the conditions of his existence has been conceived as more complex, more open and more subject to change and development." (Bellah, 1964 : 374)

Many criticisms have been directed toward Parsons' and Bellah's brand of neo-evolutionism. Wolf Heydebrand, for example, sees in The System of Modern Societies " a re-interpretation of high school or college history", an endeavor "based on a highly selective set of sources and, on the whole, surprisingly uncritical of the method of historiography" (1972 : 387). He also criticizes Parsons for exhibiting in his treatment of the lead modern society "a curiously uncritical acceptance of the cheerful clichés of T.V. commercials, press secretaries, and public relations spokesmen for the local Chamber of Commerce" (1972 : 374). Since much of these criticisms are either nonsense or indications of an ideological charge against Parsons, we do not feel it is necessary to dwell on them extensively.

Heydebrand attacks Parsons' neo-evolutionism on other, more theoretical grounds :

> "After forty years of intense intellectual work, we are still at the level of conceptual-taxonomic elaboration, and can only "account" for social phenomena after the fact by "applying" an unfalsifiable — and therefore untestable — conceptual scheme to a rich array of historical data." (Heydebrand, 1972 : 391)

[79]

This criticism is to some extent correlated with another one, namely that Parsons has only ordered structural types and related them sequentially while not showing "how the new level of adaptive capacity develops, and how the necessary evolutionary universals originated from the previous level" (1972 : 392). Parsons admits that this is a valid criticism. Let us add that a more dynamic analysis of process and change would also push to the background conceptual-taxonomic elaboration and to the forefront specific propositions.

Parsons however considers structural analysis to be a first-order of business which cannot be by-passed. In 1955, within the context of his analysis of family structure and socialization, he had argued that, though he could not fully incorporate variations in family structure and their effects on the socialization outcomes within the framework of his structural analysis, it was necessary to put first things first :

"The main reason for not attempting to enter either of them in this chapter is simply a matter of putting first things first and of the limitations of what can be done in a single attempt. It is our profound conviction that only when norms of the character we are attempting to work out here have been solidly established, can the lack of incisiveness of so much current treatment in both these fields be overcome. Essentially the requirement to enter and solve the other problems first would be analogous to the suggestion that only after the concrete problems of meteorology had been satisfactorily solved should one attempt to study falling bodies. It is the insight that the structure of the nuclear family is that of a generic type of small group which has given us our clue that there is a level of study of socialization which could transcend the particularities both of specific cultures and of specific behaviors of parents, and hence, if systematically worked through, give us hope of arriving at norms which can then serve as points of reference for attacking these exceedingly important ranges of problems.

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Hence our view is in no way depreciative of the extreme importance of both these fields of analysis. What we hope this essay does is to make a contribution to them, not directly, but indirectly by helping to establish a theoretical framework in which a more orderly and technical analysis of the problems can be carried forward." (Parsons, in Parsons and Bales, 1955 : 105-106)

In Societies, Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives (Parsons, 1966), Parsons makes the same point :

"Regarding methods of study, there is another exceedingly important parallel, or continuity, between organic and socio-cultural evolution : structural analysis must take a certain priority over the analysis of process and change. This may not hold for all social science, but its validity for the subject of this book can hardly be doubted.

One need not develop a truly advanced general analysis of the main processes of social change in order to make general claims about the structural patterning of evolutionary development. This fact is well established in biology, where morphology, including comparative anatomy, is the "backbone" of evolutionary theory. Although Darwin advanced crucial ideas about process in the principle of natural selection, he stated explicitly that he could not prove in even a single case that it had changed one species into another, but only that "it groups and explains well a host of facts...", the vast majority of which concerned structure. Darwin simply did not present a developed "theory of evolutionary process", especially in regard to the genesis of variations. But this did not impugn the entire scientific status of the theory of organic evolution as Darwin developed it." (Parsons, 1966 : 111)

Thus, though Parsons acknowledges that the analysis of process and change would improve enormously his brand of neo-evolutionism, he states clearly why he has chosen to develop first his structural analysis. Robert Nisbet (1970), in his critique of neo-developmentalism, has challenged both the feasibility and the fruitfulness of any kind of evolutionary theory, be it of Parsons or of any other theorist. Arguing that one [81] of the central elements of any evolutionary theory is the notion of endogenous change, Nisbet denounced a pattern of though which he labels "the sociological fallacy" and which consists in

"the belief that the causes and essential forces of social change may be derived from the elements of social structure. Stated differently, the sociological fallacy declares that a single "unified" theory can account both for the processes involved in social cohesion or social equilibrium on the one hand, and on the other, for those processes involved in change. Any such belief, however, manifestly flies in the face of history, of empirical observation, and — frankly — of common sense." (Nisbet, 1970 : 204)

Nisbet, it seems to us, by associating evolutionary theory and the notion of endogenous change confuses the issues. Many sociologists consider endogenous sources of change to be of great importance : they are not necessarily evolutionists. As for his concept of sociological fallacy, it clearly denies the validity of the entire Parsonian enterprise as well as that of any kind of general sociological theory. One is tempted to ask : what is left to do, beside social history?

From across the Atlantic, criticisms have also been expressed. For Chazel (1974 : 141-149), in many respects more sympathetic than Nisbet to Parsons' attempt to develop a general sociological theory, what we are confronted with is not a theory but a doctrine based on the postulation of fundamental continuity between organic and socio-cultural evolution, as well as on the too close association between evolution and progress. It is a doctrine because it does not really "account" for structural change while being biased in favor of industrial societies, and especially the U.S.A.. Rocher notes on this last point :

> "en réalité, le fonctionalisme parsonien est dynamique en lui-mêne et par la lumière qu'il [82] projette sur la société. Mais il est contrecarré par un évolution!sme qui interprète la société industrielle d'une manière statique comme un sommet atteint au terme d'une difficile ascension. Dans cette perspective, qui rapproche Parsons de Comte et Spencer, le mouvement de fond qu'on peut déceler à travers les accidents de l'histoire a mené les sociétés archaïques, élémentaires et indifférenciées, jusqu'à la société industrielle moderne. Celle-ci est l'aboutissant depuis longtemps mûri et préparé. Parsons ne peut pas —ou ne veut pas — imaginer que ce type de société puisse céder le pas à un autre, sans voir là une régression ou un stage antérieur de développement. Sans doute croit-il que la société industrielle est encore perfectible à bien des égards, mais à la condition que ce soit en se développant suivant la ligne de ce qu'elle est et non en se transformant radicalement." (Rocher, 1972 : 219)

In response to these criticisms coming from anti-Parsonians as well as from sociologists sympathetic to the Parsonian enterprise, we would like to make the following comments. It is true that Parsons has praised American society in particular and modern Industrial societies in general ; it is true that he has not always been sufficiently critical of the clichés Heydebrand referred to ; but it is also true, as A. Effrat notes, that he has done his praising in terms of criteria often shared by more

radical critics of contemporary society. Let us take for instance Milli-band's conclusion to his analysis of the State in capitalist society, con-clusion which we fell is not cited here out of its proper context.

> "It is a dangerous confusion to believe and claim that, because "bour-geois freedoms" are inadequate and constantly threatened by erosion, they are therefore of no consequence. For all its immense limitations and hypo-crisies, there is a wide gulf between "bourgeois democracy" and the various forms of conservative authoritarianism, most notably fascism, which have provided the alternative type of political regime for advanced capitalism. The point of the socialist critique of "bourgeois freedoms" is not (or should not) be that they are of no consequence, but that they are profoundly inade-quate, [83] and need to he extended by the radical transformation of the context, economic, social and political, which condemns them to inade-quacy and erosion." [Milliband, 1969 : 267)

Though Parsons is clearly more "optimistic" than Milliband, both share to some extent the same values, as Milliband's plea for extension of "bourgeois freedoms" indicates. It may be added that Parsons' ideo-logical optimism, when rejected, does not imply the rejection of Par-sonian theory.

To the next point. It is questionable to assert that modern industrial societies constitute the end point of evolutionary process. In the intro-duction to The System of Modern Societies, Parsons wrote :

> "Our assessment of the superior adaptive capacity of modern societies does not preclude the possibility that a "post-modern" phase of social deve-lopment may someday emerge from a different social and cultural origin and with the different characteristics... As the process of cultural inclusion will probably go much farther than it has, the culminating version of the modern system may prove rather less parochial than many observers now expect or fear." (Parsons, 1971 : 3)

However, since Parsons feels that modernism has not yet fully evolved and that thus the contemporary forms of modernism are not necessarily the ones with the highest adaptive capacity and that they are not without serious difficulties and problems, "talk of a "post-modern" society is thus decidedly premature" (1971 : 143). Parsons presents this

as a personal conviction, and not as a scientific prediction. What we wish to point out however is that modernism is neither as yet fully realized nor the end point of societal evolutionary development.

A related point concerns the king of argument best summarized [84] in the following citation, by H.A.L. Fisher 0905) and found in Chazel's book :

"the fact of progress is written plain and large on the page of history ; but progress is not a law of nature." (Fisher, in Chazel, 1974 : 145)

Me would like to quarrel with this affirmation, to some extent because it has a certain seductive power, in that it leads one to accept many of the empirical assertions or evolutionary judgments made by Parsons and Bellah, while rejecting the analytical and theoretical framework which grounds these judgments. Progress is not "a fact". Asserting that something is progressive involves the use of a standard or a criterion by which to determine whether or not what one is looking at is "better" or "worse", "more" or "less", "advanced" or "primitive". Parsons' criterion is adaptive capacity. Though he acknowledges that it is "not necessarily the paramount object of human value", he does have the "empirical and theoretical conviction that the salience of adaptive factors describes the "way human society is" (1971 : 3) and feels that developments in biological and social sciences strongly support such a conviction.

Furthermore, in his concluding statements of <u>Societies, Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives</u>, Parsons acknowledges a bias in his analysis in that it stressed more evolutionary breakthroughs and successes than failures. Noting that a better balance should be attained, he wrote :

"Condensing our very broad analysis into such limited space has created a distinct bias. In dealing with the main patterns of evolutionary development, we have focused on the societies and structural components which gave rise to the most important developments. It has not been possible within the limits to give equal attention to either of the above two types of "dead-end" cases... I have tried to be conscientious of this point by [85] emphasizing the failure of adaptive development in a number of societal cases. However, an adequate treatment of the empirical balance of successes and failures,

and the factors determining them, would require a different order of study." (Parsons, 1966 : 110)

A related point concerns the pattern-variables and their contribution to the determination of evolutionary trends. A. Effrat writes :

"The evolutionary stage schema does not hypothesize or imply a simple emergence of the more "Gesellschaft" pattern variables (affective neutral ity, universal ism, achievement, and specificity) and the disappearance of the more "Gemeinschaft" type (affectivity, particularism, ascription, and diffuseness). It does map an increase of the former, while, far from positing the complete withering away of the elements or institutions with Ge-meinschaft primacy, the theory sees these patterns as tending to become focused in institutions and collectivities that increasingly specialize in ope-ration on these principles or meet needs apparently related to these prin-ciples." (A. Effrat, in press)

Thus, the evolutionary trend, when described in pattern-variable terms, does not imply the disappearance of the Gemeinschaft type of pattern-variable. Mayhew, in his essay on "Ascription in Modern Soci-eties" (1968), argues in a similar fashion :

"It is important to note that this line of attack on the problem of ascrip-tion does not retreat from the idea that given orientations in the actor are appropriate to given functional contexts. Rather it insists on the multifunc-tional character of any concrete context. This approach represents a transla-tion to the macrofunctional level of Parsons' historic and continuing insis-tence that social evolution does not produce a complete transformation of all social life to the Gesellschaftlich orientations of specificity, affective neutrality, universalism, achievement and self-interest.

All concrete social units must deal with problems of integration and ten-sion-management and with other problems that require a continuation [86] of Gemeinschaftlich orientations in some contexts. Since these orientations are likely to support responding to others in terms of their statuses and their diffuse qualities, there will always be limitations on differentiation and specialization in social systems." (Mayhew, 1968 : 108-109)

Another point to be made concerns the costs involved in evolutionary development. In discussing Parsons' model of structural differentiation, mention was made of the costs involved in differentiation.

The same holds for evolutionary developments. Bell ah may be, for example, right in assessing religious evolution in terms of increased rationalization of religious symbol systems as well as in terms of increased autonomy of the individual personality system in its relationship to the ultimate conditions of human existence, but he is also right in pointing out that these developements open up possibilities not only of creative innovation but also of pathological distortions among individuals incapable of adaptively living a life defined as an "infinite possibility thing". Current estimates of the rise of mental diseases in industrial societies seem to indicate that modernism is neither the healthiest of environments nor the best therapeutic one.

Relative to this is Parsons' conviction "that _relative_ deprivation is more important, that what "hurts" most is the sense of _exclusion_ from full participation in the societal community" (1971 : 115). If modern societies have succeeded in institutionalizing a broad range of "liberal" and progressive values, important flaws remain and are thus the more difficult to accept given "that mitigation of feelings of relative deprivation through inclusion is in a sense "symbolic" does not make it one bit the less urgent and important" (1971 : 115).

[87]

A final note on what parsons considers to be the present crisis of modern industrial societies. Though Parsons acknowledges that there is one, he does not see it as mainly economic or political. The societal community seems to be the center of tension and conflict :

> "On one hand, there is the relative obsolescence of many older values like hereditary privilege, ethnicity and class. On the other, there are unsolved problems of integrating the normative structure of community, which seems fairly complete in outline, with the motivational basis of solidarity, which remains much more problematic.
>
> The new societal community, conceived as an integrative institution, must operate at a level different from those familiar in our intellectual traditions... It must go beyond command of political power and wealth and of the factors that generate them to value-commitments and mechanisms of influence." (Parsons, 1971 : 121)

It seems that, in this regard, emerging institutions of stratification are of crucial importance. While the "historic bases of hierarchical legitimation are no longer available", while equality is a paramount value, the inequalities produced by the need for functional effectiveness are still present and must be balanced with the equalitarian patterns. This seems to be the challenge which must be met by modern societies if they are to adaptively grow and evolve. The solution to this integrative problem will determine the path of future evolution.

CONCLUSION ON THE PARSONIAN THEORY OF CHANGE

We may pull together the varied writings reviewed in our discussion of Parsons' theory of social change, by first asserting that Parsons has, for some forty years now, been actively concerned with the problems of change and has put forward a coherent analytic framework (built on such [88] distinctions as that between stability and change, structure and process, boundary-maintaining mechanisms and processes of structural change, as well as on cybernetic theory), as well as specific propositions concerning particular types of change such as structural differentiation and long-term evolutionary development. We hope that our discussion of Parsonian theory has been successful in demonstrating both that Parsonian theory can deal with change and that its treatment of it is logically congruent with the analysis of structure concomitantly developed and is not a movement away from it that points to or is indicative of a convergence or conversion to Marxism, as Gouldner has contended. For there remains important differences between the two frameworks, differences that center on the issues of the place of informational components in action and in the background, that of the models of determinacy prevalent in the two frameworks. Secondly, we have tried to show that, though Parsons is not always satisfactory on the issue of the sources of change, the model of structural differentiation carries the implication that the system, because it is a living and growing one,

does produce and not only "contains" tensions and strains which may lead to change, if control mechanisms break down.

If Homans (1964) once argued that there was no action in Parsonian theory, one may be tempted to argue that there is also no causality in the framework, and thus no theory at all. We have in previous pages, tried to deal with this problem. It is important that we come back to it and try to dispel some misunderstandings. For most sociologists, causality implies the assertion of a linear, one-sided dependence of a variable upon another. For others, causality is synonymous with reciprocal action or interaction : the effect-variable is seen as not only the passive consequence of the cause, but is also seen as reacting back upon the cause [89] and affecting It. Still another model of reciprocal action is the dialectical one : indeed, it asserts that heterogenous systems or entities interact in such a way as to engender qualitative modifications of the over-all system. Marxism uses as models of determinacy classical causality and the dialectical version of the interaction model. Reading Parsons only with these models of determinacy leads to serious misunderstandings and especially to misunderstanding the place of Informational components in action. Indeed, Parsons must be read through the prism of a model of determinacy that stresses the interdependence of analytically independent variables or components. Cybernetic theory expresses this interdependence. It is important to note that cybernetic theory is not, in classical causality terms, a theory of action ; it is better understood if defined as a theory of the techniques of organization and control of action within a system. It implies that high informational components guide and channel or inform lower ones, though they do not "cause" the latter in the traditional mechanistic sense of the word. For example, we have seen that structural differentiation, as a process, is triggered by the combination of goal-attainment deficits and an opportunity for change defined in terms of possible facilities for change. For Parsons, this causal statement is not enough however : it does not exhaust the totality of the phenomena of the institutionalization of change ; other factors, higher in the hierarchy of cybernetic control, must operate in such a way as to guide the system in its selection of structural differentiation as a positive mode of systemic growth. Furthermore, these higher-order factors must come to grips with the lower ones. Parsons is very clear on this issue when he writes :

"we formulate this dependence most generally in maintaining that higher-order factors (within the social system, normative factors) must [90] successfully meet the conditions of becoming institutionalized in order to determine stable patterns of concrete actions. This means precisely that they must gain control over the relevant conditional factors. Most emphatically, this is not to say that the latter factors have only neglegible importance. Rather, it merely claims, first, that to be controlled, conditional factors must be present in certain proper combinations, both in terms of one another and in terms of the normative factors, and second, that conditional factors cannot create a new concrete order without independent innovation at a higher normative level." (Parsons, 1966 : 114)

Parsons had previously stated :

"Basic innovation in the evolution of living systems, both organic and socio-cultural, does not occur automatically with increases of factors or resources at the lower (conditional) levels of the cybernetic hierarchies, but depends on analytically independent developments at their higher levels. Essential as large population may be for advanced social organization, the pressures of increasing numbers alone cannot create such organization — rather, it will release Malthusian checks. Properly developed, this argument also applies to economic productivity and political power." (Parsons, 1966 : 113)

Of course, these statements are the antithesis of Marxism, since Marxism is not dualistic in its causal structure, but directly grounds its explanation of social system reality in the conditional or material factors. We feel however that it is valid to criticize Parsons for having paid relatively less attention to important conditional factors than to the normative ones. A better balance between the two types of factors would go far, we contend, to reduce the discrepancy — while not eliminating the major differences — between the two frameworks. We shall try to attain such a balance in this thesis, mainly by centering our attention on the politics of differentiation and the realities of economic dependency.

[91]

Modernization and the Institutionalization
of Differentiation: The Quebec Case.

Chapter II

Partial Modernization and the Politics of Differentiation : Some Specific Propositions

[92]

The purpose of this chapter is to put forward in a systematic fashion the specific theoretical framework to be used in this thesis. Building on the review of literature developed in the preceding chapter and especially on our discussion of Parsons' evolutionary theory as well as on Parsons' and Smelser's theory of structural differentiation, we shall propose specific propositions to be tested in the remaining chapters of this thesis. Our chapter is structured in the following fashion ; in the first section, we shall use some theoretical elements put forward in the preceding chapter and concerned with the process of social change in general and with the process of modernization in particular in order to identify variables that explain and account for the societal reality of partial modernization ; in a second section, we shall criticize the Parsons-Smelser's treatment of the process of structural differentiation for its lack of concern with the political aspect of differentiation and propose means by which this weakness may be corrected ; finally pulling together the orientations defined and articulated in the first two sections,

we shall elaborate specific propositions within the Smelserian seven-step model to be tested In this thesis.

PARTIAL MODERNIZATION

This thesis is concerned with Quebec's school Reform of the sixties. It rests on the conviction that this Reform, best understandable in terms of institutional secularization or differentiation, is constitutive [93] of or a manifestation of an attempt, made by Quebec society, to move from a situation of partial modernity to one of more complete or total modernity.

As we have pointed out in our review of Parsons' and Bellah's neo-evolutionism, there is no contention in the neo-evolutionary writings that the process of evolution in general and modernization in particular is unilinear, irreversible and inevitable. A1though the schema, as it now stands, does not give sufficient attention to reversals, blockages, stoppages or failures, and although it is mainly oriented toward the structural ordering of broad evolutionary patterns, it does allow greater flexibility in the usage of nineteenth century evolutionary principles : for example, it does not claim that less evolved and less adapted forms of social organization cannot survive and maintain themselves side by side with those forms which have the highest adaptive capacity ; also, the schema does not claim that the evolutionary uni versais are forever adaptive or that they cannot come to conflict and contradict one another, which is a nice way of saying that evolution may be blocked because of built-in contradictions between evolutionary patterns and until a new "synthesis" is produced and institutionalized.

The schema does however imply that the less adapted forms of social organizations will survive to the extent that they do not threaten the stability and development of the more adaptive ones. Parsons seems to use here the principles of survival of the fittest and of competition between more and less adapted forms of social organization for scarce resources. Many questions remain unanswered : what factors generate competition in the first place? Why and how do the less adapted patterns come to conflict with the more adapted ones ? Why do certain

societies accept [94] to maintain certain less adapted patterns — for example, the family firm — and block within their territory the dissemination of the more adapted ones ? Each case must be carefully scrutinized in order to go beyond the crude evolutionary principles and to generate a valid explanation : for example, with respect to the maintenance of the family firm within a rapidly industrializing Quebec, one should not stop at simply mentioning the association between family and ethnic concerns. If it is true that fully differentiated economic structures imply the inclusion of the French Canadian economy within the North-American one, i.e. within an English one, the maintenance of the family firm is not solely explainable by resistance to inclusion within a culturally-alien environment. One must analyse the interelationships between French Canadian economic interest groups and the traditional political elites, and more broadly between the family firm and some crucial characteristics of the traditional political structures and culture (for example, the importance of the partisan phenomenon and its association with the low development of the State apparatus, the division of powers between the federal and provincial governments, especially with regards to economic development, the interest groups which control each level of government, etc.). Conversely, the gradual disappearance of the family firm must be seen as associated with some important political transformations (the recognition of economic development as an important and legitimate societal goal, that of the State as a leverage of economic growth, growth of the State apparatus, etc.). In other words, the maintenance or disappearance of the family firm, when properly analyzed, may be associated not simply with economic transformations but with also political and stratificational ones. The point is that, while less adapted forms of social organizations can survive and maintain themselves [95] side by side with more adapted ones, the conditional factors which help them survive must be identified and interrelated. Conversely, if they do not survive, the analyst must be able to generate an explanation which goes beyond the survival of the fittest Imagery and which accounts for the emergence of more adaptive forms of social organizations and the disappearance of the less adapted ones.

Since the systemic perspective implies both that change processes may be and are often uneven and that in the long run, it is difficult for a system unit to insulate and immunize itself against the effects of an environmental change, the schema may be said to imply that systems

have built-in mechanisms seeking to generate internal consistency, and that in the long run, inconsistencies breed strains and conflict which can, everything else being equal, push for greater consistency. This however can go both ways : indeed, the system experiencing inconsistencies has in a sense, two choices ; it can increase its internal consistency by "falling back", to use Parsons' imagery, on its less adapted patterns and by reinforcing its traditionalism, or it can increase its internal consistency by consolidating and generalizing the evolutionary patterns. Why the system "opts" for the first or second solution or even for neither or both of them at the same time as the phenomenon of "durable inconsistencies" seem to indicate, and what variables are crucial for a proper understanding of the selection process, constitute questions which must be answered. Indeed, while it is necessary to couch our discussion of a societal movement from a situation of partial modernity to one of more complete or total modernity within the framework of systems strain toward Internal consistency, it is not sufficient to account for the process as such. Since the realities of partial modernization direct our [96] attention toward phenomena of "durable inconsistencies" and "stabilized coexistence" of modern and pre-modern or traditional patterns of action and orientation, we must identify the basic variables which help account for partial modernization and the breakthrough to a more complete or consistent modern system.

Both Parsons (1961) and Rueschemeyer (in press) give valuable indications concerning the nature of these variables. Indeed, Parsons, in "An Outline of the Social System" (1961), argued that the crucial in puts for industrialization were political and valuational, especially in cases of late industrialization, stimulated by external social forces.

In cases where Industrialization is triggered by outside forces, Parsons considered that political imputs were of crucial importance because they had to compensate for the relative absence within the society undergoing industrialization, of the relevant value-commitments necessary for economic development. Power had to be spent to generate the necessary commitments. But power has to be legitimized. Within a pre-modern culture, it is difficult to legitimize a power which is used to radically alter pre-modern institutions. This is why Parsons talked of a political strategy consisting in activating pre-modern societal values — like, African nationalism, for example, — to legitimize value-change at the sub-system level. Generalization of societal values was thus seen as

conducive to the generation of relevant sub-system value-commitments.

Rueschemeyer (in press), in an exploratory essay on partial modernization, essentially follows a similar analytical path by stressing the importance of the external forces pushing for modernization as well as the internal political and valuational characteristics "which are of [97] special significance for the ways of dealing with socio-cultural change" (in press : 12). He stresses these two kinds of variables — internal and external — because most cases of late modernization are not triggered by internal forces but are the direct result of a diffusion process of modern characteristics and patterns of action and orientation throughout the world and because most cases of late modernization involve State leadership and State espousal of the aims of economic development.

Rueschemeyer defines partial modernization as "the institutionalization of relatively modern patterns side by side with significantly **less** modern patterns in the same society" (in press : 5). We shall later on discuss what the author means by "modern" and "pre-modern". What we wish to argue at this point is that partial modernization need not be always associated with the institutionalization of modern and pre-modern patterns. The reality of partial modernization can be seen as encompassing the coexistence of patterns which are either institutionalized, partially institutionalized or uninstitutionalized. Rueschemeyer's definition is too restrictive in that it is limited to patterns which are institutionalized. We prefer to defi ne partial modernization simply in terms of co-existence of relatively modern and pre-modern patterns in the same society, while leaving open the degree of institutionalization or uninstitutionalization of the patterns in questions.

By doing so, not only do we encompass a richer array of phenomena, but we also direct our attention to different types of conflicts and social movements that may appear as the society experiences the strains associated with partial modernity. For example, within the context of this thesis, it makes a difference whether or not we consider democracy [98] to have been in the pre-Quiet Revolution Quebec, firmly or only partially institutionalized : if we consider that it was firmly institutionalized and co-existed with theocratism, we will have great difficulty in accounting for the emergence of a value-oriented movement which sought to more firmly institutionalize democracy during the fifties and which, as we shall see later on, may be associated to some extent with

the Cité Libre movement. Had democracy been firmly institutionalized, a value-oriented movement and associated conflicts would not have been necessary for the sequence of differentiation to be analyzed.

Also, there are patterns which may become stabilized, while never really becoming institutionalized, i.e. felt desirable and desired. They nonetheless exist and are of considerable importance. Two examples of Quebec's traditional political structures should constitute sufficient illustration of this : the political alignment and partisanry of bishops and the importance of the Anglo-Canadian and Anglo-American capitalist interests. The first example illustrates what sometimes happens when an historic-type of fiduciary sub-system and its elite interact with a polity which has institutionalized some form of democracy. Was it however legitimate that bishops become politically aligned and partisan ? Can we consider this element of the pre-Quiet Revolution Quebec polity simply as a manifestation of a low level of differentiation ? Though it was legitimate for bishops to be collectively an important political actor and even to have the right to veto certain policies, especially those which concerned their traditional domain of activity, we shall not consider in this thesis the parti sanry of the Church hierarchy as something felt desirable and desired by most catholics, including members of the Church hierarchy. It nonetheless existed and constituted an important characteristic of Quebec's [99] traditional political structure. It certainly helps understand why certain religious orders were more effective than others in getting State financial aid for the institutions under their authority and within their diocesan territory : there were effective in getting their priests or religious personnel to vote for the party in power.

The same kind of argument can be made with regards to the presence and importance of Anglophone economic interests within the governments which ruled the Province since Confederation. It may be legitimate that Anglophones be represented within a provincial cabinet ; it is however debatable whether or not the Bank of Montreal should have the right to select the Provincial Treasurer (Hamelin & Beaudoin, in Desrosiers, 1972 : 99). For the Anglophones, this right was considered "traditional" ; as Hamel in and Beaudoin indicate, for the Francophone media, it was never considered totally legitimate. This example leads us to ask : if the pattern was institutionalized, who decided it was desirable and desired ?

Thus we shall not define partial modernization simply in terms of the institutionalization of relatively modern patterns side by side with less modern ones, for it limits the array of phenomena to be studied as well as poses problems for a proper understanding of certain types of conflicts and social movements which tend to appear as a society experiences the strains associated With partial modernization.

To the next point : what is modern and pre-modern ? Rueschemeyer contends that "perhaps the most useful starting point for a definition that suits present purposes is Max Weber's concept of rationalization of social and cultural life (in press : 6). Bellah (1964), as we have seen in the previous chapter, views religious evolution in essentially similar [100] terms : throughout history, contends Bell ah, religious symbol systems have become more differentiated, rationalized and generalized. Moreover, modern religious symbol systems differ from all previous ones in that there is a growing awareness that religion is symbolism and that in the last analysis each man is responsible for the choice of his symbolism : modern man must thus work out his own ultimate solutions, which is a way of saying that culture and personality have come to be seen as endlessly revisable. Parsons' neo-evolutionism also rests heavily on Weber's concept of rationalization : indeed, we have tried to show in the preceding chapter that his criterion of enhanced adaptive capacity was not solely an interesting concept borrowed from biological theory, but that it was also very close to Weber's concept of rationalization : rationalization means that social systems are oriented toward cultural change and enhanced adaptive capacity is the outcome of such a process ; increased symbolization or cultural development is in a sense a process of differentiation ; differentiation implies increased autonomy with respect to the environment ; this in turn implies increased adaptive capacity.

While Rueschemeyer, Bell ah and Parsons associate modernity with rationality. Rocher provides us with a good definition of rationality :

"La rationalité se fonde sur la conviction que les choses trouvent leur explication en elles-mêmes et non en dehors d'elles, que ce soit dans le mythe ou la tradition. Une vérité est acceptée et reconnue, non pas parce qu'elle l'a toujours été ou qu'elle a été "révélée", mais parce qu'elle est démontrable logiquement ou expérimentalement, c'est-à-dire d'une manière "objective". Sur le plan de l'action pratique, la rationalité entraîne la

recherche constante des moyens les plus objectivement efficaces en vue des buts définis comme réalisables. Les buts et les moyens ne sont plus pris pour acquis ; ils sont toujours sujets à revision et à remise en question." (Rocher, 1968 : 244-245)

[101]

If rationality implies that means and goals are not taken for granted and that they are constantly scrutinized and questioned, the ultimate values which ground these means and goals tend to become more generalized. This affirmation is definitively consistent with Parsons' and Bellah's neo-evolutionary viewpoint ; it is also crucial for a proper understanding of modernity. To paraphrase Parsons, modern social systems are characterized by a generalized value-system which can effectively regulate social action without relying upon particularistic prohibitions.

Associating modernity with rationalization permits the student of modernization to ask the following kind of empirical questions : what particular socio-cultural arrangements are conducive to higher or lower levels of rationalization ? What are the consequences of different levels of rationalization ? What institutional forms are most or least compatible with those more immediately associated with a given level of rational ization (Rueschemeyer, in press : 7) ? Put together, the answers to these questions generate the ideal-type of modern society. Rueschemeyer sketches this ideal-type of modernity by spelling out the following distinctive features : a) the institutionalization of scientific research and its systematic application in the economy as well as in other spheres of social life ; b) increased emphasis on achievement in a variety of roles, especially occupational roles ; c) differentiation of roles with relatively specific tasks from more diffuse role complexes and adoption of universalistic rather than particularistic standards ; d) bureaucracies, i.e. formal organizations where judgment and action are according to universalistic standards, specificity and expliciteness of task definitions and a high degree of affective neutrality ; e) far-reaching differentiation of social structure and greater interdependence of the differentiated parts ; [102] f) integrative mechanisms such as a system of universalistic legal norms, impersonal market exchange, associations of varied purposes, and ultimate values generalized enough to inform

and legitimize values, norms and goals in a great variety of sub-systems.

Rueschemeyer's sketch of a modern society is quite close to Parsons' treatment of it in his evolutionary books. Indeed, while the Societies, Evolutionary and Comparative perspectives book (1966) stressed the importance of differentiation at the action system level, The System of Modern Societies book (1971) placed greater emphasis on the integrative mechanisms necessary for the stability of highly differentiated societies : the generalization of value-systems, the citizenship complex, market systems, bureaucratic organizations, voluntary and egalitarian associations and the legitimation of a continuing legislative function which has tended to require that the legislative process should involve the societal community through a system of representation.

Although there exists within contemporary sociology no unanimity on the economic, political, social and cultural dimensions of modernity, we suggest that rationalization has a sufficiently well established status within sociological theory to be considered the "controlling definition" of the core of modernity. Also, Parsons' characterization of the system of modern societies certainly involves judgments regarding levels and degrees of rationalization.

To sum up this discussion, we may say that a given component of social structure and culture can be considered modern if it is conducive to high levels of rationalization and that "patterns of partial modernity combine characteristically modern features with others that [103] squarely deviate from theoretical statements about the immediate requisites and consequences of a high level of rationality and about social and cultural arrangements which are most compatible with these conditions and results" (Rueschemeyer, in press : 12). Let us note that conduciveness to high levels of rationality and compatibility with the conditions and consequences of a high level of rationality are two different things : while compatibility means that a particular socio-cultural arrangment does not block rationalization processes, conduciveness means that it is facilitated, stimulated, encouraged or pushed. Although this is really an intuition, it is possible that there exists more consensus on what is conducive to high levels of rationalization than on what is compatible with high levels of rationalization, within contemporary sociology.

Having defined partial modernization, we may now turn our attention on its causes. Rueschemeyer (in press : 12-26) argues that partial modernization is, at least partially, caused by the following factors :

1) the relative ineffectiveness of the diffusion process, this ineffectiveness being a function of a) the social and cultural characteristics of the receiving society, b) the kinds of things being transmitted as well as c) the "special circumstances" of the diffusion process.

What the author is hinting at when talking about the kinds of things being transmitted is the idea that certain things are easier to transmit than others, or, more generally, that certain changes are less costly and involve less resistance than others. Parsons' concept of hierarchy of control is implied here and may be used to generate specific propositions about the relative effectiveness of the diffusion process. For example, it may be argued that it is easier and cheaper to change [104] vested Interests or role-expectations than values.

Rueschemeyer's notion of "special circumstances" of the diffusion process is really an euphemism. For what he is talking about is colonialism and imperialism, which he sees as inherently implying constricted societal development and partial modernization. His argument is basically sound in that he points to the fact that, when modernization is associated with colonialism and imperialism, it will be constrained by the colonial power's interest in the less developed society.

In Rueschemeyer's essay, the social and cultural characteristics of the receiving society which may limit the effectiveness of the diffusion process are treated separately and constitute the remaining factors conducive to partial modernization. In order of their presentation, they are :

2) the resistance to change, even in the long run, of religious orientations and of the ultimate value system of a society, largely because of their position within the hierarchy of control ;

3) the fact that pre-modern value-orientations may receive strong reinforcements from the very process of modernization, "the changes which make established orientations problematic, subject them to

strains and threaten to undermine them are likely to provoke efforts to restate and revalidate the tradition" (in press : 16).

4) late modernization implies a greater role for the State ; this in turn may "affect the consistency of the developing patterns" (in press : 18), as when the ruling groups have <u>some</u> interest in stabilizing support through tradition ;

[105]

5) modern means can be used to Implement traditional goals and vice-versa ;

6) the inherently different dynamics of different functional subsystems and their interrelations are conducive to partial modernization. "The various functional subsystems of a society differ considerably in their receptivity to modern innovations" (in press : 22) ;

7) "patterns of partial development are, in the over-all picture of social evolution, not confined to modernizing societies" (in press : 24).

After arguing that conflict and strains may be the direct consequence of partial modernization but that they may not always push or contribute to greater consistency or modernization for a variety of reasons, Rueschemeyer contends that "partial developments of modern patterns can be contained in such a way that the propagation of their effects throughout the society is prevented" (in press : 28). The following mechanisms of containment seem particularly important :

1) a high degree of segmentation of economic and social activities reinforced frequently by religious, ethnic and regional subcultural divisions. Societies with a high degree of segmentation "can cope with disturbing changes in ways analogous to the capacity of a ship with watertight compartments to stay afloat in spite of leaks" (in press : 29).

2) subcultural divisions along ethnic, religious, linguistic, regional and status lines... minimize contact and exchange even between functionally differentiated and interdependent subsystems. "The "intrusion" of modern political and economic processes into such patterns and the Increase Of communication they bring about beyond parochial boundaries activates rather than weakens these primordial ties" (in press : 29). [106] "Consciousness of "primordial" identities and divisions... reinforce or stimulate the containing effects of segmentation. Acceptance and spread of new patterns are under these conditions hindered because they are perceived as associated with an outgroup" (in press : 29) ;

3) intermediary roles are frequently found that deal with both the relatively modern and relatively non-modern social structures on terms which are less inconsistent than unmediated interaction would be.

4) "the capability of various individuals and groups for evading or minimizing strain is related to their position in the stratification system" (in press : 32).

It seems that only when these mediating mechanisms become ineffective and breakdown, partial modernization is likely to result in strain and conflict, which may further modernization if the interests of the major contending parties focus on questions of modernization, if other issues are secondary and if existing conditions do not favor a polarization of multiple conflicts along a few lines of cleavage.

Rueschemeyer's essay is interesting to the extent that it seeks to explain historical cases which do not conform to the expectations derived from systems theory. We would like however to put forward some critical comments which shall seek to distinguish between short and long term effects of particular variables. Rueschemeyer does not always make this distinction and it leads him, we feel, to overstate the case of the viability of partial modernization or of durable inconsistencies. We would like in the following paragraphs to attain a proper balance on the issue of the viability vs the unviability of durable inconsistencies.

[107]

For example, the author states that pre-modern orientations may receive strong reinforcement from the very process of modernization : "the changes which make established orientations problematic, subject them to strains and threaten to undermine them are likely to provoke efforts to restate and revalidate the tradition" (in press : 16). This clearly happens often and as we shall see in the next chapter, our historical case fits neatly within this pattern : systems under strain do tend to "hunt" for the most economical solutions, and cheapest adaptations — i.e. changes in their lower components — while clinging to their most basic characteristics — defined by the content of their higher components — . In the short term, these basic characteristics may manage to survive. I would however contend that in the long run, pre-modern orientations will be perceived increasingly as ill-adapted, obsolete and constitutive of a flight from reality phenomenon. It can be argued that modernization permits the reinforcement of certain pre-modern orientations — for example, in our case, what Rioux has labelled the ideology of conservation — in order that they prove so ineffective that they will disappear from the scene in a "surprisingly" rapid fashion. We know of no other way to understand the "surprisingly" rapid pace of Quebec's Quiet Revolution and the restatement and systematization of traditional theocratic and conservationist value-orientations in the first decades of the twentieth century, that is during the decades of relatively rapid industrialization and urbanization. From Confederation to the end of World War Two, things seem to have proceeded as if modernization of some sectors of the society did not threaten the relatively more traditional ones and as if, on the contrary, the whole process could be understood as a non-zero-sum game, with an increase in modernism not implying a decrease in traditionalism.

[108]

This is however misleading for it hides the phenomenon of mounting strains that, it seems to us, a reinforcement process of traditional value-orientations cannot eliminate or resolve. To take a Quebec example, it is not because Prime Minister Duplessis used modern political institutions to preach and facilitate a return to the land and agriculturism that land was available for "pioner" settlement and that thus sons of farmers stopped moving to the cities and the factories. It is not either because classical college authorities systematized their ideology during the industrialization of the province that both the quantity and quality

of education they were offering was adapted to the realities of an industrialized and urbanized society. On the contrary, it can be argued that there is a dialectical process going on here : an ideology is systematized, restated and reinforced, because it is challenged and in process of disintegration ; also, its restatement may mean that it becomes more rigid, less flexible, precisely because of the challenge and the disintegrating forces. In other, words, traditional value-orientations may be reinforced, but with such a defensive primacy that rigidity and inflexibility characterize them, the more so if the modernizing forces are outside the societal system and culturally alien. Rigidification may be defined as a decrease in the adaptive capacity of a particular action system ; it may be operationalized in terms of the absolutization of the lower levels of specificity of the components of that system. For example, as we shall try to show in the following chapters, the traditional undifferentiated secondary and college system became rigid when the clerical authorities controlling the system absolutized the classical curriculum and closely associated their Institutional involvement with that particular curriculum which became in post-World War Two Quebec increasingly castigated as ill-adapted to [109] the needs of a pluralized societal community and of a highly industrialized economy.

Pertinent to this line of reasoning is Rueschemeyer's recogni- tion that "modernization of some sectors of a society often raises the costs of maintaining the more traditional ones, curtails the power-bases of the elites controlling and protecting these traditional sectors as well as changes value-orientations that make labor and sacrifice in their support meaningful" (in press : 26). It seems to us that the reinforcement of traditional value-orientations is often associated with an increase in their maintenance cost as well as a symptom of the curtailment of the power base of the traditional elites and of inter-elite competition. The conjunction of reinforcement, increased costs and curtailment of power-base may help account for the rigidification process previously mentioned.

The same kind of argument can be made with regard to Rueschemeyer's contention about subcultural divisions along ethnic, religious, linguistic, regional and status lines and their strengthening as opposed to their weakening, by the processes of political and economic modernization. Here again the distinction between short and long term effects of modernization processes must be ascertained and it is

certainly arguable that the same kind of dialectic of success and failure, as previously discussed, may be operating here. Of fundamental importance here, it seems to us, is Parsons' treatment of the relative deprivation issue.

If "the "intrusion" of modern political and economic processes into traditional systems and the increase of communication they bring about beyond parochial boundaries activates rather than weakens primordial ties" in press : 29), it could be because increased contact and increased communication [110] breed comparisons and activates inter-ethnic, inter-regional or inter-linguistic cleavages and conflicts based on perception and feelings of relative deprivation. However, in the long run, if effective mechanisms are found to alleviate feelings of relative deprivation, primordial ties may be weakened.

Finally, Rueschemeyer does not develop sufficiently his argument concerning the variable receptivity to modern innovations of the different functional subsystems. He does not either sufficiently ground his proposition to the effect that the inherently different dynamics of different functional subsystems and their interrelations are conducive to partial modernization. Here again, we have difficulty in accepting the idea that in the long run the dynamics of the interchange process between the subsystems does not lead to a minimal level of over-all consistency.

Notwithstanding the relative pertinence of these critical comments, Rueschemeyer's essay is stimulating in that it forces us to at least consider the possibility that the strain toward consistency, postulated by systems theory, may not be as rigid as some might be tempted to think. A parralled may be made between the strain toward consistency and the need of consensus : in a highly differentiated and pluralized society, consensus is difficult to generate and must be very general, thus leaving considerable room for interpretation, dissensus and even conflict, but conflict within an accepted general definition of the situation. Once we are in a situation where individuals and groups agree to disagree, while all agreeing that disagreement on almost anything is both functional and legitimate up to a certain and often ill-defined point, we are in a situation [111] where a very general and fluid type of consensus has been generated. Similarly, the strain toward consistency may be seen as involving a minimum and a maximum. Very few authors would contend for example, that medieval and theocratic value-orientations can

survive for a long period of time and "peacefully" coexist with an industrialized economy, a differentiated and centralized polity as well as with the citizenship complex. But it is certainly a matter of debate whether or not modern societal communities have to evolve in the American fashion, that is along the lines of a melting pot — of course, the question as to whether or not American society is and has been really a melting pot, has to be answered first — and whether or not piurilingual and pluriethnic societies are, as Parsons states in a passing comment in <u>The System of Modern Societies</u> (1971 : 69), dysfunctional and unviable because they imply the dominance of traditional or early modern bases of solidarity.

We may conclude this section by stating that we shall in this thesis define partial modernization as the "co-existence of relatively modern patterns side by side with significantly less modern patterns in the same society". As we have tried to show, while the degree of institutionalization of the relevant patterns is crucial for a proper understanding of the reality of partial modernization, there is no need to make institutionalization a criterion of partial modernity. By doing so, i.e. by leaving open the degree of institutionalization or uninstitutionalization of the patterns under study, we are able to encompass a richer array of phenomena as well as direct our attention to different types of conflicts and social movements that may appear as the society experiences the strains associated with partial modernity. We shall also in this thesis consider a given pattern to be modern to the extent that it is [112] conducive to high levels of rationalization. We feel that rationalization has a sufficiently well established status within sociological theory to be considered the "controlling definition" of the core of modernity. It thus follows that

> "patterns of partial modernity combine characteristically modern features with others that squarely deviate from theoretical statements about the immediate requisites and consequences of a high level of rationality and about social and cultural arrangements which are most compatible with these conditions and results" (Rueschemeyer, in press : 12).

For both Parsons and Rueschemeyer, in cases of relatively late modernization triggered by an outside force, the extent of modernization of the society under scrutiny will be a function of two sets of variables, one external and internal. The external variables refer to the relative

effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the "diffusion process", this in turn being a function of the kinds of things being diffused and the "special circumstances" of the diffusion process. The internal variables refer to the "political and cultural characteristics" of the receiving society. Both types of variables, in themselves and in their interaction, help account for the peculiarities of late modernization.

THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENTIATION

The Parsons-Smelser schema of structural differentiation, presented and discussed in the preceding chapter, suffers, it seems to us, from a under-emphasis or insufficient treatment of the political aspect of differentiation. The purpose of this section is to put forward means by which this weakness may be corrected.

[113]

Parsons, for example, in the <u>Rural Sociology</u> article (1961), does mention that the "risks involved in cutting loose" have to be "handled" and that the "inevitable component of conflict of interests" has to be "contained within a pattern of mutual contribution to higher-order system functioning" (1961 : 218) ; in the case of the differentiation of kinship and occupational roles and collectivities, this "conflict of interest is handled <u>above all</u> by the definition of the situation that employment is a channel for valued contribution to the welfare of the system in that the employing organization is conceived to be engaged in making such contributions" (1961 : 231) ; this definition of the situation, it seems, will be the more easily diffused and accepted, the more so certain "minima" with regards to the risks involved in differentiation are "if not guaranteed, made highly probable" (1961 : 231). This argument is basically sound in that it stresses the importance of a new definition of the situation within the framework of which groups may seek to maximize their interests or protect their boundaries. If the argument put forward by Parsons is sound, it leaves many questions unanswer : how is the new definition of the situation generated ? How is it diffused ? What are' the costs involved in its generation and diffusion ? What happens to the differentiation process if the new definition of the situation is

only partially accepted ? At what stage must it contribute ? At what stage is it crucial?

Smelser's book on the <u>English Industrial Revolution</u> (1959), suffers from similar defects. Seeking to demonstrate the fruitfulness of his analytical framework, Smelser is pushed to give great importance to the fit between his analytical categories and the empirical data. His reinterpretation of the child labour issue testifies to the elegant fit [114] between the categories and the data ; it also indicates how well the framework can link the specific characteristics of a protest ideology both to the structural foci of dissatisfactions and to the different steps of the process of differentiation. This strategy of exposure, however well done and necessary, seems to carry a cost : the politics of the process are unsatisfactorily dealt whith. The relevant groups of actors objective interests, strategies and tactics on the one hand, and their structural position within the polity as well as the fundamental properties of that polity and changes within it, on the other hand, are neither fully analyzed nor accounted for. This is an important defect because much of the process of differentiation can be analyzed in political terms ; indeed, the whole process may be seen as involving decisions — decisions as to how to "handle" generalized dissatisfactions, as to how reward what new idea and what specification and implementation strategy — . The political aspect of differentiation may also be considered most crucial as the process evolves and as we move toward what Smelser called "the frontal attack on the sources of dissatisfactions".

Smelser is also unsatisfactory and misleading in that he seems to fall into the trap of misplaced concreteness, in his treatment of the role of agencies, including the State, involved in "handling" generalized dissatisfactions. It may be valid to argue that, from the point of view of the system and in order that differentiation follow its path toward full institutionalization, some kind of handling and channeling must be done ; it may also be valid to argue that in relatively highly differentiated societies, special institutions, like the State, have become specialized in such "handling". It may finally be important for both their effectiveness and legitimacy, that they be defined and perceived as [115] "above" a particular controversy. It does not follow however that the elites controlling these Institutions constitute an objectively neutral and disinterested third party. Though their actions must be congruent with the existing value-system and "sift the reprehensible elements of a disturbance from

those which might find a legitimate place in society" (1959 : 331), these actions are clearly political and must be analysed in such terms. It could be, for example, that, in Smelser's case, the State elite was wary of the emergence of a new economic elite and that many of the State's actions were guided by this wariness. Whatever may be the case, the point is that we doubt very much that it was and acted as an arbiter and a disinterested third party. It is quite likely that the differentiation of occupational and familial roles and collectivities Involved not simply conflicts between the English labourers more or less forced to accept differentiation and the class of capitalists, but also competition between the new capitalists and the old economic groups for control of the State apparatus and the resources it could provide for the emerging industrial system. Indeed, as Galbraith (1968) indicates, the industrialization process in England and the United States has involved a shifting of power within the polity from the landed aristocracy to the capitalist class. It is regrettable that Smelser does not fully tackle these issues and does not question liberal notions of the State.

The same kind of argument can be made with regards to many aspects of the specification process. Specification involves negotiations between interested parties ; these negotiations may or may not be within the framework of the new definition of the situation. Why they are within it, what are the strategies and tactics of relevant groups must be analyzed and accounted for.

[116]

The treatment we wish to propose and use in this thesis concerning the political aspect of differentiation is related to the concepts of consensus-creation and consensus-imposition both at the level of institutional elites and that of the masses. The concept of consensus-creation is close to what Parsons labeled a new definition of the situation and its diffusion in the Rural Sociology article (1961b). It involves those processes by which dissatisfactions are interpreted and incorporated within a definition of the situation which, when it is successfully diffused within the existing elite-structure and throughout the masses, becomes the basis of what Smelser called the "frontal attack on the sources of dissatisfactions", that is, the specification process.

The difference between consensus-creation and consensus-imposition is in a sense very relative. Indeed, while consensus-creation implies

that most elites, and especially those which have both a stake in differentiation and great quantities of power and influence, come to share the new definition of the situation, consensus-imposition refers to situations where this sharing is most problematic and where one elite spends its power in such a way as to force the other elites to at least not block differentiation. In a sense, consensus-imposition refers to situations where elites resistant to differentiation and thus not sharing the new definition of the situation conducive to differentiation, are forced to accept it largely because the modernizing elite producing the new definition of the situation are effective in paralysing them. Thus consensus-imposition need not necessarily involve an all-out war ; it can be a more subtle process by which resistant elites come to have no choice but to accept differentiation. Obviously, one must analyze the process by which resistant elites come to have no choice.

[117]

Consensus-creation or the generation of a new definition of the situation, within the context of late modernization triggered by outside forces, is neither an easy thing to do nor necessarily endowed with great durability. The high costs involved here explain why the consensus that emerges, often at the encouragement of proliferation of new ideas stage, is general and simple — simple enough, for example, to be adequately expressed by electoral slogans —, leaving ample room for further reinterpretation and spelling out of specific implications. To take a Quebec example, it is not because, by the early sixties, most elites agreed that Quebec's traditional school system suffered from severe coordinative problems and that some solutions had to be found that they were all willing to accept those which were proposed some years later by the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Educational problems.

Not only does the consensus which is created tend to be general and simple, also it need not be total and accepted by everybody. In order that the politics of the specification stage remain within the framework of the new definition, it seems sufficient that the consensus be both general and relatively well spread throughout the elite-structure. Moreover, some elites, for reasons that need to be assessed in each case, are more important than others : their acceptance of the new definition of the situation is thus crucial. For example, in our case, it can be easily demonstrated that the consent of the Assembly of Bishops and that of the Fédération des Collèges Classiques was much more important than

that of say, the Chevaliers de Colomb or the Ligues du Sacré-Coeur. Obviously, one must carefully study how the consent of the important elites is generated in order to ascertain whether or not the case of differentiation under study involved consensus-creation or consensus-imposition, [118] or more adequately, how it moved from one to the other.

There are many reasons why the consensus which is created at the proliferation of new ideas stage and which serves as a basis of the specification stage, need not be total and accepted by everybody. It is not economical to wait before doing something that everyone agrees completely with what is to be done. Not only is it not economical, it is also not legitimate within a democratic framework, where allegedly a majority rules and where the government has the authority to mobilize the collectivity, including the pockets of resistance within it, toward the attainment of collective goals.

An analogy can be made between the type of consensus we are seeing as crucial for the successful institutionalization of differentiation and a language. The fact that an observer knows the language someone is using does not help him make precise predictions as to what kinds of sentences will be constructed. It will however help him understand the content of the intellectual discourse produced. The same thing can be said about a very general consensus : it does not imply consensus about specific lines of action. It may even be said that one of its major functions is to be fundamentally ambiguous with regards to specific lines of action as well as to gain time for the frontal attack or for action.

For example, as we shall try to establish in the following chapters, it is of considerable importance for a proper understanding of the process of differentiation under study in this thesis, that a modernizing elite managed to produce and diffuse what could be called the "language of adaptation", sufficiently enough to push to the background the previously dominant "language of survival". Once you are within the "language of [119] adaptation", you will tend to accept and legitimize lines of action which seem congruent with the fundamental orientations of that language. Shrewd and machiavellian change-agents know that the way a situation is defined is of crucial importance for the process of change or non-change which may follow. They also know that those who define the situation or produce the new language have a decisive advantage over those who do not and who have thus less ability to "use it properly".

The generality and partiality of the consensus generated during the process of differentiation and specifically at the proliferation of new ideas stage, is thus crucial for a proper understanding of the politics of specification. If the consensus is large enough, the politics of specification should normally involve conflict and negotiations within the framework of the language produced at the earlier stage. Sometimes, however, issues that normally are solved at an earlier stage, reappear. When this happens, the sequence of differentiation bounces back at an earlier stage, largely because of the ineffectiveness of the consensus-creation operation. The possibility for the sequence of differentiation of bouncing back and forth is something ill-treated by both Parsons and Smelser. We wish to associate it with the relative ineffectiveness of consensus-creation at the proliferation of new ideas stage. To the extent that consensus, at that stage, has to be general and cannot imply unanimity, the probability that it becomes severely strained and breaks at a further stage, is indeed very high. Then, a new consensus has to be generated ; if this is impossible, the pockets of resistance have to be neutralized or co-opted : consensus Is imposed, while not being shared by all elites.

[120]

Some consents must be made concerning the issue of consensus-creation and false consciousness. Michael Mann (1970 : 423-439), in a paper analyzing the empirical uti1ity of consensual and conflictual theories in explaining the social cohesion of the 1iberal democracies of Britain and the United States, has argued that "both theories grossly overstate the amount of both value consensus between individuals and value consistency within individuals that actually exists" (1970 : 423). He concluded his analysis by asserting that "cohesion in liberal democracy depends rather on the lack of consistent commitment to general values of any sort and on the "pragmatic acceptance" by subordinate classes of their limited roles in society" (1970 : 423). He also found some evidence supporting the contention of the existence of some "false consciousness" among subordinate classes.

Mann tackles two distinct problems : the problem of value-consensus between individuals and that of value-consistency within individuals. The first, which is related to the degree and nature of a societal consensus, is of concern to us. Mann argues convincingly that both structural functionalism — stressing societal integration through the

sharing of common societal values — and Marxism — stressing integration through "false consciousness" and the normative acceptance by the subordinate classes of the values of the dominant class — have overstated their case. Concerning the structural functionalist approach, Mann says that "most general values, norms and social beliefs usually mentioned as integrating societies are extremely vague, and can be used to legitimate any social structure, existing or not" (1970 : 424) ; he also argues that while some values unite men, others divide them ; they may also conflict with one another or may be "insulated" from each other. On the other hand, he [121] considers that Marxist writers have often confused two types of consensus, consensus through pragmatic acceptance, "where the individual complies because he perceives no realistic alternative" (1970 : 425), and consensus through normative acceptance, "where the individual internalize the moral expectations of the ruling class and views his own inferior position as legitimate" (1970 : 425). For a Marxist, taking the position that liberal democracies are integrated through normative acceptance implies that working class individuals display "false consciousness". Mann considers that the concept of "false consciousness" is tenable if we demonstrate two of three things : that an indoctrination process has occurred, palpably changing working-class values, or that the indoctrination process is incomplete, leaving indoctrinated values in conflict with "deviant" ones in the mind of the worker ; and thirdly, in both cases we still have to be able to rank the rival sets of values in order of their "authenticity" to the worker if we are to decide which is more "true" (1970 : 425).

In this thesis, we shall be more concerned with the processes of consensus-creation and consensus-imposition at the level of elites than at that of the masses. There are many interrelated reasons for this emphasis : one, as Rocher (1968b) contends, elites have a crucial role to play with regard to the successful institutionalization of change ; consensus among them is thus the more important ; two, there exists data (Tremblay, Fortin, 1970) which indicates that, by the early sixties, most salaried heads of family considered educational development as good and desirable, as well as necessary within the context of advanced industrialism. We have great difficulty in considering this a manifestation of "false consciousness". Also we do not see it as simply a manifestation of pragmatic acceptance of the necessity of educational development : it [122] was also an indicator of normative acceptance. This is readily

under- standable if one accepts the following assertions : education has always been valued in French Canada ; it has traditionally been considered the basis of elite status ; the school reform implied the democratization and upgrading of education ; it could and did rely on a already well established meritocratic conception of the social order (Nicole Gagnon, 1970) and sought to equalize the access to education, and by extension, to high status. The Tremblay-Fortin study also indicates that French Canadian heads of family were unrealistic in their assessment of the type and quantity of education necessary within an industrialized societal context ; this unrealism has lead to an overcrowding of general programs, which in turn forced the Education Technocrats to lounch a systematic campaign designed to redress the balance between general and vocational education. Again, we have difficulty in considering this working class or lower middle class unrealism as a manifestation of false consciousness : traditionally, general education — classical education — had been de facto the avenue to high status and prestigeful occupations ; it is still the main avenue to money, power and influence.

Of course, one must make the distinction between the valuation of educational development and that of secularization or differentiation. It is one thing to recognize education as desirable and necessary in an industrial society, it is another to recognize that it should be under the authority of the State, "politicized", practical, utilitarian and emancipated from religious norms and values. In a sense, the strategy of the modernizers consisted in systematically associating the two ; political indoctrination was necessary for two reasons : one, differentiation and secularization implied the successful institutionalization of [123] a new definition of the State, as something more than the guardian of the common good ; two, it was necessary to neutralize the traditional elites and keep them from mobilizing massive support against differentiation in the name of the traditional cultural survival ideology.

A final point must be made concerning consensus-creation and value-generalization. We have proposed to view the process of consensus-creation as that process which involves the generation and diffusion throughout the elite-structure and the masses of a simple and general definition of the situation. We have proposed to view that new definition of the situation as analogous to a new language. We would like now to associate this phenomenon with that of value-generalization.

We have seen that for both Parsons and Smelser, structural differentiation involves — indeed, it is a condition of its successful institutionalization — the generalization or extension of existing values in order that the new differentiated patterns be legitimized. Values, it is assumed, do not change fundamentally : they are extended in such a fashion as to legitimize the differentiated patterns. We wish to contend on this issue two things : first, consensus-creation may be seen as a mechanism of value-generalization ; second, the case of structural differentiation to be studied in this thesis involves not simply value-generalization, but also a shift in the dominant values of Quebec society, this shift implying both that consensus-creation is of crucial importance and that it is a very difficult operation to do, since values are at the top of the hierarchy of control and thus more resistant to change than components of action situated lower in the hierarchy of control.

[124]

Viewing consensus-creation as a mechanism of value-generalization implies, it seems to us, that, within a context of partial modernization, that is, within a context where both pre-modern and modern value-orientations co-exist in the same society, political indoctrination — a mechanism of consensus-imposition by which one solution to the generalized dissatisfactions is systematically "sold" to the elites and the masses — will tend to be necessary in order to facilitate the shift in dominant values previously referred to. This idea corresponds to Parsons' and Rueschemeyer's contention that, within a context of late modernization triggered by outside forces, political Imputs are of crucial importance for modernization.

The reality of partial modernization implies that both pre-modern or traditional and modern value-orientations somehow coexist within the same culture and society. The breakthrough to a more complete form of modernity implies that the modern value-orientations are more fully institutionalized and that the traditional ones move to the background. Within such a context, consensus-creation or the generation of a general definition of the situation — in our case, the production of the "language of adaptation" — is difficult and fragile because it involves a shift in dominant values. It certainly increases the probability that the sequence of differentiation will bounce back and forth, and that some form of consensus-imposition will become necessary.

As we shall try to prove in the following chapters, the school reform to"be studied in this thesis — and by extension, most of the achievements or manifestations of Quebec's Quiet Revolution — was legitimized by the combination of liberal democratic values and national self-sufficiency [125] ones. It thus involved the further institutionalization of democratic values and the redefinition of national ones, redefinition which must be understood in terms of a shift from a strong cultural survival emphasis to an emphasis on societal self-sufficiency.

French Canada's traditional school system emerged during the French Regime and was legitimized essentially by Counter-Reformationist and Theocratic principles. It survived the Conquest and nineteenth century liberalistic attemps to transform it in directions more congruent and compatible with democratic principles. It remained basically unchanged until the end of the Second World War ; it was valued as the Nation's immunizing mechanism against anglicization and protestant!zation. As we shall also attempt to demonstrate, this type of legitimation operated most clearly for classical colleges and seminaries and especially after Confederation when French Canadian nationalism becomes strongly defensive because of the minorization of French Canada within Confederation. Our case illustrates Rueschemeyer's contention that pre-modern values may receive strong reinforcements by the very process of modernization, at least in the short run.

What happens in post-World War Two Quebec, is, we contend a dual process of resurgence of liberal democratic values and the difficult but nonetheless real generalization of national values and their transformation in terms of a movement away from a cultural survival emphasis to one on societal self-sufficiency. Both processes legitimized the Quiet Revolution, the changes in the polity and in the fiduciary institutions. The school reform was implemented both in the name of liberal democratic values and in the name of the French Canadian national interest : [126] it was defined as a national urgency as well as a democratic revolution.

No student of French Canada would consider national ism and traditionali sm to be something less than firmly institutionalized value-patterns. Some authors have however contended that democratic principles have never been fully or firmly institutionalized within French Canada.

If this is true, it could be contended that nationalism had to be used as the great legitimizer because democratic principles were alien to the traditional French Canadian culture. Nationalism would thus be conceived as an ideological defense against the cultural threat represented by the institutionalization, within the fiduciary sector, of democratic principles.

Obviously, one can muster evidence in favor of this position : French Canada was originally a colony established by a France that had not yet undergone its democratic revolution ; and when the French Revolution occurred, comnunications between the two societies were severely restricted and censured. After the Conquest and later. Confederation, French Canadian culture closed itself to the surrounding world and took refuge in an idyllic version of its past, a past untouched by democratic principles. For Trudeau (1952) the recurrent election of corrupt politicians and the political mores of French Canadians during the years of the Duplessis Regime are also strong evidence of French Canadian weak commitment to democratic principles. More fundamentally, for Trudeau (1962), nationalism is antithetical to democracy. It is the English who have given to French Canadians democratic institutions : the nationalism of the latter has been such that they have used and abused Anglo-Saxon [127]democratic institutions, without really committing themselves to democratic principles. For Trudeau (1962), nationalism is not however the sole responsible agent of low valuation of the democratic ethos : Catholicism should also assume part of the blame. Catholic collectivities have, up to this time in history, he contends, never been strong defenders of the democratic ethos.

If there is unquestionably some truth in these assertions, they do not tell the whole story. For example, under the French Regime, the seigneurial institution never succeeded in firmly establishing itself : the North American seigneurs bore little resemblance to their European counterparts as the colonial administrators saw to it that there did not develop an important class of seigneurs with which they would have to share their power. The French Canadian settler was thus not really a serf in the European sense of the word but more a relatively autonomous farming entrepreneur, wary of his independence and self-sufficiency. Also, after the Conquest, there in evidence of the emergence of a French Canadian liberal bourgeoisie which, very much like its counterpart in Upper Canada, fights the British Crown for democratic self-

government. Historians such as Mason Wade (1968) have also shown that many French Canadians were attracted by the American revolutionaries and even helped them in varied ways. Moreover, as we shall have occasion to document in the following chapter, the nineteenth century was a century during which considerable value-conflict within French Canada occurred : anticlericalism ran at certain times very high, at least enough to substantially dilute the image of the "priest-ridden" province. It may also be pointed out that Quebec shortly after Confederation, did have a State Education Department. It did not survive long, but its short existence testifies [128] to the fact that Quebec's theocratic order was not at all times unquestioned and unchallenged. Finally, if the political mores of French Canadians during the Duplessis era hint at a weak institutionalization and internalization of democratic principles, it must be said that Duplessis, in all his years in office, was favored by an electoral map biased in favor of rural ridings and detrimental to urban ridings, the locus of opposition.

There is thus both evidence of a liberal democratic outlook and of strong theocratic values. If the second set of values were more firmly institutionalized than the democratic ones, we are not warranted to conclude that they were unchallenged or experienced easy victories. There is evidence, as we shall try to show in the following chapter, of a truly French Canadian liberal tradition. That it re-emerged after the Second World War after having collapsed at the end of the nineteenth century, does not mean, we suggest, that liberalism is a post-War phenomenon or that it is a "foreign importation", alien to French Canadian traditional culture.

Nonetheless, we have to hypothesize that theocratic principles were so strongly entrenched that the post-War resurgence of liberalism had to associate itself in the sixties with a traditionalism in process of being generalized : if the Catholic Church had assured the survival of the French Canadian ethnic group, the nation's interests now called for new and more adapted educational structures. We do not wish however to over-stress the importance of nationalism as a legitimizer ; we are talking of a blending of democratic values and of nationalistic or traditionalistic ones, which is, we contend, the essence of so-called contemporary [129] neo-nationalism. Furthermore, the mobilization of nationalism as a legitimizer of basic educational change must be put in perspective ; the change-resisters also used it extensively and more

importantly, in many other countries, nationalism has also been called upon to legitimize educational change, though not necessarily the type of change studied in this thesis. Americans, for example, have experienced feverish educational innovations after the Russians were successful in sending the first Sputnik into orbit around the earth : the nation's interests as well as the "future of human freedom" called for the mobilization of all existing American talent to catch up with the Russian space technology.

To sum up, it may be said that Parsons is fundamentally right in arguing that the production and diffusion of a new definition of the situation is crucial for the institutionalization of differentiation ; but we must seek to broaden and enrich our knowledge of how this is done.

We contend that one way of doing this is to view the process of production of a new definition of the situation as a political process of consensus-creation and consensus-imposition. We also contend that within a democratic framework, the consensus produced tends to be the most economical one, in that it is very simple and general and does not normally imply unanimity at the level of elites ; some elites are more important than others both because they have a stake in differentiation and great quantities of power and influence ; their consent is crucial and sufficient for the normal processing of the sequence of differentiation. If it is not secured, the probability that the sequence will bounce back somewhat "unexpectedely" is indeed very high. Then, a new consensus should be generated : if this is still impossible, consensus-imposition may be the solution.

[130]

We also feel it is necessary to associate consensus-creation with value-generalization. In this respect, we contend that consensus-creation may be seen as a mechanism of value-generalization and that the case of structural differentiation to be studied in this thesis involves not simply value-generali zati on but also a shift in the dominant values of Quebec society, this shift implying both that consensus-creation is of crucial importance and very difficult to the extent that it emerges within a context of partial modernization. These considerations imply that the probability that the sequence of differentiation will bounce back is very high and that consensus-imposition — by such mechanisms as political indoctrination — will be necessary.

PROPOSITIONS

This thesis will seek to verify the following propositions grounded in the analytical and theoretical elements put forward in this as well as the preceding chapter :

1. When the initial impetus to modernization originates from the social environment, the modernization process will tend to be partial and uneven, the more so ;

   a- the patterns transmitted by the social environment are high in the hierarchy of control of the social system ;

   b- the relationship between the social environment and the receiving society is characterized by colonial dependency ;

   c- the receiving society Is capable of resisting to environmental pressures to modernize.

[131]

2. While pre-modern value-orientations receive strong reinforcements from the very process of modernization, that process leads to their rigidification in the long run.

3. Partial modernization. In the long run, renders the interchanges between the modernized and traditionalized subsystems unbalanced and tensionful. If the economic subsystem and the societal community experience some form of modernization, both the traditionalized polity and fiduciary subsystem become ineffective and thus block further modernization of the more modern subsystems.

4. Since the polity mediates the economy and the societal community, its ineffectiveness will be highlighted by its incapacity to respond adequately to the needs of a modernized economy as well as by its incapacity to maintain a balanced interchange with the societal community, and especially, within a context where class and ethnic lines converge to some extent, by its incapacity to regulate the class- struggle.

5. Because the fiduciary subsystem is at the top of the hierarchy of control at the social system level, its ineffectiveness will be highlighted by its incapacity to legitimize a differentiated and pluralized societal community, as well as by its incapacity to legitimize political change and to produce the generalized commitments and highly qualified manpower necessary for sustained economic growth.

6. When both the polity and the fiduciary subsystem are ineffective, and when they are only partially differentiated, tensions between the elites controlling the institutions with political and fiduciary [132] primacy may become exarcebated. Conflict may follow and may take different froms. If traditionally, both elites have competed and sought to install their domination over the societal community, conflict may center about the consequences of the partial modernization of the societal corrmunity, and especially about the legitimation of the class-struggle. This conflict will tend to be a factor of generalization of dissatisfactions, in that it will increase the ineffectiveness of both subsystem elite.

7. When both the polity and the fiduciary subsystem are ineffective and when they are only partially differentiated, a value-oriented movement will tend to emerge and develop an ideology fostering greater differmentiation and modernization of the ineffective subsystems.

8. Elites, located in relatively modernized sectors, committed to and having a vested interest in the growth of the modern sector, will tend to participate in the production and diffusion of such a protest ideology.

9. Elites, located in relatively traditionalized sectors, commi tted to the maintenance of these sectors as well as having a vested interest in a tradition-based authority system, will tend to react negatively to the protest ideology and reaffirm the traditional one.

10. Groups, in process of inclusion within the modern sectors and experiencing upward mobi1ity and relative deprivation, will tend to support the protest ideology and thus enlarge the power-base of the modernizing elite.

[133]

11. The handling and channeling of protest and generalized dissatis-
factions will be facilitated by the existence of a relatively strong
and flexible political center and of some degree of structural au-
tonomy (at least at the role level).

12. Handling and channeling will be successful when the modernizing
elite is willing and capable of moving toward the political center
and risk getting access to power. The modernizing elite's willing-
ness to move to the political center, within a two-party system, will
be affected by the opposition party's relative electoral strength.
The modernizing elite's capacity to move to the political center
will be affected by its influence-base within the opposition party.

13. When handling and channeling implies that a modernizing elite
moves toward the political center and thus gets access to power,
the encouragement of the proliferation of new ideas stage origi-
nates from that center and becomes constitutive of a strategy of
consensus-creation at the level of existing institutional elites.

14. The modern political elite's capacity to generate consensus at the
level of elites is a function of : a- its capacity to produce (by simple
electoral slogans, two successive back-to-back elections, complic-
ity and support of the media) a sufficiently general definition of
the situation which leaves manoeuvering possibilities to the re-
sistant traditional eli tes who become concerned with the chances
of survival of the institutions they control ; b- its capacity to enact
effective policies (free schooling, acceptance of federal funds for
colleges and universities, measures to encourage and stimulate
economic development) pleasing to the relevant modern sectors
and to [134] all social classes ; c- its capacity to reach over the
traditional elites and directly to the masses, and thus to isolate the
traditional elites from their power-base.

15. The setting up by the State elite of a formally independent body
composed of experts and representatives of various institutional
sectors (the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Educational Prob-
lems) can be an effective mechanism for the proliferation of new
ideas as well as an adequate tool for consensus-creation at the level
of elites. Its effectiveness will be a function of the following vari-
ables :

a- its capacity to legitimize the State's claim to fully modern operative responsibility over educational matters. Its formal independence from the ruling political party and its independence of thought are crucial here,

b- since its mandate involves permitting the expression of interest-demands by diverse institutional elites, it is capable of diffusing at the level of elites a new definition of the situation and widespread consciousness of problems. It is not simply an exercise in democratic planning, but a mechanism by which a general definition of the situation is articulated and diffused throughout the elite-structure ;

c- it creates expectations and impatience for action. It pushes for change and differentiation.

16. When the general definition of the situation growing out of the proliferation of new ideas stage is sufficiently accepted within the elite-structure, the negotiations and conflicts between the traditional and modern elites at the specification stage will remain [135] within the framework of the new definition of the situation. If it does not, the sequence of differentiation bounces back to a prior stage.

17. When the new definition of the situation is not shared by some key elites, political indoctrination can be an effective consensus-imposition mechanism : neo-national ism, when properly used, can be effective, with regard to the Church-State power-play, in neutralizing clerical resistance to differentiation. Neo-nationalism has, however, one important drawback : it increases resistance to the consequences of differentiation from the Anglophone bourgeoisie and its educational establishment ; it thus splits the societal community along ethnic lines, more than along religious ones.

18. At the implementation phase, remaining pockets of resistance may be neutralized by a strategy combining political indoctrination of the masses and co-optation of the traditional elites.

19. Routinization, under normal circumstances, involves less strategy of political indoctrination and more activity oriented toward the development of vested interests in the new differentiated patterns.

[136]

CONCLUSION

We have tried to put forward in this chapter the specific theoretical framework to be used in this thesis. We have both centered our attention on the reality of partial modernization and discussed the political aspect of differentiation, somewhat ill-treated by both Parsons and Smelser. We have contended that, especially within a context of partial modernization, the political process of consensus-creation is of crucial importance for the successful institutionalization of differentiation. We have finally put forward specific propositions grounded in our discussion of partial modernization and of the political aspect of differentiation which will be tested in the following chapters.

[137]

Modernization and the Institutionalization
of Differentiation: The Quebec Case.

Chapter III

Partial Modernization, its Causes and Effects: the Reinforcement and Rigidification of Pre-modern Value-orientations

[138]

The purpose of this chapter is to verify the following two propositions :

1. when the initial impetus to modernization originates from the social environment, the process of modernization will tend to be partial and uneven, the more so ;

    a) the patterns transmitted by the social environment are high in the hierarchy of control ;

    b) the relationship between the receiving society and the social environment is characterized by colonial dependency ;

    c) the receiving society is capable of resisting to environmental pressures to modernize.

2. while pre-modern value-orientations may receive strong rein-
   forcements from the very process of modernization, that process
   leads to their rigidification in the long run.

The testing of the first proposition will involve an analysis and ac-
count of the evolution of Quebec society and culture from the days of
New France to 1945. Our discussion of New France will be rapid for
its aim is to provide the necessary background information for a subse-
quent analysis of partial modernization. The data to be presented and
discussed will try to show that much of the history of French Canada
must be understood as the "coping behaviour" of a traditionalistic social
and cultural system constantly reacting to exogenously produced dis-
turbances and pressures : the Conquest and later on, the consolidation
of the British [139] Rule from the Atlantic to the Pacific ; the American
Revolution and penetration within the lower Canada societal commu-
nity of liberal ideas then spreading in France, Britain and the United
States ; political revolutions in France which were conducive to the im-
migration and incorporation within the French Canadian community of
reactionary elements which reinforced and diffused the Counter-Refor-
mationist and ultramontain spirit ; crisis in the International Catholic
Church, including the attacks on the Papacy and the upsurge of ultra-
montanism, etc... The data indeed seems to support the contention that
French Canada was never really a closed society, impermeable to out-
side influences and the general evolution of Western society as it moved
onward from the seventeenth century. That this relative or partial
closedness fostered both the reinforcement and rigidification of pre-
modern value-orientations is something we shall try to prove in the last
section of this chapter by analysing representative ideological state-
ments produced after Confederation and legitimizing Quebec's tradi-
tional school system, and especially its Classical Colleges and Semi-
naries.

NEW FRANCE

Fundamentally, New France can be characterized in the following fashion : it was a <u>colony</u>, which implies that its economic, political and societal community subsystems were structured according to the needs and interests of the metropolis and that their development was greatly affected by the type of relationship established between the metropolis and the colony ; also it was, very much like the metropolitan society, a relatively undifferentiated society, typical of what Bellah (1964) calls <u>historic civilization</u> ; finally, it was established within a special type of <u>social</u> [140] <u>and geographical environment</u> which fostered a special type of Integration within the society.

A discussion of the colonial status of New France leads us to analyse the reasons which lie behind its foundation. To the extent that in the seventeenth century, France was a relatively powerful and rich state, with a large terri tory that was not too densely populated, the establishment of a colony on the North-American continent did not constitute a practical means to deal with overpopulation. It was not either, as Guindon (1964 : 139) points out, "accomplished by dissident groups seeking refuge from an inhospitable homeland. It was initiated, financed, directed, and sometimes stymied by the ruling administrators of the French Court." The idea was to establish a fur trading society of which the inhabitants and rulers would explore and claim new land for the Crown of France, develop and maximize the profits to be gained from the fur trade industry as well as cultivate the soil sufficiently enough so that the colony could be relatively self-sufficient in these matters of domestic economy. Metropolitan-based trading companies were encouraged by the Metropolitan polity to come and develop the fur trade industry. With regard to agricultural development, the seigneurial institution was transposed and adapted to frontier conditions. Historians — for example, Trudel (1963) and Ouellet (1972) — are still debating the importance of the seigneurial institution in New France and its contribution after the Conquest — the seigneurial institution disappeared in 1854 — to the survival of the French Canadians. It seems that one fundamental reason which lie behind the adaptations made when the seigneurial institution was implanted, was the metropolitan and colonial

administrators' fear of seeing emerge within New France a true class of seigneurs with which they would [141] have had to share their power. The king of France, argues Ouellet (1972), was at the time, wary of the French landed aristocracy and did not want the same problems to appear within New France. Ouellet writes :

"Il serait faut de croire que le Roi aurait voulu sciemment introduire au Canada une féodalité de type médiéval, c'est-à-dire centrer sur la seigneurie des fonctions et des pouvoirs qui incombaient aux agents royaux. Dès 1663, la crainte de voir se développer en Nouvelle-France une féodalité échappant au contrôle de la monarchie se manifeste en toute netteté dans la politique de l'État. L'évolution récente de la colonie et les préoccupations particulières des dirigeants français à cette époque de renforcement de 1'autorité royale imprimaient à ces craintes une allure de réalité contraignante.

Dès lors il apparaît que les officiers royaux ont pour mission d'empêcher que ne se développe sur place une classe de grands féodaux. Les recommandations faites à l'intendant de surveiller les ecclésiastiques, déjà trop largement dotés de terres, et les seigneurs laïcs, relèvent de cette vision des choses.

Désormais 1'intendant sera l'instrument des volontés royales autant sur le plan des concessions de seigneuries, qu'il fera plus tard conjointement avec le gouverneur, que du point de vue du fonctionnement du système. Il n'est donc pas étonnant qu'une des fonctions principales de 1'intendant ait été de régler les litiges entre seigneurs et censitaires, ni que le Roi ait voulu réduire au minimum les attributions des seigneurs en matière judiciaire." (Ouellet, 1972 : 92)

Thus, while the seigneurial institution was transposed in New France, the King saw to it that it was controlled by his representatives — the intendant and the gouverneur — and limited some of its powers, judiciary and military. According to Ouellet, the seigneurial institution never became the core integrative institution within the colony. Apathy and absence of seigneurs from their domain seem to account for the fact that the family and the parish soon became more important than the seigneurial institution as integrative mechanisms. Due to these facts — greater State control and seigneurial apathy —, ft can be said that [142] French Canadian peasants were much more free than their counterparts in the old-regime metropolis and became small farming entrepreneurs.

Politically, the colony was not self-sufficient ; the major decisions concerning its development were made in France ; most of its political rulers were not natives but part of the "lesser nobility orbiting around the court of France" ; of aristocratic culture and expecting to go back someday in France, they administered the colony in such a fashion as to ameliorate their position within the metropolitan polity.

If New France was a colony, which implies that its economy was organized according to the needs of the metropolitan one, that its polity was not self-sufficient, and that the seigneurial institution was more controlled by the State, of fundamental importance is the fact that New France, like France, was a relatively undifferentiated society, typical of historic civilizations. It will be recalled that, for Bellah (1964), historic religions are characterized by a religious symbol system which incorporates a dualistic and transcendental world-view and a strong preoccupation with individual salvation, a religious action system actively seeking to mediate the relationship between the individual self and the transcendent, and a religious organization which, for the first tlme in history, breakthroughs to new levels of differentiation in that religious elites differentiate from the political ones and in that to some extent, religious roles and collectivities become distinct from political ones. Bell ah contends that the major social implications of these developments are that religions can become change-agents to an extent that was impossible at previous stages of religious evolution. Conflict between the religious and political elite is now also possible, since both compete to [143] install their domination over the societal community. Finally, some kind of agreement between the religious and political elites tends to emerge, with the respective spheres of domination negotiated and bargained. Bellah writes :

"With the emergence of a religious elite alongside the political one the problem of legitimizing political power enters a new phase. Legitimation now rests upon a delicate balance of forces between the political and religious leadership... (1964 : 367).

The differentiation of religious elites brought a new level of tension and a new possibility of conflict and change onto the social scene. Whether the confrontation was between Israelite prophet and king, Islamic ulama and sultan, Christian pope and emperor, or even between Confucian scholar-official and his ruler, it implied that political acts could be judged in terms of standards that the political authorities could not finally control. The

These theoretical elements put forward by Bellah are crucial for a proper understanding of New France : if it was a colony, it was also a society in which the polity was only partially differentiated from the fiduciary system ; if political and religious roles were differentiated, the polity was nonetheless infused with religious norms and values ; the societal community was relatively undifferentiated from the fiduciary system ; it was integrated around the principles of loyalty to the Crown and to the Catholic Church, with the latter reinforcing the former and vice-versa.

To the extent that the metropolitan polity was also only partial ly differentiated from the fiduciary system, and that it was infused with religious norms and values, we should not be surprised to discover that religious utopian elements were actively present in the discovery and [144] colonization of New France. Bell ah's characteri zati on of historic civilizations helps understand why, whithin such a civilization, coloni-zation of a new continent cannot be simply a political or economic ven-ture : it is also a religious one. Thus New France was more than a simple trading post : it was a civilizing enterprise which sought to Christianize the Indians and provide the best possible religious environment for its immigrant population. The foundation of Ville-Marie, which became Montreal, is instructive in this respect. Indeed, Maisonneuve and his followers seem to have tried to establish within the "pure" conditions of a frontier society, a community strongly integrated and energized by religious fervor, while assuring its subsistence by family farming. Ma-son Wade writes :

"the destiny of New France was shaped by the facts that in the seventeen century, the great age of the Catholic revival in France, the renewed energy of the Church found in America an outlet from the restraints imposed at home by the dominance of the State." (Wade, 1968 : 5)

This "renewed energy" of the Church, if it found an outlet in Amer-ica, did however meet some resistance within the colony. Indeed Hubert

Guindon (1964) and Mason Wade (1968) point out that as the colony grew, so did conflicts between the religious and the political elite.

The basis of the conflict seems to have been two different conceptions of the social organization of New France. For the conception of New France as essentially a fur trading society or as a commercial venture implied "a semi-nomadic type of organization, the creation of ever expanding outposts, and the elaboration of a commercial complex." On the other hand, the conception of New France as an agricultural society rested upon the [145] valuation of frugality, hard work, geographical stability, family life and religion. This last conception was much more congruent with the Catholic Counter-Reformationist spirit as well as with the then dominant religious structures.

Neither Guindon nor Wade discuss the basis of these two conceptions of the social organization of New France. Ouellet's discussion of the seigneurial institution and of the State's willingness to control and limit seigneurial powers and privileges indicates that the metropolitan authorities sought to centralize within the hands of their representatives the decision-making powers concerning the development of New France. We would like to suggest that the conflict which emerged between the political and religious elites concerning the most suitable type of social organization for New France, expresses to some extent a struggle for power between the two groups as well as a struggle for the control of the resources of the colony. Indeed, if the Church had managed to impose its conception of the social organization of New France, it would have become the most important land owner and thus the most powerful economic agent. But as Ouellet indicates, the State elite and the King of France had other ideas and priorities : they did not want to be forced to share with a class of seigneurs — of which the Church soon became the most important element — the colony's resources.

It is within this context of a low level of differentiation between sub-systems and of tensions and conflict between the religious and political elites for the control of the colony's resources, that some important fiduciary and societal community institutions appear. Parishes are created, but interestingly enough, it is the political elite which [146] gives the necessary authorization. Also, in 1635, a New France of only 300 inhabitants witnesses the arrival on American soil of the Jesuit Order and the establishment of the first classical college, le Collège de Québec. The Jesuits bring with them the curriculum and pedagogy that had

been instrumental in educating the French nobility in the sixteenth century. Le Collège de Québec remained, until the Conquest, the only classical college of the colony. In 1668, Monseigneur de Laval founded le Séminaire de Québec, also identical to its counterpart in the metropolis : it was essentially a residential institution where adolescents attracted to priesthood could be taken care of with regard to both their material as well as spiritual needs. Most of the Instruction was not given at the séminaire : the students were sent to the Collège de Québec for their training In the classical humanities and scholastic philosophy. During the first century of its existence, 850 boys passed through the Séminaire de Québec.

Two reasons seems to account for the very early development of sec ondary and college education in New France : one, many of the inhabitants, and especially the colonial administrators and the high ranking military officers, were of aristocratic culture and expected to go back some day in France ; they also expected that the metropolis would equip the colony with the type of educational services offered in the homeland to similar social classes ; the aristocratic character of New France and behind it, of France, explains why secondary education, with its nobility and bourgeois clientèle, took the larger share of the scarce intellectual resources of the colony and why elementary education was no more than a charitable and philanthropic activity ; second, the clergy was said to have a crucial role to play in the development of New France : indeed. It was supposed to Christianize the Indians, staff welfare institutions such as [147] hospitals and take care of the religious needs of the immigrant population. More importantly, the clergy, and especially the Jesuits, soon considered the New France as an ideal soil for the establishment of a theocratic society.

It must be said that the founding of the Séminaire de Québec was not caused by a shortage of priests in New-France. Indeed, Mason Wade (1968 : 6) says that in 1663, out of a total population of 500 inhabitants in Quebec, there were already 150 members of religious communities! The founding of the Séminaire de Québec should be understood as an important step in the establishment of a theocratic society with bishop Laval and the Jesuits as its leaders.

"While Gallicanism carried the day in Louis XIX France, ultra-montanism triumphed in New France under the championship of Bishop Laval,

who vanquished the gallicanism of Governor and intendant and established for himself a position the Pope himself might have envied. Ever since, French Canada has remained a stronghold of clericalism, and very conscious of its spiritual dependence upon the Holy See." (Wade, 1968 : 6)

Thus, from the outset, New France reproduces, mainly by the activity of the Jesuit Order, the metropolitan form of secondary education. As we shall see later on, this type of education rested upon a highly developed and systematized pedagogical doctrine with strong counter-Reformation and Restoration elements.

Until the Conquest, le Collège de Québec and le Séminaire de Québec remained the only secondary and college institutions. The clergy was encouraged to staff and run these Institutions by the colonial administrators : indeed, in return for the performance of their educational [148] and religious functions, the Jesuits were given large territories that they could exploit as Seigneurs. The Jesuits and later on, the clergy, thus became important land owners within the colony's economic system.

If New France was a colony and thus not self-sufficient, if it was a society characterized by a low level of differentiation between its functional subsystems, it was also a society established within a social and geographical environment which, it seems, as the colony grew, fostered a special type of integration within the society and the emergence of a typically New France "we-ness". Three phenomena are important here : the presence of an Indian population and of contacts (wars, fur trade, intermariages), the presence also of British colonies and of recurrent wars with them, and finally, the rugged conditions of a frontier environment and of Canadian winters. These factors seem to have contributed to the differentiation of New France from the metropolitan center, and to the development of an endogenous culture and sense of belonging. The winters were long and rugged ; for long periods of time, the colony was cut of from France and had to manage on its own. Even within the colony, the winters isolated people from one another beyond the limits of the Rang, in rural areas, and beyond those of the parish, in more urban ones. The Indian and the British presence in the environment also fostered a certain type of integration, in that they were threatening neighbors. Dissatisfactions with the metropolis' lack of help to the colony in its dealing with its environment also fostered the

emergence of a New France we-ness, differentiated out of the metropolitan one.

The previously mentioned characteristics of the social and geographical environment of New France do not totally account for the [149] development of a distinctive French Canadian culture and sense of we-ness. Internal dynamics were also crucial : the adaptations made to the seigneurial institution, the apathy and absence of seigneurs from their domain, the peasants relative independence and autonomy, the appearance of the "coureur des bois", conflicts between the Church and the State elite for the control of the development of the colony as well as conflicts between some colonial administrators and the metropolitan center all contributed to the differentiation of New France from France. The religious utopian elements previously discussed also contributed to the development of a New France we-ness : indeed, they implied that New France was a much more fertile soil for the establishment of a theocratic society than France. Of considerable importance also is the fact that New France was a colony : very much like other colonies, as it grew, New France witnessed the expression among its population and its elites of a will of autonomy and independence from the metropolitan center, especially when the metropolis showed little interest and comprehension of the needs of the colony.

We may sum up our presentation of New France by saying that it was a colony with a low level of internal differentiation and a historic-type culture interacting with a difficult and threatening social and geographical environment which contributed to the development of a distinctive New France we-ness.

THE PROCESS
OF PARTIAL MODERNIZATION

Having in mind the relevant information put forward in the preceding section, we may now attempt to verify the following proposition : when the initial impetus to modernization originates from the social environment, [150] the process of modernization will tend to be partial and uneven, the more so :

    a) the patterns transmitted by the social environment are high in the hierarchy of control of the social system ;

    b) the relationship between the receiving society and the social environment is characterized by colonial dependency ;

    c) the receiving society is capable of resisting environmental pressures to modernize.

The verification of this proposition will be done for two distinct historical periods, the first starting with the Conquest of 1760 and covering the nineteenth century, and the second beginning with the Confederation Act of 1867 and characterized by the industrialization and urbanization of French Canadian society. It seems important to distinguish these two historical periods, because, during them, the modernization process does not affect equally the societal subsystems. Indeed, we shall try to document that the 1760-1867 period was marked by an attempt to modernize the L-I-G subsystems, as some form of democratic self-government was institutionalized and as attempts were made to differentiate the polity from the fiduciary subsystem. The stress we wish to put on attempted transformations of the L-I-G sectors does not mean that economic factors are causally irrelevant ; it simply means that, throughout that period, we do not witness major structural transformations of the economy : we are still in an agricultural and pre-industrial system. As we shall see, this basic fact does ndt imply that the English commercial bourgeoisie did not play an important role in fostering L-I-G transformations [151] and did not attempt to control the

State, so that it may encourage economic development necessary for the take-of stage of industrialization. The period starting with Confederation seems best understandable in terms of A-I transformations, as Quebec's economy becomes industrial, its societal community more differentiated, and as urbanization proceeds at a fast pace. Distinguishing these two historical periods and associating them with the partial modernization of particular subsystems, is necessary if we wish to ascertain the kind of response produced by the partially modernized subsystems during the first period to those transformed during the second period. Indeed, it is essential to a proper understanding of the rigidification of pre-modern values which shall be documented in the following section.

A. From the Conquest to Confederation

The Conquest by the British army in 1760 of the territory of New France did not, by itself, trigger the process of modernization. In many ways, the Britain of 1760 was quite similar to France, with the notable exceptions of language, faith and law ; the Conquest did not trigger major economic transformations — the colony's economic system remained basically agricultural, with business and trade responding to the needs of England instead of France — nor fundamental political change — the authority of the King of France and of his representatives was replaced by that of the King of England and of the colonial administrators he authorized to act in his name ; we are still however within both a colonial and pre-modern political framework —. The Conquest, nonetheless, had one major consequence for French Canada, a consequence which affected, later on in the course of history, French Canada's capacity to resist [152] environmental pressures to modernize ; it eliminated from French Canada's societal community an important segment of its elites and left it in the hands of the Catholic Church hierarchy. Indeed, after the Conquest, the French colonial administrators left for France. The commanding army officers did the same thing ; some seigneurs stayed, but mixed with the English aristocracy. According to Brunet (1955), it did not take long before the English bourgeoisie, supported by the English colonial administration, replaced the French

commercial one and achieved decisive control of local commerce. The Catholic clergy thus became the dominant French Canadian elite. If the Conqueror did not tolerate the presence of the most papist of religious orders, the Jesuits, sent them back to France, confiscated the large estates they had been able to gain control over during the French regime and closed down the classical college they operated, it nonetheless, albeit reluctantly in certain Instances, accepted to negotiate with the Catholic Church.

Historians have documented the sometimes tacit, sometimes open, sometimes easy, sometimes difficult transactions and négociations between the Catholic Church and the English colonial rulers after the Conquest.

The result has often been labelled the "aristocratic pact". Indeed, one must remember that, in the second half of the eighteenth century, London was becoming increasingly annoyed by the democratic aspirations expressed by the colonial bourgeoisie of the Atlantic colonies. Britain and its aristocratic class had indeed a lot to lose in terms of economic and political power, if the North American colonies were to gain their political independence. The decision process concerning the social organization of New France thus occurs within the context of a mounting threat to the stability of the British colonial empire : it soon became evident [153] that actions had to be taken in New France in such a way as to avoid pushing the French Canadians into the hands of the American revolutionary bourgeoisie. It soon was recognized that in order to do so, collaboration of the Catholic Church, that is of the sole elite capable of controlling the French Canadian peasants, was necessary. On the other hand, the Catholic Church was threatened by the new political rulers. By the end of the French Regime, the Church had not only been successful in establishing firmly its leadership in such matters as education and welfare institutions, but it had also become an important economic and political actor. As we have seen, it owned large territories that it exploited in such a way as to enable the financing of the schools, colleges, hospitals and churches it staffed as well as to assure the subsistence of its members. Politically as Guindon (1964) has shown, it had been under the French Regime, along with the French colonial administrators, the most important political group, well ahead of the mi1itary and the fur trade merchants. Guindon writes :

"Of the four institutions involved in the colonial enterprise, the administrators and the clergy became the dominant groups in the colonial social structure" (Guindon, in Rioux, Martin, 1964 : 139).

The Conquest threatened the Church's position within that type of historic or intermediate society : the Catholic Church had obviously vested interests in the maintenance of its aristocratic traits. To complete the picture, one must add that it was an Old Regime church : its value orientation, strongly Counter-Reformationist, was also strongly aristocratic and anti-republican. It thus had in common with the New British rulers an anti-democratic value-stand, whether it was the American or the French brand of democratic ideology that was perceived and castigated [154] as dangerous.

Thus, when the American colonies emancipated themselves from the British colonial administration, many French Canadians, spurred by their religious leaders, sided with the British army and fought the American revolutionaries. Mason Wade (1968) documents the Catholic Church's support of the British administration's fight against the American revolutionaries while observing that a section of the French Canadian community was indeed sympathetic to the American revolutionary ideals. He writes :

"There was much searching of hearts in Canada over the question thus raised. Carleton summoned the militia on June 9, after urging Bishop Briand to call his flocks to arms, which that prelate did with all the more willingness since England had just granted "the practice of our laws, the free exercice of our religion, and the privileges and advantages of British subjects" to the French Canadians. Threatened on the one hand by his spiritual leaders with the refusal of the sacraments if he refused to meet the obligation of defending his country ; and urged on the other to throw of the renewed burdens of the tithe and seigneurial tenure, "the irons of slavery which have been polished with so much care" in the fine words of Congress and to join with the Americans in the defence of liberty against British oppression, the French Canadian was undecided as to where to cast his lot" (Wade, 1968 : 68).

Thus the Catholic Church helped the British rulers stabilize their political oppression over French Canadian society and helped curtail the diffusion on Canadian soil of the American revolution. On the other

hand, the British rulers respected the seigneurial institution, the Catholic faith and the French language. It is quite possible that things would had been different had there had not been in the early days of the British rule the threat to the British colonial empire voiced by the [155] American revolutionary bourgeoisie.

That some form of collaboration or some form of "aristocratic pact" associated the British colonial rulers and the French Catholic Church does not imply that everything was for the best between the two political actors. Indeed, the colonial administration was an extension of the British polity, that is a polity only partially differentiated from the fiduciary system, dominated by Anglicanism. Anglicanism was the State religion. Within such a context, collaboration with the Catholic Church posed problems, especially when the Canadian Anglican bishop claimed a status analogous to that of his counterpart in Britain and when somehow the problem of the selection and nomination of Catholic bishops had to be solved. This last problem was dealt with by obliging Catholic bishops to pass by London before being ordained by Rome, In this way, the colonial administration effectively managed to spare the susceptibilities of both Anglican and Catholic bishops.

While the colonial administration had to accommodate both the Anglican and Catholic bishops, it also had to accommodate the English commercial bourgeoisie which soon pressed the governor to institutionalize some form of elementary or popular education. Convinced that widespread ignorance was blocking economic progress, the English bourgeoisie pushed for educational reforms which implied a higher level of differentiation of religious and educational roles and collectivities as well as a higher level of differentiation of political and fiduciary subsystems. How these first instances of modernization evolved and why they were blocked will be object of the following paragraphs. Suffice it to say at this stage that the impetus to change and undergo some form of modernization did not [156] originate from within the French Canadian community, but from the English bourgeoisie and the colonial administration. The fact that what was felt as needing change were pre-modern fiduciary and political institutions is also critical, since the place of the fiduciary system within the hierarchy of control implies that the institutions with fiduciary primacy are more resistant to change than others.

From the Conquest to 1780, education in French Canada had been very problematical : the Collège de Québec had stopped operating ; the Jesuits had been forced to fled the new colonial regime ; the few elementary schools opened during the French regime had closed, for lack of qualified personnel and financial resources. According to Ouellet (1970), it was first the English bourgeoisie which openly expressed the necessity of a system of elementary or popular education. Economic reasons seemed to have been important. Ouellet writes :

> "L'alerte en faveur de l'enseignement populaire vint d'abord de la bourgeoisie anglaise qui voyait dans l'ignorance du peuple une entrave au progrès économique. Peu à peu les classes dirigeantes canadiennes françaises en arrivèrent à saisir la nécessité de satisfaire ce besoin fondamental. On manquait d'hommes d'affaires entreprenants, d'ouvriers spécialisés et d'agriculteurs éclairés sur les techniques de leur métier. Seul un système d'enseignement adéquat pouvait compenser ces lacunes et, avec le temps, amorcer un changement de mentalité. Bien sûr, il y avait de nombreux obstacles, tant au point de-vue de la mentalité que de l'idéologie qui s'opposait à une solution rapide et durable de ce problême capital. Était-ce un motif valable pour ne rien entreprendre ?" (Ouellet, in Bélanger, Rocher, 1970 : 243)

Two of these obstacles were the Catholic Church of which many members considered popular instruction a danger for the faith and moral ity and the Anglican bishop concerned with the pre-eminence of his own [157] church.

In 1787, Lord Dorchester, the British governor, set up Royal Commission of inquiry into educational matters which had the mandate to cite the best means of promoting educational development for both the English and French population. It took two years for the Commission to fulfill its mandate. What it came up with was "radical" in its implication for the level of differentiation between the political, societal community and fiduciary subsystems. Indeed, the Commission recommended that there be established an elementary school in every parish, a secondary one in every county and a state university in Quebec city ; in that university, the Catholics and the Protestants were to be united and they were not to be exposed to any religious training. Mason Wade (1968) writes about the proposed plan :

"It called for free parochial schools, with a system of free county secondary schools, whose curriculum would include such practical matters as book-keeping and surveying. A university was to complete the educational structure. Theology was to be excluded, in order that both French and English might attend the same institution, whose governors was to include the Catholic and Anglican Bishops, an equal number of prominent laymen of each faith, and the judges. Haldimand's library was to be taken over for the new university, which was to be housed in the Jesuit College at Quebec. A portion of the revenues of the Jesuit estates was to serve as an initial endowment, to be completed by private contributions. Smith anticipated that such a university would make Quebec the intellectual capital of British North America, and that it might even attrack American students, through "the opportunity of acquiring one of the most universal languages of Europe." In contrast to the past, when education had been a monopoly of the church, the new system "would follow a single principle under the watchful eye of the Crown", as Dorchester wrote to Grenville." (Wade, 1968 : 85)

[158]

The plan was never implemented : although the political elites supported it, both the Anglican and Catholic bishops managed to block it. For the plan was certainly quite "radical" and modern in spirit : it fostered a greater differentiation between the polity and the fiduciary system ; it implied that both religions would be equal before the law and it also implied a movement toward pluralization of the societal community, since it sought to establish one school system for both the French and the English and a school system which could be used to develop societal solidarity beyond ethnic lines. The plan was also grounded in modern values in that it stressed the need to develop relevant commitments and skills necessary for economic development : schools were not seen solely as agencies for socialization Into a religious faith and upper class culture, but as functionally Important for the rationalization of agricultural production and the development of business and trade. This emphasis on instrumental concerns was also new and alien to a pre-modern society and culture. Finally, the plan fostered the institutionalization of the equality of opportunity principle, since both elementary and secondary education would be free and accessible to all children.

The plan thus fostered the transformation of pre-modern fiduciary institutions and values. Since societal values are at the top of hierarchy of control of the social system, we should expect considerable

resistance. Since also the plan was put forward by the English governor, we should also expect resistance to the extent that it could easily be castigated as dangerous for the integrity of the French Canadian community, homogenous in religious and linguistic terms.

The plan, in fact, did stir up an Important value-conflict that [159] opposed the Catholic and Anglican bishops, committed to and having a vested interest in pre-modern political and fiduciary institutions, to the British colonial administration. Monseigneur Hubert, the Archibishop of Quebec, led the Catholic opposition. He felt it was dangerous to see secondary education in the hands of "men without prejudices". For Monseigneur Hubert, a man without prejudices is "a man opposed to all principles of religion, who pretends to have his conduct governed by natural law, but rapidly becomes without any morality, without any subordination to laws, which is nevertheless necessary to have respected by youth, if we want it trained for the good". The Archibishop of Quebec proposed, instead of an "unprejudiced" university, that the Jesuit Collège de Québec be reopened and permitted to pursue its original goals.

The Anglican Bishop also opposed the Dorchester's reform. Mason Wade (1968) writes :

> "The Anglican Bishop Inglis, who considered Quebec "a French colony with an English garnison", found the plan too kindly to the French Canadians and too indifferent to the rightful preeminence of his "national church." (Wade, 1968 : 85)

Although both Anglican and Catholic bishops opposed the proposed educational structures. Mason Wade (1968) notes that some sectors of the French Canadian societal community did support it, including members of the Catholic Church ; indeed,

> "the establishment of a none sectarian state university was supported by a petition of October 31, 1790, which bore the signatures of sixty French Canadians, including the co-adjutor Bishop Bailly de Messein, the provincial of the Franciscains, and a director of the Quebec Seminary. Meanwhile the Montreal lawyer Simon Sansguinet left proprety worth 400 or 500 pounds a year for the endowment of such a university. The Sulpicians applied for a charter for an affiliated institution in Montreal, to be known as Dorchester

or Clarence [160] College, which would teach the Humanities, Mathematics, Engineering, and Civil Laws, and which would be under the supervision of the Crown" (Wade, 1968 : 86).

Fernand Ouellet (1970 : 241-242) corroborates Mason Wade's (1968) contention of intracolony support for the Dorchester plan ; he depicts Monseigneur Bailly as a progressive, open and modern mind, voicing in French Canada ideas that were becoming current throughout Europe. Louis-Phillippe Audet (1951), whose traditional value-orientations are clearly implied in the following citation, goes even further in his assessment of the French Canadian's support for the Dorchester plan. He writes :

> "Comment expliquer... l'attitude d'une partie du clergé et de la majorité des laïcs qui se rangèrent carrément du côté du gouverneur, contre l'évêque? L'élite canadienne de l'époque avait déjà subit l'influence néfaste de la 1ibre pensée française et un courant voltairien pouvait s'observer parmi les plus hauts empanachés de la colonie. Le relâchement s'était introduit dans le clergé. De graves défections se produisirent même avant 1763..." (Audet, 1951 : 218).

The plan was never implemented : it never got the green light from London, which thought it was preferable to wait for the designing of a constitution for its Canadian colony and its division into two dominions somewhat ill-strategically called Upper and Lower Canada. The Dorchester plan and the debate over its main characteristics was however instrumental in facilitating the partial penetration within the Canadian societal community of the progressive and liberal ideas then voiced in the United States and the European countries. Obviously, these ideas penetrated only within limited circles —Monseigneur Bailly, says Ouellet, (1970 : 241-242) was severely reprimanded and attacked by many less [161] liberal members of the Catholic clergy —; their discussion in the seventeeth-eighties however prepared the recognition in the nineteenth century of the State's operative responsibility in educational development.

Let us note also that these ideas were imported. Liberalism penetrated the Canadian societal community because it was spreading in England, France and the United States. Very much like in these countries, liberalism was well received by the rising French Canadian

bourgeoisie, although, as we shall see later on, its competition with the English commercial one, was conducive to the subordination of liberalism to nationalism. The fact that liberalism was imported was however conducive to its castigation in the nineteenth century by Catholic bishops as a dangerous foreigh ideology.

While the British Crown decided nothing concerning the development of education in Canada, the Catholic Church continued to operate the few classical colleges which had survived the Conquest. Under the French Regime, the clergy had been encouraged to open, staff and run a college and a seminary by subsidies and land grants ; after the Conquest, it could not expect and did not receive from Protestant England such sup port. Although, shortly after the Conquest, the Collège de Québec was closed down, the Séminaire de Québec managed to assure continuity and offered the full eight year course previously given only in the Collège de Québec. Also, in 1767, the Sulpicians, who owned most of the land in Montreal, opened the Collège Saint-Raphael, which became in 1806 and is still today the Collège de Montréal. While secondary education survived the Conquest and the debate over the Dorchester plan, elementary education was, at the dawn of the nineteenth century, very poorly developed ; where it was, the Church had complete control over it. Education was [162] still a private religious affair.

The division of the Canadian colony into two Canadas, was accompanied by the institutionalization within each one of some form of democratic self-government. It was a limited form of democratic self- government in that, while the local bourgeoisie could be elected and control the legislative branch of government, the executive branch was solely in the hands of the colonial administration.

On the appearance of explicit legislation as a differentiated function. Parsons writes :

> "In pre-modern societies explicit legislation as a differentiated function is minimal, because the normative order is mainly given in a tradition or founding revelation. Hence, the legitimation of a continuing legislative function is a distinctively modern development. With a good many qualifying complications, it has tended to require that the legislative process should actively involve the societal community through a system of representation. The trend has been to make the power to legislate contingent upon the legislators' interaction with the interested elements of the community,

> ultimately the total electorate in most modern societies. Indeed, a similar contingency generally applies to occupants of executive authority. The changeability of the law, which has resulted from these developments, has made it particularly important to have differentiated provision for concern with the "constitutionality" of law" (Parsons, 1971 : 19).

We may add that the legitimation of a continuing legislative function testifies of a high degree of differentiation between the societal community and the polity as well as of the secularization and ratio nalization of the societal normative framework.

How French Canadians reacted and adapted to the institutionalization of explicit legislation as a differentiated function and to the [163] institutionalization of some form of democratic self-government can be best illustrated by a discussion of the politics surrounding the renewed attempts made by the colonial governor, again pressed by the English commercial bourgeoisie, to institutionalize some form of elementary or popular education during the first decades of the nineteeth century. How these transformations fostered the emergence onto the political scene of a French Canadian bourgeoisie and how this bourgeoisie used the existing democratic institutions is something we shall also try to document, because it constitutes an important indicator of the partial penetration within French Canada of liberal democratic ideals.

In 1801, the governor of Lower Canada makes a second attempt to establish a public school system and puts forward a bill creating the Royal Institution for the Advancement of Learning. This bill authorized the governor to name in each parish people responsible for the construction and organization of schools, to hire teachers and determine their salaries and name the members of the Royal Institution who were supposed to administer on his behalf the school system. Proposed to satisfy the English demand for elementary education, the Royal Institution was not accountable to the Lower Canada democratically elected Assembly, but directly to the governor. Again the debate over the Royal Institution concerned the issues of religion and liberalism. This time, however, French Canadian national ism was also openly voiced. Catholic bishops denounced the Royal Institution as essentially a Protestant enterprise. French Canadian liberal nationalists also opposed it, but for different reasons : it was seen as an English enterprise, since it was accountable to the governor and not to Lower Canada's elected Assembly. Ouellet

(1970) makes the point that French Canadian liberal nationalists op-
posed the idea not [164] for religious reasons, but for nationalist ones ;

> "La loi de 1801 sera aussi remise en question par le groupe nationaliste et canadien français. Ce ne sont pas les droits de l'État qu'on conteste, c'est le rôle de l'exécutif dans la gestion de 1'éducation. Pour les patriotes, 1'édu-cation est principalement affaire de nationalité, par conséquent Véxécutif ne doit avoir autorité que sur les écoles anglaises, le contrôle sur les écoles primaires françaises devant être accordées à la chambre de 1'Assemblée considérée comme la représentation nationale." (Ouellet, in Bélanger, Ro-cher, 1970 : 245)

Thus, three forces fought for the control of educational devel op-ment in Lower Canada as well as for the control of the political institu-tions : a) the colonial administration, controlling the executive branch of government and supported by the English local bourgeoisie, which sought to establish firmly its position both within the polity and within education ; b) the French Canadian bourgeoisie, both nationalist and liberal, which sought to enlarge the prerogatives of the Assembly which it controlled ; c) the Catholic Church which strongly resisted any kind of differentiation and State operative responsibility over educational matters.

According to the Parent Commission (1965 : 4-6), few French par-ishes — twelve at the most — had by 1828 Royal Institution schools ; on the other hand, there were by the same time, over seventy English Royal Institution schools. In the eighteen-twenties, new laws encour-aging elementary education were enacted : they all sought to facilitate the opening of elementary schools, but they differed in important re-spects, these differences being largely a function of which political ac-tors had proposed them. Indeed, the Catholic Church in 1824 was suc-cessful [165] in promoting a bill permitting that parishes spend a quar-ter of their budget on the opening and operation of a school within their territorial limits. These schools were to be completely autonomous and independent from any State control. In 1830, there were only sixty-eight such elementary schools in French-speaking Lower Canada. Both lower clergy apathy as well as financial incapacity limited the develop-ment of this type of elementary school. The strategy was however quite clear : the Catholic Church sought to gain some control over a level of

education that the French Canadian liberals as well as the governor wanted to see developed. Ouellet (1970) documents the fact that the Catholic clergy was, in no way comparable to the other two actors, an ardent propagator of elementary education ; he writes :

> "On ne doit pas oublier, si on veut comprendre le retard de 1'intervention positive et systématique du clergé dans 1'instruction primaire, qu' au dix-neuvième siècle beaucoup de curés et de laïcs voyaient dans l'instruction du peuple un danger pour sa foi et pour ses moeurs" (Ouellet, in Bélanger, Rocher, 1970 : 249).

The Catholic clergy thus seems to have been not the initiator of some form of popular elementary education, but the reactor to its initiation by the State and French Canadian liberals. Most of its efforts were indeed at the time concentrated in the consolidation and expansion of secondary and college education, mainly for two reasons : as Ouellet (1970 : 249) has indicated, elementary education was not seen by most clergymen as a good thing ; also, had the clergy wanted to initiate and control a completely developed elementary level school system, it did not have the staff to do so and could only increase it by concentrating its scarce energies and resources on secondary education, which it could do because its control over secondary education was not at the time at stake. [166] We must remember that, after the Conquest, the Catholic Church of Canada was not capable of getting from France priests and nuns : the British administration opposed it, and considered the Canadian born priests less "dangerous" than the French ones. The Catholic Church was thus, after the Conquest, in a somewhat difficult position : the classical colleges and the seminaries became its most important source of recruits.

While the Church was successful in getting recognized by the law of 1824 its right to establish elementary schools, the French Canadian liberals succeeded in 1829 in getting passed a bill facilitating the creation of "Assembly schools" : the bill stated that in every parish, a School Board could be elected and cçuld administer elementary schools, under the supervision of the legislature which was to subsidize these School Boards. The "Assembly schools" spread rapidly in French-speaking lower Canada : in 1835, there were 1372 of them in operation.

On the face of the statistics previously mentioned, one could argue that the political actor most successful was the group of French Canadian liberals. These statistics could be interpretated in terms of penetration within the French Canadian societal community of liberalistic ideas. In a sense, this is true and goes far to dispell the idea that French Canadian elites and habitants opposed elementary education, while the English did not. The liberal vitality and educational victory were however short lived. The law concerning the Assembly schools was not renewed. Ouellet (1970) concludes :

> "L'expérience de L'Institution Royale a prouvé les droits imprescriptibles de l'État ; l'échec de la loi des écoles de fabrique a révélé l'impuissance du clergé à contrôler seul le système scolaire, tandis que le non-renouvellement de la législation sur les écoles de l'Assemblée, grSce aux [167] efforts de l'Évêque de Montréal et de l'Exécutif, manifestait, après tout 1'éclat des premières réussites, la faiblesse de la bourgeoisie canadienne française. Jusqu'en 1856, 1'école demeurera un objet de dispute plus ou moins voilé entre l'État et l'Église. Ce n'est qu'à partir de cette date, avec la création du Conseil de 1'instruction publique, que l'Église reprendra, imparfaitement il est vrai, le terrain perdu. Désormais, son autorité ne cessera durant le siècle de croître au dépens de celle de l'État. Pendant ce temps, le secteur protestant évoluera dans le sens d'un plus grand libéralisme". (Ouellet, in Bélanger, Rocher, 1970 : 255).

The failure of the Patriots' rebellion in 1837 is of fundamental importance here : it marked the failure of the French Canadian bourgeoisie to gain control over the Lower Canada polity and increased the power of the Catholic Church within that polity. Ouellet (1970 : 253-256) argues convincingly that as the nineteenth century rolled on, the battle over the control of educational institutions was won by the Catholic clergy, which means that it remained an important political and fiduciary elite, effectively resisting pressures for differentiation. It seems that the French Canadian liberal bourgeoisie was not politically strong enough to supersede both the English colonial administration and the Catholic clergy, and thus ineffective in institutionalizing differentiation. Ouellet (1970 : 246-248) states that the emergence and articulation of a nationalistic ideology within the ranks of the French Canadian bourgeoisie was associated more with liberalism than with Catholic fundamentalism. It was the ideology of a rising bourgeoisie happy at

having gained ascendancy in the Lower Canada Assembly, but frustrated, very much like its counterpart in Upper Canada, by the political tutelage of the English governor and back of it, the British Crown. That its nationalism became later on closely associated with Catholicism seems to have been facilitated by [168] the failure of the Patriots' rebellion in 1837 and the subsequent reinforcement of the clergy's position within the Lower Canada polity and societal community.

Though the value conflicts over the development of elementary education resulted in the recognition of the State's responsibility in these matters, the nineteenth century saw this responsibility become limited only to financial support : all major educational decisions, from teacher training to curriculum design and supervision, were left to the Church and stipulated by law to be that way. Two schools systems, largely autonomous and closed to one another, became institutionalized : one Protestant or English, and one Catholic or French.

We can thus only talk of the partial modernization and differentiation of the Lower Canada political, societal community and fiduciary subsystems. The fact that the impetus to modernize originated from outside the French Canadian societal community, that it involved the institutionalization of liberalistic values and of thus components of action high in the hierarchy of control, and that the Catholic Church had a sufficient power-base to resist differentiation while the French Canadian bourgeoisie was ineffective in its attempt to supersede both the colonial administration and the Catholic hierarchy, and was thus ineffective as a differentiation agent, all help understand why French Canadian society did not fully modernize during the nineteenth century some of its basic institutional arrangements.

Nonetheless, we are warranted to conclude that the attempts to institutionalize public elementary education testify to the existence of strong value-differences within the Lower Canada community and to the [169] penetration, at least within the French Canadian bourgeoisie, of liberal iStic ideals. The image a "priest-ridden province" with its strong value-monolithism is not applicable to the reality of the nineteenth century French Canada. It did however become real with Confederation and the minorization of French Canada. But, for an important part of the nineteenth century, liberal ideas were openly expressed and hotly debated in French Canada. The Catholic Church was not the undisputed defini tor of the collective situation.

Rocher and Dumont (1964) write :

"This picture of the religious unity of French Canada is of recent origin. As with our nationalism (this coincidence should be remembered), it is only at the end of the last century that this image seems to have become cristallized. The more one studies our history during the nineteenth century, still not sufficiently well know, the more one realizes the complexity of the religious questions of this period and the divisions in the national consciousness to which they gave rise. Religious struggles rather than religious unity seem to have been very much the dominant factor during the nineteenth century." (Rocher, Dumont, in Rioux, Martin, 1964 : 187)

Moreover,

"An intellectual, liberal and anti-clerical bourgeoisie was in opposition to the whole of the clergy. There is a tendency in French Canada to ignore the extent to which the Canadian clergy was rudely attacked by the newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets, and even by the whole of a political party, during nearly half a century... This militant anti-clerical ism was particularly evident in the Institut Canadien de Montréal, a type of discussion center that brought together liberal intellectuals. The Institut Canadien developed so rapidly that it came to own a four story building comprising a library, lecture and conference halls, and study. It was finally condemned by the Bishop of Montreal in 1869, and broke up a short time later" (Rocher, Dumont, in Rioux, Martin, 1964 : 198).

[170]

While Monseigneur Plessis, in a letter cited by Louis-Philippe Audet (1951 : 217), sadly reflected in 1805 on the fact that "la haute classe des Catholiques, conseillers, juges, avocats, marchands de quelque crédits, n'est point en général ami du clergé," Bishop Bourget in 1858, according to Mason Wade (1968 : 344), issued pastoral letters "in which he deplored the rise of irreligiousness in Canada as evidenced by "bad books, lying publications, and irreligious discourses." These religious struggles constituted an important political environment for the classical colleges : we should not be surprised to find in their official Ideology a strong militant Catholicism and clericalism, relatively unaltered until the nineteen-fifties. Since the Church effectively resisted pressures for differentiation, we should not be surprised also to discover

that from the beginning of the nineteenth century to Confederation, fifteen classical colleges were created. In 1832, there were nine classical college in operation, enough to be mentioned in Lord Durham's famous Report. Indeed, he notes "the too great abundance of means of superior education enjoyed by the French Canadians "while" there exists at present no means of college instruction for the protestants in the province!" (Durham, 1902 : 66-67).

B. Confederation, Industrialization and Urbanization ;

If during the nineteenth century, French Canadian society was torn apart by value conflicts centering about the differentiation of its subsystems. Confederation, industrialization and urbanization had a profound impact on its still relatively undifferentiated subsystems.

Confederation had three basic consequences: a) it reduced [171] Canada's colonial dependency vis-à-vis England ; it defined and institutionalized clear boundaries for the Canadian political subsystem, with England now being constitutive of the social environment ; b) it provided a constitutional framework within which economic development could be fostered, encouraged and controlled by one central government ; the division of powers embobied in the British North America Act between the federal and provincial polities illustrates the kind of goals which seem to have been pursued by the Fathers of Confederation ; indeed, the fact that most of the tools effective in fostering, encouraging and controlling economic development were put into the hands of the federal government indicates that the Fathers of Confederation sought to create a federal polity endowed with sufficient powers so that it could be effective in fostering an east-west economic integration and development and counteract the pressures that existed for a north-south economic integration ; in leaving in the hands of the provincial governments the powers over their fiduciary and societal community subsystems, the Fathers of Confederation sought to respect regional, cultural and ethnic differences, without however sacrificing their goal of east-west economic integration and development ;

Confederation can thus be seen as that political framework most effective — at least more than previous ones — in promoting the interests of Central Canada's English industrial bourgeoisie ; c) finally, with regard to the French Canadian society, Confederation had as an unintented consequence the retardation of the modernization of its fiduciary subsystem and the maintenance of the partial differentiation of its political subsystem from its fiduciary subsystem ; indeed, if Lord Durham's famous Report (1902) on the state of Canada after the Patriot's Rebellion and the Act of Union which followed, heightened ethnic tensions [172] in Canada, to the extent that Durham had been quite explicit In his willingness to see French Canadians totally assimilated, Confederation raised also similar fears : by the enactment of the British North American Act, Quebec was associated with three and later on six English Provinces. French Canadians now formed less than a third of the population of the new Dominion. Mason Wade (1968) writes :

> "The defensiveness aroused by this fact was enough to breed a strong spirit of reaction which contrasted strongly with the progressive spirit of the eighteen-thirties, eighten-forties and eighten-fifties ; and the development of this reactionary spirit was greatly furthered by the immediate infringment and violation of Confederation guaranties of minority rights and privileges." (Wade, 1968 : 331)

Thus, if the Quebec State became with Confederation endowed with powers over the fiduciary and societal community subsystems, it used these powers largely in pre-modern fashion. It soon considered itself, as Prime Minister Duplessis was fond of saying, the "only Catholic State in North America" ; it thus put forward as the fundamental collective goal, cultural survival. Within that polity, the Catholic hierarchy remained an important political actor and kept control of most fiduciary and integrative institutions until the end of World War Two. These phenomena illustrate what Rueschemeyer (in press) called the usage of modern means (for example, the legislation concerning education) to attain traditional goals (for example, the maintenance of low levels of differentiation between subsystems). It seems to us important to note that Confederation, as a political framework, facilitated this deflection of modern means toward the attainment of traditional goals.

With regard to industrialization, the definition and institutionaliza-
tion [173] of provincial political subsystem boundaries also facilitated
the emergence and consolidation within Quebec's polity of what has
been labelled the Holy Alliance, that is the structuring of the political
process in terms of the needs and interests of the Anglo-American cap-
italists, the French Canadian political elites and the Catholic hierarchy.
It put the State elite in a situation in which it soon accepted to play what
Rueschemeyer called an intermediary role between the Anglo-Ameri-
can capital and the French Canadian population. As we shall see in a
subsequent chapter, playing this intermediary role implied for the State
elite double talk and double action : although it officially espoused the
values of agriculturism and ruralism, and encouraged in varied ways
land settlement and agricultural production, it nonetheless let Anglo-
American capital, technology and entrepreneurship get access to the
Province's natural resources on comparatively very advantageous
terms, and used its powers to crush labour militancy. While it did not
officially espouse economic development as a goal and did not encour-
age the development of an endogenous capitalism sufficiently strong to
compete with the Anglo-American one, it nonetheless encouraged for-
eign economic agents interested in developing the Province's natural
resources at a low cost and in labour intensive industries. Short term
political pay-offs of collaboration with the Anglo-American capitalists
seem to have guided the traditional political elites. On this point, Boily,
(in Desrosiers, 1972 : 87) writes :

> "Ainsi, sur le plan de l'économie il semble que les rapports entre pouvoir
> politique et pouvoir économique aient été loin d'être égaux. Vulnérable, le
> Québec l'était dans ses structures administratives, dans sa puissance finan-
> cière, mais aussi dans ses hommes politiques qui non seulement étaient la
> plupart du temps en accord avec ce type de relation mais encore tiraient
> profit de cette dépendance. Ces hommes politiques pouvaient difficilement
> être autre chose que des intermédiaires, [174] Ils furent des intermédiaires
> satisfaits. Ils purent donner 1'impression d'être entrés en possession d'une
> forteresse politique québécoise grâce à la Confédération, peut-être même le
> croire : cette forteresse était en fait non seulement assiégée mais investie.
> Ils étaient les gouverneurs d'une place forte tombée sous le contrôle de
> forces économiques extérieures à cette société" (Boily, in Desrosi ers,
> 1972 : 87).

Most economists acknowledge the fact that the Province of Quebec experienced its take-off phase of industrialization after Confederation and precisely between 1896 and 1918 (Raynauld, 1961 : 65). What is however central for our discussion is the fact that it was not initiated, financed and controlled by French Canadians, but resulted from the expansion of Anglo-American capitalism. Though there remains gaps in our knowledge of the economic history of the Province of Quebec, there is sufficient data to support the contention previously stated about Anglo-American economic domination. Faucher (1965) for example, studying the 1918 1938 period, has documented the fact that the industrialization of the Province did not involve simply the investment of American capital, but also the importation of American technology, entrepreneurship and management. His study shows how little resistance from the political elites voicing the rhetoric of agriculturism emerged to block American domination of such important sectors as steel and coal, hydro-electric energy and pulp and paper. Faucher and Lamontagne (1964 : 258) also argued that Quebec's economic development was inseparable from that of Ontario and the United States, and that both had invested considerable amounts of capital, technology and entrepreneurship in the development of Quebec's economy. E.C. Hughes' classic study (1965) of Cantonville illustrated the action of these outside forces at the level of a small provincial town. Also, Porter's study (1965) of the Canadian economic elite clearly [175] substantiates the contention that French Canadians have not been traditionnally very numerous within that elite. Finally, K. Levitt's recent but rich analysis (1972) indicates that Quebec's economic development has involved its becoming a satellite of the American and English Canadian economies.

Thus the impetus to modernize Quebec's economy originated from the environment and involved the integration and satellization of Quebec's economy within that environment. It implied the diffusion of not only Anglo-American capital, but also of Anglo-American technology and entrepreneurship. All that was asked of the receiving society was the facilitation of access to rich natural' resources and the provision of relatively unqualified labour, since the industrializing agents came with their own management and specialists. This is an important characteristic of the diffusion process since it meant that, at least in its first phase, the industrialization of the Province did not imply that the traditionalized subsystems had to rap idly and fundamentally change. In a typical

colonial fashion, they could cohabit side by side with the modernized ones, the French Canadian tradition al political elite playing the intermediary role between the two. Within the economy, the patterns of ethnic division of labour illustrate this phenomenon : the industrializing agents and decision-makers were Anglo-American, with the French Canadian population either remaining on the land or working at the lower levels of industrial organizations.

The industrialization of the Province did not imply a sudden disruption of the traditional ways in yet another sense : the traditional agricultural economy was increasingly ineffective In dealing with population Increase. L. Gérin (1939) and H. Miner, in his study of Saint-Denis (1964), [176] have identified the internal contradiction of French Canadian traditional society, specifically a high birth rate associated with the relative scarcity of fertile land and the traditional pattern of land transmission from father to oldest son. Miner writes :

> "Land pressure alone created the structural problem in the society, and accounts for the necessity of change and some of the actual changes ; but an even greater amount of change is only indirectly related to the basic structural problem. The growing lack of land forced parents to seek other outlets for their children. The society was experiencing trial-and-error behaviour in an attempt to find a solution to its problem. The conflict between the old patterns of establishment and the lack of land was a gradually growing one. There was no sudden disruption of the traditional ways - only an increasing attempt to find other ways. All of the new ways involved dependence upon the industrial civilization surrounding the old culture. The diffusion of elements of material and non-material culture from the cities to the country has been a feature of this growing dependence of the latter on the former. Good unsettled lands becoming rare, one way of placing children was to educate them or to buy farms from farmers willing to move to more marginal land. These two possibilities implied basic social changes. Each necessitated capital in money" (Miner, in M. Rioux and Y. Martin, 1964 : 66).

Miner continues by arguing that the need to secure money involved basic transformations of the traditional agricultural system. It involved the movement away from a subsistence-type agriculture to a commercialized agriculture, producing surplus to be sold in a market in exchange of money.

It also involved the adoption of simple farm machinery and innovations like crop rotation and new methods of animal raising. Quebec' agriculture thus, as It could not provide work for all French Canadian farmers' sons, lost its subsistence primacy, became more dependent on [177] money and city markets and thus rationalized and commercialized itself.

If the old economy was ineffective in dealing with population increases — the birth-rate in Quebec was 35.5 per thousand in 1921-25 and 28.4 per thousand in 1941-45, while that of Canada was 27.4 and 23.5 (Keyfitz, 1965 : VII) — it forced people to migrate from the rural areas to the cities within Quebec territory as well as beyond to other Provinces and the eastern part of the United States. Firestone (1969) for example, indicates that although in 1871, shortly after Confederation, only 19.9 per cent of the Quebec population was living in urban areas, that proportion grew rapidly afterwards, reached 36.1 at the turn of the century and rose to 59.5 per cent by 1931.

[178]

TABLE 3.1

Per Cent of Population Urban [a]
Quebec and Canada 1851-1961

	Quebec		Canada	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
1851	14.9	85.1	13.1	86.9
1861	16.6	83.4	15.8	84.2
1871	19.9	80.1	18.3	81.7
1881	23.8	76.2	23.3	76.7
1891	28.6	71.4	29.8	70.2
1901	36.1	63.9	34.9	65.1
1911	44.5	55.5	41.8	58.2
1921	51.8	48.2	47.4	52.6
1931	59.5	40.5	52.5	47.5
1941	61.2	38.8	55.7	44.3
1951	66.8	33.2	62.9	37.1
1961	74.3	25.7	70.2	29.8

Source : O.J. FIRESTONE, Education and Industry, A Century of Canadian Development. Ottawa : University of Ottawa Press, 1969 : 29.

[a] From 1851 to 1911 the urban population figures refer to incorporated cities towns and villages of 1,000 and over only ; from 1921 to 1951 the percentages are estimates of the percentages which would have been reported in the respective censuses had the 1961 Census definition and procedures been used ; for 1961 the figures are those published according to the 1961 Census definition of "urban".

[179]

Those who could not find jobs in these growing cities moved to the other Provinces and to the Eastern States. Urqhart and Buckley (1965) provide data on inter-provincial migrations : in 1871, 43,300 people born in Quebec were living in other Canadian provinces ; in 1911, the number was 113,100 (that is, roughly 5 percent of the population) ; in 1921, it reached 145,100. As for migration to the United States, Lanctôt (1941) has estimated that the number of French Canadians emigrating to the Eastern States from 1871 to 1931 totalled 400,000.

The ineffectiveness of the traditional agricultural economy thus facilitated the penetration of Anglo-American capital and entrepreneurship as well as forced people to move to the cities where job opportunities existed in limited numbers, as the data on emigration indicate. The following table illustrates the familiar pattern of transformations associated with industrialization, the growth of the secondary and tertiary sectors and the decreasing importance — in terms of percentage of labour force involved — of the agricultural sector.

[180]

TABLE 3.2

Percentage of Labour Force by Occupational
Group, Quebec, for Selected Years

Occupations	Years		
	1911	1931	1951
All occupations	100.00	100.00	100.00
Agricultural	36.51	27.21	16.62
Fishing and Trapping	0.80	0.77	0.49
Logging	2.04	1.90	3.18
Mining and Quarrying	1.01	0.75	1.09
Manufacturing and Mechanical	14.36	13.57	20.84
Construction	6.35	7.66	8.71
Labourers	14.10	16.25	8.87
Transportation	6.33	8,03	10.98
Trade and Finance	9.26	9.55	9.38
Service	6.11	8.98	11.81
Clerical	3.12	5.27	6.13
Not Stated	—	0.04	1.90

1. 1901, 1911 and 1931, ten years of age and over ; 1941 and 1951, fifteen years of age and over.
Source : Census of Canada, 1951, Vol. IV, Table 2.

[181]

Since we shall have occasion in a following chapter to dwell on the acceleration of economic growth in the forties and fifties, we do not feel it is necessary to provide at this time further indicators of industrialization. Its source — Anglo-American capital, technology and entrepreneurship — as well as its consequences for French Canadian society mobilize our attention. Indeed, we have seen that the ineffectiveness of the traditional agricultural economy was such that industrialization could not be resisted by a society committed to cultural survival. The traditional clerical elites had managed during the nineteenth century to resist successfully the pressures for the differentiation of the polity, societal community and fiduciary subsystems ; admonitions and idealization of agriculturism and rural ism could not create new unsettled land and thus did not keep sons of farmers from moving to the cities arid working in the factories after Confederation. It could not thus block the internal differentiation of the societal community as new occupational groups emerged and developed and as a new stratification system, based on occupational achievement and economic success, also emerged and took form. Falardeau, writing in 1953, reflected on the transformations within and of the French Canadian stratification system in the following terms :

> "Indeed, it seems we now have two overlapping scales of social stratification, each oriented toward a set of values which is in conflict with the other. One of the scales perpetuates the traditional ideal. It recognizes the clergy as the supreme social group and gives priority to spiritual and intellectual achievement. The other also takes the clergy for granted but it is closer to the secular, economic scales of prestige prevalent in the remainder of the North American "money society". If one wanted a fruitful general research hypothesis, it could be suggested that two main significant criteria of class rank in Quebec today are : identification with, and closeness to the ecclesiastical power ; and [182] identification with and closeness to the political power.
>
> We must not overlook a third important criterion of status evaluation. It is closeness to, and identification with the English. Wealth, and the social success of which it is evidence, have often had an "English" and "Protestant" connotation in Quebec. More exactly, economic success has been evidence of an ability to master skills and dominate institutions which were historically the almost exclusive privilege of the dominant ethnic group" (Falardeau, in Rioux and Martin, 1964 : 119-120).

The patterns of ethnic division of labour and the lower class status of most French Canadians within the new emerging stratification system limited however the transformations and pluralization of the societal community. In its bounded collectivity aspect, even with industrialization, the French Canadian societal community remained basically integrated around traditional ethnic values. The characteristics of the diffusion of industrialization previously discussed partially account for why the societal community remained, in its bounded collectivity aspect, integrated along ethnic lines. The intermediary role played by the elite as well as the dominance of the Church over fiduciary institutions are also important factors in this respect.

Although the characteristics of the industrialization process did not imply the complete modernization of French Canadian society, it however strained the traditionalized sectors, as growing criticisms concerning the low adaptive capacity of pre-modern fiduciary and political institutions indicate.

Indeed, as industrialization and urbanization gained momentum, some French Canadian intellectuals started expressing the need to transform the educational system and especially the secondary level so that [183] the graduates of classical colleges and seminaries could be better adapted to the emerging economic structures. Léon Gérin, the first French-Canadian sociologist, voiced the complaint, according to Rocher (1970), that the Church's involvement in education was contributing to the mal-adaptation of the fiduciary subsystem to the needs of a modern industrial economy. Gérin argued that this was so in three respects : the Church had given too much importance and spent too much energy on secondary education, as compared to public elementary education ; secondary education was too general, impractical and too much oriented toward the recruitment of clergymen ; the climate in the church-controlled institutions fostered individual submissiveness, conformism and dependency instead of individual autonomy.

The Church's response to these criticisms was twofold : it recognized the need of professional training and of thus adapting to the exigencies of a modern economy, but refused to take the leadership in these matters, and asked the State to take the initiative in developing this type of education. Reacting this way, the Church clearly stated that

its classical col1eges and seminaries were performing such an important function that it could not accept that they be "downgraded" to the status of "manufactures" of qualified personnel. As Monseigneur Roy (1935) declared :

> "Outillons-nous donc, outillons-nous donc puisqu'il le faut ; fondons des écoles de hautes études pratiques ; que nos gouvernements suppléent à l'initiative privée qui manque de ressources ; développons même en ce sens utilitaire l'enseignement de nos universités. Mais ne demandons pas... à nos collèges classiques... de se transformer en usine où l'on prépare les apprentis de tous les métiers" (Roy, 1935 : 16).

[184]

This type of response — essentially the re-affirmation of the superior virtues of traditional fiduciary values — seems to have been in the long run conducive to the disappearance of the classical colleges and seminaries. Indeed, it did not imply the recognition of the legiti- mity of the new economic order ; it was fundamentally a refusal to differentiate the Church's involvement in secondary education from the virtues of the classical curriculum. The classical colleges became so strongly attached to that curriculum that, as Arthur Tremblay (1954) points out, a challenge to that curriculum was perceived as a challenge to the existence of the Institution itself. This refusal to differentiate the classical curriculum and the secondary level of education considerably reduced the adaptability of the strained system and was conducive in the long run to basic structural changes. Arthur Tremblay, one of the architects of the school reform, wrote in 1954 :

> "Depuis quelques années qu'on en parle chez-nous, ces deux questions sont à ce point devenues indissociables qu'on ne peut plus résoudre l'une sans l'autre" (Tremblay, 1954 : 1).

The Church's response, to the needs of a modern economy must be understood as a manifestation of the rigidification process of the traditional values concomitant to the partial modernization of the society. The reinforcement and rigidification of these traditional values, fostered by the process of modernization, will be object of the following section.

[185]

Conclusion

We have attempted in this section of our chapter to verify a proposition concerning partial modernization and the factors which may account for it. Specifically, we have sought to prove that when the impetus to modernization originates from the social environment, it will tend to be partial the more so the patterns transmitted by the social environment are high in the hierarchy of control of social systems, the relationship between the receiving society and the social environment is characterized by colonial dependency and the receiving society is capable of resisting environmental pressures to modernize. It has been necessary, in the verification of this proposition, to distinguish two historical periods, one starting with the Conquest of 1760 and finishing with the enactment of the British North America Act of 1867, and another starting with Confederation, the Industrialization and the urbanization of the Province of Quebec. Both periods contain evidence of partial modernization as well as of the fruitfulness of explaining it in terms of the variables put forward. Indeed, the data reviewed indicate that it seems easier for an active and interested social environment to modernize a society's economic subsystem, especially when the traditional economy is ineffective and when the social environment provides capital, technology and entrepreneurship, than it is to modernize the fiduciary subsystem and differentiate it from the polity and the societal community. The concept of the hierarchy of control helps understand why it is easier to transform agricultural techniques, make agriculture more dependent on money as a medium of exchange and get people to accept working in industrial organizations for a fixed wage, than it is to modern [186] ize a fiduciary subsystem, especially when the traditional fiduciary elite becomes, because of a historical accident, the dominant one in all major sectors.

The interaction between the variables put forward to account for partial modernization is also important. For example, the industrialization of the Province proceeded relatively smoothly because of the

combination and interaction of the following factors : 1) the Anglo-American capitalists provided capital, technology and entrepreneurship ; 2) all they asked for was collaboration from the traditional political elites who were willing to play this role and profit from it, as well as relatively unqualified and docile workers ; 3) French Canadians accepted working in industrial organizations for a fixed wage because fertile land was no longer available for agricultural settlement; the traditional agricultural economy was ineffective in providing a living for the sons of farmers ; they thus moved to the cities and worked in the factories ; 4) the ineffectiveness of the traditional agricultural economy in a sense forced the traditional political eli tes to accept to collaborate with the Anglo-American capitalists, because they could, by providing capital, technology and entrepreneurship, industrialize the Province faster — and thus increase the short-term political pay-offs of the traditional political elites — than if the State had sought to encourage the rapid development of an endogenous and expansionist capitalism. It must also be noted that Confederation, by centralizing at the federal level the major tools of economic development, was also conducive to the acceptance by the traditional French Canadian political elites of a collaborative role typical of a colonial situation. Boily sums it up nicely :

[187]

> "Ainsi par son origine sociale et les limites étroites à l'intérieur desquelles elle eut à agir, limites économiques, sociales, constitutionnelles, 1'élite politique canadienne-française pouvait très difficilement ne pas être conservatrice et condamnée à jouer un rôle d'intermédiaire auprès des pouvoirs sociaux et économiques dominants. Elle fut l'intermédiaire nécessaire, souvent contraint, souvent satisfait, à la gouverne d'une société colonisée.
>
> La seule ressource, bien à elle, qu'elle aurait pu utiliser pour repousser plus loin ces limites, pour y faire véritablement face, aurait été de susciter, d'entretenir une vie démocratique au Québec, afin de trouver — dans une société consciente de son âme et des conditions de son avenir — l'appui indispensable pour un usage réel du pouvoir politique tombé entre leurs mains. Des traditions déjà implantées depuis longtemps dans notre culture politique avaient faussé le sens véritable des institutions et des procédures de la démocratie parlementaire et empêché cette conscience collective" (Boily, in Desrosiers, 1972 : 89).

The elements of the traditional political structure and culture which Boily considers as having limited the vitality of democracy in Quebec are the following : the high socio-economic origins of the political elites — recruited mostly within the ranks of the liberal professions — the fact that, for a French Canadian, a career in politics has always been one of the dominant channels of upward mobility, the other being priesthood, and has always been seen as providing either immediate prestige or access to other dominating groups (cf. Jean Lesage's post-poli- tical career and the number of directorates he now holds in national and multinational corporations doing business in the Province); the inordinate importance of the partisan phenomenon which has absorbed traditionally almost totally the political phenomenon ; the role of the deputy conceived as a baron or seigneur distributing governmental favors to party supporters ; these last two characteristics being associated with [188] a low development of the State apparatus ; the inordinate importance of the "chef" within political parties and his close association to Anglo-American business interests and the Catholic hierarchy. All these factors have limited the vitality of democracy in Quebec. We shall have occasion to dwell on them more extensively in the next chapter. Suffice it to say for the moment that, in interaction with an active social environment interested in profiting from the industrialization of the Province, they have been conducive to the maintenance of colonial dependencies.

As our discussion of the value conflicts and ideological warfare dominant throughout the nineteenth century and opposing the English governor, the English commercial bourgeoisie, the French Canadian one and the Catholic bishops indicates, the low vitality of democracy in Quebec after Confederation can be predicted from these struggles over the control of the State and of such fiduciary institutions as schools.

To the extent that the nineteenth century saw the Catholic Church successfully block differentiation, and consolidate its position within the polity, it cannot be said to have prepared the ground for a truly democratic life once Confederation had given French Canadians a chance to live up to democratic standards.

Partial modernization also involves the reinforcement and ri- gidification of pre-modern value-orientations. To this phenomenon, we now turn our attention.

[189]

THE REINFORCEMENT AND RIGIDIFICATION OF A PRE-MODERN NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK

The purpose of this section is to verify the following proposition : while pre-modern value-orientations receive strong reinforcement from the very process of modernization, that process lends to their ri- gidification in the long run.

As mentioned in chapter two, Rueschemeyer's (in press) concern with partial modernization led him to identify cases where moderniza- tion, instead of pushing to the background pre-modern normative frameworks, actually reinforced them. For him, this phenomenon was in itself a strong indicator of partial modernization. It implied that pre- modern values and norms remained dominant, incorporated within an idealized and often messianistic definition of the society's past, present and future, as well as took on added vigor through the challenge and ideological warfare associated with partial modernization. Our case fits this trend, as the analysis put forward in the preceding section indicates and as the analysis of representative ideological statements to be done in this section will also document. Indeed, the previous analysis of the ideological warfare dominant throughout most of the nineteenth cen- tury and of the Church's effectiveness in blocking differentiation clearly testifies to the maintenance and reinforcement of the traditional norma- tive framework. In this section, we wish to complete the picture by pre- senting representative ideological statements defining and specifying the values and norms grounding the traditional school system, and spe- cifically the classical colleges and seminaries.

As mentioned in the preceding chapters, one of the basic idea [190] behind the Smelserian value-added sequence of structural differentia- tion is that of the escalation of dissatisfactions with a particular system's goal-attainment performance once dissatisfactions have appeared. The value-added sequence follows first the escalation process and then

seeks to account for the respecification of the relevant components of action down to their lower operative levels. Smelser distinguishes between seven levels of specificity of the structural components of action, the last three being labelled the lower, operative levels. The different levels of specificity correspond roughfly to different functional contexts. The pattern of specification is an L-I-G-A-I-G-A one. In the process of specifying the substantive content of the components of action of Quebec's traditional school system, we have found it difficult to work with the seven level schema and came to feel that our data could be best explained if organized within a simpler A-G-I-L schema, that is, within one which distinguishes between the role, organizational, institutional and societal levels. There is nothing in the seven level schema which makes the number seven of fundamental importance : working with four instead of seven levels of specificity does not destroy the basic idea behind the schema : we still relate the structural components of action to functionally important contexts.

For reasons of completeness, we have specified the content of the four structural components of action : values, norms, organization of motivation, and facilities. The following table puts in schematic form the substantive content of the components of Quebec's traditional school system, with a special emphasis put on the normative framework regulating classical colleges and seminaries.

[191]

TABLE 3.3

The Components of Action of Quebec's Traditional Secondary and College Level Educational System

	VALUES	NORMS	ORGANIZATION OF MOTIVA-TION	FACILITIES
L. Societal	Cultural survival; boundary-mainte-nance.	Conformity to tradi-tions.	Development of "Catholic" motiva-tional structure: emphasis on origi-nal sin, human frailty, salvation, grace.	Dualistic world view; rejection of world, notion of providence.
I. Institutional	Theocracy. Theory of Church, state and family responsibility in education.	Laws and customs of Quebec's tradi-tional school sys-tem. The legal sta-tus of Church hier-archy within that system.	Development of motivation to con-tribute to mainte-nance of theocratic order, seen as me-diating the pursuit of salvation and protecting the lan-guage.	Catholic and classicist educa-tional principles: ex. blossoming religious voca-tions needs total educational en-vironment.
G. Organizational	Elitism.	Organizational norms regulating classical colleges and seminaries: the codex juris Canoni-cls.	Allocation of moti-vation to priestly roles and religious orders-	Pedagogical re-sources: the Jes-uits' Ratio Studi-orum, the eight-year course, in-tership, sex-seg-regation
A. Role	Education as a call-ing. Dominance of quality and diffuse-ness orientations.	Competence in the humanities; submis-siveness to author-ity; religious ortho-doxy; respect for tradition.	The religious edu-cation: le "clerc".	Financial re-sources, tuition fees, donations, taxation of clergy, state subsidies.

[192]

Before pursuing our analysis of pre-modern educational values and norms, let us define and operationalize the concept of rigidification. Rigidification may be defined as a decrease in the adaptive capacity of a particular action system ; it may be operationalized in terms of the absolutization of the lower levels of specificity of the conponents of that system. Rigidification thus is different from the process of reinforcement to the extent that the latter implies that the higher, more general levels of specificity of the components of an action system maintain themselves. If the two phenomena are distinct, they are nonetheless correlated, to the extent that the reinforcement process often breeds triumphalism, which in turn generates rigidity. This is something Ruechemeyer (1974) misses and which we shall try to document.

In characterizing the values grounding the traditional educational system, we shall rely heavily on Monseigneur Roy's (1935) conferences pronounced at the meetings of secondary and college level teachers held every three years or so during the first third of the twentieth century. His writings expressed the core-values of the classical college as Nicole Gagnon's (1970) content analysis of the review "l'Enseignement Secondaire" from 1915 to 1960 as identified them, while his career as an educator testified to the representative of his thoughts.

We shall also rely for the characterization of theocratic values on Monseigneur Ross' Pédagogie Théorique et Pratique, first published in 1924 and used in all normal schools (Teachers training Institutions) until 1948 as a standard texbook. Though Monseigneur Ross' interest lies in elementary education, the basic theocratic value outlook he holds applies as well to classical colleges and seminaries.

[193]

It is interesting to note that there does not exist much ideological material concerning the values grounding educational activities in general and the classical colleges in particular, reaching back before the beginning of this century. The review "l'Enseignement Secondaire", for example, started publishing in 1915 and the conferences grouping the classical colleges teachers on which Monseigneur Roy's book reports, were first held in 1906.

As Nicole Gagnon (1970) has documented, the whole ideological edifice which legitimized Quebec's traditional school system, and within it, classical colleges and seminaries, rests in the final analysis on the valuation of cultural survival or tradition. Classical colleges and more generally, existing educational institutions, must be maintained and protected because they shield the societal community, integrated around the faith-language equation, against environmental threats. French Canadian culture must be preserved within North America because its French and Catholic origins testify to its superiority over the Anglo-Saxon materialistic one. Classical colleges constitute an heritage which must be maintained as proof of French Canadian cultural superiority. Monseigneur Roy's definition of the function of the University of Ottawa, which started out in 1848 as a classical college, is indicative of the cultural survival value-emphasis legitimizing traditional educational institutions :

> "L'Université d'Ottawa veut être avant tout une <u>forteresse</u> de haute éducation dont l'influence catholique rayonne sur tous les milieux où elle travaille ; elle reste quand même sur la frontière des deux provinces, un bastion de défense où la race canadienne française doit trouver armes et munitions pour les luttes nécessaires. Elle assure à tous les jeunes gens catholiques qui vont lui demander une culture classique, [194] cette supériorité victorieuse qui est celle du cerveau; elle assure aussi à nos jeunes compatriotes du Canada central ce culte de leur langue, ce goût du travail intellectuel, cet attachement à leur tradition de race, sans quoi les jeunes sont inaptes à continuer 1'oeuvre de survivance commencée par les anciens" (Roy, 1935 : 74).

Throughout the history of French Canada, it is asserted, classical colleges have been effective in performing their cultural function and in maintaining the cultural system boundaries :

> "Ce fut précisément de ces foyers que sortirent au 19ᵉ siècle les défenseurs politiques de nos droits contestés, des hommes suffisamment instruits qui pouvaient opposer leur esprit, leur raison et leur autorité à l'esprit, aux raisons, à l'autorité de l'oligarchie régnante. Allez demander aux acadiens ce qu'ils pensent de la création — malgré tout trop récente — de leur enseignement secondaire et de l'appoint que celui-ci a donné depuis 50 ans à la cause de la survivance" (Roy, 1935 : 114).

In 1925, Monseigneur Roy contended that French Canadians had nothing to be afraid of if they were to be compared with the Anglo-Saxon world and that the classical colleges and seminaries were there to testify to their high culture :

> "Et aujourd'hui, Messieurs, notre province de Québec devenue pour toute tentative d'absorption étrangère uen terre impénétrable, notre province mise en regard des autres provinces de la Confédération canadienne, n'a vraiment rien à leur envier ni au point de vue de ses institutions ni au point de vue de la culture générale des esprits, ni au point de vue spécial de la valeur de ces classes dirigeantes. Si l'on veut estimer la mise de fond intellectuelle que chacune de nos provinces a pu mettre au capital commun de la nation, et si l'on veut décider où il y a plus d'humanités supérieures dans les esprits, et où la formation des intelligences a assuré le plus de sécurités sociales, notre province n'a rien à craindre ni d'un tel examen, ni de si périlleuses [195] comparaisons. Et si elle est trop modeste pour proclamer elle-même ce qu'elle vaut, ou pour le dire, elle n'a qu'à faire le geste large et assez signi fi catif qui montre sur tous les points de ses horizons, la siIhouette fière de nos collèges et de nos séminaires" (Roy, 1935 : 104-105).

If cultural survival was the highest value and if classical colleges and seminaries, it was believed, had been effective in immunizing French Canadian society against the dangers of protestantization and anglicization, it followed that nothing should be changed, even at the lower levels of specificity. There is a correlation between the triumphalism of the ideology and the rigidification of its commitments to and investments in particular facilities. Monseigneur Roy is thus happy to report that the basic characteristics of classical colleges have been respected throughout the history of French Canada :

> "Nos éducateurs l'ont compris. Et depuis 1635 depuis que s'ouvrit à Québec le premier collège classique, l'on peut affirmer que notre enseignement secondaire n'a rien retranché de son programme essentiel, de ses traditions nécessaires" (Roy, 1935 : 106).

This loyalty to traditional ways must be maintained : no concessions should be made to contemporary fads and fashions :

> "Où nos programmes et nos méthodes sont intangibles, c'est à la racine même de leur vie, c'est dans l'esprit qui les a conçus et qui en définit les principes fondamentaux... ce qui serait un dommage profond, irréparable pour nos études classiques, c'est l'abandon des disciplines qui en ont toujours été l'âme et la force" (Roy, 1935 : 107).

Thus, the strong boundary-maintenance emphasis of the normative framework and its triumphalism breeds in the long run rigidity : nothing should be changed; what has been effective in maintaining the boundaries of the societal collectivity will continue to do so; all compromises with [196] "outside" forces can only foster the decay of the traditional French Canadian culture.

While commitment to cultural survival and to a set of fiduciary institutions of which the boundary-maintaining capacity was unquestioned and unchallenged constituted the paramount value, this value had been heralded most by the Catholic hierarchy. This leads us to the discussion of theocraticism as the belief that authority comes from God and should be in the hands of its ministers. This belief legitimized the Church's involvement in education as well as blocked the full differentiation of the political subsystem from the fiduciary subsystem. As Bellah (1964) has shown, it was also typical of historic civilizations in which we find a differentiation between the polity and the fiduciary subsystem only at the role level. As we shall see later on, most of the laws and customs of Quebec's traditional school system were normative specifications of this theocratic value-orientation. This theory of authority was best formulated by Monseigneur Ross (1924). Though he formulated it within the context of elementary education, it applied as well to the other levels of education. Monseigneur Ross wrote :

> "L'Institutrice est investie de cette mission par la délégation qui lui est conférée de la part de ceux qui ont autorité sur l'enfant.
>
> I. Elle est déléguée des parents. Les parents ont reçu de Dieu, et de Dieu seul qui leur a donné cet enfant, la mission d'en faire un homme parfait dans sa triple vie : physique, intellectuelle et morale. Quand ils confient leur enfant à l'institutrice, ils lui délèguent en même temps les droits et les obligations que leur confère cette mission divine. Voilà pourquoi l'on dit que l'école n'est que le prolongement de la famille.

II. Elle est déléguée de l'Église, l'Église a reçu de Jésus-Christ la mission divine de rendre aux enfants par le Baptême, la vie surnaturelle rachetée au prix du sang de Dieu, et de [197] développer cette vie par l'instruction religieuse et la culture des fruits de vertue. En confiant à l'institutrice le soin des enfants, elle lui délègue la mission divine de faire grandir Jésus-Christ dans ces jeunes âmes.

III. L'État ou 1'Autorité civile du pays, a aussi reçu de Dieu la mission d'aider les parents à remplir les devoirs que l'auteur de la nature leur impose en leur donnant des enfants. C'est ce qu'il fait en favorisant le maintien des écoles qui supplée à l'insuffisance des parents, pour former des citoyens utiles à la patrie. L'Institutrice reçoit donc de l'État la mission d'aider les parents dans leur oeuvre d'éducation" (Ross, 1924 : 14-15).

As this citation indicates, in the final analysis, it is the Church that should have authority over educational activities. If schools are the prolongation of the family, it is because the Catholic religion considers that parents have a divine mission to accomplish, mission in which the teacher is asked to collaborate. The justification of parental authority in educational matters is religious and not civil, theological and not democratic. Finally, if the State should have a say in education it is because it supplies the financial resources the parents and the church do not have in sufficient quantity.

Thus, cultural survival was the ultimate value grounding educational activities; when it came to specify within this framework relevant institutional level values, theocratic principles, typical of historic civilizations, were brought into the picture. Furthermore, within this educational system, the organizational activity of classical colleges and seminaries were grounded in elitism. Indeed, the legacy of the seventeenth century pedagogical ideal also legitimized elitism and an aristocratic vision of the society. The product of classical education was depicted as the intellectual and moral aristocracy which was [198] to be the Indefectible guardian of the nation's highest and unalterable Interests and traditions. Within this elite, the clergy enjoyed a special status ; it was the core-elite as well as the gate-keeper ; indeed, by its classical colleges and seminaries and back of it, its theocratically legitimized institutional involvement, it controlled the entry into as well as socialized the would-be elite to its fiduciary responsibilities. As Nicole Gagnon (1970 : 71-75) documents, this elitism implied that the hierarchization of the societal community was based on the personal qualities of its

members and that the conception of education and society was, in a sense, individualistic and performance-centered. The ideal French Canadian societal cotnmunity was thus symbolically depicted as comprising basically two groups : the elite and the non-elite, the educated and the non-educated, with the clergy topping and directing the educated elite group. Let us note that Nicole Gagnon (1970 : 86-88) concluded her content analysis of the value statements to be found in the review "L'Enseignement Secondaire" from 1915 to 1960 by stating that this vision of society had not in any fundamental regards been altered during that period.

There is still another important implication to be drawn from the symbolic representation of the societal community as essentially stratified along the lines of education : indeed, it indicates that within the traditional French Canadian culture, the legitimation of elite or aristocratic status was to an important extent educational performance and achievement. The French Canadian aristocracy was never symbolically represented as an aristocracy of birth, but as one of spirit or intelligence. Many factors can help understand why this was so : under the French Regime, as previously discussed, the seigneurial institution was never really [199] firmly established ; the seigneurs were colonization agents and the serfs small farm entrepreneurs. In this respect. New France differed from its European counterpart. After the Conquest, the seigneurs either left or mixed with the British administration and did not become an important group whose elite status could be legitimized by birth. Also, the Catholic Church, controlling educational institutions, had vested interests in this type of elite legitimation : if the educational attainment of a French Canadian served as a basis for his inclusion within the elite group, then, the clergy, by his educational institutions, became that collectivity which constituted the core-elite as well as the gate-keeper. Its influence within the societal community is obviously very great within such a symbolic system.

The school reform of the sixties did not destroy this individualistic and performance -centered conception of education and of the societal community. It built on it and pushed it onward : education is still conceived as the legitimate channel to obtaining elite status ; what must be done, contends the Parent Commission, is give all students a fair chance of using it, which implies that socio-economic barriers have to be eliminated mainly by the State provision of free educational services and

facilities. The meritocratic conception of the hierarchization of the societal community to be found in the Parent Report is thus, in a way, an extention and upgrading in democratic terms of the traditional individualistic one.

We interpret the phenomena of student inflation of educational aspirations, concommittant with the creation of the CEGEPs precisely In these terms of continuity of symbolic representation of the elite [200] hierarchy. It will be remembered that the education technocrats who worked out the CEGEP formula had argued that the existing labour market conditions were such that there should be within the CEGEP a higher proportion of students involved in professional terminal studies then in general, university preparatory ones. Otherwise, congestion at the top of the occupational structure would result. Students enrolling in the CEGEP thought differently : the proportion of students involved in general preparatory studies soon rose to that planned for the professional terminal sector. French Canadian students and their parents, socialized into a culture which had long held that elite status was a function of education, and more specifically, of general education, conformed to these traditional norms and values and overcrowded the general, university preparatory CEGEP sector.

Finally, at the role level, the traditional normative framework held that education was a calling, which implied that all educational activities should be organized around the quality and diffusion pattern- variables and that religion should permeate, integrate and unite all educational endeavours. Saying this does not mean that the actors working in the traditional school system were incompetent or solely concerned with religious socialization; it means that they were working within a relatively undifferentiated system and that the culture they had to transmit was not internally fully differentiated. The following citation illustrates this eloquently :

> "La pensée humaine s'élève ou s'abaisse selon qu'elle est ou non d'accord avec la vérité catholique" (Gagnon, 1970 : 65).

This is a very strong statement. Il implies that religion must [201] permeate and integrate all teachings. Monseigneur Roy (1935) characterizes, for example, in 1917, the proper pedagogy of history by

insisting on viewing its subject-matter as useful for the inculcation of the Christian principles; history, as an intellectual discipline, is not and should not be totally differentiated from religion :

> "De là, la nécessité pour le professeur de former, par l'appréciation qu'il doit faire des hommes et des choses, la conscience intellectuelle et morale de ses élèves, de n'omettre, par conséquent, aucune occasion de leur apprendre à juger les évènements, à évaluer selon des principes justes, et conformément aux données de la philosophie chrétienne, les multiples manifestations de la vie des peuples. Il ne doit pas oublier que la providence exerce sur le monde une action certaine, et qu'à travers les desseins de la politique des hommes il est possible d'apercevoir les desseins supérieurs de la politique de Dieu" (Roy, 1935 : 33).

Even, the incorporation of science in the traditional curriculum has a religious legitimation; it is seen as a recuperative mechanism :

> "Si l'on a beaucoup abusé de ces sciences contre notre sainte religion, c'est là un motif, non pour les abandonner mais bien au contraire pour que les nôtres s'y adonnent avec d'autant plus d'ardeur, afin d'arracher leurs armes aux ennemis et d'employer à la défense de la vérité les moyens dont ils abusent pour la combattre" (Roy, 1935 : 77).

The values we have identified as grounding Quebec's traditional school system and within that system, classical colleges and seminaries, informed in specific ways the other components of action. For example, the laws and customs of Quebec's traditional school system express theocratic principles. Indeed, before the school reform, a law held that all catholic bishops, whose diocese was in part or in totality within the Province of Quebec, were de facto members of the Conseil de l'Instruction [202] Publique and of its structural emanation, the Comité Catholique. These bodies had authority over all educational matters concerning the public schools, and not solely over matters concerning religious teaching. Also, all School Boards were confessional and the local parish priest had the right of supervision over the teaching of religion within the elementary public schools located in his parish.

The laws and norms regulating classical colleges also expressed theocratic principles. Indeed, the classical colleges were subject to the

"Codex Juris Canonicis" which contained norms concerning seminaries, that is, secondary educational institutions whose main goal was to prepare adolescents for the priesthood. We shall here extract the important normative elements from the Canon Law. Two things must however be clearly understood : the Codex Juris Canonicis specified the canonical framework for the seminaries ; it applied however also to classical colleges to the extent that they were considered similar to the seminaries, mainly because they also gave the last two years of the curriculum, that is, the philosophy years or those of the "Grand Séminaire" ; also, though for the Canon Law, the seminaries exist for the sole purpose of training recruits for the clergy, in French Canada, classical colleges and seminaries have never followed solely that goal : they always have accepted to play a more "sociological" or "regional" role and have trained students to elite occupations other than priesthood. With these considerations in mind, let us look at what the Canon Law says about the seminaries.

It states that every catholic diocese should, when ever possible, establish a seminary under the jurisdiction of the diocesan bishop. Responsible for the financial viability of the seminary, the bishop had [203] the right to taxe the clergy under his authority (taxing the clergy here means imposing the salary that the clergy received from the performance of religious rituals and sacramental acts). Furthermore, the Canon Law stipulated that the bishop should delegate his administrative responsibility over the seminary's temporal assets. Traditionally, in Quebec, this delegation of authority involved the enactment of a private bill or of an order in council by which the seminary was given a civil charter.

Canon Law also regulated other matters concerning the seminaries. It stipulated for example, that all internal rules concerning the seminary had to be approved by the bishop. The content of the curriculum (religion, latin, language of the country, scholastic philosophy, theology, law, etc...), the general pedagogical regime (internship) as well as teacher qualifications (teachers, it is said, should be infused with the "ecclessiastical spirit" and the best way to nurture this spirit is to have them trained within post-secondary educational institutions recognized by the Holy See) were specified. Finally, though the Canon Law stated that the teachers should respect the freedom of conscience of all the

students and not pressed them into the orders, the young seminarians, when outside the seminary, had to be under close scrutiny.

Thus the Canon Law not only defined the organizational norms relevant for the classical colleges and the seminaries, but also those concerning the roles of students and teachers as well as the educational facilities best suited for the attainment of the institution's goals. Within this normative framework, we should not be surprised to discover that the organization of motivation component implied the progressive [204] channeling of individual motivation towards priestly roles and that of the "clerc" or the religious educator.

A more comprehensive discussion of the facility components gains by refering to the Jesuit's Ratio Studiorum. In historical terms, the Ratio Studiorum, elaborated by the Jesuits between 1585 and 1595, constituted the founding block, in the facility sense of the word, of occidental secondary schools. It remained unchanged until 1832, that is, until the restoration of the Jesuit Order which had been dismantled at the end of the eighteenth century. The Ratio Studiorum specified the content of the classical curriculum, the pedagogical organization of the eight year course and student intership. Innovations in the eighteen thirties pushed for the inclusion within the classical curriculum of the study of the country's language — a strict legalistic interpretation of this change as well as of the Canon Law would have meant that after the Conquest, English and not French was to be studied in classical colleges and seminaries ! — as well as of scientific subject matters. In the eighteen seventies, a year devoted to scholastic philosophical studies was also added. Though the Ratio Studiorum did not have the canonical status of the laws reviewed in previous paragraphs, it was however closely followed by all classical colleges and seminaries, whether ran by a Jesuit Order or not.

Finally, it may be pointed out that the affiliation of the classical college and seminaries to the French Canadian Universities' Faculty of Arts which granted the B.A. diploma, did not, in the final analysis, change anything in the educational activities of the classical institutions. For all practical purposes, until the end of the Second World War, [205] the Faculties of Arts of the Province of Quebec were an assembly of classical colleges superiors. Quebec's Universities were also private denominational ones, with a pontifical charter and under the chancellorship of the diocesan Catholic bishop.

The Ratio Studiorum rested on the assumption of the educational virtue and superiority of the greco-latin humanities. As Durkhein has shown (1969), the key to the Jesuits' pedagogy was its literary formalism. The goal of secondary education was to produce the national catholic elite : the mind of this elite had to be disciplined by the study of the greco-latin humanities. As Monseigneur Roy argued :

> "C'est d'ailleurs, à l'étude des chef-d'oeuvres de Rome et d'Athènes que notre esprit a acquis cette discipline, cet art de penser et de composer sa pensée, qui est la marque suorême du chef-d'oeuvre français" (Roy, 1935 : 48).

The study of the humanities was seen as instrumental in forming able minds, capable of attaining the best fit between form and content or between though and expression. It was at the core of a disinterested or gratuitous type of education which did not so much seek to transmit specific and useful information as use any content to develop the student's intellectual faculties. In other words, the adaptive capacity of the classical pedagogy lied in its capacity to develop in general terms the intellectual faculties of the student. In true classicism, the art of thinking was undifferentiated from the art of writing :

> "Si bien penser et bien dire ne font qu'un, la manière dont quelqu'un manie sa langue révèle l'ordre et la sûreté dont l'activité de sa pensée est capable" (Gagnon, 1970 : 62).

The best introduction to such literary expression was said to [206] be the languages of Antiquity : Monseigneur Roy is very clear on this issue :

> "En fait, et sauf pour de géniales exceptions, rien ne supplée à la formation gréco-latine... Il est bien évident, par exemple, que la connaissance du latin est nécessaire à cette connaissance, non pas superficielle, mais "intérieure et profonde du français", dont parlait encore Monsieur Bergson. On ne manie le français avec sécurité que lorsque l'on peut remonter à la signification originelle des mots. Celle-ci peut seule nous avertir des libertés légitimes que l'on peut prendre avec le vocabulaire. La syntaxe elle-même,

en un temps où elle a trop tendance à s'émanciper, ne peut qu'y gagner à se souvenir des lois qui ont régies la phrase latine" (Roy, 1935 : 51).

Transposed within the North American context, this literary formalism soon became considered essential to the survival of the French Canadian culture; it became considered as an heritage that should not be disposed of in favor of another, culturally alien pedagogy. Here again, we find the absolutization of a pedagogy and thus the rigidification of the normative framework : changing the Ratio Studiorum pedagogy is almost depicted as a national treason :

"Nous, Canadiens-Français, qui avons mission de transposer en Amérique le génie français, nous serions vraiment coupables si nous allions risquer de perdre cette meilleure part de notre héritage en sacrifiant à des méthodes de formation moins conformes à ce génie, et moins efficaces, nos humanités classiques" (Roy, 1935 : 52).

CONCLUSION

This chapter sought to verify two specific propositions about partial modernization, the factors which account for it, and the reinforcement and rigidification of pre-modern values and norms.

[207]

Our discussion of the reinforcement and rigidification process sought to demonstrate how the case under study in this thesis fits well the trend identified by Rueschemeyer : the French Canadian traditional normative framework had a strong boundary-maintenance emphasis. All changes, even at the lower, operative levels, were represented as dangers and challenges to the traditional boundaries of the French Canadian society and culture. It seems that the forces which fostered the reinforcement of the traditional normative framework, also fostered its rigidification. Systematized and articulated during the nineteenth century which saw the Church successfully block differentiation, as well as after Confederation which marked the beginning of the minorization of French Canada, and the industrialization and urbanization of the

Province, the traditional normative framework sought to construct and maintain alive a vision of the past which became akin to a lost paradise. The Church had obviously vested interests in this ideological operation : the lost paradize was that of an historic civilization, in which the Church enjoyed great quantities of prestige, power as well as money.

[208]

Modernization and the Institutionalization
of Differentiation: The Quebec Case.

Chapter IV

Structural Change, Mounting Strains and Political and Fiduciary Ineffectiveness.

[209]

In the preceding chapter, we have sought to show how throughout its history, French Canada reacted to outside pressures to modernize and managed to maintain relatively intact a set of pre-modern fiduciary institutions. We would like to show in this chapter how continuous economic growth and post-War transformations within the societal community rendered the traditionalized sectors ineffective, and thus in need of fundamental change. Specifically, we wish to verify the following propositions :

1. Partial modernization, in the long run, renders the interchanges between the modernized and traditionalized subsystems unbalanced and tensionful. If the economic subsystem and the societal community experience some form of modernization, both the traditionalized polity and fiduciary subsystem become ineffective and thus block further modernization of the more modern subsystems.

2. Since the polity mediates the economy and the societal community, its ineffectiveness will be highlighted by its incapacity to respond

adequatly to the needs of a modernized economy and by its incapacity to maintain a balanced interchange with the societal community, and especially, within a context where class and ethnic lines converge to some extent, by its incapacity to regulate the class-struggle.

3. Because the fiduciary subsystem is at the top of the hierarchy of control, at the social system level, its ineffectiveness will be highlighted by its incapacity to legitimize a differentiated and pluralized societal community, as well as by its incapacity to legitimize political change and to produce the generalized commitments and highly qualified [210] manpower necessary for sustained economic growth.

4. When both the polity and the fiduciary subsystem are Ineffective, and when they are only partially differentiated, tensions between the elites controlling the institutions with political and fiduciary primacy may become exarcebated. Conflict may follow and may take different forms. If traditionally, both elites have competed and sought to install their domination over the societal community, conflict may center about the consequences of the partial modernization of the societal community, and especially about the legitimation of the class-struggle. This conflict will tend to be a factor of generalization of dissatisfactions, in that it will increase the ineffectiveness of both subsystem elite.

To verify these propositions, we shall briefly analyse pertinent data concerning post-World War Two economic growth and transformations within the societal community and then attempt to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of both the G and L sectors during the fifties and the conflicts which opposed the elites controlling the institutions with G and L primacy.

THE ACCELERATION OF THE GROWTH OF QUEBEC'S ECONOMY

In the previous chapter, we have shown that the Province of Quebec experienced its take-off phase of industrialization after Confederation and that Anglo-American capital, technology and entrepreneurship constituted the main industrializing forces ; what is central for our pressent discussion is the fact that economic growth considerably accelerated its pace after 1939 and that after the Second World War, French Canada [211] reached the phase of mass consumption. For example, the long term (1870-1955) growth rate of manufacturing production in the Province of Quebec was 5.53 (compared to 5.48 for Ontario); from 1935 to 1955, this growth rate was at 10.7 (compared to 10.4 in Ontario). The same phenomenon can be observed in agricultural production : the long term growth rate was 3.2 in Quebec (2.9 in Ontario); from 1935 to 1955, it went up to 8.58 (8.43 for Ontario). Moreover, the acceleration of the growth rate is common to almost all industrial sectors. The following table, using a method of calculation different from the one which produced the statistics previously mentionned, illustrates this eloquently :

TABLE 4.1

Compositive Rate of Growth
Quebec, Ontario, Canada, 1935-1955

	QUEBEC	ONTARIO	CANADA
AGRICULTURE	6.6	6.3	7.6
FORESTS	11.9	11.0	12.7
FISHING & TRAPPING	4.3	5.3	6.7
MINERAL INDUSTRY	13.3	5.3	9.8
ELECTRICITY	6.2	7.1	7.6
MANUFACTURING	10.7	10.4	10.7
CONSTRUCTION	10.7	10.9	11.5
Total Industrial Production	10.2	9.6	10.0

Source ; A. RAYNAULD, Croissance et Structure Économique de la Province du Québec, P.Q. ; Ministère de l'Industrie et du Commerce, 1961 : 75.

[212]

Within this framework of accelerated economic growth, there also appeared shifts in the distribution of the industrial production since 1935 :

TABLE 4.2

Structure of Production (in percentages)
Quebec, Ontario, Canada. 1935-1955

Return to toc

	QUEBEC		ONTARIO		CANADA	
	1935	1955	1935	1955	1935	1955
AGRICULTURE	12.4	6.3	13.5	7.4	25.3	16.5
FORESTS	3.8	5.2	1.5	1.9	2.6	4.3
FISHING & TRAPPING	0.5	0.1	0.4	0.2	1.1	0.7
MINERAL INDUSTRY	3.6	6.2	9.9	4.0	7.1	6.9
ELECTRICITY	8.0	3.8	5.2	3.3	5.1	3.2
MANUFACTURING	57.5	62.8	58.7	68.2	45.8	51.9
CONSTRUCTION	14.2	15.6	11.7	14.9	12.5	16.4
TOTAL	100	100	100	99.9	99.5	99.9

Source: A. RAYNAULD. Croissance et Structure Économique de la Province du Québec, P.Q.: Ministère de l'Industrie et du Commerce, 1961:71.

[213]

These figures indicate that agriculture, once the Province's main industry, furnished in 1961 only 6.3% of the total industrial production : this was a contribution two times less than in 1935 and it made Quebec less "agricultural" than Ontario or the whole of Canada. In comparison to Ontario, where the transformation of the industrial structure has been more rapid and more dearly in the direction of the increasing importance of the secondary sector (manufacturing and construction), Quebec's economy has been slower in moving in that direction, mainly because of the importance of primary sectors other than agriculture (forest, mineral industry). Nevertheless, as in Ontario, from 1935 to 1955, the shifts in the industrial sector favored the secondary sector.

The acceleration of the economic growth as well as the transformations of the industrial structure have affected the Quebec labour force's volume as well as its structure : indeed, unemployment was very low. Faucher and Lamontagne (1964: 267) state that "out of every ten people looking for work, in 1939, 1.5 could not find a job, while in 1950 unemployment was negligeable". Employment in the tertiary industries doubled from 1941 to 1961 ; it also substantially increased in the secondary industries. The structure of the labour force, as the following table indicates, was thus transformed according to the familiar pattern of advanced industrial economies.

[214]

TABLE 4.3

Distribution of labour Force by Primary.
Secondary and Tertiary Industries
(in thousands)

Industry	QUEBEC			ONTARIO		
	1941	1951	1961	1941	1951	1961
Primary						
Agriculture	254.4	194.7	131.2	296.6	201.4	168.8
Fishing & trapping	8.0	5.1	3.0	5.5	2.2	2.2
Forests	34.9	15.1	42.4	16.6	23.0	17.9
mineral industry	13.7	19.8	25.8	32.1	30.6	42.6
TOTAL	311.1	234.7	202.5	323.8	254.7	231.6
%	26.5	18.0	11.4	22.4	13.7	9.7
Secondary						
Manufacturing	337.5	465.6	484.0	459.1	646.0	672.4
Construction	73.2	102.7	126.3	77.6	127.4	153.9
Total	410.8	568.3	610.3	536.7	773.5	826.3
%	35.0	38.6	34.5	37.2	41.0	34.5
Tertiary						
Transportation & communication	68.0	107.0	143.7	84.6	127.4	166.1
Commerce & finance	148.0	211.9	310.2	217.0	328.5	469.0
Services	234.4	291.8	450.1	279.6	379.1	648.4
Total	450.4	610.8	904.0	581.2	835.0	1283.5
%	38.4	41.5	51.1	40.3	44.3	53.6

Source : Allen, Patrick, "Tendances des Professions au Canada", Actualité
Économique, Avril-Juin, 1965.

[215]

Thus, very much like Ontario, the most Industrialized Province of Canada, Quebec's labour force decreased In the primary sector, stabilized in the secondary — though it grew In absolute terms — and considerably increased in the tertiary sector.

These economic transformations affected the other societal subsystems, strained the relatively traditionalized ones and thus pushed for change within them so that they could produce the necessary inputs for sustained economic growth.

Indeed, as we shall see in a subsequent section of this chapter, while productive power was considerably increased during the forties and the fifties, govermental support of economic activities was definitively lacking and ineffective. The Aa — Ga interchange was thus strained and unbalanced. The Ag — Lg interchange was also unbalanced : although economic prosperity was increasing — Raynauld estimated (1961 : 54) that the annual per capita Income in 1953 was for the United States $1,870.00, for Canada $1,310.00 and for Quebec $1,113.00 — the fiduciary subsystem, still clinging to traditional values, was not producing the necessary commitments and skills for sustained economic growth. Other indices can be put forward to illustrate this phenomena of socio-economic prosperity : in 1953, 332,000 households or 56% had at least one automobile ; by 1957, the total number was up to 904,000 or 70%; by 1965, 1,200,000 households had a television set and 974,000 had the telephone; in Montreal, the average income before taxation was in 1964-65, $6,342 (Dofny, Garon-Audy, 1969). It is within this context that the development of secondary education occurred, but, as we shall demonstrate later on, insufficiently both in terms of quantity and quality (i.e. the kind of educational [216] product).

The Ag — Lg interchange was thus unbalanced; the Ai — li one became also in post-War Quebec deficient. Societal community support of economic activities became problematical as the Anglo-American capitalists allied with the traditional political elites to crush working-class militancy. Feelings of economic exploitation and societal community atomization became at some moments widespread and intense. Class-warfare was quite intense and testified to the low level of

normative regulation of the organization of the factors of economic production.

TRANSFORMATIONS WITHIN THE SOCIETAL COMMUNITY

The acceleration of economic growth in the forties and fifties accelerated the differentiation process within the societal community and eroded the traditional solidarity system. The following phenomena are constitutive of the differentiation of the post-World War Two French Canadian societal community :

1. the acceleration of the urbanization process ;

2. the erosion of traditional integrative mechanisms and the appearance of new ones ;

3. the increasing differentiation of the population in terms of class and occupation ;

4. elite-pluralization and differentiation ;

5. transformations of the stratification system, the emergence of new bases of prestige and increased upward mobility ;

6. the expression of new demands for the distribution of societal [217] rewards and for inclusiveness.

These transformations, in turn, had as a consequence the erosion of the power-base of the traditional political and fiduciary elites and the push for political and fiduciary change.

The acceleration of economic growth and the important shifts in the distribution of the labour force implied considerable geographical mobility as French Canadians had to move to the cities where the job opportunities were. Indeed, in 1871, Quebec was still a rural society with 77% of its population living in rural areas; by 1961, the rural-urban proportion was reversed : 75% of the population was now living in

urban areas. Moreover, from 1941 to 1961, the urban population doubled, growing from two to four million. The metropolitan region of Montreal took the largest share of this growth : indeed, in 1951, metropolitan Montreal regrouped 72.69% of the urban population and 40% of the total population (Rapport Parent, 1965 : 71-72).

Traditionally, the French Canadian societal community had been integrated around the parish, the local community, the extended family and the land. These integrative mechanisms were no longer effective within a rapidly urbanizing context. Geographical mobi1ity diminished the importance of the extended family in everyday life. The parish no longer constituted the major community institution, lost its dominant position and became more and more specialized in strictly religious matters. New integrative institutions however appeared, better adapted to the new conditions. All were however more specialized than the traditional ones, as they sought to integrate a societal community differentiated in terms of class and occupation. For example, in company towns, the labour union [218] soon became an important integrative mechanism; it was not solely specialized in collective bargaining, but also constituted an important factor in the development of strongly integrated occupational communities. Quinn (1963 : 86-87) provides data about the development of trade union organization ; he notes that, in 1935, just before the Union Nationale party first came to power, "trade union membership stood at approximately 50,000, which was only about 9% of industrial wage earners" ; by 1946 membership had risen to 208,000, which was four times greater than in 1935. By 1951 there were 260,000 trade unionists in the province, that is approximately 32% of the labour force. Interestingly enough, Quinn also notes that the expansion of trade unionism was spurred by the American "C.I.O.'s invasion of Canada with its industrial brand of trade unionism" (Quinn, 1963 : 86). Here again, an outside force triggers change. Indirectly, the penetration of American unions fostered the transformation of the traditional French Canadian catholic labour movement. Quinn (1963) writes :

> "In spite of this leftward orientation in the tactics and policies of the international unions, surprisingly enough it was not the T.L.C. or even the C.C.L., but the Catholic unions which were to emerge in the post-War period as the most dynamic trade union movement in Quebec. This startling

transformation was brought about by the serious predicament in which the C.T.C.C. found itself in the early forties. From 1935 onward the Catholic trade union movement had been losing ground steadily to the more militant international unions, and particularly to the T.L.C.. By 1943 the proportion of trade unionists in Quebec who belonged to the Catholic organization had fallen to 28%, as compared to 74% in 1935 and it appeared that these unions were facing extinction." (Quinn, 1963 : 88)

Trade unions were not however the only integrative institution to develop in the forties and fifties. Organizations such as the Jeunesse [219] Étudiante Catholique and the Jeunesse Ouvrière Catholique provided working and middle class youth with activities and a catholic normative framework better adapted to the conditions of advanced industrial ism and increasing heterogeneity of the societal community. Intellectual associations (Institut Canadien des Affaires Publiques and Cité Libre) as well as other associations, like the Conseil de la Coopération, also emerged and developed.

These associations testified to the growing heterogeneity of the societal community in terms of class and occupation. They also fostered the pluralization and differentiation of the traditional elite- structure; it is within this context that a truly modernizing elite emerged and started articulating a new difinition of the collective situation.

Concerning this phenomenon, Guy Rocher (1968 : 79-95) makes two important theoretical points : one, the multiplication of elites within a societal community is a typical process of rapidly industrializing or industrialized societies, and second, it can be conceived as a collective mechanism which seeks to help — empirically, of course, with varying success — circumscribe, define and solve the social problems engendered by rapid structural changes in important subsystems of the society. Contending that elites should be seen as comprising those persons or those groups of persons of which the action has significance and meaning for the societal community of reference and which exercise influence within this community, he writes :

"La multiplication des élites peut être considérée comme une forme de différenciation structurelle, observable d'une part dans une période de rapide transformation et caractéristique [220] d'autre part d'une société en voie d'industrialisation ou industrialisée... Les phases de changement rapide

sont marqués par l'apparition de nouvelles élites, dont l'existence peut parfois être bien éphémère. La multiplication de ces élites est le reflet des tâtonnements, des tiraillements et en quelque sorte du climat de recherche propre à une telle période. On pourrait dire que c'est une façon qu'emprunte une société d'inventorier diverses voies, lorsqu'elle se trouve à une croisée de chemins. Chacune de ces élites apporte un point de vue, une interprétation, une solution plus ou moins globale, entre lesquels la société devra choisir et peut- être plus souvent avec lesquels elle devra se composer finalement une solution acceptable." (Rocher, 1968 : 84)

With regard to the Quebec case, the end of the Second World War sparked the following transformations within the elite-structure : a) there appeared a growing division within the Catholic hierarchy itself, opposing what for better words we shall call "traditionalists" and "modernists" ; it is difficult to identify the basis of the split : it does not seem to have been associated with the rural-urban variable, age or formal training ; it could however be associated with the socio-economic origins of the Catholic Church hierarchy — for instance, whether or not members of the hierarchy were, by family ties, members of the French Canadian haute bourgeoisie or the upper middle class — or even with the political partisanry of some members of the Church hierarchy and the disenchantment of some of them with a Union Nationale government whose head, Prime Minister Duplessis, knew well for what party the Church hierarchy and the religious orders voted for and acted accordingly when time came to distribute governmental favors. If this is true — though obviously, it is difficult to prove —, then the basis of the split within the Church hierarchy could be a function of the acceptance or refusal of the subordination of the Catholic Church to the ruling political party ; b) lay expert [221] elites emerged within the growing universities, the Catholic labour unions, the print as well as electronic media. The two phenomena are interested : the first refers to a process of division within the Church hierarchy, the second concerns the rise within the Church of a lay elite, working in Church-controlled institutions or movements and rising in terms of power and influence within these institutions and movements, and capable of rallying behind the "modernists" within the Church hierarchy. It is not a coincidence that within a traditionally religiously integrated societal community, the first signs of elite-pluralization appeared within the Church. As continuous industrialization and urbanization were rendering the Church-

controlled institutions ineffective in dealing with the integrative problems engendered by structural change, as, for example, the international labour unions were growing at the expense of the Catholic ones, adaptations had to be made. These involved, within the Church, giving greater responsibility to the laity and becoming more present and effective in dealing with the everyday concerns of the population. They involved also, in the case of the Catholic labour unions, trying to beat the International ones at their own game.

These adaptations, it may be noted, were facilitated by the fact that they were also fostered by the international Catholic Church, and especially the French Church, which showed willingness to deal with twentieth century societal community realities, attempted to redefi ne its social doctrine and sought to avoid losing the working and middle classes to communism and socialism. These problems were more acute in Europe and France than in French Canada ; the French Canadian Church nonetheless reacted in a similar fashion to the pluralIzation of the societal community. Youth movements like the Jeunesse Etudiante Catholique and the Jeunesse [222] Ouvrière Catholique as well as a re-invigorated effort of Catholic unionism and cooperatism must be understood as adaptations and defense mechanisms against the dangers of a full differentiation between the societal community and the fiduciary subsystem.

These adaptations, in turn, fostered the emergence within the Church"of a lay elite which was to become an active agent of differentiation. Thus the differentiation process under study in this thesis, was not solely caused by outside pressures, but also, by a group of Catholic laymen, working in Church-controlled institutions and seeking to broaden their influence and power within these institutions.

One point must be stressed : while the split within the hierarchy during the fifties may be seen as important and profound, divisions within the Church hierarchy are not a post-World War Two phenomenon. The history of French Canada, and especially that of the nineteenth century, is filled with cases of ideological warfare between bishops or between religious orders. While the Church hierarchy may be seen as being united throughout the history of French Canada around a common goal, that of the preservation of a theocratic institutional order, the strategies and tactics necessary for the attainment of that goal certainly were hotly debated. Religious orders — for example the Dominicans, the Jesuits

or the Sulpicians — had different traditions and different types of institutional involvements. Those which were involved in secondary and college education were competing with one another for governmental aid and students.

Some managed to get access to the sons of the haute bourgeoisie : the Jesuits'Collège Sainte-Marie and Collège Jean-de-Brébeuf as well as the Sulpicians' Collège de, Montréal are examples of this. Others founded [223] their colleges in more middle class neighborhoods. The point is that although the Fédération des Collèges Classiques emerged during the fifties to unite the religious orders and the secular clergy involved in secondary and college education and to attempt collectively to block differentiation, the superiors of Classical Colleges, it may be argued, soon became much more concerned with the fate of their college than of that of a competing religious order or of a segment of the diocesan clergy. Another instance of division which had a long tradition was that between religious orders involved in secondary and college education and the diocesan clergy and bishops. Indeed, in the traditional Church authority system, religious orders — at least those which were canonically considered "exempted" — were not under the authority of a bishop but depended directly to Rome : the Jesuits and the Dominicans are examples of this. Competition between the bishop and the religious order running a classical college for recruits to priesthood was widespread as the Bishop could not use his authori ty but only his moral influence to secure for his diocesan clergy, recruits from some classical colleges. The same kind of division and hostility existed between priests and brothers who, for example, could not, according to the Canon Law, teach latin and thus get involved in secondary and college education of the type controlled by the clergy. Fii nally, we may add that in more than one way the authority system of the traditional Catholic Church was medieval : bishops can be seen as barons or seigneurs ruling over a diocesan terri tory and wary of their autonomy and of infringements of neighboring bishops; because of this medieval authority system, the generation of consensus at the level of the Assembly of bishops or at the level of the assembly of classical colleges' superiors was not always an easy thing to produce and maintain Intact for long [224] periods of time. All this to indicate that the Catholic Church hierarchy was never really within traditional Quebec a monolithic block without any internal divisions and warfare. The "newness" of the post-

World War Two divisions, we contend, has to do with the alliance of the emerging lay expert elite with the "modernists" within the Church hierarchy.

However important the two phenomena previously discussed — the split within the Church hierarchy and the emergence of a lay expert elite within Church-controlled institutions — they do not totally exhaust the reality of elite-pluralization within post-World War Two Quebec. We must also analyze concomitant transformations within the economic and political elites. Indeed, Rocher (1968) mentions and discusses the growing importance of a French Canadian business elite. Boily (in Desrosiers, 1972) complements Rocher's analysis in his study of the transformations within the French Canadian political elite since Confederation. Finally, Dofny's (1970) study of Montreal engineers indicates that this group of professionals saw, much more than their Anglophone counterparts, in the State an important leverage of economic development, and wanted it to intervene more in economic matters. Since engineers constitute a group whose growth is clearly associated with industrialization, their attitudes toward the State are important for a proper understanding of the basis of support a modernizing political elite can generate within the elite-structure for the modernization of the State apparatus. Let us analyze briefly these phenomena.

It is difficult to evaluate the importance of the French Canadian business elite in post-World War Two Quebec. The data produced by Raynauld for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Bicultural ism (Book III, 1969), can however throw some light on this matter. Indeed, [225] Raynauld has classified the business establishments in Quebec according to whether the owners were Francophone Canadians, Anglophone Canadians, or foreigners. The following table associates ownership of business establishment with the percentage of the labour force employed.

TABLE 4.4

Ownership of Establishments

Size of establishments owned by Francophone Canadians, Anglophone Canadians, and foreign interests in selected industrial sectors, measured by numbers Employed — Quebec, 1961

	Employees	Percentage of labour force in establishments owned by			
	Number (thousands)	Franco-Canadians	Anglophone phone Canadians	Foreign Interests	Total
Agriculture	131.2	91.3	8.7	0.0	100
Mining	25.9	6.5	53.1	40.4	100
Manufacturing	468.3	21.8	46.9	31.3	100
Construction	126.4	50.7	35.2	14.1	100
Transportation and communications	102.4	37.5	49.4	13.1	100
Wholesale trade	69.3	34.1	47.2	18.7	100
Retail trade	178.7	56.7	35.8	7.5	100
Finance	62.2	25.8	53.1	21.1	100
Services	350.9	71.4	28.6	0.0	100
All industries!	1,515.3	47.3	37.7	15.0	100

Source : RAYNAULD, André, La propriété des Entreprises au Québec.

1. Excludes forestry, fishing and trapping, the public sector, and unspecified industries.

[226]

This table indicates that while Francophone business establishments employed almost half of Quebec's labour force in 1961, they were concentrated mainly in two sectors : agriculture and service industries. Their presence within the construction and the retail trade industry is also noteworthy. Conversely, their relative absence from mining, manufacturing, finance and wholesale trade illustrates the ethnic division of labour and the dominant position of Anglo-American interests within these key industrial sectors. There are two implications to be drawn from these statistics : one, the interests of the Francophone business elite may not coincide with those of the Anglo-American one : differences in sectorial involvement, productivity, competitiveness and economic stability are all important here; two, some sectors where Francophones are important employers rely heavily on State encouragement and contracts : we are thinking here of such sectors as the construction industry and the service industries.

Raynauld also provides data which substantiate the following points :

1. the Francophone manufacturing industries, while employing 22% of the labour force working in manufacturing industries, accounted for only 15% of the total value added in the manufacturing industry;

2. "Francophone Canadian establishments produced an average value added of $790,000 a year, those owned by Anglophone Canadians $3,310,000, and foreign-owned establishments $5,640,000. The value added by a Francophone Canadian establishment was thus on average a quarter the size of that added by an Anglophone Canadian establishment, and one-seventh of that for a foreign establishment" (B. & B. Commission, book III, 1969 : 55) ;

[227]

3. within the manufacturing sector, the average number of employees was ninety-four in Francophone Canadian establishments, 145 in Anglophone Canadian, and 332 in foreign-owned establishments ;

4. working wages also varied by ownership category, the Francophone Canadian employers paying less their workers than the other two employers.

One important characteristic of Francophone business establishments concerns their almost total dependence on the Quebec market for the sales of their products :

"Francophone Canadian firms sold only 22% of their output outside Quebec, four-fifths of this amount going to other parts of Canada. Anglophone Canadian establishments, on the other hand, sold 49% and foreign-owned firms 60% of their production outside Quebec. In both Anglophone Canadian and foreign-owned establishments, two-thirds of these amounts went to the other provinces" (B. & B. Commission, book III, 1969 : 57).

Thus, to some extent, one can conclude that Francophone Canadian establishements were not in 1961 integrated within the Canadian and North American markets, but were almost totally dependent for the sale of their products on the Quebec market. We should keep this fact in mind when we shall analyse in a subsequent chapter the modernization of Quebec's State during the sixties, the growth in governmental expenditures and the fact that, by 1970, the Quebec State accounted for close to 50% of the Province's GNP. If Francophone Canadian industries are limited to the Quebec market, one of the key actors within that market is the Provincial government and its public and para-public institutions.

The authors of the B. & B. Report conclude their analysis of business ownership in Quebec and of associated characteristics in the [228] following fashion :

"We have seen that Francophone Canadian industry in Quebec is concentrated in the agricultural and service fields. In the manufacturing sector, Francophone Canadian establishments accounted for a low proportion of the provincial value added ; tended to be less productive ; had fewer employees and paid them less ; produced essentially for the Quebec market ; and were based in the traditional industries. The foreign-owned establishments generally stood in complete contrast to this pattern, while those owned by Anglophone Canadian interests tended to share characteristics with both Francophone Canadian and foreign-owned establishments, and thus to occupy a middle position. Industries in a diversified economy may be expected to show many different characteristics, but this does not explain the fact that Francophone Canadian establishments have been consistently

placed at the lower end of the various scales we have employed " (B. & B. Commission, book III, 1969 : 60).

To the extent that Francophone Canadian establishments employed in 1961 47% of the labour force, to the extent also that French Canadians also started to hold administrative or legal counseling posts within Anglophone Canadian and foreign establishments, we can talk of a Francophone business elite. It obviously did not hold in its hands the total amount of economic power ; it nonetheless existed in post-World War Two Quebec and started becoming more important within the traditional political parties, as Boily (in Desrosiers, 1972) has shown. Indeed, Boily, in a study of the composition of the French-Canadian political elite from Confederation to the nineteen-sixties, has documented some important transformations within that elite, especially with regard to the socio-economic origins of its members. One important transformation concerns the gradual disappearance from the political scene and Cabinet rooms of what Boily calls the "haute bourgeoisie canadienne-française", who had dominated from Confederation to the nineteen-twenties. Boily writes :

[229]

> "Cette élite politique, elle fut d'abord et avant tout, et cela jusqu'aux années vingt, constituée des représentants de la haute-bourgeoisie canadienne-française ou de ce qui en tenait lieu, avant de devenir essentiellement constituée de représentants des classes moyennes. Mais qui sont ces gens que 1'on situe ainsi au-dessus de la classe moyenne-supérieure ? Nous serions tentés de répondre : pour la plupart des individus appartenant par la naissance ou le mariage à des familles dominantes de la vie politique québécoise, parfois depuis la fin du XVIIIᵉ siècle, qui ont aussi fourni plusieurs figures marquantes de la magistrature, des familles nouant entre elles un réseau très complexe de liens par le mariage ou encore les études juridiques. C'est de ces familles que Robert Rumilly disait très justement : "une famille de bonne bourgeoisie compte un ministre, un haut fonctionnaire fédéral, un juge, un évêque ou au moins un supérieur de communauté ou un Protonotaire apostolique". Faisaient aussi partie de cette classe politique des individus qui, quoique d'origine modeste, paysanne généralement, avaient accédé par leur instruction et leur occupation à la classe moyenne-supérieure et qui, par leur carrière tant professionale que politique, l'adoption des mêmes valeurs et du même genre de vie, avaient réussi à s'introduire au sein de cette élite, comme ce fut le cas pour Mercier. Ajoutons que lorsque ces individus

qui avaient connu une ascension aussi rapide, en grande partie grâce à la politique, avaient une descendance, ils se trouvaient alliés très rapidement à des familles plus anciennes" (Boily, in Desrosiers, 1972 : 77-78).

According to Boily, this haute bourgeoisie, though never totalling more than ten percent of the political class, dominated the political scene from Confederation to the nineteen-twenties : it tended to monopolize the important cabinet posts, including that of Prime Minister, as the cases of Mercier and Boucherville indicate. It continued after 1920 to be at the center of the polity through the activities of such Prime Ministers as Taschereau and Duplessis whom Boily considers a member of that class. Indeed, Duplessis was the son of the Honorable Nérée Le Noblet-Duplessls, the nephew of Stanislas Cooke, deputy of Three-Rivers [230] in 1900, of William Pierre Grant, deputy of Champlain in 1925, 1927 and 1931, and finally germane-nephew of Charies-Borromée Genest, deputy of Three-Rivers in 1869, later on senator; Charies-Borromée Genest, it may be noted, was the descendent of a seigneur. Another member of this haute bourgeoisie of whom we shall have occasion to talk about later on in this thesis is Paul Gérin-Lajoie. Boily writes about the ways in which this haute bourgeoisie exercized its power :

"Ce rôle dominant, ils semblent 1'avoir rempli dans un style assez particulier. Ils évoluaient très souvent avec une grande aisance et une grande facilité non seulement entre Ottawa et Québec, ou encore entre les assemblées élues et les assemblées nommées, mais encore entre la politique et la magistrature et vice versa. Ils trouvaient facilement une retraite comme juge, sénateur, conseiller législatif ou encore lieutenant-gouverneur. " (Boily, in Desrosiers, 1972 : 78-79.)

It seems that after 1920, the haute bourgeoisie was replaced by members of the upper middle class made up, says Boily, of individuals born in the rural areas and who had stayed, after studies which had made them lawyers, doctors or notaries, either in Montreal and Quebec or in the small provincial towns. These individuals, though not great stars within their profession, used their professional status as a stepping stone for a full-time political career : they became political careerists, totally absorbed by the party they belonged to.

"Moins que la naissance, ce qui constitue la ressource principale de ces nouveaux hommes politiques c'est une certaine aptitude à monter dans les ë- chelons d'un parti, à se mouvoir avec facilité et autorité au sein de son organisation et à participer à son contrôle et à son utilisation pour exploiter le pouvoir... S'il demeure encore une certaine différence sociale entre les ministres et les simples députés, elle n'a pas la même signification qu'elle pouvait avoir du temps de la domination de l'ancienne classe politique. Avec [231] celle-ci, c'était une classe socialement dominante qui occupait le pouvoir politique par suite même du contrôle qu'elle détenait sur cette société. Avec l'élite politique nouvelle, il s'agit de dirigeants d'un appareil politique qui ne sont d'aucune manière détenteurs d'un pouvoir social ou économique dominant, mais d'hommes qui choisissent comme métier de s'emparer du pouvoir politique et de l'exploiter dans l'intérêt'général dans la mesure où celui-ci correspond à l'intérêt du parti sans parler de leur intérêt personnel. Ce n'est plus l'aristocrate au pouvoir mais la "partitocratie"." (Boily, in Desrosiers, 1972 : 81-82)

Why did this transformation within the political elite occur and and what were its consequences? On the first point, Boily, after noting that the haute bourgeoisie had always been close to its English-Canadian counterpart through law firms and corporate directorates, contends that, as industrialization proceeded after Confederation, the members of the haute bourgeoisie left the Provincial cabinet posts for participation in the big Anglo-American business :

"Il est possible qu'après s'être développée grâce à la politique et avoir affirmé et confirmé sa position par le contrôle de la politique, cette classe ait émigré vers d'autres élites, professionnelles ou économiques, et que les Conseils d'administration aient remplacé les Conseils des Ministres. Elle retrouverait ainsi par la participation au contrôle économique un pouvoir d'influence sur la société québécoise, pouvoir qui lui échappait au niveau politique ou qui plus simplement présentait moins d'attrait." (Boily, in Desrosiers, 1972 : 82)

The major consequence of the arrival on the political scene of the political and party careerist has often been discussed : indeed, the importance of the partisan phenomenon within twentieth century Quebec has often been mentioned by political scientists and sociologists as the fundamental characteristic of the pre-Quiet Revolution political system

and Its articulation with the societal community. Closely associated with [232] the inordinate importance of the partisan phenomenon are the following characteristics : the authoritarian leadership within traditional political parties; the conception of the role of deputy as that of a baron or seigneur distributing within his riding governmental favors to those who voted for the right party ; autocratism ; inordinate personalization and politization of issues; as well as a low development of the State apparatus. These characteristics must be associated with the emergence of the party man or the political careerist whose main resource is not influence of the type enjoyed by the haute bourgeoisie, but the control of a party machinery. Falardeau, characterizing the 1940-1960 political period, writes :

> "Le pouvoir politique est autocratique. Il personalise et surpolitise à la fois ses contacts avec le peuple-électeur en institutionalisant ses faveurs arbitraires par l'intermédiaire du patronage. Ce sera l'ère du député-entrepreneur-homme d'affaires-commanditaire-distributeur de largesses : l'État-Providence à l'heure des anciens clochers québécois." (Falardeau, in Desrosiers, 1972 : 27)

Within this new political class, although lawyers and doctors constituted the two most important categories, businessmen started to in crease their representation. The rise of businessmen within the new political class was however difficult :

> "Longtemps les avocats, médecins, notaires constitueront à eux seuls les notables locaux, les "leaders" naturels de la société québécoise. C'est en quelque sorte un statut qu'ils ont acquis au cours du début du XIXe siècle. Même lorsque par suite de l'industrialisation, de l'expansion du petit commerce, et même d'une certaine diversification de la population active, les commerçants, marchands et petits industriels rivaliseront avec eux sur le plan local, notamment au sein des conseils municipaux, il sera plus difficile à ces derniers, il leur faudra plus de temps pour accéder au statut [233] d'homme politique. Ils ne viendront à la politique qu'une fois seulement que leur réussite en affaires aura fait d'eux des vedettes locales. Même maintenant il demeure plus facile à un jeune avocat par exemple d'entrer en politique et d'y réussir, comme s'il bénéficiait encore dans la psychologie collective du prestige attaché autrefois aux membres des professions libérales alors qu'ils constituaient à peu près la seule élite reconnue par la société québécoise. Socialement, le système de valeurs a pu changer ;

politiquement, il semblerait que les valeurs anciennes demeurent encore effectives, comme si dans cette société nouvelle qu'est devenu le Québec l'électeur n'avait pas modifié ses critères d'appréciation, à moins que ce soit l'homme politique traditionel qui ait su préserver son statut." (Boily, in Desrosiers, 1972 : 68-69)

The difficulty of the rise to power of the French Canadian businessmen can be ascertained by the fact that from 1917 to 1962, although their representation increased in the legislative assembly, they were still underrepresented in the Cabinet which remained controlled by lawyers and doctors.

Boily argues convincingly that these transformations within the political class did not lead to major changes of governmental policies. While the "style" of government was changed, the social and economic philosophy of the ruling political elites was not modified. It could not, given the colonial-type of relationship between the Anglo-American capitalists and the French Canadian haute bourgeoisie and upper middle-class :

"Si "grâce" à 1867 les Canadiens français reçoivent au niveau provincial le contrôlé d'un pouvoir politique et au niveau fédéral la participation à un autre pouvoir politique, ils ne pourront agir qu'à l'intérieur d'un cadre social et économique leur imposant des limites d'action étroites, limites que seule une vie démocratique intense et une conscience collective et nationale vive et réaliste auraient pu repousser plus loin, sinon briser. C'est ce qui fut impossible pendant longtemps et demeure difficile encore maintenant, parce que ces hommes politiques, [234] qu'ils aient appartenu à une classe sociale dominante ou à une élite partisane, ne pouvaient exercer ce pouvoir et le conserver tranquillement qu'en acceptant d'être dans une situation de dépendance face aux autres catégories dirigeantes." (Boily, in Desrosiers, 1972 : 85)

The disappearance from the political scene of the French Canadian haute bourgeoisie and the emergence of an upper-middle class political elite made up of professionals and businessmen whose power was a function of their capacity to control a party apparatus must be seen as reflecting transformations of the traditional stratification system. This system had been quite rigid, with the Catholic hierarchy and the haute bourgeoisie at the top, followed by the professionals and the merchants not integrated within the haute bourgeoisie, and at the bottom, the farmers and the workers. The acceleration of industrialization in the forties and fifties modified considerably that system : as new occupations appeared, new bases of prestige also came into existence; also there was an increase in upward mobility; a new urban middle class, different from its small self-employed merchant ancestor and better educated, emerged.

Statistics of intergenerational occupational mobility may be used to circumscribe the growth of the middle class in post-War Quebec. Two studies — one done in 1954 by Rocher and De Joncas (1968 : 711-723) and another done ten years later by Dofny and Garon-Audy (1969 : 277-303), — using a similar methodology in order to facilitate comparisons, testify to the growth of the middle strata within French Canada societal community. The following table provides indeed pertinent data.

[235]

TABLE 4.5

Occupational Structure in Samples
1954 and 1964

OCCUPATIONS	FATHERS		SONS	
	1954	1964	1954	1964
1) Professions & Top Management	3.24	2.19	5.84	4.71
2) Semi-professions & Middle management	5.11	5.10	5.68	15.16
3) White-Collar	5.24	5.74	11.26	15.80
SUB-TOTAL (non-manual)	13.59	12.93	22.78	35.67
4) Workers, skilled & semi-skilled	22.20	22.39	27.31	32.32
5) Unskilled workers	27.96	24.13	33.46	20.13
6) Services (public & personal)	4.46	5.61	7.54	8.00
7) Farmers	30.79	34.84	8.91	3.87
TOTAL N :	(1,234)	(1,550)	(1,234)	(1,550)

Source : Dofny, J., & Garon-Audy, M., "*Mobilités Professionnelles au Québec*",
Sociologie et Sociétés, Vol. 1, no 2, nov. 1969 : 281.

[236]

Regrouping the white-collar categories — category 1, 2, and 3 — we observe a clear pattern of growth : in 1954, only 13.59% of the fathers are within the white-collar category ; this figure does not significantly change ten years later (12.14%) ; their sons, however invade white-collar occupations : in 1954, 22.78% and 1964, 35.67% of them have a white-collar job and especially those jobs regrouped in category 2 and 3. This growth of white-collar occupations as well as the reduction of the unskilled worker and farmer categories, can be explained by the post-War economic growth discussed earlier. They are the familiar manifestations of industrialization.

We can get a clearer picture of middle-class growth by looking at the occupational structure of 1954 and 1964 of the urban district sub-samples.

[237]

TABLE 4.6

Occupational Structure of Samples
(Urban districts only)

Return to toc

Occupations	1954	1964
1) Professions, Top management, semi-professions, middle management	14.52	24.89
2) White-Collar	16.77	20.67
SUB-TOTAL (non-manual)	31.29	45.56
3) Workers, skilled & semi-skilled	32.48	33.23
4) Unskilled workers & personal services	28.74	16.67
5) Public Services	5.69	4.01
6) Farmers	1.80	0.53

Source: Dofny, J. & Garon-Audy, M., 1969 : 290.

According to the data contained in this table, the non-manual categories (1 and 2) grew in importance from 1954 to 1964; furthermore, they are also the only ones to do so in any significant fashion. We must however push further our analysis in order to find out if the growth in the non-manual categories had a similar rate within the English and French-speaking urban population of Quebec. This analysis will permit us to circumscribe the patterns of ethnic under or over-representation within the occupational structure and the changes from 1954 to 1964 of these patterns.

[238]

Table 4.7.

Occupational Structure of French and English Canadians
living in Urban Areas of Quebec in 1954 and 1964
(sample)

| Occupations | French Canadians | | | | English Canadians | | | |
| | 1954 | | 1964 | | 1954 | | 1964 | |
	Fathers	Sons	Fathers	Sons	Fathers	Sons	Fathers	Sons
Professions, Proprietors & Top Managers	3.22	6.81	3.11	5.38	11.82	17.27	8.93	9.82
Semi-Professions & Middle Managers	5.56	5.20	6.94	17.70	5.46	10.00	12.50	28.57
White-Collar	8.96	15.59	7.77	19.73	9.09	22.73	16.07	27.68
SUB-TOTAL (Non-manual)	17.74	27.60	17.82	42.81	26.37	50.00	37.50	66.07
Skilled & Semiskilled Workers	27.42	34.23	25.95	34.81	26.36	23.64	26.79	21.43
Unskilled Workers	30.47	25.99	25.95	13.63	17.27	7.27	13.39	8.04
Public Services	3.22	4.30	4.78	4.07	10.91	12.73	7.14	3.57
Personal Services	3.41	5.91	2.76	4.19	0.91	5.45	4.47	0.00
Farmers	17.74	1.97	22.73	0.48	18.18	0.91	10.71	0.89
(N)			(836)	(836)			(112)	(112)

Source :   - De Joncas, Y. & Rocher, G., "Inter-Generation Occupational Mobility in the Province of Quebec" in B. R. Blisken & Al.,
Eds., *Canadian Society, Sociological Perspectives*, 3rd Edition, Toronto, MacMillan, 1968 : 720.
- Dofny, J. & Garon-Audy, M., 1969 : 286.

[239]

For the French Canadian urban population, the figures in table 4.6 indicate that if only 17.74% of the sample fathers were in 1954 within the white-collar group, 27.60% of their sons in 1954 and 42.83% in 1964 had a white-collar job. Within the 1954 sample, the proportional difference between fathers and sons in the white-collar group was 9.96%; in the 1964 sample, this difference had grown to 25%. Looking at the English-speaking population, the data indicate also a similar pattern : within the 1954 sample, the proportional difference between fathers and sons in the white-collar group was 23.63% —which led De Joncas and Rocher to conclude that "on the whole, the upper part of table 4.0 shows again that the difference of occupational distribution between French and English speaking Canadians is greater for the generation of the sons than it was for their fathers" (1968 : 721) — in 1964, it had risen to 28.57% —which led Dofny and Garon-Audy to conclude that the acceleration of intergener- ational occupational mobility within the French Canadian population was slowing down the process of "ethnic distancing" noted by De Joncas and Rocher in 1954 — .

The following table, regrouping the categories of table 4.7 and focusing only on the urban sons illustrates these important shifts in the urban occupational structure and in the pattern of ethnic occupational representation.

[240]

TABLE 4.8

Evolution of Occupational Structure of French and English
Canadian Sons Living in Urban Areas of Quebec

Return to toc

Occupations	French-Canadians		English-Canadians	
	1954	1964	1954	1964
Non-manual	27.60 -- +15.23 --	- 42.83	50.00 -- +16.07 --	- 66.07
Skilled & semiskilled workers	34.23 -- + 0.58 --	- 34.81	23.64 -- - 2.21 --	- 21.43
Unskilled	25.99 -- -12.36 --	- 13.63	7.27 -- + 0.77 --	- 8.04
Services	10.21 -- - 1.95 --	- 8.26	18.18 -- -14.61 --	- 3.57

Source ; Dofny, J. & Garon-Audy, M., 1969 : 287.

Thus, both groups experience growth in non-manual occupations, and though English-Canadians are still over-represented in the upper echelons of the occupational structure, the French-Canadians have experienced in the fifties a higher rate of intergenerational occupational mobility. Indeed, while in 1954, 36% of French Canadians sons belonged to the same occupational categories than their fathers — compared to 30% for the English Canadians — in 1964, only 21.94% inherited from their fathers their occupation — compared to 33.93% for the English Canadians sons — .

[241]

Tableau 4.9.

Percentage of Sons who Remain in Same Occupational
Category as their Father, by Ethnic Origin, 1954 and 1964

OCCUPATION	1954		1964	
	French Canadians	English Canadians	French Canadians	English Canadians
Professions, Top Management, Semi-professions & Middle Management	40.82	40.37	50.00	66.67
White-Collar	34.00	40.00	29.15	38.89
Skilled & Semi-skilled Workers	45.10	44.82	36.75	30.00
Unskilled Workers & Personal Services	43.92	15.00	25.42	20.00
Public Services	5.56	25.00	10.00	12.50
Farmers	11.11	5.00	1.58	8.33
TOTAL	36.00	30.00	21.94	33.93

Source : Dofny, J., Garon-Audy, M., 1969 : 291.

[242]

These figures indicate that, during the fifties, occupational inheritance was reduced for the French-Canadians, while it was heightened for the English-speaking Canadians. It seems that French-Canadians have benefitted more from transformations in the occupational structure than the English-Canadians. This is easily understandable : French-Canadians have always been over-represented in the lower echelons of the occupational structure ; as these lower categories contracted their size, French-Canadians were forced to move up the occupational ladder. Using Carlsson's (1968) method, Dofny and Garon-Audy have estimated the relative importance of pure and forced mobi1ity for the two ethnic groups of the Province of Quebec : their figures indicate that during the fifties, French-Canadians have accentuated forced mobility — from 7.75 to 33.86 — much more than their English counterpart — from 25.45 to 28.57 — .

[243]

TABLE 4.10

Ratio of Pure to Observed Mobility for Urban French

	1954		1964	
	French Ca- nadians	English Canadians	French Ca- nadians	English Canadians
Maximum stability	82.25	74.55	66.14	71.43
Forced mobility	17.75	25.45	33.86	28.57
Observed mobility	64.15	70.00	75.12	66.07
Pure mobility	46.40	44.55	41.26	37.50
Pure mobility/observed mobility	72.33	63.64	54.93	56.76

Source : Dofny, J.& Garon-Audy, 1969 : 300.

[244]

The evidence reviewed testifies to the growth of the French Canadian urban middle class. Guindon (1968 : 702-710) puts this development in Its proper perspective :

> "The emergence of what is commonly called the new middle class is not something specific to French Canada; quite on the contrary, the growth of such a class was rather belated, in fact, essentially a post-War phenomenon. With the growth and the increased size of large-scale formal organizations of business and government, the middle class was overwhelmingly transformed into a bureaucratically employed white-collar group with professional and semi-professional status, displacing the dominant "entrepreneurial", self-employed character of the middle class in the last century. The new middle class is a product of the bureaucratic expansion of organizations." (Guindon, 1968 : 704)

Guindon also contends that, while, structurally, the French Canadian new middle class is identical to its counterparts in other industrial societies, "the circumstances of its emergence and some of its characteristics are somewhat at variance with most" (1968 : 704). Indeed,

"its emergence was more dramatic and more sudden than in many cases. Secondly, the ethnic cultural traditions from which it came provided no models for the broad spectrum of the new occupational roles. Thirdly, French Canadian bureaucraties are to be found overwhelmingly in the public and semi-public sectors as against the area of private entreprises. Finally, the bureaucratic revolution, in French Canada, has not changed the power elite of French Canadian society; it has not displaced, but rather rejuvenated traditional elites." (Guindon, 1968 : 704)

There are implications to be drawn from the post-War growth of the French Canadian middle class as well as from the characteristics of this growth mentionned by Guindon. Dofny and Garon-Audy mention one concerning the focalization of ethnic competition in the higher echelons [245] of the occupational structure :

"La jonction de deux ordres de réalité, l'ethnique et le social, ne doit pas nous faire perdre de vue dans l'analyse que, si la compétition entre les noirs et les ouvriers spécialisés américains se situe au bas de l'échelle sociale, dans le cas qui est étudié ici, c'est plutôt dans la partie supérieure de la classe moyenne que se situe la compétition, le conflict." (Dofny, Garon- Audy, 1969 : 299)

Dofny's and Garon-Audy's remark provides a useful clue to the understanding of the resurgence of nationalism in the sixties and its appeal to the new middle class. It also implies that as French Canadians moved up the occupational ladder, an increasing number of them came into contact with the English-speaking population and thus were exposed to their felt legitimate bases of prestige and stratification. Falardeau's analysis (Falardeau, in Rioux & Martin, 1964) of the emergence of new criteria of class rank in post-War Quebec is relevant here : it indicates that as these criteria were more accepted, feelings of relative deprivation started to grow in intensity.

There is another implication to be drawn from the growth of the urban middle class : periods of sudden and high intergenerational occupational mobility breed strain and tensions, especially within a society whose polity and fiduciary subsystem do not recognize and legitimize the goal of economic development. Within such a society, there are no

legitimate models for the new roles; and what Deutsch (1961) calls social mobilization, that is, the "process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded and broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior" (1961 : 494-495), is likely to happen.

[246]

Jacques Dofny (1970) has done a survey of 277 French Canadian engineers residing in Montreal in which he sought to compare them with their English counterpart with regard to their role conception, their attitudes and values regarding social class, economic development, industrial organizations and ethnic identification and relations. Dofny's survey, done for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, is interesting : it captures the attitudes and values of a group of French Canadian professionals who must be considered members of the new middle class. We shall here be mainly concerned with their attitudes concerning the organization and orientation of Quebec's economy and by extension, of Quebec's polity. Indeed, their attitudes express a willingness to see the State intervene more in economic matters and to see it foster more effectively economic development.

Dofny's sample contained 277 French Canadian engineers (45%) and 339 (55%) English Canadian ones. Only 35% of the English were born in Quebec. In contrast 95.2% of the French were born in Quebec of whom 54% were born in Montreal. The French were younger on the average than the English, reflecting their more recent entry into the profession. 72% of the French as opposed to 53% of the English were less than forty years old. The French had a greater tendency than did the English to work for samll firms. The public sector employed more than a third of the French and only 7.5% of the English. In contrast 70% of the English worked for large private corporations as opposed to 25% of the French. The French were concentrated in civil engineering and the English in electrical, mechanical and especially chemical. The English were proportionately dominant in administration, research, sales, service and public relations functions whereas the French dominated in production functions.

[247]

The English, 61%, as opposed to the French, 43%, had fathers who were professionals or semi-professionals. In contrast 32% of the French as opposed to 17% of the English had fathers who were manual workers. Differences in fathers' occupation are matched by educational differences. The fact that French Canadian engineers were of more humble social origins than their English counterpart illustrates the acceleration of upward mobility in post-War Quebec and the emergence of a new middle class, partly made up of salaried professionals and semi-professionals.

Both the French and the English engineers considered economic development to be an unquestionable socio-political objective. They diverged however in their evaluation of the best means to attain it. Indeed, while the English (78.8%) considered the free enterprise system to be the best mechanism of economic development, only 39.9% French Canadian engineers thought so; 48.3% opted for a mixed system, and 11.8% èlected for a public one. French Canadian engineers also considered more important for economic development such governmental institutions as the Conseil d'Orientation Économique and the Quebec-Hydro. Finally, 30% of the French Canadian engineers accepted nationalization as a sound economic measure. Dofny concludes :

> "On pourrait dire en résumé que, parmi les trois modèles proposés, il est manifeste que les ICA se prononcent pour le premier, celui de l'économie libérale et de 1'entreprise privée. Le choix est moins clair chez les ICF qui, dans leur majorité, penchent pour un régime d'entreprise mixte ou publique, acceptant, parmi les institutions d'origine gouvernementale, celle dont le caractère est plus nettement interventioniste, mais qui ne croient pas, en règle générale, à la procédure de nationalisation. C'est donc une intervention gouvernementale, dans des entreprises d caractère mixte, qui semblerait refléter le mieux l'opinion générale. Il n'en reste pas moins que 30% environ semblent envisager des mesures [248] d'interventionnisme économique plus affirmées." (Dofny, 1970 : 54)

One last finding is worth noting : when asked what social class contributes most to economic development, 60% of the English opt for the middle class and 23% for the bourgeoisie; the French, on the other hand, are more prone to equally weight the contribution of the three

following social classes : the bourgeoisie (36.1%), the middle class (31.8%) and the working class (30.3%). It could be, says Dofny, that French Canadian engineers have not forgotten their working class origins and are thus more egalitarian in their evaluation of social class contribution to economic development than their English counterpart.

Thus, the second wave of industrialization fostered the previously mentioned transformations of the societal community — increased differentiation of population in terms of class and occupation, elite-pluralization, adaptations of Church-controlled integrative institutions, transformation of the stratification system, increased upward mobility and the emergence of a new urban middlè class, of which Dofny's engineers constitute an important fraction — ; it also fostered the emergence of new demands for the distribution of societal rewards and resources. The engineers interviewed by Dofny, for example, clearly wanted the Quebec government to intervene more in economic development and direct toward it more of its resources. The post-War resurgence of liberalism, to be documented in the following chapter, also expressed new demands in that it pushed for the fuller institutionalization of the equality for all citizens principle, in economic, political, social and cultural domains. That these new demands strained the relatively traditionalized polity is something we shall try to show in the following section.

[249]

One demand for a better distribution of societal rewards and re sources centered on education. Marc-Adélard Tremblay and Gérald Fortin have done a survey concerning the educational demand of a representative sample of salaried French Canadians in the early sixties. The results of the survey clearly indicate that salaried French Canadians, across income categories, were not satisfied with the quantity of education they had received in their youth, wanted more for their sons and daughters, and even accepted to have less children in order to be able to give more education to their children.

> "La population est de plus en plus consciente de la nécessité de 1'instruction pour la jeune génération. On sait, entre autres choses, qu'il sera de plus en plus difficile pour un jeune d'entrer sur le marché du travail et d'obtenir un emploi rémunérateur sans qu'il ait eu au préalable une formation adéquate. Cette préoccupation prend plusieurs autres formes. Ainsi, par exemple, lorsqu'on place 1'interrogé devant l'affirmation suivante : "il vaut

mieux avoir moins d'enfants et donner à chacun d'eux plus de confort et d'éducation", quatre chefs de famille sur cinq (78%) l'acceptent d'emblée. Nous avons là un indice de l'acceptation par l'ensemble de la population d'une valeur qui autrefois se retrouvait seulement chez les familles de la classe moyenne. Si, d'un côté, cette réponse indique un changement d'attitude envers la natalité et les soins à accorder aux enfants, elle met en relief du même coup l'importance de l'instruction chez les travailleurs salariés." (Tremblay & Fortin, in Bélanger & Rocher, 1970 : 124)

After documenting the fact that 79% of the heads of family interviewed declared that they would have liked to remain longer in school, Tremblay and Fortin present data concerning the minimum and maximum quantity of education these heads of family saw as necessary or ideal for their sons. On the minimum, the authors had this to say :

"Notons d'abord que le minimum jugé nécessaire [250] est de beaucoup supérieur au degré de scolarité des chefs de famille de notre échantillon. Alors qu'en moyenne les chefs de famille avaient complété une 8e année, 50% d'entre eux jugent que la 11e ou la 12e est nécessaire pour un adolescent en 1960. Aucun informateur, même parmi ceux qui ont moins d'une 7e année, ne mentionne la 7e année comme minimum alors que 70% d'entre eux exigent une 10e ou plus. On peut donc considérer, comme norme minimale acceptée par la très grande majorité des informateurs, une 10e ou une 11e année. La généralité de cette norme pourrait expliquer l'insatisfaction des chefs de famille quant au degré d'instruction qu'ils ont eux-mêmes reçue. D'ailleurs, si cette norme généralisée était réalisée, on assisterait à un gain considérable au plan de la scolarité chez la jeune génération actuelle." (Tremblay & Fortin, in Bélanger & Rocher, 1970 : 129)

It is interesting to note that the heads of families interviewed by Tremblay and Fortin were not very realistic with regard to the kink of education best suited for their sons. While they recognized that education was necessary for obtaining a well-paid occupation, they associated the minimum of education with a general type of education and not with a professional or vocational one. The authors explain this phenomenon in terms of ignorance and misperception of both the school system and the requirements of the labour market : they do not interpret it in terms of the dominance of a humanistic vs a utilitarian conception of education within the salaried population. It seems that the heads of families interviewed wanted for their sons a general type of education to

the extent that they viewed this type of education as sufficient for the exercize of a well-paid occupation.

"Notons que la norme minimale définie par les informateurs correspond très mal aux exigences du marché du travail. Les écoles professionnelles sont mentionnées par 10% à peine des informateurs. Le secteur public mentionné par près de 90% (9e, 10e, 11e et 12e années) n'offre aucune préparation professionnelle directe sauf peut-être pour le cas des occupations de cols blancs.

[251]

La norme minimale est donc définie par rapport à une formation générale et non en terme d'une formation professionnelle ou d'un métier...

La conception populaire de l'instruction serait alors à la fois utilitaire et non réaliste puisqu'elle considérerait la formation générale non seulement comme un minimum mais aussi, sinon surtout, comme la seule formation nécessaire à l'exercice d'une occupation rémunératrice." (Tremblay & Fortin, in Bélanger & Rocher, 1970 : 130-131)

The same kind of irrealism and high expectations concerning the educational achievement of their sons are expressed when the heads of families are asked to define the maximum of education desirable for their sons : 45% of the salaried fathers wanted their sons to go to the university ; 27% chose the classical college ; only 13% mentionned technical or commercial schools. Tremblay and Fortin concluded that there was widespread consciousness of the university within the salaried population and that, if these expectations were to be realized, Quebec would soon experience an overcrowding of the highher echelons of the occupational structure.

Nonetheless, the Tremblay-Fortin data are revealing : they clearly indicate that, in the early sixties and probably throughout the fifties, the salaried population, across all income categories, demanded more education for its sons and daughters. This is important for a proper understanding of the "frontal attack on the sources of dissatisfactions" to be discussed in subsequent chapters : the modernizing elite, when in power, could relatively secure widespread support from all social classes for such things as free schooling and the prolongation of the obligatory school leaving age. The Tremblay-Fortin data on the preeminence of an utilitarian conception of education is also instructive and

important for [252] what is to follow : indeed, when we shall dwell on the modernizing elite's strategy to "sell" the school Reform to the masses partly by putting up signs across the Province which read "Qui s'instruit, s'enrichit", we should not be surprised to discover that the strategy was effective. Finally, the irrealism of the salaried heads of families concerning the relationship between types of education and labour market requirements is also important : it partly explains why, contrary to technocratic expectations, students during the sixties invaded more the general than the professional sector.

We presented the Tremblay-Fortin data to illustrate that, during the fifties and early sixties, new demands for the distribution of societal rewards and resources were being expressed and that demands for greater quantities of education constitute an example of this phenomenon. It is important to note that the expression of these demands was not circumscribed to a particular income group or social class, but was common to all groups and strata.

We may sum up our analysis of post-War societal community transformations by saying that its growing heterogeneity in terms of class and occupation eroded the power-base of the traditional political and clerical elites, fostered the emergence of new ones, within the Church, the political class, the professional and business ones, willing to espouse and articulate new demands for greater equality and inclusion.

[253]

THE INEFFECTIVENESS
OF THE TRADITIONALIZED POLITY

The ineffectiveness of the post-War Quebec polity can be ascertained by looking at the interchanges between the polity and the economy, the societal community and the fiduciary subsystem.

A. The Aa — Ga interchange

With regards to the Aa — Ga interchange, it can be demonstrated that the economic policies pursued by the Duplessis government were ill-adapted to the needs of an advanced industrial economy. Two principles guided the Duplessis regime in economic matters : economic liberalism and agriculturism. Quinn (1963 : 76) writes :

> "Although the Union Nationale leader was in most respects a very devout catholic, there was little indication during his long career that he had ever been influenced by the proposals for the reform of capitalism put forward in the encyclicals of Leo XIII and Pius XI. Duplessis took from the papal encyclicals their rejection of socialism but ignored their critique of economic liberalism." (Quinn, 1963 : 76)

Thus, Duplessis, shortly after taking power in 1936, successfully eliminated and neutralized the radical elements within his party which had helped him get access to power; until his death in 1959, he enacted an economic policy which systematically did not intervene and control economic development.

"The party's pledge to the electorate to destroy "La dictature économique" and to bring about greater participation in and control over the Quebec economy by the French Canadian was quickly forgotten. Much lip service was paid to the principle that the growth and development of small-scale French Canadian enterprise must be [254] encouraged, but the large English-owned manufacturing plants, chain stores, and insurance companies continued to dominate. Nor were any steps taken by the government to compel these enterprises to employ a larger number of French Canadians in the higher managerial and supervisory posts... Very little was done to eliminate abuses in the financing of large corporations, and the world of big business continued to be characterized by Interlocking directorates, holding companies, watered stock, and a control exercised by a minority of the stockholders." (Quinn, 1963 : 77)

While Duplessis refused to deviate from the dictats of economic liberalism and thus considerably reduced French Canadian control over the development of their economy, he however encouraged agriculture. Idealizing the rural way of life and looking upon the "farmer as the most stable, industrious, and law-abiding social type, "the true French Canadian"" (Quinn, 1963 : 79), Duplessis passed measures which sought to assist and raise the standard of living of the farmer : he established a system of agricultural credit at low rates of interest, opened agricultural schools, passed legislation setting a minimum wage for forest workers, and spent large sums of money on rural roads, colonization projects, drainage of lands, and sewage systems for small municipalities in rural areas.

As we have seen in the first section of this chapter, theses measures did not keep the population living on farms from decreasing; nor did they keep the real value of agricultural production as a percentage of the total value of production from decreasing : in 1961, Quebec was less "agricultural" than Ontario or the whole of Canada.

The combined effect of economic 1iberalism and agriculturism was to increase foreign ownership and control and to decrease the political subsystem's capacity to regulate the economy. Agriculturism was definitively [255] obsolete and economic liberalism, instead of facilitating the emergence and growth of a French Canadian capitalist class capable of competing with the Anglo-American one, retarded it.

There is still another indicator of political ineffectiveness in encouraging economic development : the Duplessis government rejected the

idea of a budgetary deficit, always presented balanced budgets and considered that sound public finances implied no deficits. This meant that the State apparatus was severely restricted in its possibilities of development. Everything had to be financed by the fiscal monetary entries ; the idea of spreading over more than one generation the financial burden of major projects or developments was alien to the Duplessis regime. Thus, it did not use as it could have the means to foster economic development.

B. Gg -- Ig and Li -- Gi interchanges

We have seen that, under conditions of rapid industrialization and internal differentiation of the societal community, new demands for the distribution of societal rewards and resources tend to appear. The modernization of the societal community implies that the polity must enact policies which institutionalize de facto equality for all citizens.

The legislative record of the Duplessis regime testifies to low responsiveness to these new demands and to a paternalistic bent. Indeed, as Quinn (1963 : 83) documents, Duplessis constantly attacked all federal legislation introduced after 1940 and efforts to establish such things as unemployment insurance, old age pensions, family allowances and hospital insurance. Duplessis held that Ottawa was invading Provincial jurisdictions and monopolizing the taxation field. Duplessis' opposition to the [256] growth of Federal services was not however accompanied by a willingness to see these services developed at the provincial level. Quinn (1963) writes :

> "Although it would not be true to say that the second Union Nationale administration introduced no social legislation, the general attitude of Duplessis was that the social welfare state was a form of "paternalism" to be avoided at all costs. When a trade union delegation made a request for the expansion of the existing system of governement old age pensions, Duplessis rejected it : "Le meilleur système est encore celui qui dépend le moins de l'État". He also expressed strong opposition to proposals put forward for a comprehensive health insurance scheme, stating that "no country or province can get good medical attention with assembly line doctors"... When

> the Liberal party began a campaign in the 1950's for increased social ser-
> vices, Duplessis accused them of being unrealistic, "... de créer des appétits,
> de faire des promesses irréalisables, d'oublier que les gouvernements admi-
> nistrent avec les argents qui proviennent des taxes... Le gouvernement ne
> peut remplacer la charité et la philanthopie"." (Quinn, 1963 : 84)

If the Duplessis regime thus held that the State was not a char itable and philanthropic organization, if it rejected many new demands on the grounds that they were illegitimate within the pre-modern value frame work it upheld, its dealings with the labour movement, its collusion with the Anglo-American capitalists and its anti-labour policy fostered the generalization of feelings of economic exploitation and political oppression within some segments of the societal community. It also engendered the deterioration of approval of legitimacy of power and was conducive to the development of a value-orientated movement seeking to change the traditional ized polity.

Duplessis' anti-labour policies during the forties and fifties have been well documented by Quinn (1963 : 91-97). He notes that during [257] the forties, Duplessis consistently interpreted Godbout's Labour Relations Act in such a way as to favour the employers, and even ignored some of its provisions.

> "For instance, the government often did nothing to compel employers
> to negotiate with a certified union. Although company-dominated unions
> were illegal, the Labour Relations Board certified a sizable number every
> year. Many trade union leaders who had been dismissed by their employers
> for trying to organize the workers found it almost impossible to get remedial
> action by the Board. Certification of unions was sometimes withdrawn wi-
> thout any other justification that the claim of the employers that such unions
> no longer represented a majority of the employees. Application for certifi-
> cation were frequently held up in the Department of Labour for months.
> (Quinn, 1963 : 91)

The interchange between the societal community and the polity is obviously quite problematical when the government systematically disobeys existing laws. It becomes difficult for the government to generate support within the societal community for its policy decisions when they are illegal. This is why, at the end of the forties and during the fifties, Duplessis sought to revamp the Labour Relations Act in such a

way as to legalize the government's anti-labour stand. The legislation put forward severely restricted unionism. The most important and most controversial part of the legislation was a clause which prohibited unions from having "Communists or Marxists" as officers. If it could be proven that a union had "Marxist or Communist" officérs, the union could be refused certification and thus the right to collective bargaining. Throughout the fifties, Duplessis, instead of proposing a comprehensive labour code, passed many anti-labour laws, most of these laws being retroactive to 1944, In order to control and decertify the more militant unions.

[258]

Duplessis' anti-labour laws deteriorated the approval of the legitimacy of power. Recurrent strikes — "during the period from 1940 to 1949 there were about three times as many workers involved in strikes as there had been during the period from 1930 to 1939" (Quinn, 1963 : 90) —, Duplessis' usage of the police and the courts and his collusion with the Anglo-American capitalists led to a split within the Catholic clergy between the "Traditionalists" and the "Progressives", as the latter challenged the legitimacy of Duplessis' usage of power. Duplessis' scapegoating of Communists and Marxists implied a manipulation of the Catholic social doctrine. His economic philosophy, as we have seen, if It rejected any form of socialism, did not Incorporate the Catholic criticisms of the ill-effects of economic liberalism. Moreover, as the societal community was becoming increasingly internally differentiated, and as the traditional religious integrative mechanisms were no longer effective, the Catholic Church was in a somewhat difficult position and was forced to adapt to new societal community realities : the increased militancy of the Catholic labour unions, competing for membership with the neutral international unions, was such an adaptation. The support given by some bishops to strikers and their challenge of the legitimacy of the Duplessis regime was another. For example, archibishop Charbonneau of Montreal declared in a famous sermon at Notre-Dame de Montréal during the Asbestos strike in 1949 :

> "The working class is the victim of a conspiracy which wishes to crush it, and when there is a conspiracy to crush the working class, it is the duty of the Church to intervene. We wish social peace, but we do not wish the crushing of the working class. We are more attached to men than to capital.

> This is why the clergy has decided to intervene. It wishes that justice and charity be respected, and it desires that more attention cease to be paid to financial interests than to [259] the human factor," (Charbonneau, in $.N. Milner & H. Milner, 1973 : 151)

If other bishops publicly supported the Asbestos strikers — some authorized collections at the church doors after mass in order to help the workers' families — not all of the church hierarchy was so inclined : the Milner's (1973) report that "for example, a group of Laval students who had planned to visit the strikers at Asbestos were forbidden from making the trip on pain of expulsion" (S.N. Milner, H. Milner, 1973 ; 152). It seems that the Laval University authorities feared reprisals by Duplessis. The reactionary elements among the clergy were also succesful in removing Monseigneur Charbonneau as archibishop of Montreal and had him exiled to British Columbia. This constituted a major political victory for Duplessis, fond of saying in private that he had the Catholic bishops eating in his hands.

As Hélène David (1969 : 249-277) pertinently notes, the fact that some elements of the Church hierarchy sided with the workers in 1949 and later on, opposed the Duplessis regime and castigated its collusion with the Anglo-American capitalists was conducive to the break-up of what the Cité Libre intellectuals have labelled the Holy Alliance, i.e. the alliance of Church, State and Capitalism. The break-up of the Holy Alliance constituted an important step in the differentiation of the polity from the fiduciary subsystem : it facilitated the autonomization and emancipation of the State from the Catholic Church's tutelage. It also, and this is important, permitted the Church to take its distances from the State, and to become an active force for the fuller institutionalization of democratic principles and of differentiation of the polity from the fiduciary subsystem.

[260]

There are other indicators of division within the clergy as well as of the Church's willingness to legitimize political change : two priests, Father Dion and O'Neil challenged the legitimacy of the traditional political system and elites by publishing a pamphlet entitled l'Immoralité Politique dans la Province de Québec, in which they denounced political corruption and the search of communists within the ranks of labour

unions and reformist movements. Their denounciation created an impact within the more liberal urban population as well as went far to legitimize political change and fuller institutionalization of democratic principles. A dominican, Father Georges-Henri Lévesque, with the support of his order, also challenged the legitimacy of the traditionalized polity. He founded the Social Sciences Faculty at Laval University and trained most of the new lay elites in the social sciences as well as socialized them to a more liberal if not left-wing Catholicism. Father Lévesque and his disciples were instrumental in the differentiation and autonomization of the cognitive field from the religious one. Within a context where the polity and the fiduciary subsystem are only partially differentiated, striving toward the differentiation of the cognitive field is a political act as well : using modern social science techniques to survey for example the housing conditions of lower-class quebecers becomes a challenge to the ruling political party ; promoting cooperatism and its secularization becomes also a challenge to the traditional clerical elites. That these developments deteriorated the legitimacy of the traditionalized polity and undermined the power-base of the traditional elites can be easily demonstrated : Father Lévesque lived most of his university career with the constant harassment of either the political elites or the University clerical authorities. He did however represent a strong sign of division within the Church as well as legitimized political change : one of his [261] famous statements — "If authority comes from God, so does freedom" — went far to legitimize the modernization of Quebec's polity and the fuller institutionalization of democracy. Father Lévesque managed to survive the harassment, to a large extent, because of Monseigneur Charbonneau exil. Indeed, as a keen observer noted (Fraser, 1952), if Duplessis had been successful in getting Father Lévesque's head, after having had that of Monseigneur Charbonneau, many catholics would have wondered who was running the Catholic Church. The Church could not afford to be too close to the political elites to the point where it would be inseperable from the Duplessis regime. It thus had to accept internal division in order that it be not perceived as a puppet of the political elites.

Nonetheless, this division and the activities of the "progressive" clerics went far to legitimize differentiation and political change.

We may sum up our analysis by saying that the post-War Duplessis government was ineffective in encouraging economic development, as

it refused to intervene in economic matters, except to support agricul-turism; it was also ineffective in responding to the new demands origi-nating from the societal community for greater equality ; finally, its anti-labour stand had as a consequence to deteriorate the legitimacy of power, as a split within the Church appeared and as progressive clerics sought to legitimize political change. The tensions and conflicts oppos-ing the progressive clerics and the Union Nationale government cen-tered to an important extent on the regulation of the post-War class-struggle and the legitimacy of the alliance of Church, State and Capi-talism. In a sense the Catholic Church, as Hélène David notes (1969), had no choice but to side with the workers, in order to avoid losing them to the International [262] socialist and neutral unions.

THE INEFFECTIVENESS
OF THE FIDUCIARY SUBSYSTEM

The purpose of this section is to verify the following proposition : because the fiduciary subsystem is at the top of the hierarchy of control, its ineffectiveness will be highlighted by its incapacity to legitimize a differentiated and pluralized societal community, as well as by its inca-pacity to legitimize political change and to produce the generalized commitments and highly qualified manpower necessary for sustained economic growth. Though the fiduciary subsystem does not comprise simply educational institutions, we shall be concerned in this section with the growing ineffectiveness of Quebec's school system, its adap-tations and the consequences of these adaptations with regards to the process of dif- rerentiation. Our strategy of demonstration will involve analyzing the growth of classical education during the post-War period, the growth of the public sector and the involvement of School Boards in secondary education and thus their challenge of the Church monop-oly over secondary education, and finally, the adaptations made by the traditional system of classical colleges and seminaries in order to meet the mounting pressures for change.

This analysis should permit us to demonstrate that the traditional system was incapable of responding to the needs of an advanced

industrial economy, as well as to institutionalize the equality of opportunity principle. Our discussion of the adaptations made during the fifties should also help understand how the system refused fundamental structural change and how, by its adaptations, it sought to retard change [263] it considered illegitimate. The discussion of the adaptations, their genesis and consequences will seek to show that the traditional normative framework was not conducive to the institutionalization of change.

A. Growth of Classical Education

Return to toc

After Confederation, classical colleges and seminaries multiplied. Twenty-two classical colleges were founded in the twentieth century, most of them (16) between 1926 and 1949. Seminaries also were more numerous : ten new ones were opened from 1892 to 1920. The following two tables document the growth of classical colleges enrollments from 1921 to 1961. They also Indicate that, after the second World War, this growth accelerated its pace : indeed, the data in Table 4.11 show that it took only five years for the classical colleges enrolments to more than double their size after 1955.

TABLE 4.11

Demographic Evolution of the Student Population Enrolled
In Classical Colleges for Boys from 1921 to 1951

Year	Student Population		Cathol. Pop, of 13-20		ratio
	Number	index	Number	index	
1921	6,190	100	174,000	100	3.56
1931	9,206	148.7	211,500	121.6	4.15
1941	10,756	173.8	251,000	144.3	4.28
1951	16,034	259.0	251,000	144.3	6.39

Source : A. Tremblay, *Contribution à l'étude des problèmes et des besoins de l'enseignement dans la Province de Québec*, Commission Royale d'enquête sur les problèmes constitutionnels, 1955 : 196-197.

[264]

TABLE 4.12

Enrollments in Classical Colleges
from 1955-56 to 1961-62

Year	Boys		Girls		Total	
	number	index	number	index	number	index
1955-56	19,770	100	2,451	100	22,049	100.0
1956-57	24,134	122.1	3,986	174.9	28,068	127.3
1957-58	25,142	127.2	5,642	247.6	30,724	139.3
1958-59	28,456	143.9	7,090	311.1	35,546	161.2
1959-60	31,007	156.8	8,848	388.2	39,855	180.8
1960-61	33,574	169.8	9,426	415.6	43,000	195.0
1961-62	57,291	188.6	11,466	505.1	48,757	221.1

Source : F.C.C., *Notre Réforme Scolaire*, tome II ; *L'enseignement classique*, Montréal, Centre de Psychologie et de Pédagogie, 1963 :106-107.

This rapid growth however created problems. Indeed, traditionally one of the main elements of the economic solvency and stability of the classical colleges had been the fact that these institutions had been run and staffed at all levels by the clergy. The rapid growth of classical education during the twentieth century and especially after the second World War rendered extremely difficult the maintenance of the system's traditional staffing customs : laymen had to be called upon and they were more expensive than clergymen.

[265]

Tableau 4.13.

Teaching and Administrative Personnel in Classical Colleges for Boys
from 1911 to 1961, by Civil Status

Year	Priests		Scolastics, Seminarists		Brothers		Total Clergy		Laymen		Total	
	nber	%	nber	%	nber	%	nber	%	nber	%	nber	%
1911	342	63.0	150	27.5	36	6.7	528	97.2	15	2.8	543	100
1921	440	65.1	181	21.8	17	2.5	638	94.4	38	5.6	676	100
1926	563	83.9	141	18.4	18	2.4	722	94.4	43	5.6	765	100
1931	702	73.6	115	12.4	30	3.3	847	91.5	79	8.5	926	100
1936	842	75.8	42	4.2	42	4.2	926	92.5	75	7.5	1001	100
1941	905	84.1	36	3.4	58	5.4	999	93.6	68	6.4	1067	100
1946	1072	84.8	16	1.3	76	5.9	1164	91.1	113	8.9	1277	100
1951	1192	84.5	26	1.8	69	5.0	1287	91.2	125	8.8	1412	100
1956	1234	75.8	44	2.7	27	1.6	1305	80.1	323	19.9	1628	100
1961	1414	58.2	34	1.4	126	5.2	1574	64.8	854	35.2	2428	100

Source : F.C.C., Notre *Réforme Scolaire*, vol. 2, Montréal, Centre de Psychologie et de Pédagogie, 1963 : 166.

[266]

The laymen's presence in classical colleges had been minimal at the outset. Except for the 1931-1941 decade, the lay category has consistently increased to the point where in 1961, it constituted 35.2% of the total staff. The 1931-1941 drop, small in absolute terms, is possibly due to the great inf1ux of priests during this period. The laymen constitute the category with the highest rate of increase, having multiplied from 1911 to 1961 by about 57.

Thus, from 1911 to 1961, though the clergymen increased in absolute terms, they cannot by themselves respond to the expansion of the classical colleges and must call upon laymen. This transformation in the hiring practice was obviously expensive. The Fédération des Collèges classiques (1954 : 101) estimated, that the services of a priest was worth $3,500.00 annually. It calculated the average cost of his room and board, and personal expenses (clothes, medical expenses, etc..) at $1,000.00 per year. A classical college thus made a "saving" of $2,500.00 for each priest on its staff.

Diocesan priests received in 1954 from $250 to $400.00 in salary, while members of religious orders received no salary, the classical colleges paying to the order $200.00 for each priest on its staff. Laymen were paid from $2,500. to $4,000.00 annually. The saving in hiring members of the clergy is fairly obvious from these figures. Another way of stating the saving is to note that while American liberal arts colleges allocated 54% of their budget to salaries in 1953, the classical colleges of Quebec allocated only 14.6% of their budget for the same purpose.

Since 1953, however, these expenses have considerably increased both as a result of the declericalization of the teaching staff and the [267] increase of salaries paid to laymen. In 1956-57 the average salary of a full-time college professor was $3,774.00. By 1961-62, it had risen to $5,784.00 (F.C.C., 1962 : 42).

These figures indicate that as expansion pursued its course, classical colleges needed more state financial support. This aid began in 1912, but was not sufficient : the provincial government granted $1,000.00 yearly to all classical colleges. The amount was raised to $10,000.00 per year in 1922. Things remained unchange for thirty years ; only in 1951 did the state's aid increase to $15,000.00 per year. Since this was far from enough, in order to raise more funds, the classical colleges

occasionally launched fund-raising campaigns and called upon their alumni.

The point we wish to make is that the economic position of the classical colleges, obliged to construct new and bigger buildings as well as to staff them increasingly with laymen, was not secure. The provincial government was not overly generous with its own money and it aggravated the situation by refusing in the fifties Federal subsidies to universities and equivalent institutions (the classical colleges were considered as equivalent institutions). Indeed, it will be recalled that in the first years of the 1950 decade, the Federal government, adopting recommendations made by the Massey Commission, had decided to intervene in the educational field, especially to support the provinces' effort to develop post-second- ary education. The Duplessis government, claiming that education was a provincial domain, refused the subsidies from Ottawa. It was only some ten years later that the Quebec government accepted the Federal money — totalling by then $200,000,000.00 — and used it to build CEGEPs and [268] University facilities. This incident in federal-provincial relations illustrates the kind of xenophobic nationalism espoused by the Duplessis regime as well as the ineffectiveness of this type of polity in meeting the new demands originating from the economy and the societal community. The existence of federal money however contributed to the development of a sense of opportunity for change : indeed, federal money was available to meet the growing needs of colleges and universities. The fact that the provincial government did not in the fifties accept these funds and did not inject in the system enough money — when it did, it did it more often than not in a paternalistic and discretionary fashion — disenchanted the rising urban middle class from the Duplessis regime.

B. Growth of Public Education

The private classical colleges experienced rapid growth during the twentieth century ; so did the public schools. Indeed, as the decades passed, the public school system was pressed in adding new grades and new programs. Efforts were made to establish a public secondary level, which, as we shall see, threatened the monopoly of the classical colleges, while rendering imperative some form of coordination between the public and private secondary institutions.

As Louis-Philippe Audet (1970 : 337-359) indicates, from 1888 to 1923, the public elementary educational system involved an eight-year course, divided in four years of elementary education, two years of "model" education and two more of "academic" education. In 1923, a new program was Introduced and consisted of six years of elementary education and a two years complementary course. In 1929, a "superior primary" three [269] years course was added, while in 1937, the regular elementary course was raised to seven years, thus pushing the total number of public education grades to twelve (seven years for the primary course, two years for the complementary course and three years for the superior primary course). Through these reforms and extensions of public education, a public secondary level without the name came into existence :

> "The introduction of higher elementary education, first in Montreal, and then in others major towns in Quebec, was an important step in the development of the school system. Until 1929, the French Canadian school population in the province was split into two disproportionate groups. The first group comprised the privileged few who followed their elementary course with secondary and classical studies leading to the university. The second group consisted of the children of the middle and working classes who had only a few years of elementary study culminating, after 1923, in two years of so-called continuation studies that offered little in terms of general cultural development and nothing in preparation for the liberal professions. The addition of three extra years to the two continuation years produced a more complete course, but one which neither rivalled the classical course nor could be compared with that of the English High School, both of which started after the seventh grade and lasted for four years... Even though it was violently criticized as a road leading nowhere, the higher elementary

> course became truly a secondary level and enabled members of the middle class to proceed to careers in business, engineering, and the sciences." (L.-P. Audet, in Wi1 son, Stamp, Audet, 1970 : 344-345)

Thus, the growth of public education in the Province of Quebec after Confederation pushed into existence a public secondary level ambiguously labelled "higher elementary or higher primary". It was to be financially supported by the provincial government in the fifties. Curriculum transformations led to the articulation of six sections or specialties within these institutions : general, commercial, scientific, classical, agricultural and Industrial. By these transformations, public secondary [270] schools came not only to offer vocational education but also the first four years of a classical college curriculum. Before discussing the implications of these developments for classical education, let us note that after the second World War, public secondary institutions had higher enrollments and grew faster than the classical colleges. This is easily understandable since that tuition fees were cheaper in the public schools than in the classical colleges.

TABLE 4.14

Evolution of Enrollments in "Secondary" institutions
from 1946-47 to 1951-52

Type of Institution	1946-47	1947-48	1948-49	1949-50	1950-51	1951-52
Classical Colleges (first 4 years)	10,394	10,479	10,488	10,923	11,431	12,009
	100%	100.8	100.9	105.1	110	
Modern Secondary Schools	1,111	1,097	1,183	1,182	1,278	1,280
	100%	98.7	106.5	106.4	115	
Public Schools (From grade eight to grade twelve)	20,919	20,712	21,464	22,347	23,767	
	100%	99.0	102.6	106.8	113.6	

Source : Arthur Tremblay, 1955 : 199.

This growth of public education and especially of secondary or "post-elementary" education should be put in perspective. Indeed,

"In 1950, fewer than 10% of the high school age group stayed in the Roman Catholic schools to the end of the system at grade eleven ; in 1960, it was still the lowest in Canada at 18%." (Stevenson, in Wilson, Stamp, Audet, 1970 : 404)

[271]

TABLE 4.15

Population in School, for Ontario, Quebec and Canada,
by age, selected years

Return to toc

Provinces	Percentages					
	10-14		years	15-19		years
Ontario	96.3	94.0	97.5	38.6	43.7	62.9
Canada [1]	93.4	94.4	97.1	33.7	40.5	58.5

1. Excluding Newfoundland for 1931.

Sources : Census of Canada, 193, Vol. IV, Table 8; Census of Canada, 1951, Vol. X, Table II; Census of Canada, 1961, Vol. 1.3-6, Table 99.

Thus, even with the expansion previously documented, Quebec's traditional school system was still in the fifties characterized by lower enrollments and lower retention rates than in Ontario or the whole of Canada. This educational lag testifies to the ineffectiveness of the traditional school system to meet the needs of an industrial economy as well as the demands of the societal community for a better distribution of educational services.

The educational lag and the system's ineffectiveness was to a [272] great extent due to the structure of the educational system, and especially to the monopolization by classical colleges and seminaries of the secondary level. This monopoly retarded the institutionalization of the principle of equality of opportunity in two ways : classical colleges were private institutions and thus accessible to those who could afford the tuition fees ; but, even if tuition fees had been minimal or non-existent, classical colleges authorities lacked, as we have seen, the clerical personnel needed to adequately respond to the rising demand.

It is within such a context that public School Boards started providing the first four years of the classical curriculum. This development as

well as the diversification of secondary education along the lines of vocational imperatives had many implications for the traditional system :

1. it undermined the classical college's monopoly over secondary education;

2. it pushed to the forefront the problem of control and coordination of the diversified secondary programs as well as that of access to the universities;

3. it undermi ned the classical college's claim of the necessity of a unified eight year course and pushed for the differentiation of secondary and college level education.

In localities where classical colleges had not been established, School Boards, pressed by an increasing demand for educational services over the elementary level, offered the first four years of a classical college curriculum. Before 1954, twenty School Boards had started to provide such a course. Two things must be noted with regard to this [273] important educational development : local initiatives and not governmental planning were the prime agent; the classical colleges were strong enough to retain, by way of the University Faculty of Arts, full academic responsibility and control over what was being taught in these public institutions. If the teachers within these schools were hired by a School Board, the classical colleges designated to control their activities by the Faculty of Arts, had the necessary authority to determine the curriculum, the choice of textbooks and grading practices. Where classical education was not offered to students by public School Boards, an important curriculum transformation was implemented in the fifties : the "scientific section" of the "superior primary" course incorporated the study of latin ; this enabled students, after graduation from the superior primary schools, to enrol in a classical college and complete the last four years of a classical curriculum.

Through these innovations, the traditional monopoly held by classical colleges over secondary and college education was slowly undermined and challenged. The Fédération des Collèges Classiques, created in 1953, was quick to understand the implications of these innovations. It argued, on the one hand, for greater state aid to its affiliated

institutions so that the competition between them and the public "secondary" schools would be equalized, and on the other hand, against the differentiation of the classical curriculum into two four years programs, one secondary and public and the other collegial and private, mainly because :

> "La valeur du cours classique dans la province de Québec lui provient en grande partie de ce qu'il représente un foyer culturel homogène pour toute la période de formation générale de 1'adolescent, depuis la fin de l'enseignement [274] primaire jusqu'au seuil de l'enseignement universitaire." (F.C.C., in Tremblay, 1954 : 203)

It is interesting to note that, during the sixties, the Fédération des Collèges Classiques came to espouse a different position : acknowledging that a fully developed public secondary system was needed, it nonetheless still fought for a private college sector and still sought to retain full control over the last four years of the curriculum (J. Tremblay, 1964 : 6-11).

The initiatives taken by public School Boards, however threatening to the classical colleges which, it may be recalled, were experiencing economic difficulties due to their unprecedented growth and the provincial government's refusal of federal funds, pushed to the forefront the issue of access to university education. Indeed they had not solved it : students graduating from the public secondary schools, because they had not the B.A. given by the classical colleges, could not have access to the university faculties of theology, law, medecine, and letters.

Those coming out of the superior primary course could either go into a classical college and thus gain access to the previously mentionned university faculties or could be admitted to preparatory years, not compulsory for classical college graduates, in such faculties as commerce, engineering or science. As the following table 4.16 indicates, in 1952-53, over 60% of the students registered in the universities of Montreal and Laval had the B.A. and were thus the products of the classical colleges. The table also shows in what faculties these students were concentrated. We should not be too surprised to discover that close to 40% of the university's clientele did not in 1952-53 possess the B.A. : the

statistics presented indicate indeed that after the Second World War the public

[275]

Tableau 4.16.

Proportion of Students With and Without the B.A. and Enrolled
in the Universities of Montreal and Laval in 1952-53

FACULTY or SCHOOL	Montréal B.A. nber	%	Others nber	%	Total	Québec B.A. nber	%	Others nber	%	Total	Total B.A. nber	%	Others nber	%	Total
1. Droit	322	100.0	—	—	322	196	100.0	—	—	196	518	100.0	—	—	518
2. Chirurgie dentaire	111	100.0	—	—	111	—	—	—	—	—	111	100.0	—	—	111
3. Médecine	508	99.8	1	0.2	509	682	100.0	--	--	682	1190	99.9	1	0.1	1191
4. Théologie	159	77.6	46	22.4	205	193	93.2	14	6.8	207	352	85.4	60	14.6	412
5. Philosophie	90	69.2	40	30.8	130	48	97.9	1	2.1	49	138	77.1	41	22.9	179
6. Pêcheries	—	—	—	—	—	11	68.7	6	31.3	46	11	68.7	5	31.3	16
7. Optométrie	35	64.8	19	35.2	54	—	—	—	—	—	35	64.8	19	35.1	54
8. Pharmacie	194	54.8	160	45.2	354	59	66.3	30	33.7	89	233	57.1	190	42.9	413
9. Sciences sociales	72	43.9	92	56.1	164	70	76.9	21	23.1	91	142	55.7	113	44.3	255
10. Lettres	152	39.3	235	60.7	387	54	85.7	9	14.3	63	206	45.8	244	54.2	450
11. Médecine vétérinaire	54	42.2	74	57.8	128	—	—	—	—	—	54	42.2	74	57.8	128
12. Sciences et polytechnique	349	40.6	511	59.4	860	191	45.3	231	54.7	422	640	42.1	742	57.9	1282
13. Commerce	95	44.2	120	55.8	215	89	29.9	209	70.1	298	184	35.9	329	64.1	513
14. Agriculture	22	25.9	63	74.1	85	20	51.3	19	48.7	39	42	33.9	82	66.1	124
15. Pédagogie	19	13.9	118	86.1	137	44	28.0	113	72.0	157	63	21.4	231	78.6	294
16. Hygiène	7	8.7	73	91.3	80	—	—	—	—	—	7	8.7	73	91.3	80

| | Montréal | | | | | Québec | | | | | Total | | | | |
| | B.A. | | Others | | | B.A. | | Others | | | B.A. | | Others | | |
FACULTY or SCHOOL	nber	%	nber	%	Total	nber	%	nber	%	Total	nber	%	nber	%	Total
17. Musique	1	3.3	32	96.7	33	4	10.5	34	89.5	38	5	7.0	66	93.0	71
18. Diététique	—	—	46	100.0	46	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	46	100.0	46
TOTAL	2190	57.3	1630	43.7	3820	1711	69.8	739	30.2	2450	3901	62.2	2369	37.8	6270

Source : Tremblay, Arthur, 1954 : 16

[276]

sector had rising enrolments and grew faster than the classical colleges. Some of their graduates managed to he admitted in the existing universities.

C. Adaptation of the Classical College System

It is our contention that the conjunction of post-War economic growth and prosperity, the rising demand for educational services more adapted to the conditions of advanced industrialism, the emergence of a public secondary sector and pressures originating from the universities fostered the modification of the classical curriculum. Since Confederation and the beginning of industrialization, classical colleges had been criticized for their over-commitment to the greco-latin humanities at the expense of both scientific and business-type studies. Léon Gérin, the first French Canadian sociologist, in 1901, had denounced, along with other contemporaries, the unpractical nature of classical education :

> "Le mouvement intellectuel de notre classe supérieure (suffisamment actif) n'est pas parfaitement équilibré, ne se fait pas dans le sens le plus utile. Abstraction faite des ouvrages professionnels ou officiels, notre production écrite est presque toute faite de sentiments, d'imagination et de légèreté." (in W. R. Ryan, 1970 : 195)

Edouard Montpetit, the first French Canadian economist, had also criticized the classical curriculum for its lack of adaptation to industrialization :

> "Notre enseignement a vécu longtemps au-delà de la réalité, dans le domaine de l'esprit. Il a été surtout littéraire et philosophique, d'une philosophie livresque, sans contact avec la vie." (in W.F. Ryan, 1970 : 198)

[277]

The clergy controlling classical education had managed to maintain the integrity of the traditional classical curriculum by recognizing the need for less general and more practical education and by asserting that the State should take the leadership in this sector while leaving the classical colleges intact in their basic orientations. Although the clergy opposed the downgrading of their institutions to the status of commercial vocational schools, the universities showed less rigidity and more adaptiveness as they created faculties and schools with a professional emphasis : for example, Laval University diversified its programs by creating in 1920 the Ecole Normale Supérieure for the training of teachers, the Ecole Supérieure de chimie (1920), the École de Pharmacie (1924), the École Supérieure de philosophie (1926) distinct and differentiated from the theology faculty, and the Écoles des Sciences Sociales (1932). Montreal University followed this professionalizing trend by affiliating the Ecole Polytechnique in the eighteen-eighties and the Hautes Écoles Commerciales in 1919. In the nineteen-thirties, both Laval and Montreal had a faculty of Science (Girard, 1974 : 179).

As the universities multiplied the creation and affiliation of professional schools, they came to press the classical colleges and seminaries to better prepare their students for the professional faculties and schools : scientific studies, it was said, were under-emphasized in the classical colleges; the universities wanted to see them more and better incorporated within the classical curriculum. Sandwiched between a public sector that successfully invaded their traditional domain — after all, close to forty percent of the university students in 1952-53 were graduates of public schools — and the private confessional universities which pressed for curricular reforms, the classical colleges and [278] seminaries, albeit relunctantly, institutionalized the latin-sciences course. The traditional classical curriculum differentiated into two main directions : the traditional   greco-latin one and the more modern one of latin-science. It thus became possible for a student to follow the classical course without learning greek, which had traditionally the status, along with latin, of the core discipline of the humanities.

Nicole Gagnon (1970), in her study of the evolution of the classical college ideology from 1915 to 1960, has documented that, while at the beginning scientific culture was not integrated within the core humanities, it became after the war recognized and integrated within the

traditional ideology, albeit ambiguously. We contend that the classical authorities had not much choice, as the public schools showed greater adaptive capacity and as the universities, to which the classical colleges were affiliated since 1863, pressed them to change.

A1though the classical colleges adapted to the needs of an industrial economy by differentiating their curriculum and giving greater importance to scientific studies, they did so with some resistance. Because of this resistance, Arthur Tremblay warned the classical college authorities in 1954 that, if they refused curricular adaptations, the survival of the institution was endangered ; if it could not meet new demands, new institutions would do so :

> "Nous prétendons que, s'ils refusent d'instituer chez eux le cours latin-science, nos collèges classiques contribueront eux-mêmes à leur propre perte où à la décadence des humanités gréco-latines dans notre milieu...
>
> Le dilemme dans lequel se trouve aujourd'hui placés nos collèges classiques peut donc se résumer en ces termes : d'une part, la diffusion de 1'enseignement secondaire, qui s'impose à [279] l'heure actuelle dans notre milieu, dépasse leur possibilité de développement matériel, ils doivent donc accepter d'en partager avec d'autres la responsabilité; d'autre part, un tel partage ne saurait s'établir sur la base de leur spécialisation dans l'enseignement latin-grec, s'ils ne veulent pas abandonner radicalement le genre de mission qu'ils ont rempli jusqu'à maintenant dans notre milieu.
>
> Voilà pourquoi, nous semble-t-il, devant la nécessité de se spécialiser de toute façon, les collèges devraient se spécialiser en terme de degrés ou cycles de l'enseignement secondaire plu tôt qu'en terme de ses modalités." (A. Tremblay, 1954 : 97)

It seems that classical college authorities took notice of Tremblay's final remark. Indeed, many classical colleges, and especially those operating in large urban areas, became specialized in the last four years of the curriculum. However illegitimate this adaptation seemed with in the framework of the classical tradition, the growth of the public secondary sector was such that the differentiation of the traditional eight year course into a secondary and college level was in fact, as the fifties rolled on, being realized. The following table 4.17 illustrates how far this differentiation had proceeded by the time the first CEGEPs were created.

[280]

TABLE 4.17

Proportion of Students at "College" Level
In Classical Colleges and Seminaries In 1967-68

Number of Institutions	Proportion of Students at College Level
11	70 et +
8	44 à 64%
15	29 à 38%
14	0 à 27%
Total	48 (Data available for only that number of institutions).

Source : F.C.C., Annuaire 1967-68, service d'information.

This differentiation of the classical curriculum was conducive as well as manifested a growing recognition of distinct levels of education beyond the elementary and prior to the university levels. That this recognition was a major disintegration force of the traditional classical curriculum is beyond doubt. The fact that some religious orders — especially the Jesuits — did accept this evolution and saw in it the enhancement of their chances of creating a new university is politically relevant. It however testifies to the gradual disintegration of the classical college system of facilities.

The classical colleges also adapted by changing some well established [281] pedagogical traditions : indeed, among the new post-War institutions, many do not institutionalize internship ; in urban areas, extern- ship becomes increasingly widespread. The loss of favor of internship were not always well seen by classical authorities. For example, Jean-Marie Beauchemin, writing in 1960 in the Fédération des Collèges Classiques Bulletin, sadly commented on this development :

"Nous savons très bien que le pensionnat évoque de mauvais souvenirs chez plusieurs anciens de collèges. Nous ne pouvons cependant pas négliger le fait que chez beaucoup, ce fut l'occasion d'un développement intellectuel et social qu'ils n'auraient pu atteindre autrement. Les témoignages à ce sujet sont indiscutables et chacun d'entre nous, s'il veut être sincère avec lui-même, reconnaîtra facilement le profit qu'il a retiré d'un séjour au pension-nat...

Aussi explicable qu'elle puisse être, la défaveur que l'ensemble porte à la vie du pensionnat nous laisse songeur. À la lumière des avantages que l'on a toujours reconnu au pensionnat et des difficultés de plus en plus grandes d'étudier que rencontre l'externe dans son milieu familial, on peut se demander si 1'éloignement du pensionnat pour le plus grand nombre sera pour le mieux ou pour le pire." (Beauchemin, 1960 : 7)

Thus, among the nineteen classical colleges and seminaries founded after the Second World War, only two — the Séminaire St-Augustin and the Collège du Mont Ste-Anne — adopted exclusively internship.

During the sixties, another pedagogical tradition is abolished : co-education is attempted in many institutions. Indeed, twenty-three institutions affiliated to the Fédération des Collèges Classiques tried co-education and opened their doors to girls as well as to boys.

Finally, the old and strict disciplinarian regime was somewhat attenuated in the name of respect for individual differences. If new, more student-centered pedagogical principles were not really expressed, [282] greater flexibility in the application of the colleges' rules was proposed.

These adaptations — the diversification of the traditional curriculum,- the beginning of institutional specialization in the last four years of the classical curriculum, externship, co-education and a greater flexibility in the application of the disciplinarian regime — belong to the same domain, that of the means used by the classical colleges in order to attain their goals. They belong to the level of what Parsons calls the facilities necessary for action. That for certain actors, changes at this level were perceived as a very serious deviation from the traditional goals of the system is a phenomenon that many social-psychologists interested in openness to change have often documented. Our case is similar : the institutionalization of the latin-science course, for example, was indeed perceived by many actors as a radical treason. One

could draw a parallel between the resistance of many catholics to certain liturgical reforms brought forward by Vatican II and that of many actors of the classical colleges system ; in both cases, resistance proceeded from the same confusion and the same absolutization of a constellation of facilities, in one case liturgical and in the other, educational.

There are however adaptations which theoretically have more importance and carry more weight. Among these, one must note adaptations of the organization of individual motivation in roles and educational collectivities. We would now like to center our attention on this type of adaptation. Two phenomena here must be analyzed : the growth of competence — as measured by diplomas — within the teaching personnel of classical colleges and the legitimized inclusion of laymen within the educational collectivity.

[283]

Because classical colleges had been from the outset private institutions, the State had never imposed requirements for the teaching staff. However, there seems to have been a minimal level of qualification without which a college professor could not be hired, unless exceptional circumstances prevailed. The minimal level of qualification consisted in having a classical secondary education and at least one year of university training or teacher training.

Looking at the distribution of college professors according to the highest degree obtained in 1956-57 and 1961-62, it is found that for both years, the majority of the professors had at least a specialized baccalaureate. The proportion increased over the five years period to 61.5% for the religious professors and 66.3% for the lay professors. Several professors with no specialized baccalaureate had gone to the university for five years or more : religious professors were numerous in this category because many priests, brothers and sisters had advanced training in religious institutions — considered here as equivalent to university institutions — without getting a diploma.

Thus, the growth of classical education, if it created financial problems for the religious orders or diocesain clergy that were responsible for it, also had as a consequence to foster greater training for those — laymen as well as clerics — who taught in them. In a way, this is surprising, for one would expect that as the demand for classical education

grew, the authority seeking to satisfy it would have contented itself with somewhat less trained personnel. This has not been the case for both the clerical and lay teaching staff. The data presented in table 4.18 indicate that in the fifties the level of formal training of

[284]

TABLE 4.18

Qualifications of the Teaching Staff of Classical Colleges
and Seminaries, by Civil Status and for 1956-57
and 1961-62, in percentages

Qualifications	Religious		Lay		Total	
	1956-57	1961-62	1956-57	1961-62	1956-57	1961-62
Ph.D.	4.4	5.2	4.3	5.1	4.4	5.2
M.A.	4.5	8.0	6.5	12.7	4.9	9.6
Licence	31.3	31.5	21.1	19.5	29.3	27.3
Special Diploma	2.0	0.2	2.2	5.2	2.0	1.9
Specialized B.A.	9.4	16.5	18.3	23.8	11.2	19.2
Sub-total	**51.6**	**61.5**	**52.2**	**66.3**	**51.8**	**63.1**
Certificat	4.8	4.5	13.0	4.5	6.4	4.5
Diploma	—	5.9	—	6.9	—	6.3
From one to five years of university studies without a diploma	40.2	23.4	15.8	10.3	35.3	18.8
Sub-total	**45.0**	**33.8**	**28.8**	**21.7**	**31.7**	**29.6**
Mon-declared or without university training	3.4	4.7	18.8	12.0	6.5	7.3

Source : F.C.C., *Recensement du Personnel des Collèges Classiques, année acadé-mique 1956-57*, vol. 11, annexe 2, p. 4.

F.C.C., *Trois études statistiques sur l'Enseignement classique*, (1961-1962), an-nexe 2, p. 29.

[285]

the classical colleges staff increased : if Ph.D.s and M.A.s were still a rarety, licences and University Baccalaureates were increasingly numerous.

There are many interrelated explanations of this training upgrading : for one, a substantial portion of the classical colleges growth happened in large urban areas, where universities — also growing — where operating and which could be called upon for the provision of trained teachers and the formation of the ones already teaching, also, as the public School Boards came to offer the first four years of the classical curriculum,,and as some of their graduates continued afterward within a classical college, these institutions became heavily populated in their college years, where traditionaly higher training requirements had prevailed.

We may add to these factors the fact that the religious orders who controlled classical education were orders which where from the outset created not for parish ministry but for teaching : their educational mission and tradition can be seen as conducive to competence upgrading or at least, as not blocking it. Monseigneur Roy's conferences on the problems of classical education to which we have previously referred to, testify to this commitment among the Quebec's religious hierarchy to upgrade the teaching skills of the personnel they had authority on. Again and again, he pleads the case fro greater university training of classical teachers. In 1935, when rector of Laval University, he declared :

> "Et la qualité du professeur dépend en très grande mesure de sa spéciale préparation à son ministère d'enseignement. Il lui faut des études supérieures sanctionnées par des diplômes.
>
> Tout enseignement qui ne se renouvelle pas sans [286] cesse, par ses maîtres, à une culture de degré supérieur, a tendance inévitable à s'amoindrir, à déchoir, à descendre au-dessous de lui-même.
>
> Sans doute la science ne suffit pas à tout, mais rien ne la remplace : pas même le dévouement ; surtout s'il s'agit d'enseignement dans les classes supérieures de Lettres et de Sciences. Plus on sait et plus on est apte à utiliser les bonnes méthodes, si en plus de savoir on est vraiment professeur." (Roy, 1-35 : 211)

The fact that Monseigneur Roy talks as Rector of Laval University indicates also that the Universities to which classical colleges were affiliated since 1863 were also active in the development of commitment to competence upgrading. Finally, it may be added that the growing competition of public schools, rendered urgent the upgrading of teaching skills, if it is true that one of the arguments used by classical colleges to defend their monopoly over secondary and college education was the higher quality of the education they offered.

If all these factors inf1uenced competence upgrading, the net effect of this upgrading was the firmer institutionalization of competence over more strictly clerical concerns : Monseigneur Roy stated it clearly :

> "Sans doute la science ne suffit pas à tout, mais rien ne la remplace ; pas même le dévouement." (Roy, 1935 : 211)

The second adaptation belonging to the domain of the organization of individual motivation in roles and collectivities concerns the legitimation of the presence of laymen within the collegial teaching collectivity. As we have seen, the traditional ideology grounding classical education had always held that the collectivity responsible for the pursuit of classical educational goals was the Catholic Church. Traditionally, this had always meant the church hierarchy. After the Second World [287] War, laymen had to be included to a greater extent within the collectivity and this also had to be legitimized. Theologically, it was not a difficult task to perform, especially if one accepted the teachings of Pope Pius XII on these matters, as Cardinal Léger did. Writing about the necessary collaboration between clergymen and laymen. Cardinal Léger (1961) argued that this collaboration is not a concession to laicism, but a normal manifestation of the true life of the church :

> "Il faut se rendre compte jusqu'à quel point et comment cette collaboration est un bien ; elle n'est pas une simple concession à l'esprit du temps et encore moins une réaction de panique devant ceux qui parlent d'enseignement "laïc" au sens non chrétien du mot. Elle est au contraire une manifestation parfaitement normale de la vraie vie de l'Église où les différents membres doivent faire oeuvre commune.

> L'Église, en effet, ne se limite pas à la seule hiérarchie. Le mot "Église", par son étymologie même (ecclesia veut dire "assemblée") doit désigner la communauté du Peuple de Dieu marchant vers le royaume à venir, sous la conduite de ses chefs établis par Jésus-Christ. Réduire 1'Église aux seuls évêques et prêtres, croire que pour faire partie de l'Église, il faille porter la soutane ou tout autre habit ecclésiastique, religieux ou monastique, c'est atrophier 1'Église et ne pas comprendre ses dimensions." Les laïcs sont aussi l'Église", disait le Pape Pie XII... " (Léger, 1961 : 20)

Cardinal Léger went on to compare 1aymen to workers whose job is to maintain the Church presence within the educational system :

> "Pour accomplir en plénitude son oeuvre de salut dans les âmes et au coeur des civilisations, l'Église a besoin des clercs et des laïcs. Ces derniers sont les ouvriers qui portent le règne du Seigneur au coeur de la Création et qui remplissent la mission de 1'Église dans les activités temporelles.
>
> Ainsi les laïcs, animés d'un grand esprit chrétien et d'un sens aigu de leur responsabilité, s'appliqueront à maintenir comme le font avec éclat les clercs et les congrégations enseignantes depuis [288] trois siècles dans cette province, la présence de l'Église dans les divers domaines de l'enseigne-ment." {Léger, 1961 : 21)

Thus, if the educational collectivity is still defined as a catholic church collectivity, catholic laymen were recognized as important members of that collectivity. The inclusion of laymen within the col-lege collectivity and its legitimation within the traditional value fos-tered the universalization of the norms governing classical colleges. The issue is not whether lay college professors espoused laicist ideolo-gies or not — some were active members of the Mouvement Laïque de Langue Française, others did not get involved — ; the issue is whether or not the presence of laymen, trained in the universities and seeking to be treated as employees and to develop a "full career" — which meant participation in the institution's decision-making apparatus and access to administrative posts —was a secularizing force of sufficient strenght to pushpin the background clerical concerns and replace them by more universalistic ones. We contend that the inclusion of laymen did in fact constitute an internal force in favor of secularization, in that it prepared their unionization. Indeed, before the Reform, at least in Montreal and Quebec, a movement of unionization of college professors was initiated

and gaining momentum; the Syndicat Professionnel des Enseignants (S.P.E.) was created and affiliated to the C.N.T.U.. Before the Reform, it negotiated labour contracts with classical college authorities. It was thus a force leading to the rationalization and bureaucratization of the classical college system. These changes implied that in the long run, the old theocratic normative framework would have to give way to secular organizational principles.

[289]

Thus, the inclusion of laymen — explainable in terms of growing student population and the Church's incapacity to produce enough qualified clerics and their subsequent unionization and affiliation to the C.N.T.U., a catholic union which had been quite active and militant throughout the fifties, constituted an important internal force for institutional secularization. The lay college professors, during the sixties, did get involve in the process of differentiation at the proliferation of new ideas stage — the Association Professionnelle des professeurs laïques de l'enseignement classique presented a brief to the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Education — as well as at the specification and implementation stages, and especially at those moments concerning the CEGEPs. As the sixties rolled on, the militancy of the college professors, evident in the S.P.E.'s bulletin "Education Québécoise", grew. It is still today a radical element of Quebec's labour movement.

Classical colleges adapted, albeit reluctantly, to the increasing pressures for change in ways described in previous paragraphs ; they also adapted by proposing a solution to the coordinative problems raised by the development of classical sections in public schools. Indeed, the classical college authorities sought to keep control of these classical sections, even if they were formally under the jurisdiction of a School Board. As Monseigneur Décarie (1938), the head of the Fédération des Collèges Classiques, stated : the Church had traditionally assured the unity and coordination of the school system; it could and wanted still to do so ; there was thus no need for an Education Department or for greater differentiation :

> "Je sais bien qu'on demande 1'établissement d'un Ministère dans l'intention de coordonner l'enseignement à tous les niveaux et d'avoir un ministre responsable devant le peuple. Mais les directeurs des différents paliers

d'enseignement [290] peuvent se rencontrer sans qu'il y ait un ministre spé-
cialement désigné à cette fin, et le gouvernement actuel de cette province
qui aide les institutions est responsable devant les citoyens. Nos collèges,
vous le savez, sont des institutions d'Église et nos évêques qui participent à
la direction de l'enseignement public ont la fonction de veiller sur nos mai-
sons aussi bien que des universités : voilà où réside l'unité." (Décarie, 1958 :
3)

Thus, to the coordinating problems raised by the growth of public
secondary institutions, the classical college authorities responded by re-
asserting their traditional right to control education; they thus resisted
differentiation and sought to "recuperate" the classical sections within
the public schools. During the fifties, this solution was adopted. Obvi-
ously, it did not entail any change in the traditional theocratic normative
framework nor a clear recognition of the differences between public
and private educational institutions. In its report to the Parent Commis-
sion, the Fédération des Collèges Classiques indeed denied the validity
of such a distinction :

"On oppose fréquemment un secteur privé qui grouperait les écoles pri-
vées et les écoles publiques indépendantes à un secteur public groupant les é-
coles publiques sous contrôle central ou sous contrôle local. Des pro-
blèmes scolaires importants concernant les programmes d'étude ont été
longtemps posés sous forme d'opposition entre institutions. Cette distinction
n'est pas conforme au bien commun, qui est l'éducation des enfants et elle
a nuit considérablement. Elle est contraire à la terminologie juridique
exacte, à la lettre et à l'esprit libéral de notre loi de l'instruction publique,
pour laquelle toute institution d'enseignement dans la province, privée aussi
bien que publique, fait partie du système d'instruction publique." (F.C.C.,
1962 : 155)

Thus, classical college authorities, seeking to cope with new devel-
opments, did not abandon the theocratic principles which traditionally
[291] had regulated educational activities in the Province.

A last example of adaptation, in many respects troublesome for
those who wanted maintained an educational theocracy : three ay col-
leges — the Collège St-Paul, the Collège St-Denis and the Lycée de
Mont-Royal — open their doors. These institutions had in the fifties a
teaching and administrative personnel mostly composed of laymen. In

all other respects, they did not differ from other classical colleges : they followed the same classical curriculum and were subject to control of the University of Montreal's faculty of Arts. The lay colleges neverthe- less constituted a major departure from the educational tradition of the Province of Quebec : for these institutions, laymen were not only col- laborators or auxiliary personnel to a religious order or a diocesan clergy, but were administrators as well as teachers. The mobilization or organization.of motivation component was thus being transformed and redefined.

We have tried in this section to identify the major problems faced by Quebec's traditional classical college system and its ineffectiveness in producing the kind of manpower necessary for sustained economic growth as well as in meeting the societal community demand for edu- cational services. Our argument has been the following : the post-War boom in educational demand beyond the elementary level, which is as- sociated with post-War economic prosperity, put heavy strains on the traditional school system : as the classical colleges and seminaries ex- panded, financial problems became acute : the clergy, though growing faster than the general population in the first decades of the twentieth century, did not recruit and train enough religious educators to staff its rapidly expanding institutions ; it had to rely more and more on laymen who were obviously [292] more expensive ; furthermore, Duplessis' re- fusal of federal funds and his unwillingness to inject sufficient money in the system did not ease the financial burden of the classical colleges. The Church's ineffectiveness in responding to the growing educational demand and in providing a more adapted curriculum resulted in the ap- pearance of local School Board initiatives in secondary education : most of the innovations discussed in this section and concerning public education constituted step-by-step, partial and incomplete attempts to fully institutionalize public secondary education : they were however adaptive as they responded to the rising educational demand as well as offered curricula better suited to the conditions of advanced industrial- ism than the classical colleges. These innovations in the public sector reached their height when School Boards offered the first four years of the classical curriculum, thus challenging the classical colleges' monop- oly over secondary education. As we have seen, the type of coordina- tive structure tried out during the fifties did not imply a fundamental alteration of the system's traditional normative framework. This

coordinative structure, putting public bodies under the authority of private ones, could not be anything but temporary.

While the growing educational demand strained the traditional system, the post-War period also witnessed the expression of dissatisfaction with the classical curriculum and its ill-adaptiveness to the conditions of advanced industrialism. These criticisms were not new. They were however politically effective in post-War Quebec because the classical college authorities became sandwiched between a growing and better adapted public secondary sector and the universities — and especially their professional faculties — which pressed the classical colleges authorities to change their curriculum. We have seen how the classical [293] colleges adapted, albeit reluctantly, within the existing normative framework which did not legitimize structural change, and how these adaptations were in a sense self-defeating and auto-destructive. The inclusion of laymen and their subsequent unionization was a particularly instructive development in this regard : indeed, laymen became, within the system, an active force fostering the universalization of norms regulating educational activities.

CONCLUSION

This chapter sought to verify three propositions concerning the long run effects of partial modernization. Indeed, we had hypothesized that, in the long run, partial modernization would render the interchanges between the relatively modernized and traditionalized subsystems unbalanced and tensionful. Our strategy of demonstration involved presenting data about the acceleration of economic growth during the forties and the fifties and its consequences for the French Canadian societal community.

We then sought to show how ineffective the traditional political institutions were in encouraging economic development, in responding to the new demands originating from the societal community and how this ineffectiveness deteriorated the approval of legitimacy of power. We finally attempted to show how ineffective the traditional school system was in responding to the needs of an advanced industrial economy as

well as in equalizing educational opportunities. We must now turn our attention to one major consequence of this double ineffectiveness, i.e. the emergence of a value-oriented movement fostering differentiation and modernization of both ineffective subsystems.

[294]

Modernization and the Institutionalization
of Differentiation: The Quebec Case.

Chapter V

The Emergence of a Modernizing Elite and of a New Definition of the Situation : the Antithesis

[295]

The purpose of this chapter is to verify the following propositions :

1. When both the polity and the fiduciary subsystem are ineffective and when they are only partially differentiated, a value-oriented movement will tend to emerge and develop an ideology fostering greater differentiation and modernization of the ineffective subsystems.

2. Elites, located in relatively modernized sectors, committed to and having a vested interest in the growth of the modem sector, will tend to participate in the production and diffusion of such a protest ideology.

3. Elites, located in relatively traditionalized sectors, committed to the maintenance of these sectors as well as having a vested interest in a tradition-based authority-system, will tend to react negatively to the protest ideology and reaffirm the traditional one.

4. Groups, in process of inclusion within the modern sectors and experiencing upward mobility and relative deprivation, will tend to support the protest ideology and thus enlarge the power-base of the modernizing elite.

We wish to argue that partial differentiation and subsystem ineffectiveness constitute crucial structural conduciveness factors for the emergence of a value-oriented movement and of the generalization of dissatisfactions with pre-modern institutional arrangements. These factors are also crucial for a proper understanding of why the protest ideology was produced by Catholic laymen, i.e. from within the Chruch.

Our strategy of demonstration will involve analysing the emergence during the fifties of a modernizing elite, its structural position [296] and its power-base, as well as circumscribing the main parameters of its ideology, as expressed in representative ideological statements ; we shall then analyze the reactions of the traditional elites, as expressed in the Bulletin de la Fédération des Collèges Classiques which started being published in 1955, and as expressed in the Rapport Tremblay, known as the Rapport de la Commission Royale d'enquête sur les problèmes constitutionnels (1954).

This strategy of demonstration has the advantage of illustrating the dialectical nature of the phenomenon under study. Indeed, if the traditional theocratic normative framework with its cultural survival or boundary-maintenance emphasis can be seen as constituting the thesis, the Cité Libre ideology is clearly with its anti-nationalism, anti-theocratism and strong democratic valuation, the antithesis. The fact that both ideologies were involved in warfare during the fifties and that the synthesis was not yet crystallized is important for a proper understanding of the problems of consensus-creation experienced by the modernizing elite during the sixties after it had gained access to power.

It must however be clearly understood that, although this chapter deals with a lay expert and ideological elite and its ideological warfare with the traditional political and clerical elites, we do not wish to contend that the lay expert elite constituted the sole agent of differentiation. Since this chapter deals with the generalization of dissatisfaction in post-War Quebec and with the articulation of a value-oriented movement, it is necessary that we analyze ideological material produced by intellectuals. It does not follow, as we have tried to indicate in the preceding chapter, that the only important manifestation of elite-pluralization [297] during the fifties was the emergence of a lay expert elite working in church-controlled institutions. It was however the one

which developped and articulated an ideology fostering differentiation : this is why we shal1 discuss its activities in this chapter and the reactions it engendered from the traditional political and clerical elites.

THE EMERGENCE
OF A MODERNIZING ELITE

We have seen in the preceding chapter that the modernization of Quebec's economy and the acceleration of economic growth in the forties and the fifties had profoundly affected the societal community. Indeed, it had accelerated the process of urbanization, the internal differentiation of the societal community in terms of class and occupation, increased the possibilities of upward mobility and facilitated the emergence of a new urban middle class. The traditional integrative mechanisms — parish, extended family, local community and land — were increasingly obsolete and new ones, more specialized and better adapted to the conditions of a differentiated societal community, were emerging : youth movements, labour unions, intellectual associations, cooperatism mushroomed.

What is important for our demonstration is the fact that most of these developments were sponsored by the Catholic Church which sought to adapt to the new realities and counteract the differentiating effects of industrialism, involved greater responsibility for the catholic laity and thus facilitated the emergence of a lay expert elite within church-controlled institutions, i.e. the universities, the labour unions, and the youth movements. It is this lay expert elite, rising in power and [298] influence within the church-controlled institutions, plus the progressive elements within the church hierarchy, which developed and diffused an ideology fostering greater differentiation and modernization. It is thus, to some extent, from within the Church, that the challenge to the traditional legitimacy system came, and that the legitimacy of political change was produced and articulated.

One must note the dialectical nature of this development. Indeed, it can be argued that the Catholic Church, both in Quebec and in other countries, had been since the beginning of Western modernization

essentially defensive, seeking to counteract the forces of differentiation — the Counter-Reformation sought to enhance the power of the hierarchy ; the nineteenth century saw the Pope's authority increase ; the twentieth witnessed the articulation of a social doctrine seeking to counteract the forces of social ism and communism, etc. —. Rocher writes about this Catholic Church defensiveness :

> "D'une manière générale, on peut dire que l'Église catholique des derniers siècles fut plutôt à la remorque des grands mouvements de pensée qu'elle ne les a provoqués ou dirigés. La Renaissance, les socialismes, le marxisme, l'évolutionisme, le freudisme sont nés en dehors d'elle et même parfois contre elle et elle les a longtemps boudés avant de finir par les accepter de plus ou moins bon gré. C'est comme si l'Église catholique ne s'était pas consolée de la fin du Moyen Age et du déclin de 1'hégémonie qu'elle avait exercée pendant plusieurs siècles. Elle a joué pendant près de dix siècles un rôle civilisateur et novateur. Mais depuis, elle n'a cessé d'adopter une attitude conservatrice, et réactionnaire — je le dis à regret, étant croyant et membre de cette Église - devant tous les nouveaux courants de pensée dont les derniers siècles ont été si riches...

> Il se trouve malheureusement que 1'Église francophone d'Amérique a hérité des courants de pensée les plus traditionalistes et les plus [299] conservateurs. Elle est issue directement de 1'esprit de la contre-réforme, c'est-à-dire de la réaction contre le schisme protestant et contre les nouvelles valeurs que celui-ci avait voulu affirmer. Le respect de 1'autorité hiérarchique dans l'Église, la soumission docile à toute parole des évêques et du Pape, sans distinction de sujet ni de contexte, une certaine glorification de l'esprit d'obéissance découlaient directement de la réaction anti-protestante" (Rocher, 1973 : 42).

The Church's defensiveness and the adaptations it sometimes legitimized — catholic labour unions, catholic youth movements, catholic cooperatives, etc. — although effective for some periods, proved to be in the long run ineffective. Competition with other, more modern forces, seems to have resulted more often than not in the victory of the modern ones : despite attempts to institutionalize, for example in post-War Quebec, catholic social sciences, or to limit the growth of science, the process of rationalization has pursued its course and fostered greater differentiation and autonomization of the cognitive field ; it has not been however easy and, as our discussion of Quebec's nineteenth

century sought to show, was stopped for a relatively long period of time before it re-emerged during the fifties.

Post-War adaptations such as 1'Action Catholique, seeking to give greater responsibility to the laity within the Church and to call on it to run the growing church-controlled institutions, in the long run constituted a secularizing force, in that it fostered the development, within the Church, of a lay expert elite whose marginal and ambiguous status vis-à-vis the Church hierarchy led some of its members to espouse a left-wing Catholicism legitimizing differentiation.

In other words, as the Catholic laity assumed the responsibilities [300] the hierarchy wanted it to assume, it soon came to realize the ambiguities of its new role, challenged the hierarchy's monopoly of power and came to push for differentiation. It is obvious that if secularization was to be successful and if the Church was to specialize, the lay elites would gain full control over the secularized institutions and not be dependent on the Church hierarchy for legitimacy.

This seems to have happened in post-War Quebec : as the Church's institutions were increasingly ineffective in responding to the society's modern needs, and as the traditional political elites, ideologically still clinging to the old theocratic framework, were as ineffective as the Church, a Catholic lay elite, socialized within the Catholic youth and labour movements, emerged and challenged the theocratic legitimacy system.

It is difficult to evaluate for the decade of the fifties the extent of the influence of the modernizing elite and the contours of its power-base. There does not exist any survey data on this. We can only evaluate it indirectly, by looking at the electoral strength of the opposition party during that decade. Though there does not exist a one to one correspondance between the modernizing elite and the liberal party of the fifties, the electoral platform of that party during the fifties incorporated some of the reforms proposed by the new elite (Roy, 1970).

[301]

TABLE 5.1

Percentage of Popular Vote Secured by the Liberal
Party and the Union Nationale in Provincial Elections,
Québec, from 1944 to 1956

Year	Party	
	Liberal	Union Nationale
1944	28	27
1948	27	38
1952	35	39
1956	35	40

Source : V. Lemieux et al., Une élection de réalignement, 1970 : 20.

Since the Liberal party was strong in the cities and especially in Montreal (Quinn, 1963 : 99), and since it has been shown that, throughout the fifties, the urban working class remained loyal to the Union Nationale (Pinard, 1970), it can be argued that the electoral base of the Liberal party was made up of the French Canadian urban middle class as well as of most of the Anglophone voters. It makes sense to associate the mod ernizing elite with the new urban middle class; as Guindon (1968) has argued, this new middle class emerged because of the growth of church-controlled institutions (schools, hospitals, welfare institutions, publishing companies) and other public bodies (radio and television). Experiencing rapid upward mobility, it can be seen as having vested interests in the full secularization of these institutions and in political change, to the extent that the Duplessis regime, as we have seen in the [302] preceding chapter, was not responsive to the new demands originating from the societal community, and especially to those originating from the non-rural areas. A modernizing elite, voicing these new demands, could get a sympathetic hearing from these sectors of the population.

Although survey data is lacking for the fifties, there are for the sixties electoral statisti cs which document cl ass voting in Quebec. Indeed, the Social Research Group data of 1960 and 1962, based on individual interviews about voting intentions, indicate that the Liberal party's support grew as one moved up the occupational ladder, while that of the Union Nationale varied inversely with the social rank of the occupational groups. This pattern seems to have accentuated from 1960 to 1962, as the middle class, both new and old, abandonned the Union Nationale for the Liberal party (Pinard, 1970).

[303]

TABLE 5.2

Vote Intentions (1960 and 1962) by Social Class

Return to toc

	Middle Class				Working Class				Farmers	
	Prof. & Managers (%)		Clerical & Sales		Skilled & Semi-Skilled		Unskilled Workers		Farmers	
1960										
National Union	54		63		63		72		59	
Liberal	41		29		34		26		38	
Other	5		8		3		2		3	
N	(123)		(63)		(246)		(84)		(125)	
		25		43		28		22		10
1962										
National Union	30		23		37		49		51	
Liberal	66		72		58		48		48	
NPD	4		5		5		3		1	
N	(110)		(83		(257)		(71)		(71)	

Source : M. Pinard, "Working Class Politics : An Interpretation of the Quebec Case", *La Revue Canadienne de Sociologie et d'Anthropologie*, 7 (mai) 1970 : 92.

[304]

TABLE 5.3

Vote Intention 0962) by Occupation
(Per cent)

Return to toc

	NATIONAL UNION	LIBERAL	NDP	N
Self-employed Professionals & Proprietors	26	70	4	(27)
Salaried Professionals & Managers	25	72	3	(61)
Small Businessmen (Self-employed)	55	40	5	(20)
Salaried Clerical	20	73	7	(45)
Salaried Sales	29	69	3	(35)
Self-employed Workers	35	61	4	(23)
Salaried Skilled Workers	28	64	8	(26)
Salaried Semi-skilled Workers	47	50	3	(108)
Salaried Unskilled & Service Workers	49	48	3	(71)
Farmers	51	48	1	(71)

Source : M. Pinard, "Working Class Politics : An Interpretation of the Quebec Case", *La Revue Canadienne de Sociologie et d'Anthropologie*, 7 (mail 1970 : 92)

[305]

The fact the old middle class (with the exception of the group of small self-employed businessmen) abandonned the Union Nationale for the Liberal party needs to be accounted for. Pinard (1970) recognizes the shift, but does not put forward any explanation. We contend that the economic policies of the Lesage government, its nationalism and its hard-nose attitude toward Ottawa facilitated the shift of political allegiance for the old middle class.

While during the sixties, the Liberal party was supported by both the new and old middle class, it is certainly arguable that the new one, rising during the fifties, also supported the Liberal party and was sympathetic to the ideological discourse produced by the modernizaing elite, which, as we shall see in the following chapter, joined the ranks of the Liberal party at the end of the fifties.

THE VALUE-ORIENTED IDEOLOGY FOSTERING DIFFERENTIATION

The review <u>Cité Libre</u>, which started publication in 1950, facilitated the expression and articulation of the differentiation ideology by some members of the new lay expert and ideological elite. As Marcel Rioux (1973) contends, <u>Cité Libre</u> was essentially a review of protest against the traditionalized political and fiduciary subsystem and the elites which controlled the institutions with political and fiduciary primacy :

> "If one closely examines the issues of <u>Cité Libre</u>... one notes that this was really a review of protest — against Duplessis, the clergy, the system of education and many other subjects — but it never developped the positive aspect of its ideology in a systematic way. From its beginning in 1950, until early 1960, it fought the "Ideology of conservation"; [306] from 1960 it began to counter the thrusts of the new ideology... If one could schematize the thoughts of the principal spokesmen of this (*Cité Libre*) ideology, it does not seem that they questionned the fundamental postulate of the "ideology of Conservation" : the understanding that Quebec forms a culture, that is, an ethnic group that possesses certain characteristics — language, religion, and traditions which distinguish it from other ethnic groups of Canada and

the North American continent —. If Quebec is retarded in relation to other ethnic groups, it is because of its elites who have led it in the ways of conservatism, nationalism, chauvinism and messianism. For them, this ethnic group must now acquire a more open culture and ideology and integrate itself into Canadian society". (Rioux, in H. Milner, N. Milner, 1973 : 142)

The Cité Libre movement constituted a direct challenge to the traditional political and fiduciary elites and to the legitimacy pool they monopolized. The Cité Libre intellectuals attacked and debunked many traditional values and myths ; thus, they must be seen, within the framework of this thesis, as agents of the generalization of dissatisfactions as well as the legitimizers of a shift of dominant values within French Canadian society and culture. We do not assume nor intend to judge the Cité Libre attacks of the traditional values and elites as "unjustified" and/or "unrealistic". What matters is that, by their ideological production and its diffusion within the elite-structure, — Cité Libre was not and did not intend to be a mass movement — , dissatisfactions generalized and a shift in dominant values was proposed. Indeed, if Cité Libre protested, they did so in the name of such values as individual freedom, democracy and openness to the modern world. They looked to Ottawa and Washington for a model of liberal democracy ; to France, for a progressive Catholicism, and especially Mounier's personalistic philosophy; they held that French Canada had the follow these examples and [307] adapt to modern conditions. Cultural survival could no longer be the paramount societal value. Maurice Blais (1952), in an editorial introduction to three articles entitled "Pour une dynamique de notre culture", challenged the cultural survival emphasis of the traditional French Canadian culture :

> "On n'a jamais tant parler de ces derniers temps de la survivance au pays du Québec de la culture française...
>
> Cette rhétorique commence à donner de la voix et à exploiter les clichés les plus classiques de l'arsenal traditionaliste : "fidélité à la tradition française", "hautes valeurs de notre patrimoine culturel", "héritage sacré de la religion, de la langue, et de nos droits". À propos de culture, elle propose les sentences les plus académiques et sur des figures de style les plus abusives, telles que "Mission providentielle du Canada Français" et "Reconnaissance de la civilisation française en Amérique".

> S'agit-il bien d'un simple artifice de rhétorique et d'une brusque flambée d'éloquence, ou d'une grave inflation du language et d'une dévaluation de la réalité qu'il représente, ou est censé représenter ? Il serait peut-être opportun de les interroger, depuis le temps qu'on les emploie sans référer à la validité de leur signification". (Blain, 1952 : 11)

The collaborators of the review answered Blain's questions in chorus : the traditional cultural survival rhetoric is empty, sterile, schizophrenically cut off from reality and thus decaying. Blain went as far as depicting the traditional French Canadian culture as dead and museum-like :

> "Notre culture a perdu toutes ses vertus de contradiction, de recherche, de critique et de méditation. Elle est à un point incroyable dénuée de passion pour la vérité. Coupée de tout courant de pensée, hostile aux grands mouvements de l'extérieur, indifférente aux tentatives de redressement et de rajeunissement de l'intérieur, elle s'installe dans le souverain conformisme. À défaut de s'alimenter et de se revivifier, elle [308] s'identifie un peu plus avec l'enseignement officiel. Quant une culture entre au musée des institutions, elle court un danger d'a- cadémisme et il faut craindre pour elle le péril des manuels. C'est le sort commun aux civilisations mortes que celui des facultés universitaires. La récente création d'une chaire de civilisation canadienne-française nous permet de mesurer dans toute sa force le mythe de la tradition...
>
> Tout se passe maintenant comme si, purement formelle et catégorique, la culture française du Québec n'avait hérité de la tradition européenne que de concepts stériles. À force d'intel1ectualisation, elle s'est vidée de 1'intérieur, par une déperdition constante de son énergie la plus vive, et se meurt maintenant d'idées générales. Nous vivons le temps des idées générales, qu'aggrave le divorce permanent avec la vie de 1'esprit. Nous sommes établis sur les hauteurs vertigineuses de l'idéalisme, nous entrons en pleine décadence de la culture, traditionnelle, cléricale et bourgeoise." (Blain, 1952 : 21)

For Vadeboncoeur (1952), this schizophrenic character of French Canadian culture implied low adaptive capacity which he associated with the French Canadian habit of responding to diverse crises in the same uniform, tradition-bound way ; the rigidity of the traditional normative framework was also associated with its incapacity to respond adaptively to crises and changes, and with its incessant defensiveness :

> "C'est un indice très visible de notre insuffisance dialectique que de voir une crise culturelle s'exprimer, sur le plan de la réponse théorique, par le regonflement incessant des mêmes idéaux. À toute crise, même économique, répond chez nous la recristallisation automatique d'un système à peu près invariable. Rien d'étonnant : dans un pays où la tradition est sacrée et la pensée rare, c'est la tradition que l'on charge de représenter à toutes fins le réel. C'est elle qu'on a sous la main et c'est par ailleurs elle qui, de son chef, se proclame l'image de la réalité et l'arme du bien. Une répétition indéfinie des mêmes propositions, indépendamment de toutes conditions [309] nouvelles, dans l'ignorance culturelle de ces conditions, à distance de toute chance d'une philosophie nouvelle, est donc à prévoir à partir de là dans ce cercle. Dans une telle conjoncture, nous assistons au déballage périodique et obstiné de ce qui au terme de la tradition, est toujours considéré comme le remède, comme la solution, suffisante, complète et que seule, paraît-il, la malice des hommes empêche de prévaloir pour produire ses bienfaisants effets." (Vadboncoeur, 1952 : 22-23)

For the Cité Libre intellectuals, the low adaptive capacity of the traditional French Canadian culture and the growing contradiction between It and modern realities, were a function of three interrelated phenomena : the primacy of nationalism, the reactionary and theocratic form of French Canadian Catholicism and the low valuation of democracy.

Nationalism was indeed denounced as reactionary, totalitarian and blocking progress in all spheres of activity. Pierre-Elllot Trudeau (1962), the most articulate and aggressive of the anti-nationalists, wrote, in a famous article called "La nouvelle trahison des clercs" :

> "Tout le temps et toutes les énergies que nous employons à proclamer les droits de notre nationalité, à invoquer notre mission providentielle, à claironner nos vertus, à pleurer nos avatars, à dénoncer nos ennemis, et à déclarer notre indépendance, n'ont jamais rendu un de nos ouvriers plus adroit, un fonctionnaire plus compétent, un financier plus riche, un médecin plus progressif, un évêque plus instruit ni un de nos politiciens moins ignare." (Trudeau, 1962 : 10)

If nationalistic fervor was wasted energy because it never bred anything progressive, it was also wasted energy in the light of broad evolutionary developments :

> "La nation est porteuse de valeurs certaines : un héritage culturel de tra-
> ditions communes, une conscience communautaire, une continuité histo-
> rique, un ensemble de moeurs, toutes [310] choses qui contribuent — au
> stade présent de 1'évolution de 1'humanité — au développement de la per-
> sonnalité. Certes ces valeurs sont plus privées que publiques, plus introver-
> ties qu'extroverties, plus instinctives et sauvages qu'intelligentes et civili-
> sées, plus narcissistes et passionnées que généreuses et raisonnées. Elles
> tiennent à un stade transitoire de l'histoire du monde. Mais elles sont lâ au-
> jourd'hui, probablement utiles, et à tout évènement conçues comme indis-
> pensables pour toutes les collectivités nationales." (Trudeau, 1962 : 15)

If nationalistic values were symptoms of a transitory state with
which some form of accommodation had to be reached, Vadboncoeur
(1953) saw in the post-War social conditions the sign of the decay of
nationalism : he asserted that the new context was forcing French Ca-
nadians to diagnose and solve societal problems at a level and in terms
indifferent to national survival :

> "Il est significatif que ce qui aujourd'hui actue notre valeur, ce soit pré-
> cisément la conjoncture dont le développement nous forcera un jour à poser
> tous les problèmes, sans exception, sur un plan indifférent à notre "survi-
> vance"." (Vadboncoeur, 1953 : 28)

Not all collaborators went as far as Trudeau and Vadboncoeur in
their denounciation of nationalism. All agreed however on the need to
reduce its importance within the French Canadian cultural system and
criticized it for its status quo maintenance functions. The traditional
ideological elites were severely attacked for having too often diffused
the fear of assimilation and used it to justify the maintenance of the
status quo :

"Nous nous comportons toujours comme un groupe culturel investi de toutes parts, comme une nation en guerre. Il se mêle à tous nos réflexes une dose anormale de peur instinctive. Notre circonspection tient de la dé-fiance." (Pelletier, in Savard, 1963 : 231)

[311]

"Notre position toujours précaire, dangeureuse, a pourtant évoluée, se-lon Pelletier. L'atmosphère s'est dégagée ; l'anglais ne veut plus l'assimila-tion à tout prix, il nous regarde comme un phénomène curieux qu'il a ten-dance à oublier, bien souvent, dans ses décisions politiques. Et Pelletier prend comme illustration notre politique provinciale, qui, confrontée aux problèmes énormes d'organisation de notre évolution récente, (système sco-laire, développement industriel, problème des salaires, sécurité sociale, etc.), les néglige scandaleusement pour évoquer les fantômes communistes, les dangers du fédéralisme, les mythes de l'assimilation et inventer des en-nemi s fictifs." (Savard, 1963 : 231)

Cité Libre, however anti-nationalist, did not favor linguistic and eth-nic assimilation ; it did not question the basic fact that French Canada constituted an ethnic community whose characteristics — language, re-ligion and traditions —- should survive. What it challenged was the primacy of national cultural survival values over all others ; what it sought was the promotion of other values — democracy, pluralism and freedom — and their full institutionalization. For Louis Savard (1963), the fundamental option of the review lay mainly here, i.e. in the promo-tion of a shift in dominant values within French Canadian culture :

"(Les auteurs) insisteront dans le même sens également : le nationalisme sans doute a sa place, mais il ne doit pas s'identifier à notre politique. Il n'en doit, au contraire, constituer qu'un des multiples éléments, important sans doute, mais non l'unique mobile. D'autres motifs doivent nous inspirer dans l'aménagement politique : la liberté, le respect de l'homme, la responsabi-lité, le souci de la justice et de l'égalité sociale.

La tendance de Cité Libre sera donc de laisser dans l'ombre les motiva-tions nationalistes pour insister davantage sur les autres aspects, trop long-temps ignorer : la politique, l'économique et le social ont d'autres finalités que nationales, et l'on s'accorde pour tenter de les dégager, de les revalori-ser, aux dépends des arguments traditionnels. C'est là, il nous semble, que se [312] situe l'essentiel de l'effort de la revue, son choix fondamental." (Savard, 1963 : 231)

Thus, the Cité Libre intellectuals argued, to caricature a bit, that the nation's borders were relatively safe, that the nation's energies and scarce resources should not be totally invested in their defence and that internal problems not only had to but could be dealt with, if only the traditional fiduciary and political elites would direct their energies and attention to such a type of action. The emphasis on boundary-maintenance was castigated as fostering homogeneity, monolithism, conformism and non-change. More importantly, the designated acute internal problems (schools, labour and welfare problems) were provincial responsibility : Ottawa could not be and was not depicted as the scapegoat and the source of their aggravation. In this sense, Cité Libre contributed to the development of a sense of opportunity for change : it neutralized the traditional rationalizations for the maintenance of the status quo; it refused to scapegoat the English and Ottawa as the source of the evils it wanted eliminated : these were internal and if some group had to be castigated for its ineffectiveness, it was the Church and the traditional political elites, who were not committed to the institutionalization of democracy and equality, not the English whose commitment to democracy had to be imitated. Thus, by seeking to render ineffective old nationalistic anti-change rationalizations. Cité Libre was instrumental in "internalizing" Quebec's modernizing problems; this "internalization" Implied that something could be done, especially by the state, if only it would modernize. This "internalization" was associated with the promotion of adaptation as a societal goal : French Canada was seen as moving from a boundary-ma1ntenance emphasis to an adaptation and [313] integration — not assimilation — to its environment one.

Thus, nationalism was seen as essentially reactionary, and as Vadboncouer (1952) argued, it was time for French Canadian culture to stop being grounded in the sole exploitation of what made it different from environing ones. French Canadian Catholicism had also to substantially upgrade some of it basic features, and the confusion between the religious and the secular spheres had to be eliminated :

> "En leur qualité de citoyens catholiques, au nom de l'intégrité de l'Église et de la liberté des citoyens, les collaborateurs de Cité Libre exigeront sans relâche une distinction claire et nette des secteurs spirituels et temporels. Au fond, les interventions de la revue cherchent à libérer 1'homme chez le canadien-français catholique. Au-delà des caractéristiques ethniques et

religieuses. <u>Cité Libre</u> veut atteindre l'howne dans toutes ses dimensions."
(Savard, 1963 : 234)

It is important to note that the Cité Libre intellectuals attacked the Church from within and not from the outside : the quarrel was defined as one between Catholic laymen and Catholic hierarchy ; the promoted differentiation was legitimized by appeals to the highest interests of the Catholic Church. Gérard Pelletier (1952) expressed eloquently the dangers the Quebec Church faced if it maintained the confusion between the religious and secular spheres; responding to a classical col lege professor who saw in <u>Cité Libre</u> the reflexion of a profound "crisis of authority" within French Canada, he voiced the fears of a catholic whose Church is to close to the temporal powers :

"Nous sommes inquiets, parce que l'Église, au Canada français, se trouve en permanence aventurer sur cette frontière dangereuse du spirituel et du temporel. Et nous sommes inquiets, non pas en premier lieu de notre fief temporel où les clercs nous disputent l'autorité, mais [314] des dangers qu'y courent notre Mère-Église par la suite de leurs empiétements...

N'allez surtout pas imaginer que cette richesse de 1'Église nous cause scandale dans son aspect même de richesse. Nous connaissons assez bien le clergé canadien pour savoir qu'il n'est pas composé de Sybarites. Ce qui nous inquiète dans cette richesse, ce sont au contraire les besoins qu'elle crée. Un orphelinat, un hôpital, un collège sont autant de trésors, qui, de nos jours, ne laissent aucun repos au clergé qui les possèdent. De telles institutions confèrent à l'Église une vaste autorité, une influence considérable. Mais elles 1'embarrassent d'autant de dettes que le clergé doit ensuite régler dans les antichambres de la politique.

Il fut un temps oû 1'Église soutenait seule nos universités, mais voici désormais les hommes de Dieu en pourparlers constants avec les politiciens et les financiers pour alimenter des caisses toujours vides. Si du moins cette politique se faisait au grand jour, ce serait un moindre mal.

Elle se trame, hélas, presque toujours en coulisse. L'Assemblée législative, par exemple, vote sans discussion après que les compromis, toujours précaires, sont survenus dans l'intimité...

Mais qu'en retire l'Église? Des octrois toujours insuffisants, des limites à son indépendance, et une autorité dont elle n'a que faire pour 1'exercice de sa mission propre. Elle règne sur 1'enseignement, mais en propriétaire, ce qui la surcharge de responsabilités techniques étrangères à sa mission, et compromet son influence spirituelle. Elle règne sur les oeuvres d'assistance,

mais en maîtresse des lieux, ce qui ne lui laisse pas toujours le loisir d'y infuser la charité chrétienne.

Et plus encore que les soucis dont cette propriété les surcharge, la confusion qui en résulte souvent dans l'esprit des hommes d'Église nous paraît redoutable." (Pelletier, 1952 : 6-7)

As if it needed to be said, Pelletier compensated his plea for Church withdrawal from the secular realm by asserting his submissiveness and obedience to the Church hierarchy in spiritual matters :

"Soyons clairs. Il ne s'agit nullement de contester 1'autorité de l'Église en matière spirituelle [315] ni son autorité dans les questions mixtes, ou les intérêts spirituels sont en jeu. Nous ne réclamons pas le libre examen ! Un ordre émane-t-il de notre évêque où celui-ci établit clairement qu'il parle au nom de l'Église et lie nos consciences, il ne nous vient même pas à l'idée de la discuter. Il commande notre obéissance immédiate." (Pelletier, 1952 : 7)

A sceptic may be tempted to argue that Pelletier's openly stated submissiveness to the Church's authority in spiritual matters on the one hand, and his plea for differentiation on the other, was a tactic. In a sense this is true and in another, it is not. Indeed, it is certainly arguable that within a context where the traditional social controls did not tolerate ideological deviations of importance, it was difficult in the post-War Quebec to remain employed by church-controlled institutions if one openly professed atheistic or anticlerical views, or even if one openly departed from clerical orthodoxy, as some clerics found out quite drastically (cf. M[gr] Charbonneau's exile to British Columbia) ; one had to be very careful in expressing dissent and had to protect, to use military terms, its retreat. Fol1owing this line of reasoning, dissent could only be legitimate if defined from within or as a family quarrel. But, if this is obviously true, it does not exhaust the total phenomenon of protest and dissent : Pelletier was a roman catholic whose religious commitments were real —we use Pelletier as a symbol ; we could use others as well — . The point to be made is the following : Pelletier and his friends were alienated from the traditional French Canadian culture and from most of its organs of reproduction, but not to such an extent that retreatism became the only solution. Rioux (1953) notes that total individual alienation from French Canada's traditional culture and society did not

breed dissent, social criticism or reformism : it bred flight to [316] better social environments (Paris, New York). He even saw the development of communications as a danger in this regard : as it became easier to fly to Paris or New York, alienated intellectuals, instead of fighting for the institutionalization at home of the values they cherished could be tempted to go abroad where their values had already a long tradition and a strong vitality. Rioux' analysis is sound : total alienation breeds retreatism and flight from reality, not involvement and social criticism.

If social criticism and reformism is to blossom, it must come from quarters which are only partially alienated. The Cité Libre movement proves this beyond doubt. We cannot thus interpret the carefulness or timidity of its attacks as simply a strategy : it stems partly from the obvious dangers involved in voicing dissent as well as from the partial nature of their alienated motivation.

It was thus as catholics and for the good of the Church that the new intellectuals pressed in the fifties for the full differentiation of the fiduciary and political subsystems and the secularization of schools and welfare institutions.

Concerning the Church's involvement in education and especially in secondary and college level education, the collaborators of the review felt that the Church had failed its humanistic as well as its religious mission. The classical colleges constituted ample proof of the low adaptive capacity and sterility of the traditional theocratic and cultural survival framework :

> "L'éducateur canadien-français se croît tout de même humaniste; en réaction contre la science et la civilisation technique environnante, il vantera la sagesse des auteurs gréco-latins, pour mieux les assassiner ensuite. Il défendra la dignité humaine bafouée et s'évadera du monde [317] contemporain. Qu'offrira-t-il à l'étudiant comme sagesse, comme réponse ultime? Une religion qui trop souvent est restée le système de sécurité qu'étudiants et éducateurs ont absorbé dans leur jeunesse. S'il y a présentement dans le monde occidental trois façons d'être homme, trois attitudes principales devant la vie, trois principes intégrateurs de la personnalité et de la culture, humanisme, science ou religion, ce ne sera aucune de ces possibilités que l'étudiant aura actualisée en lui à la fin de son cours secondaire.
>
> On parlera bien de fusion de ces idéaux, de synthèse enrichissante et d'intégration de toutes les valeurs de la culture occidentale. Cette synthèse existe-t-elle vraiment ? Ensemble éducateurs et étudiants ont brassé bien

des idées, bien des auteurs. Ils ont essayé de s'enthousiasmer pour Virgile, pour Aristote, pour Veuillot, pour Poincaré et pour Claudel. Ils n'y sont point arrivés...

Regardons notre bachelier à la fin de son cours secondaire. Qui est-il ? Un homme qui possède la faculté d'étonnement et d'émerveillement ?

Un artiste, un poète ? Il est btien rare que ceux qui le sont chez-nous viennent du secondaire. Est-ce un homme doué d'esprit critique, qui a le sens du dépassement ? A-t-il le sens du problème ? Veut-il connaître la vérité ? Peut-il seulement s'exprimer en français ? Est-ce un homme de Dieu ? Sera-t-il le sel de la terre ? Sa religion lui servira-t-elle de levier pour secouer le monde ? Regardez-le devenu avocat, curé, médecin ou ingénieur. Reconnaissez-vous en lui tout ce que le cours secondaire devait lui apporter ?" (Rioux, 1953 : 41-42)

Though Rioux did not answer squarely these questions because he sought to use the classical colleges' failure as a symptom of cultural sclerosis, it is clear from the context that his answer was no : the classical colleges have failed; they have not bred humanism; they have only perpetuated and reproduced religious conformism and could not do a better job because they were part of a culture and society which valued above all cultural security.

The Cité Libre intellectuals pushed this criticism of the [318] Catholic Church to its limits : not only theocracy and educational failure, but also the traditional, Jansenist brand of Catholicism was debunked, essentially for crippling the French Canadian personality with guilt, fear, shame, and submissiveness. Jean Lemoyne (1955 : 1-14), in a famous article called "L'atmosphère religieuse au Canada français", wrote :

> "Ah ! elle connaît son affaire à merveille, notre vieille religion française ! Elle a beau radoter ceux qu'elle infecte de culpabilité jusqu'aux sources de l'être et divise à la jointure de la chair et de l'esprit le sont tôt, au bon moment de la tendre raison sans défense. Culpabilité maudite, voix perçue depuis la conscience première, tonnerre de malheur sur le paradis de l'enfance, venin de terreur, de méfiance, de doute et de paralysie pour la belle jeunesse, saleté sur le monde et la douce vie, éteignoir, rabat-joie, glace autour de l'amour, 1'ennemi irréconciliable de l'être, on l'a respiré comme l'air, on l'a toujours entendu comme le vent, on l'a mangé comme une cendre avec toutes les nourritures, et les terrestres et les célestes. Elle parle bien la culpabilité, pour qui toute parole autre que la sienne est malice et vaine excuse absolument : elle troublerait les élus si possible. Elle recuse d'avance tout témoignage et prétend intimer le silence à quiconque veut se faire entendre." (Lemoyne, 1955 : 7)

Faithful to their commitment to 1iberate French Canadians from the bounds of tradition, the Cité Libre intellectuals rejected the religiously-grounded dualistic world-view as morbid and sterilizing :

> "Le dualisme continue donc la désincarnation de la chute et depuis toujours, il subsiste en symbiose avec un ferment morbide tantôt latent, tantôt virulent, que ces orgueilleuses, formidables, fascinantes et subtiles structures intellectuelles ne parviennent pas à dissimuler." (Lemoyne, 1955 : 8)

Both the primacy of nationalism and the counter-reformation brand of Catholicism were seen as responsible for French Canada's low commitment to democratic ideals. For Trudeau (1952), the traditional [319] nationalism and its primacy over all other value-considerations were such that French Canadians had never really adhered to the democratic ethos : they had used and abused of it, after the English had given it to them.

> "Après la Conquête, vainqueurs et vaincus furent plus ou moins d'accord pour importer progressivement les formes politiques anglaises, mais pour des raisons à mon avis diamétralement opposées.
>
> Les canadiens d'origine britannique voyaient le "self-government" comme la façon la plus noble de régir les rapports des hommes entre eux : leur dignité de citoyens libres ne se satisferait de rien de moins. Pour les canadiens-français, au contraire, cette institution ne pouvait briller d'aucun éclat intrinsèque... nous n'avions alors qu'une passion : survivre. Et à cet

effet le suffrage universel pouvait bien s'avérer un instrument commode. Aussi bien, en important pièce à pièce le système parlementaire anglais, notre dessein secret n'était pas seulement d'en user mais d'en abuser. À d'autres la recherche du gouvernement ideal : nous faisions flèche de tout bois." (Trudeau, 1952 : 54)

French Canadian nationalism was not however seen as the sole responsible agent of low valuation of democracy. Catholicism shoud also, according to Trudeau (1955), assume its share of the blame :

"Cette genèse de notre incivisme se double aussi d'explications d'ordre religieux. Sans rien préjugé de l'avenir, il faut reconnaître que les catholiques, en tant que collectivité, ont rarement été les piliers de la démocratie — je le dis à notre grande honte —. Car ils arrivent à si bien mêler les questions spirituelles et temporelles qu'ils se résignent difficilement à statuer ensuite d'aucune vérité en comptant des votes...

C'est là encore une raison pourquoi au Québec, où chacun sait que l'autorité vient de Dieu, on n'attache guère d'importance aux simagrées électorales : ce sont des divertissements protestants et anglo-saxons dont la signification profonde reste obscure, et dont l'utilité immédiate se traduit par la bouteille de whisky à recevoir, par la salle paroissiale à faire bâtir, ou par le contrat de route à obtenir." (Trudeau, 1955 : 55-56)

[320]

Trudeau's statement concludes our discussion of the kind of argument presented in the review Cité Libre during the fifties and the ear ly sixties, as a new lay expert elite sought to transform the traditional legitimacy system and promote a shift in dominant values within French Canada. We have used Cité Libre extensively : we feel it symbolized the new differentiation and modernization ideology which took form after the Second World War. We have used it not because it had a voluminous readership, but mainly because those who wrote in it as well as those who read it, occupied positions within the French Canadian institutions which grew after the War and which were well equipped to diagnose and diffuse the diagnosis of the societal problems engendered by partial modernization : the universities, the labour movements, the media, printed and electronic, as well as youth movements.

Within the framework of this thesis. <u>Cité Libre</u> is seen as essentially performing three interrelated functions : a) it generalized dissatisfactions with the traditional political and fiduciary institutions ; b) it produced a new definition of the situation, a new language — of adaptation — which was to become during the sixties the basis of consensus at the level of elites as well as that of the masses ; c) it was instrumental in fostering and facilitating both the process of value-generalization — from boundary — maintenance and cultural survival to societal self-sufficiency — and that of a shift in dominant values — from theocracy to democracy — .

Our discussion of the <u>Cité Libre</u> movement indicates that the modernizing elite was an active agent of the generalization of dissatisfactions. If intellectuals often perform within a society the function [321] of defining the collective situation, in periods of rapid change and associated tensions (Rocher, 1968), they often become agents of the generalization of dissatisfactions : they tend to diagnose the goal-attainment deficits of strained subsystems at their highest levels and not only at their lower operative levels. The <u>Cité Libre</u> intellectuals are no exception to this phenomenon. They reached high in their diagnosis of political and fiduciary ineffectiveness and produced a new definition of the situation, of sufficient generality to be useful in the generation of consensus at the level of elites as well as at the level of the masses : as the fifties rolled on, as the new intellectuals were effectively diffusing their new definition and language, consensus grew on the need to adapt. This new definition also facilitated the process of value-generalization : indeed, as we have seen, the Cité Libre intellectuals did not favor ethnic assimilation ; they did not attack the fundamental postulate of the traditional legitimacy system — i.e. the assumption that French Canada constitutes an ethnic group whose language, religion and traditions should survive — ; they only attacked the traditional over-emphasis on boundary-maintenance and pushed for differentiation and modernization without fostering ethnic assimilation. In doing so, they facilitated the emancipation of nationalism from Catholicism and theocratism and its mix with liberalism, which was to become during the sixties the essence of the so- called neo-nationalism. It is in this sense that <u>Cité Libre</u> prepared the ground for value-generalization, consensus-creation and change in dominant values.

Although it prepared the ground for these developments, it did not during the fifties become sufficiently strong to overthrow the traditional dominant theocratic cultural survival Ideology. It was more [322] than anything else the antithesis of the traditional normative framework, which as we shall now seek to demonstrate, was still alive and dominant.

THE REACTIONS
OF THE TRADITIONAL ELITES

The purpose of this section is to verify the following proposition : elites, locate in relatively traditionalized sectors, committed to the maintenance of these sectors as well as having a vested Interest in a tradition-based authority-system, will tend to react negatively to the protest ideology and reaffirm the traditional one.

We shall rely on two sets of sources for our demonstration : the Rapport Tremblay, known as the Rapport de la Commission Royale d'Enquête sur les problèmes constitutionnels (1954), in which we shall find a pre-modern definition of the role of the State, and the ideological material produced by the Fédération des Collèges Classiques in its Bulletin which started being published in 1955 and in which we shall find examples of the kind of ideological ammunitions the Fédération produced and used in its warfare with the modernizing elite.

A. The Tremblay Report

Set up in the early fifties by Duplessis in order to counteract the continuing post-War federal centralization, the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional problems constituted a systematic effort in defining the role of the State. It did not however deviate from tradition and expressed views grounded in a theology typical of historic civilizations (Bellah, 1964).

[323]

Indeed, it held that the Province of Quebec should be seen as the "guardian of French Canadian culture" (Tremblay Report, vol. III, book I, 1956 : 108), and that culture was basically catholic. From thereon, it deduced the role of the State, a role which was thus informed and guided by catholic principles : the State, in the Report, was not thus fully emancipated from the tutelage of the Catholic Church. On the contrary, this tutelage constituted its originality with regard to environing states.

Since "Catholicism considers Man as called to an eternal destiny of which the present life is but a prelude and a preparation" (Tremblay Report, vol. III, book I, 1956 : 114),

> "the achievements of the temporal life... are essentially of a personal and individual nature. It is Man who makes his salvation, and he makes it because, as a reasonable and thus a free being, he chooses, in the intimacy of his own conscience, to act according to divine grace in each and every one of his actions" (Tremblay Report, vol. Ill, book I, 1956 : 114).

Man is thus free and responsible.

Man also needs society, not only for the fulfilment of his tern- oral life, but also for the pursuit of his eternal destiny. The Tremblay Report cited Maritain : "political society has the duty of leading the human being to spiritual perfection" (Tremblay Report, vol. III, book I, 1956 : 114). Thus, there is a transcendent order which man must achieve in his person and which society must aid him to reach.

The catholic concept of the social order rests, according to the Tremblay Report, on the preceding assumptions; three principles are seen as crucial :

[324]

"1. The first initiative and responsibility comes from the individual. This is on the ground of the connection which the Catholic concept establishes between the accomplishments of the temporal life and the fulfilment of the calling of Man — both natural and supernatural...

2. Principle of "subsidiarity". The Catholic philosophy regards society as a complete organism into which Man is placed through the medium of institutions, groups and communities which he creates himself through a natural need ; these include families and various associations which contribute to the fulfilment of the common good, each according to its own purpose. The role of the State is not to take the place of these natural groupings, but to help them achieve their purpose...

3. Finally, the supplementary principle. This principle is derived from the preceding one. The state is not the creator of the common good; it is its guardian. It alone is not the whole of society ; it is the first of various societies that Man creates according to his needs, on his own initiative. It does not replace private, personal or organized initiative ; it stimulates, surrounds and controls it, co-ordinates its movements, and, where necessary, takes its place more or less completely. It employs direct action only in the case where individuals and groups suffer from an insufficiency, which cannot be remedied. Its rule is justice, that is to say, the continual search for a group of conditions that enable each person on his own, or with the aid of those like him, or, if circumstances demand it, with the direct help of the state, to acquire the benefits necessary for the fulfilment of his life. It cannot allow anyone, through a defect of social organization, to be thwarted in his life and lessened in his person" (Tremblay Report, vol. Ill, book 1, 1956 : 114-116).

What are the implications of these principles ? They clearly imply the limitation of the growth and involvement of the state in different spheres of activities : the activities of the State must always be remedial and supplementary, and must be judged according to their con- formity or non-conformity "with the demands of a given culture" (Tremblay Report, vol. III, book I, 1956 : 109), in this case, Catholic and French. [325] This means for example, that the State should not intervene in economic activities or develop social security measures ; if it does, it should be on a temporary basis, because there are temporary "defects of social organization".

These principles also imply the existence of a transcendent order which receives primacy : temporal life — and its manifestations, economic development, political growth, etc... — is a means to an other-wordi y end, and it is this end which receives primacy.

Finally, this pre-modern concept of the social order and of the state does not legitimize basic political change. The State is seen as informed and guided by Catholic principles : it is thus only partially differentiated from the fiduciary subsystem, as in historic civilizations (Bellah, 1964). The Tremblay Report does not deviate from this philosophy and does not, by the same token, legitimize differentiation and the growth of the State : the State is seen as the guardian of the common good, which is defined in religious terms as "the most widespread benefit, common to all men, and one which everyone must enjoy in order to fulfil his vocation" (Tremblay Report, vol. III, book I, 1956 : 114).

To the extent that the Tremblay Report expressed the views of the dominant political elites of the fifties, we can understand why the post-War Quebec polity was increasingly ineffective in responding to the needs of an advanced industrial economy as well as to the equality demands originating from diverse sectors of the societal community. It simply did not consider state intervention in economic activities or social security programs as legitimate within the pre-modern value framework which informed its activities.

[326]

B. The Bulletin de la Fédération des Collèges Classiques

If the Tremblay Report held that the State was the guardian of the common good and not its creator, the Federation of classical colleges, by the Bulletin its started to publish in 1955, still clung to a theocratic outlook and sought to resist differentiation.

The Bulletin constituted the official review of the Federation which was created in 1953 to meet the post-War educational problems and criticism and which regrouped the classical colleges and seminaries of the Province. Though the review sought more than simply produce

ideological ammunitions against rising criticisms and demands for differentiation — it helped legitimize and diffuse throughout the classical college system the kinds of adaptations discussed in the preceding chapter — it did diffuse such ideological material. Indeed, the Bulletin, published from 1955 to 1965, contained articles which sought on the one hand to respond to criticisms — i.e. Catholic Church has improvised its involvement in secondary education; the clergy staffing classical colleges is incompetent ; the Church has used classical colleges mainly for the production of priests ; the Church and the classical colleges are responsible for the economic inferiority and backwardness of French Canada ; the Church is against public secondary education; the Church is rich — and on the other hand to reassert the traditional theocratic legitimacy system.

Since we have touched on this issue in our discussion of the adaptations made by classical colleges during the fifties, we shall be brief.

Let us note that in the first two issues, mention is made of the Federation's desire to upgrade its image within the general public.

It is stated that there is an urgent need for a public relations effort. [327] This desire to upgrade the classical college image obviously implies that, by 1955, it was not very good, at least for the heads of the Federation, and that the Federation felt the need to generate support in its effort to resist differentiation. M^{gr} Thomassin (1955 : 3) squarely tackled the problem :

> "Malgré des efforts centenaires et des réussites admirables, le public, en ces derniers temps, semble vouloir nous demander des comptes. On entend de temps à autre cette question : nous vous avons confié tous nos enfants, au niveau secondaire; comment se fait-il que nous manquions de tant d'hommes qualifiés dans tant de domains ? Comment nos bacheliers ne sont-ils pas mieux préparés à la vie ? Rendez compte de votre mission" (Mgr Thomassin, 1955 : 3).

In the fourth issue of the Bulletin, the secretary general of the Federation argued that the mandate of the secretariat he headed was that of "reestablishing the truth" concerning classical colleges :

"Il (le secrétariat) doit être présent pour pouvoir dire son mot 3 1'occasion. On parle beaucoup d'éducation sur différentes tribunes : journaux, radio, télévision, dîners-causerie, forum, congrès, symposium, où l'on fait facilement le procès des collèges et où l'on prête quelquefois à ces mêmes, collèges ou à leurs dirigeants des intentions ou des sentiments qui leur sont complètement étrangers. Il faut être là pour rétablir la vérité parfois ou encore pour déclarer les efforts qui sont tentés pour l'amélioration de tel ou tel point." (Bluteau, 1956 : 2)

A letter written by Father Bibeau, superior of the Séminaire de Joliette and published in the Bulletin in 1956, indicated that the classical colleges' alumni did not at the time seem ardent defensors of the classical tradition : the Federation was thus losing its traditional support base.

"Mes chers anciens, croyez que nous ne faisons pas la sourde oreille à toutes les remarques plus ou [328] moins obligeantes que vous entendez vous-mêmes de part et d'autres, contradictoires parfois, mais dont la victime est toujours la même : le cours classique et ses châteaux forts, les collèges dirigés par les prêtres. De plus en plus on ouvre des yeux inquisiteurs sur nos institutions et plus elles se débattent dans des difficultés proprement scolaires ou simplement matérielles, plus on semble les harceler et se montrer exigeant envers elles...

Sans préjudice pour les autres institutions, on peut dire que les collèges classiques fournissent à la Province la majorité de ses dirigeants en titre ou en nom. Comment se fait-il que parmi eux, ils ne se recrutent pas plus de défenseurs ? Les Amicales d'anciens élèves devraient être une force puissante à 1'actif des collèges — elles pourraient facilement le devenir. Qui donc mettra le courant générateur d'énergie ? Il faudrait avouer que notre éducation ne porte que de bien piètres résultats, si nous ne pouvions compter sur les milliers d'enfants que nous avons formés pour promouvoir la cause des collèges et assurer leur prospérité dans tous les domaines" (Bibeau, 1956 : 6).

Father Bibeau went on to ask for alumni support, not simply in terms"of monetary assistance, but also in terms of ideological and political support in the defence of the type of education they had received. What is essential for our argument is the following point : during the fifties, the clerical authorities controlling classical colleges became defensive, sought to maintain their support base and responded to the

growing criticisms by reasserting the traditional values and the clerical authority they legitimazed.

For Father Bibeau, what was involved in the growing criticisms of the classical colleges was the Church monopoly over secondary education. He did not deny the existence of such a monopoly ; he considered it legitimate and justified on the grounds that the clergy had always been a competent and devoted educator :

[329]

> "Cependant ce qui alimente davantage les critiques contre les collèges classiques a quelque chose de plus local que la querelle des humanités contre les sciences. C'est le monopole du clergé et des communautés religieuses dans l'enseignement secondaire. Ce prétendu monopole a de quoi faire sourire : c'est comme si l'on disait que les médecins ont le monopole de la médecine et les architectes, le monopole des plans et livres de charges. Songe-t-on à reprocher à certaines catégories de jeunes gens de choisir telle profession, de s'y préparer par des études appropriées et d'y consacrer leur vie. Ceux qui entrent dans une communauté enseignante ne sont pas des usurpateurs. Ils possèdent leurs lettres de créances au même titre que les autres professeurs ; il n'est pas juste de dire qu'ils s'improvisent éducateurs et que leur nomination à tel poste est leur seule préparation et leur seule carte de compétence. Ces temps héroïques sont révolus depuis longtemps et le peuple canadien-français peut s'estimer heureux de les avoir vécus; sans les sacrifices de milliers de prêtres, notre province ne posséderait pas les institutions qui font sa gloire et n'aurait pas eu les hommes publics qui ont assumé sa survivance" (Bibeau, 1956 : 6).

The defensive tone is evident in Father Bibeau's argument : the Church has not been an usurpator ; it is a competent educator and it has throughout history performed important functions — cultural survival — for the societal collectivity which should be grateful instead of critical.

While the Federation authorities felt the need to defend their involvement in secondary education and argued that it had been instrumental in maintaining the boundaries of French Canadian society and culture, they felt it was necessary to reassert their right to use classical colleges and seminaries for the recruitment of priests. Disturbed by the accusation that classical colleges were "manufactures of priests" instead of "manufactures of engineers, businessmen and technicians".

Father [330] Lalande, then president of the assembly of classical colleges' superiors wrote in an article entitled "Nos collèges sont-ils appelés à disparaître ?" (1956b) :

"Afin de dissiper toute équivoque, je dirai d'a bord que les séminaires et collèges catholiques dirigés par le clergé séculier et les communautés religieuses trahiraient leurs origines et manqueraient à leur mission première s'ils ne préparaient pas les prêtres qui sont absolument indispensables à l'Église bien sûr, mais aussi à toute société chrétienne. Ils n'ont pas à s'excuser d'avoir à remplir ce rôle, au contraire, j'ai la conviction bien arrêtée que c'est là le service le plus urgent et le plus élevé qu'ils puissent rendre non seulement à l'Église mais à toute nation qui se dit spiritualiste et, à plus forte raison, chrétienne et catholique.

En conséquence, m'appuyant — sans forcer les textes, il me semble — sur les récentes déclarations du Souverain Pontife, je n'hésite pas à affirmer que même si nos séminaires et collèges étaient consacrés exclusivement à la formation du clergé — et l'on sait qu'il n'en est pas ainsi, même pour ceux qui portent le nom de Séminaire — ils auraient droit de compter sur toutes les ressources financières dont ils ont besoin pour atteindre leur fin, selon les procédés de financement normal en vigueur dans la nation" (Lalande, 1956 : 2).

Father Lalande's statement is both very strong and very traditional : the interests of the nation and those of the Church coincide, because the nation and the State are defined as catholic. Let us note that Father Lalande justified the Church's right to produce priests and the State's duty to support it financially, not only by reasserting theocratic values, but also by appealing to democratic ones :

"Dans un pays démocratique et chrétien, il ne serait pas juste que les parents, dont les enfants se dirigent vers le service de leurs frères dans le sacerdoce ou la vie religieuse, soient grevés d'obligations que n'auraient pas à porter les parents des enfants qui se préparent à d'autres formes de services de la société. [331] À mon point de vue, une société qui ne comprendrait pas ce devoir ne pourrait se dire chrétienne. Elle serait devenue matérialiste dans la pratique même si elle se refusait de l'être dans les formulations théoriques" (Lalande, 1956 : 3).

In other words, if classical colleges ever became specialized only in the training of priests, the State should support them exactly as it accepted to support a professional school producing qualified manpower, because parents and adolescents have the fundamental right to choose their calling and should not be penalized for choosing priesthood. Father Lalande's argument thus changed as it unfolded : at the beginning, theocracy was the legitimizer ; at the end, democratic principles were brought into the picture. This contradiction may be seen as a symptom of the difficulty, experienced by the Church hierarchy, to defend its monopoly over secondary education during the fifties.

The Church felt the need to reassert the traditional catholic cultural survival framework largely because a new definition of the situation — discussed in the preceding section — was emerging and gaining Importance. Of this new definition of the situation, the classical colleges authorities said it was foreign and that it would foster the deterioration of the moral fiber of the nation and lead it to materialism :

> "Il n'est pas étonnant que ce soit répandue l'idée qu'en prenant les formules et les méthodes d'éducation des peuples qui nous entourent et nous dominent à certains points de vue, on assure en même temps son émancipation économique et qu'on lui permette de jouer pleinement son rôle dans le pays et dans le monde. Plusieurs affirment avec une assurance parfois inquiétante que le grand mal actuel, c'est la pénurie d'ingénieurs, d'hommes de science et de techniciens canadiens-français et qu'il faut orienter les études secondaires de façon à attirer les jeunes gens vers ces carrières...

[332]

> Mais si nous produisons plus d'ingénieurs et de techniciens sans produire en même temps des artistes, des sociologues, des politiciens, des philosophes et des humanistes, serons-nous plus avancés ? Nous aurons peut-être plus de pouvoirs sur les matériaux et les machines : en serons-nous plus hommes ? Pour assumer la promotion d'un peuple vers une civilisation plus haute, il faut sans doute de la technique, mais il faut surtout de l'humanisme authentique sans quoi l'homme ne saura plus dominer la matière et la technique et il sera détruit moralement et spi rituellement par elle" (Lalande, 1956 : 3).

It is interesting to note that, only five years later, another superior, Father Beauchamp, felt that it was important to reassert strongly the right of the clergy to be involved in teaching. The problem was no

longer that of "manufacturing priests" instead of technicians or of monopolizing a level of education, but that of clerical involvement in teaching.

> "Mais je rejette cette vue étroite et bornée qui voudrait réduire 1'apostolat du clerc à la sacristie ou, tout au plus, dans 1'enseignement, à des cours de religion. Le prêtre, pour sa mission d'éducation chrétienne, a sa place dans 1'enseignement, même profane. Il doit sans doute s'imposer par sa compétence et non seulement par son caractère sacerdotal. Il doit dialoguer avec ses confrères laies qui, eux aussi, doivent dialoguer avec lui. La place nécessaire du laie n'enlève pas celle du prêtre. Une revision de situation donne au premier son rôle et sa dimension, mais respecte aussi la vocation d'éducateur de nombre de clercs" (Beauchamp, 1961 : 8).

Father Beauchamp did not refuse the inclusion of laymen within the system : he expressed the fear that the inclusion of laymen would foster the exclusion of the religious educator. In our terms, what he feared was the universalization of the norms governing secondary and college teaching, universalization which would have implied either the [333] specialization of religious teachers in religious subject matters or their inclusion within a teaching collectivity governed by non-clerical and professional norms.

The two last citations — Father Lalande's and Father Beauchamp 's — indicate how rapidly the situation changed for the clergy controlling classical institutions : in 1956, Father Lalande reasserted strongly the right of the Church to use classical colleges and seminaries for the training of priests ; only five years later. Father Beauchamp felt it was imperative to defend the right of the clergy to be involved in teaching. They also indicate how effective was the modernizing elite in changing the definition of the situation, and in forcing the Church hierarchy into a defensive position.

This defensiveness was also apparent in the Federation's stand on the issue of public secondary education. It seems that the Federation was pragmatic and did not stage an all-out war against it. It realized that it could not effectively respond to the educational demand, both in terms of quality and quantity, and was more concerned with the consequences of that ineffectiveness and the dangers it implied for the survival of the classical colleges than it was with the possibility of

maintaining its monopoly. It sought to protect what it had built, and did not — it could not anyway — seek to eliminate competition :

> "Suivant de près 1'évolution des structures de la nation sur tous les plans, et leur démocratisation de plus en plus marquée, ces chrétiens, dont plusieurs sont des hommes publics, se rendent compte que l'heure est venue pour eux de chercher des formules d'intégration des institutions d'enseignement privé, surtout au niveau secondaire qui nous importe particulièrement ici, dans les structures nationales en évolution, sans [334] toutefois détruire leur caractère privé qui, au dire des chercheurs les plus avertis chez ceux-là même qui ont fait l'expérience de 1'école publique, demeure un irremplaçable élément de fécondité culturelle au service du bien commun...
>
> Cette évolution, les séminaires et collèges affiliés à la Fédération la veulent largement ouverte et compréhensive. Sachant parfaitement qu'ils ne peuvent déjà plus suffire, comme ils l'on fait par le passé, à rendre seuls à la nation le service de la formation générale classique de tous les jeunes gens qui la désirent, ils sont prêts à mettre en commun avec d'autres leur expérience plus que séculaire dans bien des cas, en acceptant sans arrière-pensées les structures nouvelles d'un enseignement secondaire public par exemple ou d'un enseignement privé donné par des religieux non clercs ou par des laïcs. Corrélativement, je suis nettement convaincu que le bien de la nation exige que les nouveaux secteurs de l'enseignement secondaire respectent le secteur ecclésiastique et ses modalités historiques sans quoi il y aurait un gaspillage inutile et inconcevable de forces vives sans profit pour personne.
>
> À tous les intéressés, il appartient de travailler sans relâche... pour qu'un tel gaspillage, qu'on a expérimenté amèrement dans d'autres pays, soit évité chez-nous" (Lalande, 1956 : 3)

Thus, the Federation accepted the new developments because, as Father Lalande argued, they were for the best of the nation. On the other hand, the nation cannot afford to eliminate the existing classical colleges : their elimination would be a wastage of scarce educational resources, and would be contrary to the nation's interests.

It seems that the Federation authorities were afraid that the mounting anticlerical ism would result in their being refused any right of involvement in education; they thus took the stand that the nation could not afford to follow the French path and radically secularize its educational system.

[335]

Our discussion of the clerical elites' reactions to generalized dissatisfactions thus indicates that these elites became essentially defensive, seeking to salvage the status quo and to counteract, as effectively as possible, the forces of differentiation : they reasserted their right of involvement in secondary education, their right to use their educational institutions for the recruitment and training of priests, arguing that priests were more vital to the nation than engineers, technicians, scientists and administrators. They did not thus recognize the legitimacy of fundamental structural change and of differentiation : the nation had survived 300 years with the traditional set of fiduciary institutions; it could continue to do so. Though they adapted and accepted competition, they did not abandon the traditional cultural survival normative framework which had implied for them great quantities of prestige and power.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have sought to analyze the emergence of a French Canadian modernizing elite, its structural position and the new definition of the situation it produced and diffused. We have also tried to analyze the ideological discourse produced during the fifties by the dominant political and fiduciary elites. The gap between the two types of elites should be apparent. We analyzed it in order to show that the type of differentiation under study in this thesis clearly involved a change in dominant values and a shift from theocracy to democracy, and not simply the generalization of tradition — from cultural survival to societal self-sufficiency — . This is important for it lies behind the [336] difficulty experienced by the modernizing elite, then in power and sharing the control of the State apparatus with the groups traditionally associated with the liberal party — the Anglophone business interests and a fraction of the French Canadian middle class, especially the new urban one whose growth has been discussed in the preceding chapter — to generate consensus on differentiation and to develop a synthesis transcending the oppositions documented in this chapter between those who still clung to the traditional definition of the situation and those which developed a new one. Given the difficulties involved in

generating consensus, we should not be surprised to discover that the process of structural differentiation under study in this thesis bounced back during the sixties. On these and related questions, we shall center our attention in the following chapter.

[337]

Modernization and the Institutionalization
of Differentiation: The Quebec Case.

Chapter VI

The Politics of Differentiation

[338]

The purpose of this chapter if ? to focus our attention on what Smelser called the "frontal attack on the sources of dissatisfaction".

If, in preceding chapters, we have shown both the ineffectiveness of Quebec's traditionalized subsystems and the emergence of a value-oriented movement seeking to promote differentiation and modernization, we must now attempt to verify the propositions put forward in chapter two associating the sequence of differentiation with the politics of con-sensus-creation. Our strategy of demonstration will involve presenting and discussing data supporting the propositions associated with each step of the sequence.

HANDLING AND CHANNELING

We hypothesized in chapter two that :

1. the handling and channelling of protest and generalized dissatis-factions will be facilitated by the existence of a relatively strong and flexible political center and of some degree of structural au-tonomy (at least at the role level);

2. handling and channeling will be successful when the modernizing elite is willing and capable of moving toward the political center and risk getting access to power. The modernizing elite's willingness to move to the political center, within a two-party system, will be affected by the opposition party's relative electoral strength. The modernizing elite's capacity to move to the political center will be affected [339] by its influence-base within the opposition party.

We wish now to present data which supports these propositions.

The indicators we wish to put forward of the existence of a relatively strong and flexible political center are the following : since 1791, the democratic franchise has been institutionalized in Quebec ; since Confederation a two-party system and well established party organizations have existed : from Confederation to the nineteen thirties, the Liberal and Conservative parties have each in turn ruled the Province and have not been successful in eliminating the other ; in the thirties, a coalition of radical Liberals and a group of Conservatives headed by Duplessis founded the Union Nationale which ruled the Province, with only one inter- uption, during the end of the forties and the fifties. During the War, a political party, nationalist and opposed to conscription, — the Bloc Populaire —, was founded and managed to get elected some deputies. The Union Nationale, however strong, did not eliminate the Liberal party. Indeed, the electoral statistics presented in the preceding chapter indicate that, throughout the fifties, the Liberal party, managed to get as much as 35% of the popular vote. Its under-representation in the legislative assembly was largely a function of an outmoded electoral map, favoring rural ridings at the expense of more urban ones.

There were thus two well established political parties with relatively strong party organizations and important electoral bases. The opposition party could be "used by" a modernizing elite seeking to promote differentiation and modernization.

Thus, there existed a relatively strong political center ; it [340] also enjoyed some degree of structural autonomy, at least at the role level. We have seen that traditional French Canada had been characterized by a low level of differentiation between its political and fiduciary subsystems; but as Bellah's (1964) discussion of historic civilization indicates,

political and fiduciary elites were differentiated; the role- incumbents were different, even if the norms and values which informed their activities were less differentiated. Moreover, as our discussion of the growing post-War ineffectiveness of both the polity and the fiduciary subsystem has shown, the fifties were a decade during which the political elites attempted to emancipate from the tutelage of the Catholic Church (David, 1969).

Concerning the association between the Liberal party and the modernizing elite, two things seem important : a) the links between the Liberal party and the modernizing elite were more informal than formal ; b) political neutrality, within the relatively undifferentiated context of the fifties, was impossible : if one was not a supporter of Duplessis, one was automatically castigated as a liberal "rouge". Two examples should constitute sufficient proof of this : when Father Lévesque, head of the Laval Social Science Department, asked Duplessis money to support the development of the Faculty, Duplessis refused and asked the Laval authorities to dismiss Father Lévesque, because the Social Science Faculty was producing data — for example, data on housing conditions in Quebec City — which were perceived by Duplessis as critical of his administration (Fournier, 1974). Gérard Picard, then president of the militant C.N.T.U., lost twice his driving licence simply because he was head of the C.N.T.U.! (Lapalme, 1970). Within such a context, where opposition to the ruling government is identified to opposition to the legitimate authority of the [341] State, neutrality is impossible : one is either on the side of those in power or on the side of the opposition. Thus, Duplessis' traditionalism and hard-nosed politics constituted factors conducive to the association between the modernizing elite and the Liberal party.

Georges-Émile lapalme's memoirs (1969, 1970, 1973) —Lapalme was during the fifties head of the Liberal party before Jean Lesage arrived on the scene from Ottawa, and as Lesage, he was parachuted from Ottawa — illustrate the kind of informal relations between the Liberal party and the modernizing elite. In many pages, and especially in volume II (Lapalme, vol. II, 1970), Lapalme relates the contacts and discussions he had during the fifties with such members of the new elite as Bergeron, Father Lévesque, Maurice Lamontagne and other members of the Institut Canadien des Affaires Publiques. Gérin-Lajoie, in 1965 when Minister of Education, recognized that the idea of a state

Education Department had been first put forward at the 1956 I.C.A.P. conference on education which he attended, probably with other progressive liberals (Gérin-Lajoie, 1965 : 105). The candidacy, in the 1960 election, of a popular newspaperman, René Lévesque, who helped the liberals win the election, exemplifies the penetration within the ranks of the Liberal party of some elements of the modernizing elite. Lévesque's candidacy — he had, during the fifties, animated a public affairs show on television called "Point de Mire", which had made him one of the most influential political commentators — facilitated the election of the Liberal party in 1960 and symbolized the coming to power of a new breed of men (Lapalme, 1970 : 286-288). Finally, the electoral programs of the Liberal party during the fifties and especially that of 1960, written by Georges-Émile Lapalme, testify to the close proximity of thought between the modernizing elite and the Liberal [342] party leaders (Roy, 1970). The 1960 Liberal program promised the creation of a Department of Cultural Affairs, and of Natural Resources, free schooling, the setting up of a Royal Commission of Inquiry into Educational Problems, the creation of an Economic Council with the mandate to plan and coordinate the Province's economic development, a hospitalization plan, and finally, a reform of the civil service. These promises sought to encourage economic development and French Canadian control of it as well as to respond to the equality demands originating from the societal community.

THE PROLIFERATION OF IDEAS STAGE

The encouragement of the proliferation of ideas stage must be analyzed extensively, because, during that stage, a covert effort, originating from the political center, was made to generate consensus on differentiation. We would like to show that the strategy of the modernizers seems to have been the following : on the one hand, a covert effort was made to generate consensus on the need to redefine the lower level — role and organizational — components of the school system, and on the other, an ideological discourse, synthesizing the traditional concern with boundary-maintenance and the more modern one with equality and economic growth, was diffused and sought to generate consensus

on the redefinition of the societal level components. The institutional issue — the issue of state vs church control over education — was tactfully not tackled head on : the Lesage government even reassured the traditional clerical elites by publicly stating that there would never be a state education department. Since that issue was seen as the possible source [343] of conflict and dissensus, the modernizers preferred to built-up consensus on both the lower level components and the higher level ones. No wonder the Church soon felt caught in a bind : it accepted many of the elements of change proposed for the lower level components ; it also could not effectively oppose the new definition of the situation which stressed the need to adapt and to become self-sufficient; politically compromised on these two counts, it was slowly but irreversibly led to "accept" institutional secularization, or, to put it in traditional ideological terms, the introduction of politics in education.

It must also be said that the covert effort to generate consensus did not simply involve political indoctrination but also the enactment of policies capable of generating support within the societal community for differentiation and modernization across class and ethnic lines. As we shal1 see, the government did not wait for the publication of the Parent Commission report to start redefining the components of the school system : the actions it took seem to have been effective in generating support for differentiation.

a. When handling and channeling imply that a modernizing elite moves toward the political center and thus gets access to power, the encouragement of the proliferation of new ideas stage originates from that center and becomes constitutive of a strategy of consensus-creation at the level of existing institutional elites.

The creation by an order in council (April 21st 1961) of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Education, known as the Parent Commission, must be seen as constitutive of a strategy of consensus-creation at the [344] level of elites. We do not wish to argue that there was not a need for a thorough study of the educational problems of the Province of Quebec. What we wish to argue, however, is that when the Liberal party took power in 1961, most of the ideas and options which were to be incorporated in the Parent Report, had already been put forward during the fifties by those who were to become the architects of the school

reform. In the following paragraphs, we would like to show that, during the fifties, the fundamental options of the Parent Report were put forward and that, both the traditional and modern elites, agreed on one thing : the setting up of a Royal Commission of Inquiry on Educational Problem.

Let us take 1954 as a starting point. Within the context of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems, briefs, concerning educational needs, were submitted to the Tremblay Commission. Arthur Tremblay (1955), then member of the Laval University School of Pedagogy, — he later on was appointed as technical counsellor for the Department of Youth, the ancestor of the Education Department, as well as associate member of the Parent Commission with the right of discussion, but without the right to vote ; his career culminated when he was appointed the first deputy minister of the Education Department — was mandated by the Tremblay Commission to synthesize the diverse briefs concerning education. His synthesis is interesting; after having scrutinized the problems of coordination and control between the private classical colleges and the growing public secondary schools, Arthur Tremblay concluded that it was necessary to move toward the institutionalization of a four year college program. Indeed, he recognized that on the one hand, public secondary schools were rapidly growing, and on the other, that the universities were questioning their capacity to effectively respond to the growth of their enrolments and were wondering if some of [345] their courses could not be given within colleges. Accepting these facts, A. Tremblay proposed the idea of a four-year college — akin to the American liberal arts college — where the graduates of secondary education could prepare their entry to the university, in addition to the option of going directly to the university, as was already the custom for about twenty years for students enrolling in the Faculty of Science, the Schools of Commerce and Administration and of Engineering.

Tremblay thus recognized the need for a clearer differentiation of secondary and college level education as well as of a better coordination and articulation of the two.

Finally, it may be pointed out that within the context of the Tremblay Commission, most groups presenting briefs, including the Fédération des Collèges Classiques, proposed the setting up of a Royal Commission of Inquiry on Education (Tremblay, 1955).

In 1956, the Institut Canadien des Affaires Publiques held a conference on education (I.C.A.P., 1956). During that Conference, there was much talk on the need to democratize the traditional school system : democratization, for the panelists invited, meant essentially two things ; free schooling at all levels and the creation of an Education Department. Nine years later, Paul Gérin-Lajoie, then Minister of Education, was invited at the 1965 I.C.A.P. conference on the utilization of human resources ; he then recognized that the idea of an Education Department had been expressed for the first time at the 1956 I.C.A.P. conference :

> "En venant ici, ce soir, je me rappelle que c'est à la conférence annuelle de l'Institut Canadien des Affaires Publiques de 1956 que fut 1ançée l'idée d'un ministère de 1'éducation. Quelque sept ou huit ans plus tard, le Ministère de l'Education prenait naissance" (Gérin-Lajoie, 1965 : 105).

[346]

In 1958, the Fédération des Sociétés Saint-Jean-Baptiste du Québec, the Fédération des Collèges Classiques, the Fédération des Commissions Scolaires as well as the Chambre de Commerce de la Province de Québec got together and sponsored a provincial conference on education.

The fifty-five associations, corporations and public bodies which participated in the proceedings of the Conference can be seen as fairly representative of the elite-structure of the fifties : indeed, all levels of education were represented, as well as the private and public sectors ; Anglophone representatives of the Protestant School Boards and the English Universities (McGill, Bishop, Sir George Williams) also assisted; teacher unions and worker unions were present to discuss with business associations and representatives of large private corporations. University alumni associations, professional corporations (doctors, engineers, dentists), parent associations and religious associations (L'Action Catholique Canadienne) assisted also at the Conference.

During the Conference, legal, financial, coordinative and teaching personnel problems were diagnosed and solutions proposed and voted on. Since the bodies which sponsored the Conference were known for their traditionalism, and since fifty-five associations participated in the discussions, it is interesting to look at the ideas and solutions the

participants brought forward in order to assess the extent and nature of the consensus that existed by 1958 at the level of institutional elites. For example, after diagnosing the financial problems created by rapid educational growth, the conference passed a resolution asking the provincial government — i.e. Duplessis — to negotiate with the federal government so that the Province could fully use its taxation power in order to satisfy the needs of its educational system ; it also asked Duplessis to accept the federal money he had always refused, for the universities and the colleges. [347] The conference finally passed a resolution demanding the generalization of fellowships for college students. A strong motivating factor behind these demands consisted in the willingness to gain equity with the Anglo-Protestants who already had a public and free system of secondary education. Teachers also wanted equal pay (Lessard, 1970).

Thus the Conference recognized the need to upgrade and increase the system's facility component so that the system be more democratic and better adapted. These recommendations were considered by the participants as needing immediate action.

For the long term, the Conference asked the state to ensure free public education for everyone and at all levels. It also asked the prolongation of obligatory schooling and the change of the legal leaving age from fourteen to sixteen, arguing that because of post-War economic conditions, more education was necessary for everyone and that there was no reason why French Catholics should satisfy themselves with less than the Anglo-Protestants. This last recommendation testifies to a rapid evolution within French Canada on this issue : indeed, the first law on obligatory schooling had been passed as late as 1942, and at the time, some elements of the Church hierarchy had opposed it on the grounds that the State had no right to intervene in a family and Church matter. In 1958, the resolution, proposed by Arthur Tremblay, and seconded by Jean Marchand, was passed (Conférence Provinciale sur l'éducation, 1958).

The discussion of educational problems thus led the participants to ask the state to intervene more in educational matters. This did not involve however a change of the traditional role of the state in education : It still was asked to play essentially a supplementary role, but to play it more effectively, while avoiding the intrusion of "politics" [348] in education. The Conference did not propose the creation of an Education

Department — it did discuss it, however — ; instead it proposed modifications to the Conseil de 1'Instruction Publique. Up to then, the Conseil had been composed of all the bishops of the Province, plus Catholic and Protestant laymen ; it had, for all practical purposes, the authority of an Education Department, but on part of the educational system only : the classical colleges, the universities and the professional and technical institutes were not subjected to its authority. The Conference asked that this body be more democratic and representative. It also proposed similar transformations of the Montreal and Quebec School Boards, where the commissioners, since 1834, had always been named by the Church and the government. This recommendation indicates how far the traditional elites were willing to go during the fifties : they did not want the state to change its traditional role in education ; they still wanted the educational system to remain under the authority of the Church and the family; they wanted the State to play more and better its supplementary role as well as wanted the highest decision-making bodies, traditionally controlled by the Church, more representative of the population and more democratic ; this did not mean that the Church should lose its authority over education.

One last examination of educational problems must be discussed. Indeed, from 1957 to 1960, Laval University set up a committee to study the programs of its Faculty of Arts, that is, the programs of the classical colleges and seminaries under its authority. Known as the Lafrenière committee, the Laval study group held eighty meetings, heard 122 persons involved in secondary and college education and analyzed sixty-five briefs. It produced a three volume report — over 1,500 pages — [349] in which one can find both a critical analysis of the classical college curriculum and a relatively well thought out blueprint of change. The Lafrenière Report, though basically traditionalistic in its orientation, recognized that a better articulated distinction between the secondary and the college level should be institutionalized, and that at both levels, many curricular changes should be made. The University of Montreal's Faculty of Arts, headed by Perras, embarked on a similar and parallel questioning of its educational practices.

Thus, by the end of the fifties, most of the elites, both traditional and modern, agreed on many things : the educational system was expanding ; this expansion was a good thing ; it had to be encouraged; the state should provide more money so that the system be more "responsive" ;

more education was needed for everyone ; students should thus be obliged to stay longer in school ; the secondary and college levels of education should also be clearly distinguished and effectively coordinated. Finally, all agreed on the necessity of a thorough examination of Quebec's educational problems by a Royal Commission.

Dissensus existed however on one fundamental issue : the roleof the State in education. For the traditional elites, it should keep on playing its supplementary role; for the modern ones, democracy implied that it should have full operative responsibility over education.

Thus, during the fifties, at the level of elites, a considerable amount of educational discussions were held and consensus on the need to upgrade and redefi ne the lower level components of the system emerged.

A sense of opportunity for change also developed to the extent that the badly needed economic resources existed : Ottawa had them and was willing [350] to give them to the Province. A sense of opportunity for change also developed to the extent that, at least within the elite-structure, the educational problems discussed in 1954, 1956, 1957 and 1958, were presented by both the traditional and modernizing elites as a worldwide phenomenon. However local in important respects, the problems engendered by rapid educational growth were not seen as a solely French Canadian phenomenon. This implied that one could listen to other countries' debates over educational reforms and carefully scrutinize the kinds of means being tried elsewhere. An increased consciousness of Quebec's educational problems went hand in hand with an awakening to the educational realities of the surrounding world and thus contributed to a sense of opportunity for change in that models for change were being developed and implemented all over the world. Borrowing could be done.

There is some evidence which testifies to this growing internationalism and openness. Esdras Minville, presiding the Provincial Conference on Education (1958) opened the meetings by declaring :

> "Depuis quelque temps, surtout depuis quelques mois, la Province de Québec, qui longtemps s'était tenue à cet égard dans une complète quiétude, semble prendre une sorte de conscience aigüe de l'importance et de l'urgence du problème de l'enseignement... Bien qu'il ait ici des causes particulières, cet état d'alerte n'est pas propre à notre milieu : il est la

manifestation locale d'une inquiétude commune autant dire à tous les pays qu'a touché le progrès moderne ou qui y aspire. En Europe aussi bien qu'en Amérique, devant l'état actuel et les tendances à brève ou à longues échéances de la vie conmune, on s'interroge sur la valeur de l'enseignement comme il s'est organisé au long de l'histoire et comme il est aujourd'hui dispensé d'un pays à l'autre. Partout il est question de réformes — sur la nature et 1'étendue desquelles toutefois on est encore loin de s'entendre.

[351]

Les journées d'études qui commençent ce soir, sont donc, dans notre milieu, une manifestation de cette prise de conscience. Elles ne prétendent certes pas d'apporter la réponse définitive à 1'inquiétude commune, mais beaucoup plus modestement, aider celle-ci à préciser son objet, et si possible à se dépasser elle-même, et à se formuler en un programme d'action." (Minville, 1958 : 13)

For the Fédération des Collèges classiques, the educational pro blems were also worldwide :

"Dans tous les pays du monde, il se fait un immense effort en vue d'équiper les systèmes scolaires. On bâtit des écoles, on forme des professeurs, on prolonge la scolarité obligatoire, on adopte les programmes aux besoins du monde actuel. Le progrès scientifique et industriel, en plus de multiplier les loisirs, a augmenté le nombre d'années que chacun peut consacrer à s'instruire. Pour la première fois dans 1'histoire de 1'humanité, toute la population peut bénéficier de 1'ensemble des moyens de culture. C'est à ce mouvement général que se rattache 1'état présent du système scolaire de la Province de Québec et, en particulier, celui des collèges classiques. Pour notre génération, il s'agit d'assimiler, d'enrichir et de diffuser, grâce à des techniques nouvelles, les constances de notre civilisation." (F.C.C., 1952 : 43)

Thus, if by the end of the fifties, consensus at the level of elites existed on the need to study educational problems and to find ways to facilitate an effective response to the educational demand, dissensus was still strong on the institutional issue of state control vs private and clerical initiative and authority in education : the traditional elites did not accept institutional secularization as the discussion of the traditional clerical elite's response to the ideology of differentiation put forward in the preceding chapter sought to show.

Thus, when the Liberal party decided to put in its electoral [352] platform of 1960 the promise of the creation of a Royal Commission of Inquiry on Education and when it realized its promise in April 1961, it was not making a radical and costly move in terms of elite support. It was simply responding to growing demands for such a commission as well as sought to give itself time to generate consensus on differentiation both at the level of elites — including within the party ranks and the cabinet — and at the level of the masses.

The "whereas" of the act creating the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Education sought to capitalize on the consensus previously discussed :

> "Whereas education at all levels is beset by many problems and it is therefore expedient to have a thorough and impartial study of the state of education in the Province made by a Royal Commission of Inquiry ;
>
> Whereas the necessity for such a study was revealed as early as 1956 in the report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems ;
>
> Whereas such recommandation was followed by many demands from all quarters;" (Parent Report, vol. I, 1963 : VIII).

b. The modern political elite's capacity to generate consensus at the level of elites is a function of : a) its capacity to produce (by simple electoral slogans, two successive back-to-back elections, complicity and support of the media) a sufficiently general definition of the situation which leaves manoeuvering possibilities to the resistant traditional eli tes who become concerned with the chances of survival of the Institutions they control ; b) its capacity to enact effective policies (free schooling, acceptance of federal funds for

[353]

> colleges and universities, measures to encourage and stimulate economic development) pleasing to the relevant modern sectors and to all social classes ; c) its capacity to reach over the traditional elites and directly to the masses, and thus to isolate the traditional elites from their power-base.

Electoral slogans can be considered valid and reliable indicators of a broad definition of the situation produced by a modern political elite. In this respect, the liberal electoral slogans of 1960 and 1962 are revealing. Indeed, the liberals campaigned in 1960 under the slogan "Il faut que ça change" and in 1962, they sold the idea of "Maîtres chez-nous". Both slogans expressed the Liberal party's desire to modernize French Canada's traditionalized subsystems : the first implied the institutionalization of change, and a movement away from a cultural survival and boundary-maintenance emphasis; the second implied that the State could legitimately become a leverage of economic development, that economic development was an important societal goal and that it was constitutive of a movement toward societal self-sufficiency. These slogans also expressed the secularization of political goals and the growing autonomy of the polity and its full differentiation from the fiduciary subsystem.

The gradual fall of the Union Nationale can be considered a valid indicator of the growing penetration of these slogans and related values within the general population : in 1956, the Union Nationale had received 40% of the votes ; by 1966, its support had dropped to 29% and in 1970, to 16% (Lemieux, 1970). During the same period, the Liberal party Increased its support base, except in 1966 when the Union Nationale [354] was returned to power, although it received less votes (29%) than the Liberals (34%) ; in 1960, the Liberals received 42% of the votes, in 1962, 44%. The rise of the Parti Québécois after 1966 also indicates that the definition of the collective situation produced by the Quiet Revolution liberals was accepted by the population : indeed, the Parti Québécois pushed to its full consequences the "Maîtres chez-nous" slogan and was not opposed to state intervention in economic as well as in other spheres of activity. It received 5% of the votes in 1966, 20% in 1970 and 30% in 1973.

These electoral statistics also indicate to some extent how effective the modernizing elite was in curtailing the power-base of the traditional elites by producing a general definition of the situation which synthesized modernism and traditionalism. The politics of the nationalization of the Shawinigan Water and Power Company are revealing here.

It is interesting to note that before taking the decision to nationalize the remaining electricity companies and to call an election on this issue, the Liberal party was divided : René Lévesque, then Minister of Natural

Resources, had alienated many of his cabinet colleagues, and especially the more traditional ones, by publicly campaigning in favor of nationalization without having discussed the matter with the cabinet. Why he bypassed the cabinet remains to be known : it is probable that he sought to appeal to the masses in order to curtail more effectively cabinet resistance to nationalization. Lesage, for one, as Lapaime (1973 : 163-177) recalls, was definitively against It. Other cabinet members feared the Union Nationale would effectively castigate the proposal [355] as socialism and communism. Nonetheless, at the Lac-à-1'épaule meeting, Lévesque convinced his colleagues of the necessity to nationalize the electricity companies and later on helped the party strengthen its position in the 1962 election. It seems that the Quebec Hydro's officials and engineers who supported the nationalization plan were instrumental in facilitating Lesage's acceptance of the idea (Lapalme, 1973 : 163-177).

The nationalization plan was sold to the masses in the name of national developmental values. It was defined as an Important step toward the institutionalization of "Maîtres chez-nous", i.e. of French Canadian self-sufficiency. As the Bretons have argued (A. & R. Breton, 1963 : 17-28), the nationalization of the electricity companies, was to some extent an investment in nationalism, investment which paid for the Liberal government to the extent that it was returned to power with an increased majority. The investment paid also for the modernizing elements within the part : the referendum on the nationalization proved to the traditionalists within the party and the cabinet, that modern policies, if defined within a neo-nationalist framework, could be sufficiently supported by the electorate. Thus, not only did the party strenghten its position, but also the modernizers within the party.

The politics of the nationalization plan are interesting because they indicate how effective a member of the modernizing elite in power — in this case, René Lévesque — was in neutralizing resistance to state intervention in the economy from the traditional sectors of the Liberal party, the financial interests behind the private electricity companies (see below our discussion of the relationship between the Liberal party and the financial Institutions) and the Union Nationale party, by [356] reaching over these traditional political and economic elites and directly to the masses. Effectively campaigning through the media in favor of the nationalization plan, Lévesque forced the hand of the Liberal

party and especially of Jean Lesage. Gérin-Lajoie, a year later, was to repeat Lévesque's performance.

The politics of the nationalization plan are also revealing, because, to some extent, the same kind of argument and rhetoric was to be used to sell the school reform and curtail resistance to differentiation. The scenario in the latter case was however different : an election was not called — the party had a strong majority in parliament ; there was no need to risk seeing it reduced — and the Parent Commission Report constituted an important legitimizing factor for the government's educational legislation.

The school reform was presented and sold as a national urgency ; if the Church had assured French Canada's cultural survival and if the nation had to be grateful for its leadership in these matters, the same national interest, confronted by new conditions, called for new means to assure cultural survival, and especially called for the development of an integrated and state controlled educational system. Arthur Tremblay, in his work for the Tremblay Commission on constitutional problems in 1954, had expressed eloquently the nationalistic reasons why French Canada should invest heavily in educational development :

> "Si la culture française a des chances de survivre dans ce pays, ce ne peut être qu'à mesure de ses propres ressources et de sa capacité à soutenir la concurrence avec les autres cultures du continent. L'époque est révolue où elle pouvait, par une sorte de négativisme passif, se "conserver" en s'isolant et en se refermant sur elle-même.

[357]

> Il lui faut devenir plus positive et plus "agressive". Sans nier pour autant le rôle "d'agents" plus spontanés et moins "organisés", telles les traditions, la famille et d'autres "institutions" de ce genre, nous croyons néanmoins que, dans l'élaboration d'une culture vivante et adaptée aux circonstances présentes, l'éducation scolaire est appelée à jouer un rôle plus important encore que dans le passé.

> C'est un fait, nous n'avons pas réussi à conserver la propriété des principales ressources naturelles du territoire où habite notre peuple. Parce que nous ne pouvions pas les exploiter nous-mêmes, nous avons dû en confier l'exploitation à des étrangers. Sur ce plan, les "jeux sont faits" inutile de nous en désespérer.

Mais il nous reste une ressource naturelle que nous sommes libres d'exploiter à son maximum ou de laisser se perdre : les talents et les aptitudes que la nature distribue et renouvelle, à chaque génération, aussi généreusement dans notre groupe ethnique que dans les autres.

Sans doute ne sommes-nous plus maître de notre économie et ne le serons-nous peut-être jamais, si l'on entend cette maîtrise dans le sens de "propriété des entreprises".

Mais, dans l'économie moderne, du moins au niveau de la grande industrie, ce ne sont pas tellement les "propriétaires" qui définissent la politique des entreprises. Celles-ci s'inspirent d'abord des conditions et des exigences techniques du marché et de la production. Et ce sont les administrateurs, eux-mêmes ordinairement choisis pour leur compétence technique, qui ont à cet égard les décisions les plus importantes à prendre.

Voilà pourquoi, bien que l'accès au contrôle des grandes entreprises par l'acquisition de droits majoritaires de propriété soit devenu pour le canadien-français à peu près impossible, une chance demeure d'accéder au contrôle de leurs comportements et de leurs attitudes, de tout ce qui, en somme, est le plus important au point de vue "culturel", si les Canadiens français fournissent à ces entreprises des techniciens de tous niveaux qui orienteront et détermineront leur politique concrète.

C'est dans cette perspective, croyons-nous, que prend toute sa signification la nécessité pour les Canadiens français, à l'heure actuelle, d'assurer leur avenir "ethnique" tant au point de vue économique [358] et social, qu'au point de vue culturel en "misant" pour ainsi dire sur 1'éducation scolaire". (Tremblay, 1955 : 149-150)

Thus, as Tremblay argued, French Canada will assure its future as an ethnic community in all spheres — economic, political, social and cultural — if its political subsystem modernizes and mobilizes the badly needed financial and human resources for educational development. Tremblay's argument is not without, as we now know, inflationary overtones : educational development was seen as the major factor of the decolonization of Quebec's economy ; competent French Canadians, by the virtue of their competence, would be able to influence and gain control within and over the economic decision-making system in such a way as to assure that Quebec's economic development would follow French Canadian priorities; if French Canada had never had a real bourgeoisie in the financial sense of the word, by educational development, it could have its own technostructure whose power would balance that of Anglo-American capital.

Tremblay's statement was made in 1954. The same kind of argument was repeated and diffused throughout the elite-structure and the masses in the sixties by the modernizing elite in power. For example, in 1963, Paul Gérin-Lajoie, then Minister of Youth, the ancestor of the Education Department, concluding a tour of the Province during which he actively sought to reduce local and regional resistance to differentiation, declared :

> "Notre salut, notre progrès, notre épanouissement seront oeuvre collective ou ne seront pas. Pas d'émancipation économique fructueuse, pas d'avancement politique, pas de progrès culturel, sans un système d'enseignement puissant, organique, dynamique, intégré à la société canadienne-française, lui donnant un stimulant nouveau et en recevant un appui ferme. À ceux qui disent que nous allons trop [359] vite, et que nous voulons tout faire à la fois, je réponds que nous avons un retard d'un demi-siècle à rattraper et qu'il est, dans l'histoire des peuples, des moments où il faut tout faire à la fois, parce que tout se tient.
>
> Dans cet Occident aux progrès foudroyants, dans cette Amérique du Nord Anglo-Saxonne toute puissante de son nombre et de sa richesse, il y a une place et un rôle pour une nation française fidèle à son témoignage centenaire, adapté au continent et au temps. Cette place nous l'occuperons, ce rôle nous le jouerons, ce témoignage nous le rendrons par un effort de rigueur et de qualité auquel participera la nation entière.
>
> Bâtir aujourd'hui le Québec de demain : comment cette entreprise n'attirerait-elle pas l'adhésion fervente, la participation enthousiaste d'un

peuple réveillé au sens de la dignité et de la liberté ?" (Gérin-Lajoie, 1962 : 140)

Gérin-Lajoie espoused and tried to diffuse throughout the elite structure and at the level of the masses national self-sufficiency goals, he was quite aware that he was opposing and debunking old values and what he called old myths :

""Les nécessités" qu'on invoque aujourd'hui pour préserver le système actuel d'éducation dans son intégrité, se rapportent toutes à quatre grands mythes : le mythe de la survivance : ce qui nous a sauvé une fois nous sauvera toujours et ne doit jamais changer.

Le mythe de la reconnaissance : le clergé nous a sauvé malgré nous, nous devons nous en remettre entièrement à lui.

La politique nuit à l'éducation : c'était en grande partie la politique qui avait imposée l'éducation : on lui reprochait muettement cette intervention autoritaire; de plus, on imputait à la violence et à l'instabilité politique de l'époque les malheurs de l'éducation.

L'éducation est l'affaire des élites : seules ces élites possédaient une certaine instruction; elles pouvaient, seules, la transmettre; de plus, l'éducation n'était pas encore une nécessité vitale et on ne croyait pas la masse des gens capable de la "porter"." (Gérin-Lajoie, 1963 : 21-22)

[360]

Of the traditional means of ethnic and religious survival, Gérin-Lajoie had this to say :

"Nous étions français et catholiques : il fallait éviter toute intrusion d'un pouvoir anglais et protestant. Au tout début, la survivance avait été assurée par l'analphabétisme ou plutôt, par le refus d'entrer dans des écoles qu'on avait raison de craindre. Quand le nombre fit loi, on favorisa la survivance grâce à un système d'écoles conçu de façon à créer une serre-chaude ou une forteresse, malgré un régime d'union avec une province anglaise de plus en plus puissante... Nous avons assez "survécu". Le temps est venu de donner un sens positif à cette survivance, de lui fixer un but, de la justifier. En 1963, la nation est prête à rendre au centuple ce qu'elle a reçu" (Gérin-Lajoie, 1963 : 22).

If ethnic survival is no longer a problem, if, to put it bluntly, the borders are safe, "gratitude" for the Catholic Church's role in assuring ethnic survival should not provoke elite irresponsibility with regard to the nation's educational and cultural development. For Gérin Lajoie, the elites who contend that because the Church has played such a crucial role in the past, the nation should put its future in its hands, are, in the final analysis, irresponsible citizens, with a medieval outlook :

> "Après la Conquête, par son travail et par certains refus, le clergé a maintenu ici la langue française. Sauvés une première fois par le clergé, les canadiens-français le furent une deuxième fois, en partie, lors de la guerre des éteignoirs. Souvent, dans les villages, c'était les curés qui maintenaient 1'enseignement et, avec l'aide des meilleurs chefs politiques, en faisant la propagande.
>
> Dans le haut Moyen-Age, le sauveteur acquérait parfois droit de vie ou de mort sur celui qu'il avait sauvé. Le noble devenait féal, le bourgeois écuyer. La reconnaissance que nous avons vécu pendant 100 ans engendre une sécurité qui a provoquée la démission des élites et engendrée dans le peuple 1'insouciance à l'égard de [361] son développement éducatif et cul-turel (Gérin-Lajoie, 1963 : 23)

Gérin-Lajoie went on to argue that educational development and greater institutionalization of the democratic ethic and the citizenship complex went hand in hand, one assuring the other. French Canadians should thus not fear the politicization of education and the creation of an Education Department : better educated citizens will become better citizens, better equiped to participate in the political process concerning education.

Thus, for Gérin-Lajoie, differentiation was legitimized by an ideology synthesizing liberal democratic values and national self-sufficiency ones. He was thus an active agent of the generalization of tradition — from cultural survival to societal self-sufficiency — and of a shift in dominant values — from theocratism to democracy — . This synthesis seems to have been to some extent effective in generating consensus at the level of the masses, if not totally at the level of elites, as we shall see later on. The billboards which read "Qui s'instruit, s'enrichit" and which were put up across the Province seem to have been accepted by the population. Indeed, enrollments in secondary, college and

university education grew steadily during the sixties. If, as we shall see later, more students enrolled in general programs than in vocational ones, it is not because they and their parents did not accept the slogan "Qui s'instruit, s'enrichit", but because they thought that general programs were the best avenue to high occupational status and to high income. In thinking this way, French Canadian students and their parents were conforming to the traditional norms which had always implied that the classical curriculum — i.e. a general one —was the main road to [362] prestige and fortune. This pattern is also close to the one documented by Tremblay and Fortin (1970) and discussed in a previous chapter (M.E.Q., 1971).

One group which definitively accepted Gérin-Lajoie's ideological discourse was that of the growing college and university students. Bélanger and Maheu (1972) have studied the politics of student groups from 1956 to 1970. Considering that the student politics of the 1956-1970 period must be understood in terms of the socio-economic origins of the students as well as in terms of their anticipated social class position. Bélanger and Maheu document how the college and university students of the late fifties and early sixties soon considered themselves as the watchdogs of the Quiet Revolution and especially of the modernization of the school system. Not only did they mobilize their troups in order to support the government, but they sought to force the government to keep the promises he had made when taking power in 1960.

A member of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Education, Guy Rocher, at the 1965 Conference of the Institut Canadien des Affaires Publiques, expressed, though in more sober terms, a justification of educational development and of differentiation similar to Gérin-Lajoie's : if French Canada did not radically alter its educational structures, French Canadians would be condemned at continuing to be, and increasingly so, the parasites and the marginals of an industrial civilization they would not possess and control. If French Canadians wanted a bigger share of the fruits of the industrial civilization, if they wanted to become something more than an ethnic working class, they should commit themselves to educational development and modernization :

[363]

"La population française du Québec vit dans une civilisation industrielle dont elle cherche à tirer quelques avantages, en particulier un niveau de vie plus élevé que dans la plupart des autres pays du monde ; mais elle ne participe pas activement au développement de la société industrielle et elle n'en retire pas tous les fruits parce qu'elle s'en est aliénée par son manque de préparation et d'instruction. La population française du Québec appartient à une société industrielle, mais le monde industriel ne lui appartient pas ; elle en vit à la manière d'un champignon, de façon marginale et parasitaire, mais le noyau et la sève sont hors de sa portée. Car dans cette civilisation, le travailleur qui n'a comme bagages qu'un cours élémentaire est dans une position au moins aussi désavantagé que celui qui ne savait ni lire ni écrire au 19e siècle. Il est le correspondant de "l'homme à tout faire" d'autrefois, c'est-à-dire qu'il ne peut qu'être manoeuvre, journalier, ouvrier non-spécialisé... Loin de s'améliorer depuis 50 ans, le sort des jeunes travailleurs du Québec s'est détérioré au point de devenir critique. Et avec les jeunes travailleurs, c'est le sort du Québec lui-même qui est en jeu. Comment en effet espérer un progrès économique, qui sera fonder nécessairement sur le développement industriel, lorsqu'on dispose d'une main-d'oeuvre qui n'a ni la formation générale, ni la préparation technique, qui sont toutes deux également nécessaires dans le cadre technologique moderne ?" (Rocher, 1965 : 74)

The Parent Report also incorporated and diffused the ideological discourse produced by Tremblay, Gérin-Lajoie and Rocher. Indeed, the Parent commissionners held that the future of French Canada lied essentially in educational development :

"L'avenir culturel et socio-économique du Québec, c'est-à-dire sa volonté non pas seulement de survivre, mais surtout de grandir et de réaliser les aspirations qui sont aujourd'hui les siennes, repose en grande partie sur le système d'éducation qu'il se donnera. Les Canadiens français doivent plus que jamais se rendre compte que c'est en unifiant leurs efforts dans cette direction qu'ils se rendront eux-mêmes capables d'occuper la place qui leur revient et qu'ils réclament au Québec. Toutes les réformes que nous avons proposées, tout au long [364] des volumes et chapitres précédents, sont destinés à améliorer le système scolaire dans son entier. Mais à cause des inégalités et disparités actuelles entre l'enseignement français et l'enseignement anglais et des retards considérables accumulés dans le secteur français, on doit, de toute urgence, fournir un effort beaucoup plus grand dans ce secteur que dans l'autre" (Rapport Parent, tome IV : 103).

We have deliberately selected statements of persons who have been crucial change agents and who are not known for strong separatist

leanings. Members of the modernizing elite in power during the sixties, they produced an ideological discourse which effectively sought to promote differentiation and modernization in the name of liberal democratic values as well as in the name of societal self-sufficiency ones. We contend that the usage of nationalism was instrumental in generating consensus on modernization and differentiation and neutralized to some extent clerical resistance to differentiation. It seems also to have been instrumental in generating consensus across class lines, as Bélanger (1970) notes :

> "Les oppositions à cette transformation radicale ont été peu nombreuses, et parmi celles-ci les aspects de régionalisation et de confessionalité ont sans doute pris la vedette. Des oppositions ou conflits de classe, presque aucun écho ; ça frise le consensus. On s'étonne même de la faible résistance opposée au projet de déloger les collèges classiques privés de leur position privilégiée dans le système traditionnel. Et encore les adversaires du projet étaient-ils mus davantage par des intérêts autres que ceux de classe. De fait, ce sont surtout les responsables des institutions d'enseignement classique, (en majorité des clercs), plutôt que l'élite elle-même, qui ont manifesté la plus grande opposition...

> La réforme de l'enseignement au Québec se fait sous le signe d'une idéologie nationale ; elle s'inscrit dans une lutte pour redonner aux Québécois les Instruments qui leur permettront d'être "maîtres chez-eux". Rehausser le niveau d'éducation de la population et adapter le système scolaire aux exigences de la société moderne, [365] constituent les principaux objectifs de la réforme. Celle-ci est une entreprise nationale qui requiert pour son succès la mobilisation de toutes les forces de la nation.

> Dans de telles circonstances, s'opposer à la réforme de l'enseignement secondaire au nom d'intérêts de classe, c'était s'opposer à des intérêts nationaux (et à bien y penser, que Québec soit maître chez lui est en apparence à leur avantage). Les élites étaient ainsi prises entre deux feux ; leurs intérêts de classe et ceux du Québec ne coincidaient pas, d'où leur inaction". (P.W. Bélanger, in P.W. Bélanger & Rocher, 1970 : 365).

As Blaise Datey (1973) has shown, the Anglophones, at least at the proliferation of new ideas stage, did not oppose the basic orienta- tions of the Liberal regime. Throughout the fifties, they had supported the Liberal party despite the fact that it was the opposition party; they welcomed its taking of power in 1960 and accepted many of the proposed reforms. Two factors are crucial here : one, the Anglophone business

bourgeoisie was happy at seeing a government committed to economic development take power ; it also perceived many elements of the modernization program — and especially those concerning education — as relevant and partinent only for the French Canadians : it considered its institutions as not needing any change : it was the French Canadian institutions — in all sectors, including and foremost in the educational sector—which needed change. As we shall have occasion to document further on, these attitudes and the "quiproquo" they generated were conducive to conflicts which at this time are not yet resolved and which have blocked the full differentiation of educational structures. It might also be added that the Anglophones realized that something, willy nilly, was bound to change in French-speaking Quebec. With the Liberal party, they felt associated with the lesser risks party, which is still the case today.

[366]

Thus, it seems that the Anglophones saw in the Liberal government and the modernizing elite, the agencies which were to bring French Canadians closer to Canadian and North American standards in all spheres, without affecting their position within Quebec and without changing their institutions, including their colleges and universities. Also, the Anglophones saw in Lesage a man who could "invest" his power in order to develop more fully the Province's economy, a goal in which they had vested interests.

Thus, the Liberal party and the modernizers within it, were effective in producing a broad definition of the situation which synthesized the protest ideology discussed in the preceding chapter and the traditional value-concern with boundary-maintenance. Their electoral slogans are indicative of this synthesis; their effectiveness can be ascertained by the gradual downfall of the Union Nationale during the sixties, and their capacity to generate a broad consensus across class and ethnic lines for modernization and differentiation.

In the name of the ideology it espoused, from 1960 to 1966, the ruling Liberal party implemented policies which sought to modernize Quebec's polity as well as transform its interchanges with the other societal subsystems. Let us analyse these policies and their effects.

[367]

THE MODERNIZATION OF THE STATE

One of the elements of the Liberal party's electoral program promised a thorough reform of the civil service and the end of patronage : universalistic norms, it was promised, would from now on, govern hiring and promotion practices, as well as the giving away of governmental contracts and subsidies. The Liberal party acted on these matters : it created a Treasury Board with the mandate to scrutinize all governmental spending over $15,000 (July 1960) ; it abolished the system of "letters of recommendation" (July 1960) ; the Liquor Board and the Provincial Police were reorganized ; School Boards were told that, from now on, they should ask for subsidies directly to the Département de 1'Instruction Publique and bypass their deputies : subsidies would also be sent directly ; a lawyer, M^e Jean Rémillard, was named president of the Civil Service Commission, with the mandate to upgrade standards, fight patronage and universalize recruitment and selection practices. Elaborate procedures concerning the Civil Service were thus implemented.

The bureaucratization of the Civil Service created problem however. As Lapalme (1973 : 169) recalls, the non-patronage policy did not please all liberal supporters who, it must be remembered, had been waiting a decade for a chance to gain access to governmental favors. Lapalme contends that this resistance to the modernization of the civil service was a decisive factor in the decision to call the 1962 election :

> "Après deux ans de pouvoir, malgré 1'oeuvre de résurrection que nous accomplissions, l'instabilité de notre position nous faisait froncer les sourcils. La politique du non-patronage affligeait les libéraux exclus du pactole" (Lapalme, 1973 : 169).

[368]

While the State apparatus was during the sixties changed according to more universalistic principles, it also expanded both in terms of the volume of the Civil Service and in terms of governmental spending. Indeed, in 1960, the government employed close to 30,000 civil servicemen ; by 1966, that number had risen to 70,000 (Lapointe, 1972). Available statistics on governmental spending in the sixties are as revealing (Lemoyne, in Roussopolos, 1973).

TABLE 6.1

A Comparison of the Gross National Product of Quebec with the Expenditures of the Three Levels of Government, Public Enterprises and Public Services for the Period 1961-1970 (in millions of dollars)

Return to toc

Year	Gross Nation. Prod.	Prov.gov. Expend.	Expend, of Pub. Enterp.	Expend. Hospit. Serv.	Expend. Educ. Serv.	Fed. Expend. Quebec [1]	Expend. Municipalities	Total Expend. Pub. Sec.
1961	10,226	1,036	250	72	206	(1576)	275	(3415)
1962	10,664	1,200	309	56	231	(1627)	299	(3722)
1963	11,331	1,367	513	40	238	1632	381	4171
1964	12,784	1,761	645	48	306	1688	412	4860
1965	14,233	2,025	584	55	417	1774	449	5304
1966	15,832	2,312	852	41	420	1978	547	6150
1967	17,025	2,661	985	41	449	2284	831	7261
1968	18,314	2,995 [2]	974	123	503	(2400)	872	(7867)
1969	20,221	3,348	1,145	94	518	(2700)	959	(8756)
1970	21,535	4,049	1,192	104	534	(3000)	995 [3]	(9874)

1. Total Federal Government expenditures for Quebec minus transfers to the Quebec Government. For those years which were available (in brackets) the estimated figures assume that the funds spent by the Federal Government for Quebec will not exceed its receipts in Quebec.

2. Quebec Public Accounts 1968-69

3. Order of Importance

Source; Lemoyne, B. Roy, "The Growth of the State in Quebec", in D.I. Roussopolos, 1973, *The Political Economy of the State, Quebec*, Canada, U.S.A. p. 66.

[369]

TABLE 6.2

A Comparison of the Gross National Product of Quebec
with the T Expenditures of the Three Levels of Government,
Public Enterprises and Public Services for the Period 1961-70.
(Data is presented in both simple and accumulated percent)

Return to toc

Year	Prov.gov.	Enterprises	Hospitals	Education	Municipalities	Fed.gov.	Expend. Quebec Pub. Sec. Prov.gov.	Expend. Quebec Pub. Sec. Prov-Fed.
1961	10.13	2.44	.70	2.01	2.68	15.41	17.99	33.40
1962	11.25	2.89	.52	2.80	2.80	15.25	19.64	34.90
1963	12.06	4.52	.35	3.36	3.36	14.40	22.41	36.81
1964	13.77	5.04	.37	3.22	3.22	13.20	24.82	38.02
1965	14.22	4.10	.38	3.15	3.15	12.46	24.81	37.27
1966	14.60	5.38	.25	3.45	3.45	12.49	26.36	38.85
1967	15.62	5.78	.24	4.88	4.88	13.47	29.12	42.65
1968	16.35	5.31	.67	4.76	4.76	13.10	29.85	42.95
1969	16.55	5.66	.46	4.74	4.74	13.55	29.99	43.34
1970	16.80	5.53	.48	4.62	4.62	13.93	31.82	45.85

Source : Lemoyne» B. Roy, "The Growth of the State in Quebec", in D.I. Roussopolos, 1973, The Political Economy of the State, Quebec, Canada, U.S.A. p. 66.

Lemoyne's statistics clearly testify to the expansion of the Quebec State and its importance as an economic agent : in 1960, governmental expenditures represented 17.99% of the GNP of Quebec ; by 1970, they represented 31.82%. If we include federal expenditures within the Province, we must acknowledge the fact that by the end of the sixties, public sector expenditures represented close to half of the GNP.

The Lemoyne data also indicate in what sectors the government spent its money : in the financing of its bureaucratic apparatus — from 10.13% —

to 16.80% — in that of public corporations — from 2.44% to 5.53% — [370] education — from 2.01 to 2.47% — and municipalities — from 2.68% to 4.62% of the GNP — .

This increased governmental spending carried many implications : for one, it implied that the State could not and should not be run as a household, as Duplessis thought, and that the public debt could be increased in order to extend credit and consequently the amount of economic resources to be spent in the pursuit of system goals. It also implied that new fiscal arrangements between Ottawa and Quebec had to be reached to help the financing of the expansion of the Quebec State. Lesage's hard-nosed politics from 1960 to 1965 toward Ottawa sought to increase the Province's spending power by recovering from Ottawa fiscal points, (Morin, 1972). Lesage also accepted from Ottawa all the money Duplessis had refused in the name of provincial autonomy, including the 200 million for colleges and universities which were used for the construction of higher education facilities. The third implication of increased governmental spending concerns the relationships between the Quebec State and the North American money market. Indeed, it goes without saying that, in order to finance all its activities, the government had to sell increasing numbers of governmental bonds on the North American financial market. For the financial institutions specialized in this type of business, this was good news : since Duplessis had not been very prone to increase the public debt and thus call upon financial institutions, the Lesage government and its policy of increased governmental spending was certainly welcomed by the Canadian and American financial institutions. Parizeau, economic advisor of the provincial government throughout the sixties, and for many, the symbol of the rise to power of a Francophone technocratic class, has analyzed the relationships between the provincial government and the financial [371] institutions during the sixties (Parizeau, in le Devoir, 1970 : 5-7), and the inevitable conflict between the two.

According to Parizeau, most provincial governments since Taschereau had called upon, for the selling of its bonds, the aid of a financial group made up of the Bank of Montreal and Ames and Company. Although, technically, the financial syndicate was made up of two groups,

it obeyed to one direction, and enjoyed, for all practical purposes, a monopoly : there was no way, says Parizeau, to bypass it. The American correspondent of this syndicate was the First Boston. The association between the Bank of Montreal and the Quebec government was as old as Confederation : indeed, Hamel in and Beaudoin (in Desrosiers, 1972 ;91-115) have shown that from Confederation to the Duplessis era, the Bank of Montreal had almost always selected and vetoed the Provincial Treasuror as well as those occupying key financial and economic posts within the cabinet, Duplessis, by naming Onésime Gagnon in 1944 as Provincial Treasuror, was the first French Canadian Prime Minister to break this tradition.

When the Lesage government sought to finance the nationalization of the Shawinigan Water and Power Company, it seems that the financial syndicate, sympathetic to the Shawinigan Water and Power Company and to one of its principal backers. Power Corporation, was not too eager to help Lesage in finding funds. The government thus looked to the New York market : the Halsey Stewart Company offered to assemble credits worth $350 million. According to Parizeau, this possibility of bypassing the financial syndicate made the syndicate backtrack, leave "undefended" the Shawinigan Water and Power Company and accept financing the nationalization by the First Boston.

[372]

Similar difficulties seem to have emerged also when the government created the Société Générale de Financement. In 1963, when the government again needed money, the syndicate imposed tough conditions : the cost for the Province was to be 6.28% and the syndicate guaranteed only two thirds of the money asked. The government reacted by trying to dismantle the syndicate : Eric Kierans, who had recently left St-James Street and joined the provincial cabinet, tried to break the syndicate into two groups. It seems he was only partially successful : the second group negotiated with the first and refused to compete with it. The government thus sought to bypass the syndicate by another way : it created the Caisse de dépôt.

In 1961, the government had asked for a study on the feasibility of creating a universal pension plan. Also, the recently created Conseil d'Orientation Économique had studied the possibility of regrouping all governmental investments in a central body. Finally, the federal

government had proposed to the provinces a universal pension plan, but without accumulation of funds. The Lesage government succeeded in rallying the other provinces and the federal government to its own pension plan which permitted the accumulation of funds, and thus their usage to finance provincial governmental operations. Obviously, this implied greater independence vis-à-vis the financial institutions which had up to then monopolized the money market. As the pressures exerted later on the Johnson administration concerning the subsidies to McGill University indicate, the creation of the Caisse de dépôt did not however eliminate from the scene the financial syndicate (Parizeau, in <u>Le Devoir</u>, 1970 : 5). In 1971, the Caisse de dépôt had invested its money in the following fashion :

[373]

Quebec bonds	52.8%
Canada bonds	3.5%
Municipalities and school board bonds	6.4%
Company actions	16.8%
Company bonds	11.2%
Mortgage and buildings	5.3%
Other	4.0% (Morin, 1972 : 21).

Thus, the liberal government implemented policies which sought to modernize Quebec's polity : the civil service grew enormously, an attempt was made to limit patronage and to institutionalize more universalistic and bureaucratic norms, the government increased its spending considerably and stopped being run like a household. New system goals were actively pursued : economic development and societal self-sufficiency, instead of agriculturism and cultural survival, became priorities.

A. The G-A Interchange

The modernization and growth of the State apparatus obviously transformed the interchange between the polity and the economy. Instead of financing agricultural settlement, the liberals created the Conseil d'Orientation Economique du Québec in 1961, which pushed for the creation of State instruments of economic development : the Société Générale de Financement, the Régie des Rentes du Québec, the Société de Récupération et d'Exploration Forestière, the Hydro-Québec, the Société Générale Forestière, the Société Québécoise d'initiatives Pétrolières, the Société Québécoise d'Exploration Minière, and the Conseil Economique Régional. Many of these societies simply sought to assure the presence of the State within Important economic sectors ; other sought to help the development [374] of an endogenous capitalism. With varying success, they nonetheless testified to the government's willingness to encourage economic development and exert greater control over the economy. The Nationalization of the Shawinigan Water and Power Company was crucial in this respect, for it symbolized more than anything else the acceptance by the government of the idea that the State could and should be an important agent and leverage of economic development.

As our discussion of the relationships between the liberal government and the Anglo-American financial syndicate indicated, Anglophone support for these government initiatives decreased as the government increasingly intervened in economic matters. To the extent that the 1962 election was a referendum on the nationalization of the electricity companies, there is no doubt that French Canadians, from all social classes, accepted the new system goals of economic development and societal self-suffiency.

B. The G-I Interchange

The liberal government also implemented policies which transformed the relationship between the polity and the societal community.

Most of these policies sought to secularize the legal system and differentiate it fully from the Catholic Canon Law. The young and relatively aggressive Mouvement Laïque de Langue Française seems to have been effective : many of the changes it fostered were indeed implemented : religious oaths in civil courts were abolished ; hospitals and welfare institutions were secularized and administered by laymen instead of by nuns ; religious practice was less emphasized as a criterion for the choice of foster and [375] adoptive parents. These measures testify to a willingness to secularize the system of legitimate order and to increase the autonomy of the legal system vis-à-vis the Roman Catholic legal system, which, at the same time, within the context of Vatican II, was seriously questionned.

Policies sought also to fully institutionalize de facto equality for all citizens. A new labour code, more respectful of working class rights, was passed ; minimum wages laws were also revised and upgraded ; a hospitalization plan and later on, medicare were set up ; free schooling was implemented not only at the secondary level, but also at the college level — a first in North America — ; finally, student grants and loans alleviate to some extent the financial burden of university education.

These policies seem to have been only partially effective : as the Raynauld data produced for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturism (in S.H. Milner & N. Milner, 1973 : 57) indicate, there still exists income differentials within the Province between the Francophone and the Anglophone groups; as the Garon-Audy and Dofny (1969) data on occupational mobility also indicate, though the gap between the two ethnic groups is being reduced, there are still important differences in the occupational distribution of French and English Quebecers. Of course, both Raynauld's and Dofny's data were produced before the policies here reviewed had generated their full impact on the structure of Quebec society.

[376]

C. The G-L Interchange

The Lesage government had promised the setting up of a Royal Commission of Inquiry on Education, free schooling and a new compulsory education law. In a sense, it had promised to act fast and not wait for the Royal Commission Report before implementing free schooling and a new compulsory secondary education bill. As we have seen, most of the elites during the fifties had called for these measures. The government thus acted rapidly in 1960 and 1961 and implemented the following measures : it set up a Royal Commission of Inquiry on Education, extended the compulsory school age to sixteen and institutionalized free schooling further than before. It also asked Gérin-Lajoie, Minister of Youth, to reorganize his ministry and take control of all the types and branches of education over which many diverse ministries had authority (Ministry of agriculture, Ministry of Labour, etc.). If some saw in this policy the spectre of a state Education Department, Lesage reassured them by declaring — as he had during the 1960 electoral campaign — that, as long as he would be Prime Minister, there would not be an Education Department. Finally, Lesage was quick to cash in the federal money Duplessis had refused for the development of the universities and the classical colleges : university and classical college authorities were thus happy at seeing more money being made available to their institutions.

Thus, the liberal regime seems to have sought to implement very rapidly measures which could be politically effective in solidifying its position and in generating support for the beginning of its actions in the educational field — free schooling, federal money for classical colleges and the universities — from the universities' faculty, administrators [377] and students (Bélanger & Maheu, 1972), the business and labour elites; it sought to implement policies which were proof of its willingness to encourage and support educational development, and by extension economic development, while reassuring the traditional elites that it did not plan to nationalize schools and destroy the classical colleges. It is quite probable that some members of the traditional clerical elites

went to "sleep" as the Lesage government followed this course of action.

To the extent that the Tremblay & Fortin (1970) indicate that in the early sixties, most French Canadian salaried heads of family considered that their children should receive more education than they had managed to get, the early policies of the Lesage government encouraging educational development were well received by the French Canadian working and middle classes.

    c.   The setting up by the State elite of a formally independent body composed of experts and representatives of various institutional sectors (the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Educational Problems) can be an effective mechanism for the proliferation of new ideas as well as an adequate tool for consensus-creation at the level of elites. Its effectiveness will be a function of the following variables :

a) its capacity to legitimize the State's claim to fully modern operative responsibility over educational matters. Its formal independence from the ruling political party and its independence of thought are crucial here.

b) Since its mandate involves permitting the expression of [378] interest-demands by diverse institutional elites, it is capable of diffusing at the level of elites a new definition of the situation and widespread consciousness of problems. It is not simply an exercise in democratic planning, but also a mechanism by which a general definition of the situation is articulated and diffused throughout the elite-structure.

It creates expectations and impatience for action. It thus pushes for change and differentiation.

Before discussing the Commission's composition and activities, mention must be made of a working committee which was set up in January 1961 — three months before the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Education — by Gérin-Lajoie, then Minister of Youth, and which had the mandate to study the problems of technical and professional education and to make recommendations by June 30th 1961, that is two months after the order in council creating the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Education. Arthur Tremblay, then assistant director of Laval University's École de Pédagogie et d'Orientation and technical

counselor of the Ministry of Youth, was named chairman of the committee. The committee deposited the first two volumes of its report on the December 31st 1962 and recognized it could not fulfill its mandate within the time schedule imposed by the government. It did not finish its work as the Parent Commission, of which Arthur Tremblay was associate member, started its study of the Province's educational problems, including those of the technical and professional sector. The working papers of the Tremblay committee, by a cabinet decision, were transferred to the Parent Commission.

There are three interrelated reasons why the Tremblay committee was given very limited time : *one*, the liberal regime, in its first months [379] acted with a sense of urgency : things had been unchanged for so long that there was a general feeling of urgency of governmental action In all spheres, and especially in the educational one ; *two*, the federal-provincial agreements concerning federal aid to professional education provided funds for professional education with a dead-line : it was thus urgent to come up with a provincial program aiming to develop professional education and use the federal money ; *third*, the government intended to and passed in 1961 a law, which became known as the Grande Charte de l'éducation, by which compulsory education up to the age of sixteen and free secondary schooling were passed. It was thus urgent to think of means of providing professional and technical educational programs, in order to avoid the overcrowding of the existing classical colleges and seminaries, specialized, as we have seen, in traditional general education.

Within the framework of its tight schedule, the Tremblay committee managed to produce a two volume report : the report is most revealing on two counts ; one, it clearly indicates that the modernizers knew when they were going to the extent that they managed to produce on short notice a relatively thorough study and plan of development of professional education; two, in many ways, the Tremblay Report can be seen as the first draft of the Parent Commissions's Report. Indeed, the Tremblay committee studied the problems of organization of professional education and of its coordination with a more comprehensive type of education. As we have seen, these problems had become acute in the fifties and had constituted the major foci of dissatisfactions. The way the Tremblay committee studied these problems and the solutions it put forward soon became Important material for the Parent Commission.

Indeed, the commi ttee put forward the following fundamental propositions :

[380]

1. no student should leave school without having received a minimum of professional training ; the school system should be structured in such a way as to offer to all students, at the right time, the kind of professional training best suited to the students' abilities and ambitions.

In other words, the school system should have as a goal the provision of qualified manpower necessary for economic growth ; it should also be structured in such a fashion as to make sure that when a student leaves school, he will be equipped with the skills necessary for a smooth incorporation within the occupational system. There should not be any dead-end courses and programs, but programs rationalized and geared to the needs of the occupational system.

2. The fundamental unit around which professional and technical education should be organized must be regional and not local : each region of the province should be equipped with a diversified reseau of professional schools so that, within each region, the students can find the relevant array of professional training specialties. Thus, within each region, institutions should specialize and complement one another.

The Tremblay committee's concept of regionalization of professional educational facilities was to be incorporated within the Parent Commission's Report. Not only the concept, but also the actual number of such regional units was to be recommended by the Parent Commission and implemented later on. Indeed, the Tremblay committee estimated that fifty-five such regional units should be created. The province now has fifty-five regional School Boards.

3. Within the regional units which should provide all professional [381] and general types of education, the most economical and effective organizational format is what the committee called the "polyvalente", that is a campus within which all teachings previously mentioned could be offered. The committee discarded as non-economical and pedagogically unsound the idea of "sprinkling" over a regional territory specialized educational institutions. It preferred the idea of a polyvalente, where professional and general education would coexist side by side.

This polyvalente was to be built in a larger set up known as the "Cité des Jeunes" where youths, in addition to their formal schooling, could find all sorts of facilities and expand their socio-cultural life : leisure-time organizations, work shops and performance arts facilities. The concept of polyvalente was to be retained by the Parent Commission.

4. The Tremblay committee also held that education should be seen as an investment and as such, should be planned and coordinated. Though the committee did not dwell upon the issue of a State Education Department, it did ask for state coordinative and planning structures in order to maximize the returns of the province's investment in educational development.

Thus, the Tremblay committee, bypassing the issue of State vs Church responsibility in educational development since it dealt with professional education, never in the past the concern of Church-controlled institutions, nonetheless redefined the components of action of the school system at the role and organizational levels and grounded this redefinition in democratic and economic developmental values. The institutional issue was to be dealt with by the Parent Commission.

The work done by the Tremblay committee is of fundamental [382] importance for an adequate understanding of the role and contribution of the Parent Commission to the process of differentiation : to the extent that the Tremblay Report constituted in many ways the first draft of the Parent Report, the Parent Commission must be seen not as a mechanism effective in generating new ideas, but more importantly as a mechanism seeking to generate consensus on the institutional level issue. Let us now look at the Parent Commission's composition and activities.

The Commission was made up of eight members, plus one associate member, Arthur Tremblay who, as we have seen, had been quite active in promoting educational change. Mgr Parent, vice-rector of Laval University, presided over the Commission. Politically, M^{gr} Parent had the advantage of being a member of the Church establishment as well as of being compromised in terms of educational change : he had, for example, prefaced A. Tremblay's book (1954) on the coordinative problems between public schools and private colleges and supported, if only by his preface, many of A. Tremblay's views. Within the Commission, the Anglophones were represented by the director of McGill University's

Institute of Education (D. Munroe) and by the assistant director of studies within the Catholic School Commission of Montreal (J. McIlhone) : the first can be seen as the representative of the Anglo-Protestants; the second represented the Anglo-Catholics. Gérard Filion, managing editor of Le Devoir, a newspaper which had fought Duplessis and supported the Liberal party throughout the fifties, was also a member of the Commission : Filion had also been a very active School Board commissioner. Indeed, he had presided over the activities of the first French Canadian regional School Board of the province and had written a book on his experience in education. Paul Larocque, assistant secretary of Aluminium Lted, seems to have represented [383] economic concerns. Two women also were members : a nun, Soeur Marie-Laurent de Rome, a philosophy professor in a Montreal classical college for girls, who had attracted some attention by echoing first on the CBC television network, and later, in Le Devoir, Brother Anonymous' denounciation of the catholic hierarchy's rigidity and traditionalism; Soeur Marie-Laurent de Rome was the only member of the Commission formely attached to classical colleges; the other woman was a faculty member of Laval University, Jeanne Lapointe, who had been involved in the Lafrenière committee and had produced a study for it. Finally, Guy Rocher, of Montreal University, was also an active member of the Commission. Two researchers, Arthur Tremblay whose change-proneness cannot be questionned, and L.-P. Audet, historian of education and long time prudent back-bencher on the side of change, completed the team-

Thus, the composition of the commission seems to have sought to respect two imperatives : representativeness and commitment to educational change. Indeed, the commissioners, as a group, could be seen as representative of French and English concerns, business and educational sectors, classical colleges, universities and public School Boards, Montreal and Quebec cities. Catholic hierarchy and catholic laymen, male and female population as well as expertise and "general public opinion" (more precisely, the French-Canadian middle classes which read at the time Le Devoir). While all members enjoyed elite status, the commission did not have as members representatives of the labour movement, of students nor of the educationnally and economically deprived social groups. The members had however in common a commitment to educational change : one was sure in naming them that they would come up with recommendations which would foster change.

[384]

The members of the Parent Commission cannot be considered Liberal party members who, after having rendered services to the party, were paid back by the party by being named on the commission. They were experts and representatives of various sections of the societal community. Obviously, they were change-agents, but as we shall see, they went much further in their recommendations, than the Liberal party and some members of the cabinet, thought they would go.

There are two principal characteristics of the commission's activities which are of importance : one, the commission did not work behind closed doors ; second, it did not start from scratch but could and did rely on work previously done, and especially on the work done by the Tremblay working committee on technical and professional teaching.

The commission did not work behind closed doors to the extent that it received and discussed over 300 briefs submitted by diverse associations, educational and religious bodies and individuals ; it travelled throughout the province and held public hearings which were covered by the press and the electronic media. It also travelled across Canada and abroad — U.S.A. (California), Europe (mostly England and France, plus Sweden), and even Russia — in an effort to find new ideas and effective institutional arrangements.

Functioning in such an open fashion, the commission seems to have tried to diffuse throughout the elite-structure a new definition of the situation, based on the idea that Quebec should adapt its educational structures to the conditions of advanced industrialism and societal community pluralism, and widespread consciousness of educational problems. For a couple of years, a considerable amount of elite energies were spent [385] in producing, presenting and defending briefs to the commission.

The setting up of the Royal Commission, its composition and its activities testify to the rapid evolution of post-World War II Quebec and to the decreasing importance of the Catholic Church within Quebec's polity. Indeed, Gérard Pelletier, in a recent television interview (Gérard Pelletier, in Les origines de la révolution tranquille ; Mgr Charbonneau, II, Radio-Canada, 16 mai 1975), admitted that when he started his journalistic career in the early fifties, education was taboo : a newspaper man, — even one trained and socialized in the Action Catholique

movements like himself — could not write critical articles concerning the problems of Quebec's Church-controlled educational system. Education, Pelletier asserted, in the early fifties, was a clerical monopoly; there was no way a laymen could publicly criticize this monopoly, without risking reprisals

The setting up of the Royal Commission on Education, its composition and the 311 briefs which were presented to it and discussed are symptomatic of a feverish and collective assault — by words — on this taboo. Brother Anonymous, by his famous [Les Insolences du Frère Untel](#) Book (1961), had shown the way : he had, as a Brother, talked loud and clear on the educational problems of Quebec society. Many groups, who traditionally had not enjoyed a right of discussion on education — for example, lay teachers, students, labour unions and even to some extent, parents — within the framework of the Royal Commission on Education, publicly took a stand and sought to influence the work of the commission. In this sense, the Parent Commission, by its existence, was symptomatic of a change : no longer was education something that could only be discussed by the Assembly of bishops and other members of the Church hierarchy. [386] In this sense also, it was an "exercise" in democracy.

Obviously, by considering that all groups had the right and even the duty to present before it the views they wanted upheld by the commission, the Parent Commission performed an important political function : indeed, it changed the traditional rules concerning the educational decision-making process and prepared the ground for the State's assertion of full operative responsibility over education.

According to Dion (1967), throughout 1961 and 1962, that is, throughout the period of consultation, the associations and bodies which presented briefs to the Parent Commission did not structure and organize their briefs around a major issue. The briefs seem to have been very diverse in their orientations and proposals for change. Very few — fifty-eight out of 311 — briefs discussed the issues of the existing Département de l'Instruction Publique, the Conseil de 1'Instruction Publique and that of the creation of an Education Department. Also, among the 58 briefs which discussed these issues, very few considered them central. There was not either consensus, as twenty-six of the fifty-eight briefs wanted the traditional decision-making structures to remain relatively unchanged.

"À 1'époque où ils se préparent à se présenter devant la Commission d'enquête, en 1961 et 1962, associations et individus n'ordonnent pas leurs mémoires en fonction de thèmes dominants précis. Sans doute, un certain nombre de mémoires abordent-ils les questions du Département de l'Instruction Publique, d'un Ministère de 1'éducation ou d'un Conseil supérieur de l'éducation, mais ils accordent à ces questions une importance inégale. Le fait que seulement 58 mémoires sur 311 — dans tous les cas il s'agit d'associations — aient abordé ces thèmes, montre que l'enjeu du débat qui se déroulera en 1963 ne s'imposait pas [387] alors avec clarté aux esprits et que la situation était loin d'être structurée dans un sens ou dans l'autre" (Dion, 1967 : 23-24).

Dion goes so far as contend that the debate over Bill 60, compared to the 1961-62 period of proliferation of new ideas, produced an entirely different image of French Canadian society :

"En d'autres termes, le débat sur le Bill 60 va produire une image de la société tout autre que celle que les mémoires avaient esquissée. Il ne fait donc pas de doute que l'enjeu s'est précisée bien après la rédaction et la soumission des mémoires à la Commission d'enquête" (Dion, 1967 : 24).

The fact that the briefs submitted to the Parent Commission were not structured around a major and central issue may be seen as typical of the proliferation of new ideas stage. Indeed, during that stage, although new ideas are expressed, no commitments are made. We should not be surprised to discover that at the specification stage, when commitments are made, issues become clearer and associations and individuals focalize their attention on these issues.

The relatively unstructured nature of the briefs submitted to the Parent Commission also helps understand the crucial structuring role played by the Commission and its legitimizing effect on the government's specification plan. To the extent that the Commission had the mandate to, after having heard associations and individuals, propose a blueprint of change, it thus had the mandate to structure and define the boundaries within which the politics of the specification stage were to be played.

In this crucial sense, it may be seen as a consensus-creation mechanism to the extent that it had to transcend the diversity of the briefs and representations made before it, define the collective situation in such [388] way as to legitimize change and structure the politics of the specification stage.

Due to the high number of briefs submitted to the Parent Commission as well as to the diversity of content and of emphasis whioh characterized them, we cannot, within the framework of this thesis, produce a content analysis of even a sample of the 311 briefs submitted, sample which could be considered representative of relatively opposite views. We would like however to discuss briefly two briefs, that of the Fédération des Collèges Classiques and that of the Mouvement laïque de Langue Française, for what they reveal of the strategy of both the traditional clerical elites and a radical — but marginal — fraction of the modernizing elite. The two briefs are not however comparable : the M.L.F.'s brief is one of the rare ones strictly concerned and centered on the institutional secularization issue ; the F.C.C.'s brief tackles all components of the traditional school system, and, though it touches the institutional issue, it does not place emphasis on it. The F.C.C. did not, at the proliferation of new ideas stage, go all out against the idea of differentiation, basically because it did not feel it was coming. One must remember that Lesage had repeatedly said that there would never be a State education department as long as he would be Prime Minister.

The Fédération des Collèges Classiques submitted to the commission a 400 pages brief which testifies of a minimum acceptance on the need to change the traditional school system. Indeed, the Fédération recognized that

> "pour la première fois dans 1'histoire de l'humanité, toute la population peut avoir accès à l'ensemble des moyens de culture. L'idéal que 1'on poursuit aujourd'hui partout dans le monde est la démocratisation de l'enseignement" (F.C.C., 1962 : 199).

[389]

The Federation accepted as legitimate this ideal and wanted to collaborate to its institutionalization. It also recognized that, in modern pluralist societies, the state "doit intervenir de plus en plus pour

coordonner toutes les activités et y introduire une marche logique par une planification adéquate" (F.C.C., 1962 : 201). We can thus say, that, at least in very broad terms, the F.C.C. acknowledged the legitimacy of democratization and equality of opportunity (societal value level) and accepted greater state intervention (institutional norm level). It also recognized the need to provide students with a greater array of choices in terms of technical, professional and general education (organizational level) as well as the need of better and greater quantities of teacher training programs and facilities (role level).

However, if the F.C.C. accepted that the State had to intervene more and play a crucial coordinative role, it did not recognize the need to fully secularize the educational system (institutional value level) nor the establishment of an Education Department (institutional norm level). Indeed, it did not recommend any major changes in the decision-making bodies — the Conseil de l'Instruction Publique and its Comités Catholique et Protestant — though it did recommend that representatives of the non-catholic and non-protestant population be members of the Conseil de l'Instruction Publique (F.C.C., 1962 : 205). Arguing that the British North America Act protected and guaranteed the rights of Catholics and Protestants, it wanted the educational system to remain under the control of the Catholics and the Protestants and asked the state to coordinate activities and provide the facilities necessary for the institutionalization of equality. For the F.C.C., the State should keep on playing a supplementary role. The F.C.C. did not thus transcend the pre-modern [390] orientations concerning education and the relationships between Church and State : education was still essentially defined as a family and Church affair, with the state, and especially a democratic one, helping out when needed :

> "Ces principes s'appliquent de manière éminente à l'éducation où le droit naturel et le droit international établissent la priorité des devoirs et des droits des parents à l'endroit de leurs enfants. L'état doit sanctionner cet ordre de choses en traitant de la même manière tous les types d'institutions requis par les divers pluralismes de la population.
>
> Les parents catholiques, en particulier, estiment que l'Église constitue une société parfaite, égale, dans son ordre, à l'État. Pour eux l'école catholique est une nécessité fondamentale dans l'éducation de leurs enfants. L'État doit donc, pour être démocratique, reconnaître aux citoyens catholiques comme groupe le droit de constituer et de régir des écoles conformes

à leur philosophie de la vie, dans une égalité complète de statut juridique et de participation aux fonds publics" (F.C.C., 1962 : 201).

Thus, the F.C.C. accepted the ideal of equality of educational opportunity but did not feel it was necessary to secularize all education al institutions : on the contrary, it viewed secularization as anti-democratic and unconstitutional.

If the F.C.C. did not favor full differentiation, it did recognize the need of significant changes at the organizational level. Indeed, the F.C.C. recommended in its brief that the educational system be organized in the following fashion : six years of elementary education, five years of secondary education and four or five years of college education. It thus accepted to some extent the differentiation of secondary and college level education and the idea of a more diversified curriculum, better adapted to the needs of an advanced industrial economy. It did not [391] recommend the elimination of the classical humanities curriculum : on the contrary, it wanted it generalized throughout the public as well as private institutions. It finally recommended that public and private institutions, at all levels, be treated equally by the state.

This last point is crucial and indicates the kind of strategy adopted by the F.C.C. : it did not seek to defend its monopoly over secondary and college education; it realized that it could not adequately respond to the growing educational demand beyond the elementary level ; it thus accepted competition with a public secondary and college sector; what it wanted was a governmental assurance that the competition would be fair, that is, that private classical colleges would be equally treated by the state, especially with regards to financing. The F.C.C. seems to have calculated that the growth of the public sector would result at the worst, in the organization of a public sector equal in importance to the private classical colleges and seminaries, and at the best, at the organization of a public sector less important in numerical terms than its own system. It obviously miscalculated : this miscalculation of the growth of enrolments beyond the elementary level explains partly why the F.C.C., did not go all out against the idea of a public secondary and college sector. We must also remember that Lesage had publicly reassured the classical college authorities that there would not be an Education Department and that the classical colleges were not in danger.

We have discussed the F.C.C.'s brief because it indicates the kind of minimal consensus which seems to have emerged during the time the Royal Commission on Education was holding its public hearings : since the F.C.C. must be considered as a force blocking differentiation — it [392] only called for minor changes of the traditional Conseil de l'Instruction Publique and its Comités Catholique et Protestant — , its opinions are indicative of how far an important element of the traditional clerical elites were willing to go. As we have seen, the F.C.C. accepted the ideal of democratization and that of adaptation to the needs of an advanced industrial economy, though it still considered the classical humanities a valuable educational facility. We contend that it could not oppose these principles, irregardless of the strategy of action it took and which we have discussed : had it opposed these principles, it would have been perceived and castigated as defending class interests at a time when national ones were defended by the modernizers and presented as needing top priority. Moreover, it is debatable whether or not the clergy involved in teaching was that much prone in defending class interests. For, as Jean-Charles Falardeau noted in 1952 (Falardeau, in M. Rioux and Y. Martin, 1964 : 342-357), the Quebec clergy had never been, in terms of socio-economic composition, recruited from a single class :

> "In contrast to the clergy in a great number of European countries, the French Canadian clergy has never been recruited from a single class, and still less from the dominant class of the society. Members of the secular clergy, monks, nuns and teaching brothers have, until now, come from all social strata. As has often been observed, one seldom finds a french-canadian family that does not include a member or a relative who is in the clergy or in one of the orders ; with few exceptions, any former student of a college or a seminary has some friends among the clergy or in the religious orders to whom he remains bound by the "old school tie". Thus the clergy is neither above nor below, but within the society. Not only is there no distinction between a "high" and a "low" clergy, but the totality of the society is reflected within the clergy. It is impossible for a French Canadian to think impersonally of a problem concerning the clergy. No such problem belongs to a social world removed or different from his own : it is [393] always a "family" problem. In fact, most of the disagreements, difficulties, or disputes that break out between lay groups and the clergy are traditionally settled in the manner of family quarrels. They are restrained, reabsorbed, and eventually forgotten. For the same reason, a general movement of militant anti-clericalism is scarcely possible in the Province of Quebec" (Falardeau, in M. Rioux, Y. Martin, 1964 : 355).

Of course, one may be tempted to question Falardeau's assessment of the French Canadian Church by arguing that traditionally, priesthood and the liberal professions constituted the main avenues to prestige, power and money, which could mean that those attracted to membership in the Church hierarchy were favorably disposed, whatever their socio-economic origins, to become integrated within what traditionally was the core-elite. One could also add that the Church, while recruiting from all social classes, socialized its recruits — by its scholasticats and seminaries — into its elitist world-view. There is certainly some truths in these assertions.

Falardeau wrote his assessment of the French Canadian Church in 1952. While he did not weight sufficiently the importance of both the pre-dispositions of the recruits and the clerical socialization mechanisms, he was wrong in his assessment of the impossibility of anti clerical ism. Indeed, such a movement — though limited and certainly not "general", to use Falardeau's terms —did emerge in the early sixties, held conferences, diffused its message through the media and presented a brief to the Parent Commission in which it asked for the full differentiation of educational institutions. The Mouvement laïque de Langue Française, which must be seen as a value-oriented movement, gave itself the following goals and principles :

[394]

"1. le mouvement établit comme règle fondamentale de son action le respect de toutes idéologies, doctrines et opinions et exclut formellement toute forme de discrimination ou d'intolérance.

2. Le mouvement entend accueillir et assembler toute les personnes qui en reconnaissent les principes et les buts indépendamment de leurs tendances intellectuelles et religieuses.

3. Le mouvement poursuit comme but essentiel de ses activités la reconnaissance et 1'établissement de la laïcité, c'est-à-dire de la non-confessionalité, dans les institutions politiques en respectant le fait religieux et les intérêts légitimes des groupes qui composent notre société.

4. Le mouvement poursuit également comme but essentiel de ses activités 1'établissement d'un secteur scolaire laïque, c'est-à-dire non-confessionnel, égal en droit et parallèle au secteur multiconfessionnel déjà existant.

5. Le mouvement se portera à la défense des individus ou des groupes dont les droits seront lésés à cause de leur confessionalité ou de leur non-confessionnalité" (Mackay, 1961 : 20).

The Mouvemertt laïque de Langue Française can be seen as that group symbolizing one of the extreme position the Parent Commission heardand discussed. The following excerpt from an article written by a member of the movement illustrates how it conceived the school reform :

"Du mouvement laïque, — à titre purement personnel, — j'attends qu'il fasse comprendre ceci :

-   que l'école laïque est la seule qui sera véritablement l'école du people ;

-   que 1'école laïque, non seulement n'est pas, mais ne peut pas être 1'école de 1'athéisme ;

-   que la laïcité est le plus court chemin, — et le seul, — entre les nationalismes et la conscience nationale ;

-   que la solution nationaliste à laquelle nous aboutirons, qu'elle quelle soit, ne sera jamais durable sans laïcité ;

-   que la laïcité, et la laïcité seule, mettra au service de la Nation, non pas ce que tel ou tel groupe juge bon, moral ou désirable, mais [395] tout ce qui peut contribuer à la santé de la Nation ;

-   que la laïcité c'est, dans le domaine culturel, moral et spirituel, 1'équivalent des nationalisations dans le domaine des ressources naturelles ;

-   et que si la démocratie remet le gouvernement entre les mains des peuples, c'est la laïcité, elle, qui remet la Nation entre les mains du peuple" (Bobet, 1963 : 189).

The movement presented a brief to the Parent Commission. It called for the legal neutrality of the educational system, the creation of an Education Department with at its head a minister responsible before the legislative assembly, the creation of a superior Council of Education divided into two committees, one French and one English, and the respect of the non-Catholics' or non-Protestants' right to equal

educational services. The movement and its brief were thus a force favoring differen- tiation and modernization.

The strategy of the M.L.F. seems to have been to focus on the institutional issue and to ask for total differentiation. It seems to have calculated that this was the best strategy to force the Commission and the government to at least change the relatively undifferentiated educational structures. It seems to have been happy at the changes which were implemented : it dismantled as most of the Parent Commission's recommendations were implemented from 1963 to 1967.

The Parent Commission was originally supposed to present to the government its report on December 31st 1962. It presented Its first volume in April 1963, a volume which put forward a general definition of the situation and proposed essentially two things : the creation of an Education Department and that of a superior council of education. The [396] first volume must thus be seen as an ideological discourse redefining the societal and institutional level components, while leaving untouched the organizational and role-level components. The other volumes of the Parent Report discussed these matters extensively. Organizing the content of the first and following volumes within the framework of our analytic categories, we may schematize the components of action of the proposed educational system in the following fashion.

[397]

TABLE 6.3

The Components of Action of the Proposed Educational System

	VALUES	NORMS	ORGANIZATION OF MOTIVATION	FACILITIES
Societal	Democracy ; Self-sufficiency	Supportive conformity to educational development.	Development of "modern" motivational structure : valuation of change, adaptability, freedom, faith in man.	New world-view based on sciences. Organic conception of individual growth and learning, psychology of learning.
Institutional	Commitment to separation of Church and school.	State neutrality. Education Department; neutral School Boards; CEGEP ; Public corporations.	Development of motivation to contribute to modern societal development : development of ambition, individuality, cooperativeness, tolerance, creativity.	Student-centered principles ; the development of pedagogy as a science. Principles of polyvalence
Organizational	Service to the community and responsiveness to community needs.	Regionalization of educational services : polyvalent secondary, college education.	Allocation of motivation to teaching profession.	Secondary, college general and professional programs options, co-education, social class mixing, ability grouping.
Role	Education as profession : commitment to cognitive rationality and freedom of inquiry.	Competence, autonomy, innovativeness, respect for student individuality, teacher, parental and student participation in administration.	Allocation of motivation to discipline : the disciplinarian.	Public taxation, books, community, educational resources.

[398]

The ideological discourse to be found in the first volume of the Parent Commission is very sober and technocratic ; it attempts to legitimize and justify the need for educational change and the State's operative responsibility in education by discussing the nature and consequence of such worldwide phenomena as the educational explosion, the scientific and technological revolution, changes in peoples' living conditions (urbanization, development of communications, the leisure civilization) and general cultural evolutionary patterns. It thus put Quebec's situation within the framework of general Western civilization and called upon Quebec's governing elites to adapt to these global evolutionary patterns by changing the traditional educational structures which it presented as outdated and ineffective. It thus reproduced, in technocratic and sober terms, the ideology of differentiation and rattrapage which we have discussed in a preceding chapter, ideology which the commission had diffused during its hearings held across the province and which was to an important extent, by 1963, relatively accepted within the elite-structure.

The first volume of the Parent Commission Report was well received by the media. Claude Ryan, of Le Devoir, labelled it an "historic" document brilliant by its conciseness (Le Devoir, 21 novembre 1964). Lorenzo Paré, of l'Action, wrote :

> "nous croyons pour notre part qu'à 1'intérieur de la Constitution et en tenant compte de la composition religieuse et ethnique du Québec, la Commission Parent a prévu toute la mesure de justice possible" (Lorenzo Paré, l'Action, 21 novembre 1964).

Even the Jesuit-controlled and conservative Relations (no 290, February 1965) praised the Report, essentially in the following terms :

> "Aucun écrit jamais publié chez-nous n'aura autant touché le sort d'un aussi grand nombre, [399] aucun non plus n'aura autant mérite de la part de tous une consideration aussi attentive. Si complet et si audacieux apparaît ce projet de rénovation scolaire qu'il amorce vraiment un des grands tournants de notre histoire et ouvre pour la collectivité québécoise un destin nouveau" (Relations, no 290, février 1965: 33).

The technocratic tone of the Parent Report and its favorable reception by the media are symptomatic of the Parent Commission's legitimation function with regard to the State's claim to full operative responsibility over education. The report was well thought out and well written : it put the debate about the needed changes at a high level and called for the collaboration of everyone in their implementation.

Having defined the collective situation in the fashion previously mentioned, the commission structured the politics of the specification stage by proposing the creation of an Education Department and of a Superior Council of Education. If it thus clearly recognized the state's claim to full operative responsibility on education, it nonetheless proposed means by which the traditional religious rights would be respected. Indeed, the Superior Council was to be partly sub-structured into two committees, one Catholic and one Protestant ; the deputy-ministers of the Education Ministry were supposed to be of Protestant and Catholic faith.

For the commission, these means were minimal, as the other volumes of its report would further spell out its views on the Church's involvement in education.

d. When the general definition of the situation growing out of the proliferation of new ideas stage is sufficiently accepted within the elite-structure, the negotiations and conflicts between the traditional and modern elites at the specification [400] stage will remain within the framework of the new definition of the situation. If it does not, the sequence of differentiation bounces back to a prior stage.

e. When the new definition of the situation is not shared by some key elites, political indoctrination can be an effective consensus-imposition mechanism : neo-nationalism, when properly used, can be effective, with regard to the Church-State power-play, in neutralizing clerical resistance to differentiation. Neo-nationalism has, however, one important drawback : it increases resistance to the consequences of differentiation from the Anglophone bourgeoisie and its educational establishment; it thus splits the societal community along ethnic lines, more than along religious ones.

Under normal circumstances, the proliferation of new ideas stage, when it is successful, generates a new definition of the situation which legitimizes change and differentiation. Normally, at the specification stage, when change-agents, — in our case, the Liberal party — decide to propose a blueprint of change, the values grounding the change should not be questionned. Otherwise, the process of structural differentiation either freezes or bounces back to a prior stage.

For our case, the specification stage can be said to have started with the presentation by the Liberal party of Bill 60 creating an Education Department and a Superior Council of Education. Fortunately extensive and reliable data exist on this stage, since Léon Dion has done a study of the career of Bill 60. Let us discuss his data in order to ascertain whether [401] or not the sequence of differentiation bounced back to a prior stage.

Dion starts by asking why the publication of the first volume of the Parent Commission Report and the presentation of Bill 60 stirred up so much debate and conflict. His answer is revealing in that it indicates that, through these actions, the sequence of differentiation was entering a new phase :

> "En rendant public le rapport et en déposant le Bill 60, le gouvernement manifestait sa ferme intention d'employer les moyens propres, tels qu'il les concevait, à faire face à l'épineux problème de l'éducation. Et on pouvait prévoir que le public applaudirait le geste du gouvernement. L'éducation n'était-elle pas généralement considérée comme la question la plus urgente de l'heure ? Alors comment comprendre la réponse mitigée du public à ces gestes du gouvernement ?
>
> Cette réponse mitigée, selon nous, s'explique par le fait que l'éducation, du moment qu'elle faisait l'objet d'un projet de loi précis, cessait d'être simplement un problème social pour devenir d'abord une question politique. On passait du plan des finalités générales à celui des moyens concrets, de l'ordre des bonnes intentions à celui de 1'exécution obligée ; d'où l'éveil de nouveaux réflexes" (Dion, 1967 : 28).

If the sequence was thus entering a new critical stage, Dion's analysis of the career of Bill 60 indicates that the sequence could have either frozen or bounced back to the extent that Bill 60 sought to transform and modernize the G-L interchange :

> "Durant les mois qui suivirent le retrait, partisans et adversaires ont discuté du rôle de l'État en éducation et surtout de l'éducation chrétienne et cela à satiété et sous toutes les facettes. Comment expliquer pareille ardeur sinon par la conviction que ces deux thèmes mettaient en question les fondements mêmes du système social québécois ?" (Dion, 1967 : 29).

The sequence did not however bounce back, as we shall now try [402] to prove, because of shrewd governmental strategy as well as — and this is more important — because the Assembly of bishops did not stage an all-out war against the Bill, remained within the framework of the politics of the specification stage and, while acknowledging the state's claim to operative responsibility over education — thus legitimizing it ipso facto, — sought simply to get more guarantees concerning Catholic education and the right of Catholics to get a Catholic education within state-controlled schools.

According to Dion, when the government received the first volume of the Parent Commission in April 1963 and when it decided to go ahead with its main recommendations, it knew opposition would be strong. Indeed, it had received on June 17th, that is, only nine days before it presented before the legislature Bill 60, a letter from Mgr Roy which clearly stated that the Catholic bishops did not accept the Education Department and the Superior Council of Education as they stood in Bill 60 :

> "Nous sommes dans l'obligation de faire des réserves sérieuses au sujet du projet soumis, en raison de son inspiration, des structures qu'il impose et des implications qu'il entraîne... Sur ce point (c'est-à-dire les garanties aux écoles catholiques) le texte actuel ne saurait être agree par l'épiscopat ; quelques modifications nous paraissent absolument nécessaires... Il faut rappeler ici ce qu'est une école catholique. Pour l'Église, la religion ne se sépare pas de la vie, et une école n'est pas catholique du seul fait qu'elle inscrit un cours de religion à son programme et qu'elle n'offense pas la morale chrétienne, mais bien par les fins et les objectifs chrétiens qu'elle poursuit, par le climat général qui la baigne et par l'inspiration qui anime les maîtres et que reflètent programmes, manuels, etc...
>
> On ne peut donc se contenter d'orgamser l'enseignement religieux dans des écoles qui, pour tout le reste, seraient pratiquement neutres" (M[gr] Roy, in Dion, 1967 : 133).

[403]

M^gr Roy grounded his opposition to the proposed reforms in the Catholic educational principles which we have discussed in a previous chapter. His letter was written as if he wanted to "remind" the Lesage government of the necessities of Catholic education. His insistence on the need of a Catholic educational "climate" was to spark a relatively long discussion on that issue throughout the Bill 60 debate. In other words, while the Parent Report structured the politics of the specification stage by proposing an Education Department and a Superior Council of Education, the June 17th letter of M^gr Roy also structured the politics of that stage by defining for the government the target group which needed to be convinced or neutralized. The letter was also important in that the issues it brought up soon became the center of debate throughout the summer and fall 1963.

Thus, the liberal government knew by M^gr Roy's letter that opposition would be strong against the Bill as it stood at the time the government presented it before the legislature. It thus defined it strategy accordingly. The following elements seem to have been constitutive of the strategy :

a- presentation of the bill before the legislature on June 26th 1963, that is, during the summer, a period of the year during which most voluntary associations have difficulty mobilizing their members and the general public in order to play pressure politics, to the extent that summer is the holiday period ;

b- covert handling and channelling of protest by the following means : retreat of the Bill and governmental call for suggestions and amendments. This type of action had many advantages for the government : <u>one</u>, it could present itself as very responsive to public demands for [404] time to study the implications of the Bill ; <u>two</u>, by delimiting boundaries in term of time as well as in term of the kind of suggestions acceptable — the government gave all associations until the first of September to present <u>specific</u> amendments ; Lesage clearly stated on the 16th of July that he wanted amendments, not rhetoric or doctrinal statements — the government was thus gaining control over a process it feared could get out of hand and thus cause much damage to the party;

three, it forced the Church hierarchy to play its pressure politics in the open, like any other representative association ; four, it clearly indicated that it would not back up on the fundamental properties of the Bill, while openly stating that it was willing to accept "constructive" suggestions.

c- The Parent commissioners and Gérin-Lajoie, then head of the Youth Departement and future head of the Education Department, would publicly defend the Bill. Gérin-Lajoie did in fact invest all his political capital in the debate : he toured the province during the summer, sought actively to diminish local and regional resistance to differentiation, met with a wide array of association representatives, including many bishops, and tried to sell the Bill according to the ideology discussed in a preceding section of this chapter. The political activities of Gérin-Lajoie, during the summer 1963, must be seen as constitutive of a strategy of political indoctrination — i.e. the systematic and vigorous attempt to sell to the population the solution he viewed as desirable — as well as of consensus-imposition to the extent that, behind the rhetoric of dialogue, Gérin-Lajoie definitively sought to curtail resistance to Bill 60 and the power-base of the traditional clerical elites. The fact that his tour of the province occurred during the summer, that he was constantly in the media and that his speeches, [405] later on put together in his book Pourquoi le Bill 60 ? (1964), were certainly "aggressive" while remaining constantly at a high level of principles, all point to the conclusion that Gérin-Lajoie, during the debate over Bill 60, was involved in the most important political game of his career.

What is important is that Gérin-Lajoie sold Bill 60 alone with some members of the Parent Commission : the Liberal party did not invest all its capital in the debate : it is in this sense that the scenario of the nationalization of electricity and that of the school reform are different. In the first case, the government called an election and the whole party machine got involved in the selling of the nationalization plan. In the case of Bill 60, the party seems to have decided to let Gérin-Lajoie do it alone in such a way as to protect its retreat : if things worsened, Gérin-Lajoie would have to resign, but the government would not fall. It is possible that internal divisions within the party rendered this strategy the less costly to take : after all, Lesage, as Prime Minister, had many times asserted that there would not be, as long as he would be in power, an Education Department.

These tactics seem to have made up the government's strategy, a strategy which essentially sought to keep control of a process it feared could get out of hand and which, though officially espousing the values of dialogue and of "constructive" criticism, involved an active campaign of political indoctrination by Gérin-Lajoie. Though Dion does not argue that it was thought out before the presentation of the Bill, he does hint at the possibility that this strategy could have been. The fact that the debate over Bill 60 followed largely this path as well as the fact that [406] the government knew before presenting the Bill that the Catholic bishops would oppose it certainly point in the direction of a well thought out strategy.

If the government defined and acted according to a specific strategy, so did the Catholic bishops. Indeed, they intervened in the process three times, and the timing seems to have been calculated. The first and last interventions were private and directly to the Prime Minister, while the second one was public and only two days before the end of the period of public consultation on the content of the Bill. The first private letter was the one previously mentioned, nine days before the presentation of the Bill before the legislature; the last private letter was in December 1963, one month before the representation of the new Bill before the legislature. By intervening publicly only two days before the end of the consultation period, according to Dion, the bishops sought to take their distance towards all other associations and representative bodies :

> "D'une part, en effet, le 29 août, avant-dernier jour où des suggestions pouvaient être régulièrement adressées au Premier Ministre, peut avoir été 1'objet d'un choix délibéré : 1'agent social qui se jugeait le plus autorisé à se prononcer sur l'enjeu avait intérêt à ne pas faire une déclaration hâtive, qui entraverait 1'action des autres agents, et il avait aussi intérêt à bien marquer ses distances par rapport à ceux-ci" (Dion, 1967 : 128-129).

The Catholic bishops were the more prone to consider themselves as a special pressure group to the extent that the government had, from the onset, recognized their special status :

> "La position stratégique que 1'Assemblée des évêques a occupée au cours du débat, c'est le gouvernement au départ qui la lui a délibérément [407] concédée. Bien avant de les présenter à l'Assemblée législative, le

> Premier Ministre avait soumis à M^gr Roy les textes du Bill originel et du Bill amendé. C'était là, au moins de façon implicite, reconnaître à 1'Assemblée des évêques une prérogative quasi législative ou, mieux peut-être, quasi judiciaire. C'était en même temps lui procurer un accès d'un caractère tout à fait exceptionnel auprès du gouvernement. Celui-ci donnait l'impression de se placer dans une position de subordination, de requérir une "permission", un "droit de procéder" à une autorité jugée supérieure ou tout au moins concurrente" (Dion, 1967 : 128).

How and to what ends did the bishops use their special status ? According to the bishops' August 29th declaration and Dion's analysis, the bishops were solely concerned with confessional guarantees : they did not question the State's right of involvement in education, nor the creation of an Education Department and of a Superior Council of Education. Their interventions were thus specific and did not seek to freeze the sequence of differentiation or even force it to bounce back at a prior stage. They only sought guarantees which would have ensured that within the new state educational system, legally neutral, the Catholics' right to Catholic schools and Catholic education would be respected. Dion even contends that by their August 29th intervention, the bishops not only remained within the framework of the politics of the specification stage, but in a way, salvaged the Bill by refusing to align their position with that of the extreme conservatives.

> "Après la déclaration du 29 août surtout, qui dans sa partie technique, endossait l'essentiel du projet gouvernemental, la question qui se posait n'était pas de savoir s'il y aurait un Ministère de 1'éducation mais bien plutôt quel serait le statut précis du Ministère par rapport à la confessionalité. La déclaration du 29 août a brisé les reins aux opposants d'un Ministère de l'éducation...

[408]

> On peut être catégorique sur ce point : l'Assemblée des évêques s'est refusée à servir de point d'appui au grand nombre de ceux qui, très souvent pour des motifs, extérieurement tout au moins, liés à la religion, s'opposaient à la création d'un Ministère de 1'éducation ou qui encore, par crainte de la "technocratie", souhaitaient une réduction substantielle des fonctions du ministre au profit du Conseil supérieur.

> Tout en ne se prononçant pas sur les modalités concrètes de l'exercice par 1'état de son rôle en éducation, l'Assemblée des évêques s'est montrée favorable aux objectifs politiques fondamentaux du Bill 60. Par son

> comportement général elle se rangeait dans le camp des conservatives mo-
> dérés, mais elle ne s'éloignait pas sensiblement de celui des progressistes
> modérés.
>
> Les adversaires avoués de 1'Assemblée des évêques se recrutèrent parmi
> les progressistes extrêmes. Mais nous avons 1'impression que certains con-
> servatistes extrêmes ont pu être mécontents de la position, somme toute fort
> conciliante, adoptée par 1'Assemblée. Le mutisme complet de la Fédération
> des Collèges Classiques après la déclaration du 29 août peut s'expliquer de
> cette façon" (Dion, 1967 : 137-138-139).

The bishops thus remained within the framework of the politics of specification, that is, they only sought to secure more guarantees without challenging the state's claim to full operative responsibility over education; they were instrumental, by refusing to ally with the extreme conservatives, — Dion puts in this category the Chevaliers de Champlain, the Fédération des Ligues du Sacré-Coeur and the Fédération des Collèges Classiques — in keeping the debate over Bill 60 within the bounds defined by the Lesage government, that is, within the bounds of constructive amendments and not within those of a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the state's claim to control over education.

The Anglophone associations also got involved in the debate and sought essentially the same kind of guarantees as the Catholic bishops, but for the Protestant minority and the Anglo-Catholic one.

[409]

Dion notes also the relative absence and silence of business interests throughout the debate. He explains this phenomenon by the nature of the Bill ; had it involved, for example, a thorough revision of school taxation, then it would have been quite probable that the business interests would have intervened. While this is true, it must be added that to some extent, the membership of voluntary associations often overlaps and that a particular association, though not officially representing business interests, may come to defend those interests. For example, the Fédération des Sociétés Saint-Jean-Baptiste is officially a national association : its membership is however composed to an important degree of small French Canadian businessmen, insurance brokers and public relations men. Also, the Protestant School Board of Greater Montreal and the board of governors of Anglophone Universities include some important members of the Montreal business community. We cannot

thus conclude that because the formal business associations were relatively silent during the debate over Bill 60 that business concerns were not heard; other associations could do the job as effectively. There does not exist any evidence indicating that the business elites opposed a bill they saw as definitively favoring educational development and by extension, economic development.

Thus, the debate over Bill 60 did not constitute a freezing of the sequence of differentiation. Although some conservative religious groups, like the Ligue du Sacré-Coeur, and others involved in education, like the Fédération des Collèges Classiques, tried to freeze it, it is obvious that they could go nowhere without the leadership and support of the Assembly of bishops. And this leadership and support was not spent in directly freezing the process.

[410]

Why did the bishops acknowledge the state's claim to full operative responsibility over education? Fundamentally, we contend, because of the factors discussed in previous chapters : the Catholic Church could not any longer assume most of the educational burden; the school reform was sold in the name of the highest national interests; and the Church hierarchy was divided. These factors together in a sense "forced" the Assembly of bishops into a non-opposition — if not in a total and unanimous "acceptance" stand — posture.

With regard to the internal divisions within the Church hierarchy, it must be said that the Catholic Church of the Province of Quebec had never been a monolithic block. Indeed, throughout the history of Quebec and especially during the nineteenth century, bishops have often publicly quarreled with one another, not to mention their private antagonisms. As we have seen, the decade of the fifties had witnessed the emergence of a split within the Church hierarchy, the basis of which seems to have been the acceptance or the refusal of the Church subordination to the ruling political party. During the sixties, internal divisions also existed : while the Assembly of bishops included some "progressive" bishops — Cardinal Léger of Montreal to name one —who were not eager to stage an all-out war against the Lesage government, others, like M^{gr} Cabana for example, were less receptive to change. During the summer 1963, Gérin-Lajoie met with Cardinal Léger. Though we do not know the content of their conversation, it is quite

probable they talked of Bill 60 and the August 29th declaration of the Assembly of bishops, each actor sounding the other.

The career of Cardinal Léger is revealing of what we mean by [411] clerical "progressiveness". Indeed, Cardinal Léger was named archibishop of Montreal, after Mgr Charbonneau, under the pressures of Duplessis, was exiled to British Columbia. The two men had different styles and different ideas : M[gr] Charbonneau was young, outspoken, advised by laymen and not administration-minded ; M[gr] Léger seems to have been chosen as successor of M[gr] Charbonneau to some extent because he did not have the qualities and defaults of M[gr] Charbonneau. It is interesting to note that M[gr] Léger, during the fifties, was forced to get involved into the politics of the first Montreal public school teacher strike. He was forced because. M[gr] Charbonneau, before leaving his office, had gotten involved, asked the strikers to resume work and promised to defend their position before the Catholic School Board Commission and the Duplessis government. Cardinal Léger thus, after replacing M[gr] Charbonneau, tried to solve the Montreal teacher strike. It was not an easy job to do, as the situation worsened during the fifties : the teachers were divided ; a new union emerged, challenging the militancy of the Alliance des Professeurs de Montréal ; Duplessis decertified the Alliance ; court proceedings, which started in the early fifties, lasted until 1958 ; no collective agreement was signed from 1949 to 1958. Cardinal Léger, in his attempts to restore working relationships between the teachers and the School Board, and back of it, the Duplessis government, seems to have discovered that it was not easy to play a conciliatory role while at the same time having the authority to name some members of the School Board. He soon was attacked by the more militant Alliance teachers, especially after having proposed as a solution the dissolution of the Alliance executive and that of the recently created second teacher union, dissolution which was to be followed by the creation of only one union of which the leaders could not be members [412] of the Alliance executive. For the militant teachers, this proposal was perceived — and rightly so — as a means to eliminate from the teacher union scene the relatively radical Alliance executive. Cardinal Léger's solution was not accepted by the teachers : his image thus suffered from this setback. It is quite probable that from then on. Cardinal Léger decided not to intervene in labour relations which, during the fifties, rapidly politicized due to Duplessis' anti-labour policy, and

preferred to remain within the bounds of the more purely religious concerns. His "progressiveness" may be said to lie mainly here : he had learned from his dealings with the teacher militancy that a bishop could antagonize people and lose some prestige by getting involved and playing a conciliatory role ; he preferred from then on to remain "above" these issues. In this way, he "accepted" the secularization of the public school teacher role and the authority of the State in the regulation of labour relations. From then on, Cardinal Léger preferred to produce doctrinal statements on the inclusion of laymen at a sufficiently high level of generality as to be able to remain above specific conf1icts and to restore his image and that of his office. He remained within the bounds of his ecclesiastical authority. (Lessard, 1970).

Clerical "progressiveness", it may be argued, within the context of the sixties, can be seen as associated with the willingness to remain within bounds and to not risk losing the prestige of the bishopric by getting involved in specific conflicts and by thus inevitably antagonizing some segments of the population. The strategy of the Assembly of bishops, throughout the debate over Bill 60, sought to respect this imperative ; indeed, as we have seen, the bishops, by timing their interventions, sought to take their distance toward the other associations [413] involved in the debate, and "reminded" the government of the necessities of a truly Catholic education. If they did not stage an all-out war against Lesage and a Gérin-Lajoie touring the province and selling the school reform, it could be because they feared losing the prestige associated with their positions within the Church hierarchy. In this respect, Lesage's strategy, which forced the Assembly of bishops to play pressure in the open and like any other association, must be seen as crucial. Indeed, once you have to play the game in the open, you have to protect the image and prestige of your Institution and offices within it. In this sense, it becomes important to note that at the end of the debate of Bill 60, both the Catholic Church and the government won : as Dion (1967) remarks, there were no losers; the Catholic Church got the guarantees it wanted incorporated into the law, and the government did pass the Bill creating the Education Department and the Superior Council of Education.

"Ainsi donc, les objectifs de l'Assemblée des évêques et ceux du gouvernement, divergents au départ, ont finalement convergé au mieux de leurs

intérêts mutuels. De leurs points de vue respectifs, les deux protagonistes sortaient de la campagne du Bill 60 avec les honneurs de la guerre. Ce sentiment résultait de ce que l'un et l'autre avaient envisagé l'enjeu sous des angles différents. En effet, ce qui importait le plus du point de vue du gouvernement, c'est-à-dire la création d'un Ministère de 1'éducation doté de prérogatives adéquates, restait acquis. Inversement, l'Assemblée des évêques croyait avoir permis l'insertion de clauses offrant les garanties de l'éducation chrétienne, objectif qui avait été son unique préoccupation. Par ailleurs, les concessions que l'un et l'autre avaient dû consentir au cours des négociations paraissaient minimes en comparaison des gains obtenus par les deux parties et notairment l'assurance que l'harmonie était, du moins provisoirement, rétablie entre l'Église et 1'État" (Dion, 1967 : 146).

Thus, when Bill 60 finally was passed in 1964, its preamble, [414] close to the Assembly of bishops' wording, gave the bishops the guarantees they saw essential :

"Whereas every child is entitled to the advantage of a system of education conducive to the full development of his personality ;

whereas parents have the right to choose the institutions which, according to their convictions, ensure the greatest respect for the rights of their children ;

whereas persons and groups are entitled to establish autonomous educational institutions and, subject to the requirements of the common welfare, to avail themselves of the administrative and financial means necessary for the pursuit of their ends ;

whereas it is expedient to establish, in accordance with these principles, a department of education with powers commensurate with the functions vested in a superior council of education, its Catholic and Protestant committees and its boards" (Gouvernement du Québec, 1966 : 9).

This preamble, though not evocable in court, was formally judged satisfactory by the Assembly of bishops. The debate over Bill 60 constituted the crucial moment of the specification stage. It was not however the only one as the Parent Commission published its remaining volumes and as the government acted on its recommendations. There are two others moments which must be analyzed, that of Bill 21 creating the CEGEP in 1967 and that of Bill 28 restructuring the School Boards on the Island of Montreal . The politics of Bill 21 are clearly

within the framework of the politics of specification, that of the restructuring of the School Board of Montreal seem to have forced the sequence to bounce back to a prior stage.

Blaise Datey (1973) has, using a methodology similar to Dion's, studied the decision-making process concerning the CEGEP concept and the political career of Bill 21. He has analyzed public statements concerning [415] the CEGEP for three period of time :

a) time I, from November 20th 1964, date of the release of volume two of the Parent Commission, in which the CEGEP plan was put forward ;

b) time II, from January 27th 1967, date of the introduction and first reading of Bill 21 in Parliament ;

c) time III, from March 7th 1967, date of the referral of Bill 21 to the parliamentary committee on education until June 29th 1967, date of the passage of the Bill. His content analysis clearly indicates that the debate over the CEGEP concept did not generalize and remained largely within the framework of the politics of specification.

TABLE 6.4

Number of interventions by time and issue

ISSUES	TIME I	TIME II	TIME III	TOTAL
General-vocational	275	18	223	516
Decentralization	193	11	139	343
Public-private nature	157	14	154	325
Educational rights	131	4	103	238
Pace of change	123	8	58	189
Financial accessibility	68	8	119	196
Confessionality	33	6	140	179
Direction of studies	81	10	24	115
Educational objectives	76	2	32	no
Size of enrollments	61	2	19	82
Co-education	58	3	12	73
Board of governors	0	0	31	31
				2397

Source : Blaise, Datey, <u>The socio-political process of innovation and planning as demonstrated by the introduction of CEGEP's in Quebec's educational system,</u> PH.D. University of Toronto, 1973.

[416]

Indeed, what the change-agents and the change-resisters discussed were such issues as what type of curriculum will be institutionalized within the CEGEPs, what kind of relationship will be established between the Education Department and the CEGEPs, how much autonomy will the CEGEPs have, and how many private CEGEPs will there be. This last question was obviously of utmost importance for the Fédération des Collèges Classiques which, though somewhat reassured by the preamble of Bill 60, wanted to know how its institutions could survive.

Blaise Datey's interview material reveal that the specification process concerning the CEGEP had two fundamental characteristics, one concerning the consultations that took place before the official presentation of Bill 21 in parliament and one concerning the creation of the

"Mission des Collèges", again before the passage of the Bill in Parliament.

Indeed, it seems that both Gérin-Lajoie and Bertrand consulted with F.C.C. officials and with the executive committee of the Superior Council of Education before presenting the Bill in Parliament. Datey writes :

> "Indeed, very official sources said that the debate ended with the assent of the F.C.C.. Unless "ended" in the preceding sentence ought to be considered an overstatement, then considering the high respect which Jean-Jacques Bertrand was reputed to have for people and institutions (interviewees with whom the subject was discussed were unanimous about it and greatly admired Bertrand for that) it could be said that the debate ended before the nomination of the "Mission des Instituts", i.e., before November 29th 1966 when the creation of the Mission was made public. That is, the Bill had been "passed" even before it was introduced in Parliament : "À la création de la Mission le mouvement était devenu irréversible", said an Interviewee. (Datey, 1973 : 52)

[417]

For the government, the F.C.C. seems to have been the key organization of which assent to the CEGEP plan was needed. According to Datey's interview material, governmental officials and Education Department technocrats were surprised by the positive attitude of the F.C.C. Datey explains this by changes in the executive of the F.C.C., the financial position of the classical colleges and the catalyzing effect of the general context of the overall on-going school reform. We would like to stress a factor previously mentioned : the August 29th 1963 declaration of the Assembly of bishops. Indeed, that declaration had killed all forms of extremist resistance to the school reform : if the F.C.C. wanted to resist the changes, it has to do it alone, without the leadership and support of the bishops. We should not be surprised to discover that by 1965, the extreme conservatives of the F.C.C. had lost power within the F.C.C. and that more progressive clerics had gained greater influence. Some of the conservatives who left the F.C.C. found a job within the universities' Faculty of Arts — for example, Mgr Décarie — to which were affiliated the classical colleges. This cannot be seen as a promotion to the extent that with the school reform, the CEGEPs were not to be affiliated to the universities, but would be controlled by the

Education Department's direction de l'enseignement collégial. Others — for example. Father Marcel De Grandpré who had written the F.C.C.'s brief to the Parent Commission — resumed their career of educator within the recently created university Faculty of Education. Still others — like Jean-Marie Beau- chemln who had been the first full-time researcher and laymen employed by the F.C.C. —were co-opted within the newly created Education Department and the Superior Council of Education.

While the F.C.C. and the Francophone university officials [418] accepted the CEGEP plan, the Anglophone resisted and, according to Datey, panicked.

> "The French-speaking milieu was generally favorable whereas the English-speaking counterpart was fiercely opposed to the solution. The Anglophones claimed that it was good for the French population but not for themselves. They panicked. The Anglophone opposition was led by the "establishment of McGill University" and the Protestant School Board of Greater Montreal (P.S.B.G.M.)" (Datey, 1973 : 55).

Why did the Anglophones oppose the CEGEP plan ? It seems that vested interests in the status quo played a crucial role. Indeed, the Institute or CEGEP plan implied that McGill University and the other Anglophone universities would lose 48.6% of their undergraduate clientele to the CEGEPs, since these students, within the new system, would be considered CEGEP level and not university level. 48.6% obviously means a lot of students and a lot of money. It obviously implies a limitation of the growth of the Anglophone universities. The same applies to the Francophone universities, but less so : indeed, with the creation of the CEGEPs, the Francophones universities would lose only 18.4% of their undergraduate enrollment.

Thus, the "McGill establishment" and the P.S.B.G.M. rejected the CEGEP concept and attempted to convince the Parent Commissioners who met them that the CEGEP concept was akin to the American junior college one and that the American junior college was a failure. The Anglophones waited before setting up CEGEPs : Dawson College was opened in 1969, i.e. after most of the network of CEGEPs was in operation throughout the province.

The second characteristic of the politics of the specification [419] process concerning the CEGEPs refers to the creation of the "Mission des Collèges" which was set up in January 1967, before the law creating the CEGEPS was passed. The idea of the "Mission des Collèges" was thought out by Pierre Martin, an Education Department technocrat who had studied in France's École Nationale d'Administration, and had, during his stay in France, heard of the French concept of "Mission" to facilitate the implementation of a government-induced change. He brought back the concept and adapted it, by arguing that the members of a "Mission" should not be solely Education Department technocrats but also members of representative associations. The Education Department thus set up a "Mission des Collèges" with the mandate to tour the province, meet those who would have to get involved in the creation of the CEGEPs and help them prepare for the implementation phase. Interestingly enough, the president of the Mission was a rector of a classical college who later on became head of the Education Department's direction générale de 1'enseignement privé. Though we shall further on discuss the politics of co-optation, the "Mission des Collèges" and its membership constitute one of many examples of co-optation.

What is interesting is the fact that the mission started its work before Bill 21 was passed. As Datey's interview material indicate, the Mission was instrumental in generating support for the CEGEP plan, not so much at the level of elites who were negotiating privately with the government, but at the level of non-elites in the province's regions. It was effective in diffusing a definition of the situation which essentially implied that it was better to prepare for the implementation phase than to resist It. The presence of Father Bibeau, president of the Mission and rector of a classical college, was also instrumental in getting [420] across the idea that the clergy involved in classical education wer willing to adapt to the changes, and facilitated the implementation phase.

Bill 21 was passed on June 29th 1967. The Education Department technocrats had planned that in September 1967 five CEGEPs only would open their doors. None of the five would be located in Montreal. It seems that the government wanted to first experiment the CEGEP formula before generalizing it across the province. In this experimentation, Montreal had to be excluded : it was not politically feasible to create only one on two CEGEPs in Montreal ; automatically, the government would have been accused of favoritism. However, public pressure

— the Institut Canadien d'Education des Adultes played a crucial role here —were such that the government was forced to open twelve CE-GEPs in September 1967. Indeed, it must be said that in the CEGEPs, education was free, which was not completely the case in the remaining classical colleges. Jean-Guy Cardinal, then Minister of Education, interrupted his holidays and learned during the summer 1967, that it is politically unwise to only partially institutionalize free schooling at the college level. This phenomenon has Implications for differentiation theory : indeed, it indicates that once the risks involved in what Parsons called in the Rural Sociology article (1961b) "cutting loose" are adequately dealt with (by the preamble of Bill 60 and the private negotiations before the passage of Bill 21), the implementation of the new differentiated patterns can be relatively rapid to the extent that they are perceived as advantageous for an important proportion of the population, in this case, the parents and the students who aspired to college level education. Once the law was passed thus, the CEGEPs were created at a relatively fast pace, except for the Anglophone CEGEPs which came late as we have seen.

[421]

We may sum up our discussion of the politics of specification concerning the CEGEPs by noting that there was no surprise : the government secured relatively easily the consent of the F.C.C. while the "Mission des Collèges", before the law was passed, diffused throughout the province the idea that people should get ready, start organizing themselves and thus increase their chances of getting for their own locality a CEGEP relatively quickly. It must be said that a CEGEP, like a polyvalent secondary school, represented an important economic investment for many localities. Competition between municipalities, as Gagnon and Gousse have shown (1970), for such an investment was thus an important element of the implementation phase. Competition also existed between the religious orders and the diocesan clergy which had traditionally been involved in secondary and college education. Indeed, as early as 1965, the F.C.C. had prepared itself to the changes : it had surveyed its members in order to ascertain which classical colleges and seminaries would integrate within the new system, either at the secondary level — by signing agreements with the regional School Boards — or at that of the CEGEPs — by signing agreements with technological institutes — or would try to survive as private institutions. Interestingly

enough, there is a high correlation between the F.C.C.'s confidential document and the presently existing network of public and private secondary and college institutions (F.C.C., Évolution de l'ensemble des collèges membres de la F.C.C., très confidentiel, 10 décembre 1965).

The last important moment of the specification stage concerns the regionalization of Schools Boards on the Island of Montreal. One must discuss this moment because of the importance of Montreal : 40% of the Province's population live in Montreal ; over 75% of the Anglophones [422] and over 88% of the non-French non-English Quebecers are concentrated in the Montreal region. Thus, if Montreal's educational structures are not differentiated, then we must conclude that to an important extent, the school reform has not been successful in fostering differentiation. We would like to show in the following paragraphs that, because of the regionalization issue, the sequence of differentiation has frozen, not so much because of Anglophone and Francophone religious fundamentalism — though it exists —, but more so because of linguistic conflicts and the two ethnic groups' concern with cultural survival on the Island of Montreal and by extension in Quebec. Religion has been and is still to this day used to defend the status quo and to block differentiation. It is not differentiation which is the core issue, but its consequences in terms of inter-ethnic patterns on the Island of Montreal.

We would like to show in the following paragraphs that if the school reform can be seen as an indicator of the rise to power of the new urban French Canadian middle class, the specification process concerning the regionalization of the Island of Montreal's educational system involved and still does a class-struggle between the Anglophone middle class and the nationalist fraction of the new French Canadian middle class. The struggle centers about the control over educational development in Montreal. It is because of this conflict that the specification process has generalized and has not remained within the bounds of the politics of specification as the debate over Bill 60 and Bill 21 had. Differentiation, we contend, is not in the final analysis the issue, but ethnic and class privileges —associated with the tradition of local control, unequal school facilities and quality — are ; to defend these privileges, religion has been and is used.

[423]

During the election campaign of 1966, the last volume of the Parent Commission was made public. This volume, centered on the administration of the new educational system, proposed a plan for the regionalization of the School Boards of the Island of Montreal. According to Rocher (1971), five objectives were pursued : 1) equalize on the island the costs and the quality of education ; 2) rationalize the distribution of educational resources and services ; 3) secularize the School Boards, make them responsible for education within a terri tory, regardless of the religious and linguistic composition of the population living in that territory ; 4) end the special educational status of Montreal and Quebec cities and make them identical to the rest of the province ; 5) unify under one administrative structure elementary and secondary education.

To attain these objectives, the Parent Commission proposed a three-level administrative structure : the school committee, the regional unified School Board and the Island's council. For each elementary and secondary school, the Parent Commission proposed the setting up of a school committee, made up of elected students' parents (non-parents could be elected, but only parents with students in the school could vote). The school committee was supposed to concern itself with the quality of the education given in the school, and specifically with that of religious or moral education. It had the right to accept or reject rules affecting the modalities of religious or non-religious education. Generally, it was seen as an instrument favoring parental involvement in education at the school level. To us, the newness of the concept lies mainly in its giving a sizeable amount of responsibility to parents with regard to religious or moral education, as compared to that of the Church hierarchy. Gérin-Lajoie and the Parent Commissioners had been quite clear on this [424] issue ; the quality of religious education, in the new system, they asserted, would be a function more of parental involvement than of any kind of legal guarantees.

The Parent Commission's concept of regional School Board was also quite new and radical. Indeed, the commission proposed unified School Boards, that is. School Boards which would be legally neutral and which would have the mandate to provide for a given territory the educational services — elementary, secondary and adult education — needed for all, that is, for both the French and the English population, as well as for the Protestant, the Catholic and the Neutral population. The members of the School Board would be elected by an electoral

college made up of the school committees' representatives. Responsible for the education within its territory, the School Board, though legally neutral, was supposed to respect the religious and linguistic diversity to be found within the territory.

Finally, an Island council would regroup the School Boards and rationalize the development of education within the Montreal region. The council had formally the mandate to standardize school taxation throughout the island, vote the budget of each regional School Board, control school construction, standardize educational services and negotiate collective agreements with the teaching and non-teaching personnel. Each School Board would delegate two members to the council. The provincial government would also name two members.

Ironically, in its presentation of the advantages of the Island council, the Parent Commission used the P.S.B.G.M. as an example. Indeed, it recognized that the P.S.B.G.M. had been, since 1925, performing for [425] the Montreal Protestants some of the functions it wanted the Island council perform for all Montrealers, regardless of their language or religion :

> "L'expérience du Bureau Métropolitain des écoles protestantes de Montréal et du Bureau Central qui l'avait précédé manifeste bien, depuis une quarantaine d'années, qu'il faut réformer en profondeur les structures scolaires de l'île de Montréal pour leur donner plus d'unité et pour assurer une meilleure coordination entre toutes les pièces de cette maquetterie. Il est donc devenu nécessaire d'établir une autorité centrale pour l'ensemble de 1'île, chargée d'assurer la plus grande égalité possible dans les services scolaires et une distribution équitable des charges financières des contribuables dans l'ensemble du territoire de l'Île : tel sera le rôle du conseil de développement scolaire" (Rapport Parent, tome IV, 1966 : 196).

To understand the implications of the Parent Report's recommendations concerning the regionalization of educational facilities on the Island of Montreal, some basic information must be put forward. Indeed, it is important to note that the C.E.C.M. has experienced during the sixties rapid growth : while its enrollments numbered 156,609 in 1958, in 1968, they reached 227,087 — i.e. a 47% increase — ; at the secondary level, enrollments rose faster : in 1958, they were 29,776 ; in 1968, 73,787 — i.e. an increase of 145% —. Expenditures rose by 100%

during that period ; in 1969, the C.E.C.M. was spending $690.00 per pupil : salaries accounted for 71% of the total expenditures. On the other hand, the P.S.B.G.M., in 1969-70, was spending $799.00 per pupil; salaries took only 56% of the total expenditures; the average salary was close to $1,500 higher than the average salary paid by the C.E.C.M. Finally, the enrollments of the P.S.B.G.M. were relatively stable throughout the period for which we have data (Fournier, 1971).

Thus, the Protestant and the Catholic School Boards differed in [426] their growth rate, spending power and average salary. One of the objec tives of the regionalization plan was to equalize the quality of educat through the rationalization of the distribution of educational resources and services on the Island of Montreal.

Outside of Montreal, the regionalization proposals were not seen as engendering many problems, for the simple fact that outside Montreal, the population was linguistically and religiously homogenous. A legally neutral regional School Board outside Montreal does not constitute a major change, because in reality, all schools within the jurisdiction of the School Board, would be French and Catholic. In Montreal, however, the situation was and is still quite different : most of the Anglophone population of the province lives in Montreal ; it is also in Montreal that one finds an important non-Catholic French-speaking population.

The Parent Commission proposed for the island of Montreal the setting up of seven regional School Boards, instead of the forty-one that existed in 1966. Let us now look at the politics of the regionalization of the Montreal School Boards in order to ascertain why and how the sequence of differentiation bounced back.

In 1966, the Lesage government was beaten at the polls and the Union Nationale — though, with less votes than the liberals — squeezed into power to the surprise of everyone, including the Union Nationale. Jean-Jacques Bertrand took over the education portfolio : seeking to gain time, he created a committee with the mandate to study the Parent Commission's recommendations concerning the regionalization plan and to take the advice of the Superior Council of Education.

[427]

In 1968, the Saint-Léonard School Board commissioners adopted a resolution which sought to progressively establish French unilingualism within the schools under its jurisdiction and thus to force English-speaking Italian Catholics to send their children within French schools. The Saint-Léonard incident constituted the starting point of the generalization of the regionalization issue. Both sides — the French uni linguists and the Italian Catholic minority, supported by the auxiliary bishop of Montreal, M^{gr} Gallagher, and by sixty-two Italian parish priests —mobilized their troups and fought either for or against the uni lingual resolution. The Mouvement pour l'intégration scolaire, headed by Raymond Lemieux, an architect, was set up and drew support from the R.I.N., the labour unions (C.S.N., F.T.Q., C.E.Q.) and student associations. René Lévesque's M.S.A. took its distance toward the M.I.S.'s confrontation politics and even denounced it because it was manipulating students. On the other side, Parents' association were set up under the leadership of Robert Beale, drew its support from the Anglophone Catholic hierarchy, including besides Mgr Gallagher, Rev. Patrick Malone of Loyola College (Mac Donald, 1975).

The Saint-Léonard incident is most revealing with regard to the conditions which permit and facilitate generalization; indeed, it indicates that when a nationalist and unilingualist French-speaking minority organizes, takes control of a School Board and passes uni lingual resolutions which a bitterly divided Union Nationale government does not confirm or disconfirm, thus creating all sorts of uncertainty concerning the legality of the resolution, then dissatisfied groups mobilize and react quite strongly because they cannot trust the ruling political party to defend their interests or to even take a clear stand on the issue. The Saint-Léonard [428] incident and its sequels — riots, marches on Parliament Hill in Ottawa, court proceedings — is as much explainable by the militancy of a French-speaking radical uni lingual minority as it is by the paralysis of the Union Nationale government — paralysis associated with Daniel Johnson's ill-health, internal divisions between a nationalist faction close to Jean-Guy Cardinal, and a more sympathetic to Anglophones faction close to Bertrand — which consistently hided behind the pending report of the Pagé committee on the school reorganization for the island of Montreal. In other words, the Saint-Léonard incident reveals how effective confrontation politics can be especially when they happen within a political context characterized by governmental

paralysis. From 1960 to the Saint-Léonard incident, the ruling political party had been the initiator of educational change and had, more often than not, managed to keep control of the process. With the Saint-Léonard uni lingual resolution, for the first time since the beginning of the Quiet Revolution, the government was not the initiator, the M.I.S. was. The time the Union Nationale took before reacting was sufficiently long to render both sides politically incapable of accepting a "compromise" : no one wanted to lose the battle.

The English-speaking Saint-Léonard minority reacted strongly to the uni lingual resolution, as well as those who, though French-speaking, wanted their children to receive an English education. The Italian Catholic parish priests of Montreal signed a petition and sent it to the government, in which they expressed their fear of seeing Catholic Italians send their children to Protestant schools because of the French unilingual' ism resolution of the Saint-Léonard School Board. Private basement classes were set up; fund raising campaigns were launched to support these [429] classes that the government did not want to subsidize, allegedly for "administrative" reasons. The archibishop of Montreal also got involved and expressed his fears :

> "Je ne puis que regretter l'impasse actuelle qui entraîne artificiellement les catholiques à mettre en cause leur appartenance à leur Église. Je prie particulièrement pour ceux qui éprouvent ces hésitations afin qu'ils soient fidèles à leur foi comme à une valeur première" (M[gr] Grégoire, in Maintenant, 1971 : 293).

Some Anglo-Catholic priests also participated in a march, organized by Robert Beale's Parent Association, on Parliament Hill in Ottawa which culminated in a sympathetic reception by Trudeau and the Quebec federal cabinet members : Trudeau called upon Johnson to live to the promises he had made at a federal-provincial conference, promises concerning the respect of minority rights in the Province of Quebec. It is revealing that those who opposed the Saint-Léonard unilingual ism resolution went to Ottawa instead of Quebec which had the constitutional powers to act in this matter : the Anglo-Catholic population did not trust the Union Nationale government. By going to Ottawa, they certainly added fuel to the fire lighted by the French nationalists and unilingualists. Their march was also effective in putting the spotlight

on Saint-Léonard. The marchers' slogan was "Today its' Saint-Léonard, tomorrow it could be your community" (Le Devoir, 13 septembre 1968).

On the other hand, the M.I.S., victorious in Saint-Léonard, sought to build up its organization in other localities and School Boards (Chambly, Matagami, Saint-Michel, Donnacona, Quebec and Granby). In Donnacona, Quebec and Granby, the M.I.S. was successful in promoting unilingual resolutions. As the M.I.S. showed signs of spreading across the province, [430] René Lévesque of the M.S.A. denounced its tactics and ideology as "fascist" (MacDonald, 1975).

During the same year, the committee set up by Bertrand — known as the Pagé Committee — to study the regionalization of School Boards on the Island of Montreal, published its report. It proposed, instead of the seven unified School Boards of the Parent Commission, nine French ones and four English ones : the French ones would be responsible for catholic and neutral educational institutions, while the English ones would be responsible for catholic, protestant and neutral schools. In other words, the regional School Boards, legally neutral, would be organized around the language parameter : the Anglo-Catholics and the Anglo-Protestants could not, in the Pagé proposals, be drowned within a primarily French and/or catholic School Board. It seems that the Pagé committee had difficulty generating consensus to the extent that seven out of the eighteen members of the committee signed a minority report in which they called for more vigourous action to secure the integration of the immigrant population within the French school system.

The Bertrand government — Daniel Johnson had died in 1968 and Bertrand had succeeded him — in its handling of the linguistic and school regionalization issues, seems to have developed the following strategy : it passed first a bill (Bill 63) guaranteeing the parents' right to choose the language of education as well as religion and then tried to pass a bill restructuring the School Boards of the island of Montreal, mainly along the lines proposed by the Parent Commission. In other words, it sought first to reassure the Anglo-Catholics and the Anglo-Protestants and then wanted them to accept school regionalization. Jean-Guy Cardinal, then [431] Minister of Education, defending Bill 62, called for moderation and consensus, arguing that Bill 63 et Bill 62 could be seen as a package deal :

> "J'en appelle à 1'objectivité des citoyens. Il ne faudrait pas oublier ce qui s'est passé depuis un mois au Québec, ni oublier que le projet de loi sur la restructuration scolaire de l'Île de Montréal constitue le complément du projet de loi 63" (Cardinal, in <u>Maintenant</u>, 1971 : 294).

While the bill was discussed in Parliament, the archibishop of Montreal, M^{gr} Grégoire, launched a consultation operation in order to discover what the catholic population thought of bill 62. Though its scientific value was later on questionned because Louis Bouchard's Association des Parents Catholiques transformed it into a petition in favor of confessional School Boards (Pépin, 1972), the consultation gave M^{gr} Grégoire indications that the catholic population (70%) opposed the Bill. He thus asked the government to implement the two new structures which he felt were accepted : the school committee and the Island council. He wanted the government to wait before implementing the regional School Boards. M^{gr} Grégoire was proposing the strategy put forward by the Parent Commission (Rapport Parent, tome IV, 1966 : 192-212). As we shall see later on, M^{gr} Grégoire's proposal was retained by the Bourassa governement and its second Education Minister, D^{r}. François Cloutier.

The Anglophones objected to the bill. They feared essentially two things : becoming a minority in many of the regional School Boards and losing powers which traditionally the School Boards had to the Island Council which they would not necessarily numerically control. It must be said that the Anglophone population of Quebec, like its counterpart in English Canada and the United States, is strongly attached to the tradition of local School Board control over education. It thus saw in the [432] Island Council a centralization measure which it opposed the more so the Council risked limiting their autonomy, spending power and resources.

The PSBGM expressed these fears eloquently :

> "The proposed unified school board districts will have french as the majority language where the french might have complete control. Yet in all of these eight districts there are now English schools administered by the protestant system. Not only could the School Board be completely in French,

> but the bill provided no guarantee of an English speaking curriculum director." (PSBGM, in Maintenant, 1971 : 295)

Not only did the regionalization plan raise fears among the Anglophone Montreal population, but the transfer of powers from the School Board to the Island Council was perceived as an assimilationist mechanism : Howard White, of the Montreal Teachers'Association, saw in the new system

> "un instrument entre les mains du Ministère de l'Éducation et d'autres membres du gouvernement qui veulent procéder à une assimilation de la majorité des anglophones et des immigrants. Nous réclamons des protections légales afin de ne pas être victimes d'extrémistes tels que Chartrand, Lemieux, Angers et Cardinal (White, in Maintenant, 1971 : 295)

The "McGill University establishment" also threw all its weight in the fight against the proposed bill. Frank Scott, for example, counselled the PSBGM on the constitutionality of Bill 62. He and his associates (T.P. Howard, P. Laing, J. Martineau) concluded :

> "It is hard to imagine any provision in law more prejudicial to constitutionally protected school rights than Section 13 of Bill 62 which abolishes existing denominational School Boards, confiscates their property and vests it in a non-Denominational Council wholly appointed by the Minister of Education." (Scott, In PSBGM brief to the Education Committee of the National Assembly with regard to Bill 62, March 1970 : 8)

[433]

McGill university graduates were mobilized by a letter from Principal Robertson urging them to pressure the government and the deputies (Fournier, 1971).

The PSBGM, whose membership overlaps to some extent with that of the Montreal Board of Trade — H. Reid Tilley, chairman of the PSBGM, was formerly, financial vice-president of Imperial Tobacco ; the three main architects of the Board of Trade brief on Bill 62, C.G.

Southmayd, K.D. Sheldrick, A. Van B. Wight, were at the time members of the PSBGM — warned the government about the economic ill-effects of Bill 62 :

> "The economy of Quebec is seriously threatened by the failure of Bill 62 to ensure the free and full survival of the English language tradition. The presence in Quebec of a strong English speaking sector having close cultural ties with the rest of Canada and the United States has contributed greatly to the economic welfare of all Quebecers. It is vital, therefore, not only for English speaking Quebecers but for their French speaking compatriots as well that in the public educational system adequate provision be made for the curriculum and course of study available for English speaking students to be as similar as possible to practices observed in the rest of Canada and North America. In the past there has never been any danger of any such disparity with its attendant threat to both the English speaking and French speaking sectors but the provisions of Bill 62 offer no assurance in this regard for the future.
>
> It is essential that nothing inhibit a free interchange of English speaking people between Quebec, the rest of Canada, and the whole North American milieu. The sowing of seeds of limitation in schools would, at one and the same time, drive many away and deter many who might have come.
>
> In the end, the loss will be Quebec's." (PSBGM, brief submitted to the Education committee of the National Assembly with regard to Bill 62, March 1970 : 18-19)

Thus the Union Nationale government was caught in a situation [434] where no consensus existed and where no compromise could be reached; the Anglophones opposed the Bill and defended the status quo which they felt was protected by the B.N.A. Act; the Catholic hierarchy also had strong reservations concerning the bill, but mainly for religious reasons. The M.I.S., the F.S.S.J.B., the C.S.E., François-Albert Angers' Ligue d'Action Nationale, the M.L.F., Parti-Pris, the S.P.E. and the labour unions opposed the bill as they had opposed Bill 63, but mainly for nationalistic reasons. Furthermore, the Union Nationale governement was divided; Daniel Johnson's death had exarcebated internal divisions between the nationalist faction and the more sympathetic to parental choice of education one.

Thus, it can be said that the Montreal Island regionalization plan stirred up a considerable amount of conflict which went beyond the

administrative issues involved in regionalization. The debate involved and still does the questioning of the legitimacy of School Board unification, largely because School Board unification involves centralization of powers at the island Council level and the equalization of the educational resources on the island, which implies that financial resources would be re-allocated from the rich and mostly Anglophone School Boards to the poorer, east-end inner-city and Francophone ones, if religion is used to defend the status quo, because the B.N.A. Act protects religious educational rights, at least on the Anglophone side, it is mainly for linguistic and class reasons.

In 1970, the liberal government was returned to power with the help of the Anglophone vote. It also sought to solve the Montreal school reorganization problem and tactically, presented Bill 28 in July 1971, that is during the summer. It did not have more success than its predecessor. [435] New arguments were however expressed by the Anglophone spokesmen, arguments which centered on the need to defend an educational system which they felt was high quality and superior. Indeed, the PSBGM feared that unification would result in the lowering of the quality of Anglophone education :

> "La mise en minorité des anglophones dans neuf des 11 commissions scolaires projetées pourrait rendre difficile sinon impossible le maintien de la philosophie qui a assuré 1'éducation de qualité dont nous avons bénéficié jusqu'ici." (PSBGM, in Maintenant, 1971 : 295)

The PSBGM went so far as to indicate that, if the bill was passed, it would challenge its constitutionality before the Supreme Court of Canada. On the other hand, M^{gr} Grégoire reiterated the same objections he had had before Bill 62. At the other end of the spectrum, the C.E.C.M. and the C.N.T.U., while accepting regionalization, called on the government to pass a bill establishing clearly the priority of the French language.

According to the Presbyterian and United Churches in Montréal, the Bill as is was constituted, would result in Anglophones moving West to school Boards under English control. The PAPT also feared the constitution of linguistic ghettos :

> "French speaking parents wishing to ensure that their children's education would be directed by those educated in their own culture, would seek to live in areas where the majority of parents were French speaking. English speaking parents, who often choose their homes according to the schooling available in the community, would move to an area where they are assured the administration of the schools would be handled by those educated in their culture. This would lead to the creation of English-language ghettos which would totally destroy the bilingual, bicultural society, which, in our opinion, is highly desirable for Quebec." (PAPT, in The Gazette, January 31th 1970)

[436]

The president of the Board of Trade of Montreal was quite blunt on the issue of educational quality. Indeed, he declared in front of the Education Committee of the National Assembly :

> "Vous ne viendrez pas chercher nos écoles, plus belles que les vôtres, que nous nous sommes payés en gagnant des salaires plus élevés parce que nous avons étudié davantage que vous." (Porteus, in Maintenant, 1971 : 300)

Pierre Fournier, who has studied the politics of Bill 62 and Bill 28 through a content analysis of Montreal newspapers (Le Devoir, La Presse, The Gazette, The Star) and interviews with Francophone and Anglo phone representatives of key groups (PSBGM, Board of Trade, CECM, Education Department officials, Parent Commissionners) concluded his analysis In the following way :

> "For school reorganization, the ideological polarization took place, by and large, along linguistic lines. The English educational and economic groups played the key role in determining the outcome of the decision-making process and in mobilizing the support of the English community. The predominantly French groups, on the other hand, supported the original proposals of the government, but were unable to influence the final legislative product to any significant extent. The primary debate and group activity involved the Quebec government and the English educational and business groups." (Fournier, 1971 : 77-78)

Fournier contends that the strategy of the key Anglophone groups — the PSBGM and the Montreal Board of trade — involved both spreading fear in the English community about cultural survival and applying direct pressure on the government by threatening to challenge the constitutionality of the Bill and by voicing vague intimations that some investments might be lost to Quebec if business did not approve of the school reorganization schema. It seems that the Star saw through this strategy and [437] denounced it :

> "Parents have been victims of an insidious campaign over the past four months to create mistrust of the French majority and the intentions of the government's education legislation. Some school administrations have contributed to that campaign. If they fear for their jobs and future promotions as a result of pending legislation, they should properly take up these matters with the Department of Education. The methods they have used to frighten the English minority are unbecoming to persons holding responsible educational positions." (The Star, editorial, "Explanations should calm parents' fears", February 28, 1970)

For Fournier, one basic indicator of the importance of the PSBGM and the Montreal Board of Trade had to do with the fact that they were asked by Guy Saint-Pierre, then Minister of Education, to rewrite Bill 28 to their convenience. No other groups. Francophone or Anglophone, were asked to do so, before the Bill was tabled in the National Assembly. There is very probably a correlation between this private negotiation and the fact that Bill 28 provided less powers to the Island Council than proposed by the Parent Commission.

It is however very symptomatic of the rapid evolution of Quebec's polity during the sixties and of the declining importance of the Catholic Church within it that, unlike during the debate over Bill 60, the key groups, effective in getting access to the political center, were not made of Catholic bishops but of the representatives of the PSBGM and of the Montreal Board of Trade.

The issue is still to this day not solved. Though school committees and the Island Council have been created, the Island Council is less powerful than would have wanted the Parent Report : the C.E.C.M. and the PSBGM have not been fundamentally altered and they still own

their [438] resources and hire teachers. In many ways, the regionalization of the School Boards of Montreal remains to be done.

With regards to the differentiation issue, because of the surimposition of the linguistic and ethnic ones, the situation is presently ambiguous. Bill 27, for example, which regrouped School Boards across the province outside Montreal, in its appendix, has only two categories of School Boards, one Protestant and one Catholic, which would indicate that, presently. School Boards are not legally neutral. This ambiguity leads us to contend that, with regard to the secularization of School Boards, the sequence of differentiation has been blocked at the specification stage, as no consensus across ethnic lines has emerged and as the Anglophone population has been politically effective in blocking differentiation, not for religious fundamentalist reasons, but for ethnic and class ones.

The role of the militant and nationalist fraction of the French Canadian urban middle class and its effectiveness in playing confrontation politics — as the Saint-Léonard incident indicates — should not be under-emphasized : this nationalist fraction of the urban middle class was instrumental in the generalization of the regionalization issue. We contend that the present conflict-ridden situation has all the characteristics of a class-struggle opposing the Anglophone middle class — represented by the Anglophone members of the provincial legislature and the cabinet, the PSBGM and McGill administrators, the Parents' associations and members of the Protestant and English Catholic church hierarchy — and the nationalist fraction of the French Canadian urban middle class — represented by C.E.C.M. officials, the nationalist fraction of the liberal party, the P.Q., the labour qnions and the nationalist organizations — for the control of education on the Island of Montreal. There does not seem to [439] be an easy solution in the prospect as the conflict unfolds and as the Island Council has until December 31st 1975 to present to the government a regionalization pi an ; it is presently hearing all associations which want to be heard before it ; to this day, there is no consensus between the key target groups, i.e. the PSBGM, the CECM, the Anglophone parents' association and the French Canadian nationalist organizations.

We have discussed in this section the politics of the specification stage, mainly by analyzing three different moments of the process, that of the presentation before the legislature of Bill 60 in 1963, Bill 21 in

1967 and the many bills concerning the regionalization of the Island of Montreal from 1967 to today. We have attempted to show that only in this last case can we conclude that the politics of specification were such as to block the sequence of differentiation and constitute a challenge to the legitimacy of the overall unification plan. In many ways, this challenge by the Anglophones was forthcoming to the extent that, as Datey's interview material indicates, for the Anglophone elites, the school reform, from the onset, was perceived as only good for the Francophone population. It is only when the reform started affecting the Anglophones — by Bill 21 creating the CEGEPs and by the various bills concerning regionalization — that they reacted negatively and attempted to preserve the status quo : they saw in the regionalization, unification and secularization of the School Boards an assimilationist plot. Behind the linguistic issue lurks that of the class privileges enjoyed by the Anglophones since Confederation. The rhetoric used by some Anglophone spokesmen — the PSBGM, the Board of Trade of Montreal — hint at their willingness to defend an educational system they see as superior to the Francophone one, better adapted to the realities of North America, and to the mobility of [440] Anglophones in Quebec and in Canada.

> f- at the implementation stage, remaining pockets of resistance may be neutralized by a strategy combining political indoctrination of the masses and co-optation of the traditional elites.
>
> g- routinization, under normal circumstances, involves less activity of political indoctrination and more activity oriented toward the development of vested interests in the new differentiated patterns.

It is difficult to delineate clearly the implementation phase and differentiate it from the specification stage, because, as we have seen, the government, in many cases, acted fast. For example, the "Mission des CEGEPs" which must be seen as an implementation mechanism, started functioning before the law creating CEGEPs was passed. Also free schooling was implemented before the Royal Commission produced its report.

To the extent that the politics of specification, at least the politics concerning Bill 60 et Bill 21, remained within the framework of the politics of that stage, and to the extent that the assent of the traditional

elites was relatively easily secured, the implementation phase did not need a systematic and thorough program of political indoctrination. Three factors facilitated the implementation of regionalization outside Montreal, of CEGEPs and of the Education Department : co-optation of the traditional clerical elites, competition between municipalities for the new educational structures, and free schooling. As the government realized, it is not easy to close the gates once they are opened. Let us look [441] briefly at these factors.

The Parent Report stated that competent school teachers and administrators at all levels should not suffer from the school reform. It seems that the government followed this policy and co-opted many of the traditional classical colleges administrators within the new structures. We have seen that the "Mission des collèges" was headed by a rector of classical college ; the case of Father Bibeau, who later on became head of the Education Department's direction de l'enseignement privé, is not exceptional. If we look at the composition of the Superior Council of Education, that of many Education Department's "directions" as well as that of the CEGEPs, we find that many persons who had had important responsibilities in the old system managed to survive the changes and remained with important responsibilities, at least until their retirement. We do not wish to argue that these persons were incompetent; what we do wish to argue is that co-optation facilitated the implementation phase. The implementation of the CEGEPs is indicative of this phenomenon. Indeed, the CEGEP concept implied that classical colleges authorities and professional teaching authorities would get together and form a new public corporation responsible for college level general and vocational programs. In many cases, this meant that the classical colleges authorities would remain with important administrative responsibilities within the CEGEP. This happened the more so if we realize that the implementation phase of the CEGEPs was fast, to the extent that the government was under public pressure to equip the province with a complete network of CEGEPs which were free. Thus, in many cases, the traditional administrators kept their positions within the new college level system.

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Some actually were promoted. Most of the first CEGEP "Directeur Général" were former "préfets des études" of classical colleges. Many full-time employees and administrators of the Fédération des Collèges

Classiques became technocrats of the Education Department and in some cases, deputy-ministers. We do not have precise data which would permit us to measure co-optation. It seems to have been sufficiently widespread as to engender some reactions by observers who wondered if anything had changed. For example, Michel Dumas, in Education Québécoise, the review of the C.S.N. affiliated CEGEP teachers, wrote in 1968 :

"Quand le Ministère de l'Éducation a vu le jour au Québec, les éducateurs ont accueilli cette réforme comme la fin du laisser-faire du D.I.P. et l'annonce d'une planification des budgets, des structures , de l'équipement, des programmes et examens qui s'imposaient au Québec pour réduire les dépenses inutiles et pour assurer la qualité de l'enseignement en même temps que sa démocratisation.

Aujourd'hui, certains sont à se demander si nous ne retournons pas, imperceptiblement et bien subtilement, aux beaux jours du D.I.P.. Alors qu'ils croyaient qu'on mettait de 1'ordre en éducation, ils constatent le fouillis qui persiste dans de vastes secteurs de 1'administration scolaire." (Dumas, in Education Québécoise, vol. 1, Mars 1968 : 3)

In the following issue, Dumas associated this "dilution" of the school reform to the many "compromises" he contended had plagued the specification and implementation stages :

"...Notre réforme a été rongée par le compromis. On sait que toute réforme bouscule, tantôt de vieilles habitudes, tantôt des intérêts qu'on ne veut pas aisément sacrifier. Les chances de succès d'une réforme tiennent donc à l'attitude que prendront ceux qui la dirigent. L'État étant ce qu'il est, c'est-à-dire pas très séparé de la politique et celle-ci étant l'art du compromis, il semble que la réforme scolaire ne soit devenue possible chez nous que lorsque tous les intérêts sont satisfaits, ou également contrecarrés. [443] Autrement dit, enlever quelques plumes à chacun plutôt que de déplumer définitivement ceux qui doivent mourir. Oui, la polyvalence existe dans certains CEGEP, mais plusieurs n'en ont tout simplement pas. Oui, les institutions privées font place aux publiques, mais on leur fera une loi-cadre pour qu'ils continuent d'exister. Oui, les "neutres" seront libres de l'être» mais à 1'intérieur d'une maison catholique où certains enfants seront appelés à s'isoler pendant les cours de religion : oui, les CEGEPs seront gratuits mais on payera à l'Université. Ainsi de suite." (Dumas, in Education Québécoise, vol. I, juin 1968 : 3)

Though Dumas does not explicitly mention co-optation as one factor responsible for the dilution of the reform he diagnosed, we feel it is safe to argue that it can be incorporated within the compromises he discusses.

Thus, co-optation both facilitated the transition from the traditional school system to the new secularized one as well as compromised it, if only by permitting the survival within the new system of educators and administrators with a traditional value-outlook and set of attitudes. Competition also played an important role, as local elites sought to get for their locality a regional School Board, a polyvalent secondary school or a CEGEP. Gousse and Gagnon (1970) have studied the politics of the implementation of regional School Boards in the Gaspé peninsula area. Their data can readily be considered generalizable. It indicates that, once the local elites —the parish priest, the local mayor, the local chapter of the Chamber of Commerce, the local School Board administrators — realized that the government was going through with its plans to change the traditional system, they started to seek to secure for their own locality the educational institutions which were planned for their region. They soon realized what economic effects for their locality a CEGEP or [444] a polyvalent secondary school could have. They thus competed with other local elites for regional school buildings and equipement. Local elites' pressures seem to have been partly effective : indeed, in certain cases, the Education Department's technocratic norms concerning the localisation of polyvalent secondary schools and CEGEPs have not been completely respected. For example, the CEGEP plan provided the bas-du-fleuve area with only one CEGEP. There are now four CEGEPs north-east of Quebec city. An-other case is that of the Drummondville-Sainte-Hyacinthe-Tracy CEGEP. The CEGEP concept implied that one campus and one direction would assume the college level leadership for a region: those who thought out the CEGEP plan thus followed the "cité des Jeunes" concept put forward by the Tremb1ay committee and applied it to CEGEPs. The original CEGEP plan thus did not provide for the "sprinkling" over a region of the constituents of a CEGEP. At the beginning of the implementation phase, this policy was followed and engendered stiff competition between localities, for example between Rouyn and Amos. At the end of the process however, the policy was revised as the Drummondville-Sainte-

Hyacinthe-Tracy CEGEP indicates: it is a CEGEP with three campuses, located in the three cities previously mentioned. Still, some cases are not yet settled; indeed, a special leg-isi ati on is in the process of being drafted in order to decide the fate of the four regional campuses of the Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean area.

Whatever may be the case, competition for educational institu-tions was certainly a factor which facilitated in a sense the implementation phase, as local elites sought to maximize their localities' educational infrastructure. The provision of free schooling also facilitated the im-plementation [445] of the new secondary and college level institutions. As we have seen, though the Education Department had planned to open only five CEGEPs in 1967, if was forced by public opinion pres-sure — especially that of Montreal which was not supposed to have CEGEPs the first year and that of the Institut Canadien d'Éducation des Adultes — to open twelve CEGEPs that year and accelerate the imple-mentation phase.

If everything went relatively well and fast concerning the institu-tionalization of a complete network of CEGEPs, one problem called for the enactment of as systematic information campaign in order to redress the balance between general and vocational enrollments. Indeed, the Education Department technocrats had estimated that, in order that col-lege graduates meet the needs of the labour market, between 65 and 70% of them had to enroll in vocational terminal programs while the remaining 30-35% would enroll in general university-préparatory pro-grams (out of a foreseen 40% of each age-group). As the CEGEPs were created and as enrollments increased at the college level, the proportion of students involved in general education soon reached that predicted for the vocational sector. The government had to react to this phenom-enon, for it feared the overcrowding of the universities as well as un-employment for the general education graduates. It thus embarked on a campaign which sought to return the situation to that planned prior to the creation of the CEGEPs. To our knowledge, the situation is still not totally returned : there exists onlyone CEGEP which respects the fun-damentally vocational nature of the CEGEPs — -the Thetford Mines CEGEP — . This phenomenon — which has been labelled the phenom-enon of student inflation of aspirations — is interesting : for genera-tions, French Canadians had been told that the avenue to success and prestige was classical education. It seems that they [446] enrolled in the

CEGEPs with the old notions of higher prestige associated with general education.

If all three factors were instrumental in facilitating the implementation phase, and indicate that vested interests in the new differentiated patterns can be generated and facilitate the transition from the old undifferentiated patterns to the new differentiated ones, they seem to have engendered problems at the routinization phase, to a large extent because they accelerated the implementation one. For example, the Education Department technocrats wanted to experiment the CEGEP pedagogical and administrative regime, correct it if necessary, and study it before generalizing it. The fact that politically they could not close the gates after having opened them partly explains the many and varied problems the CEGEPs have had since their birth. Indeed, eight years after their creation, there is still considerable uncertainty concerning the CEGEP concept, the nature of general education, the relationship between the CEGEP and the University and the adaptiveness of the vocational education given in them. To some extent, the fast pace of the implementation phase as well as co-optation are symptomatic of this situation which was in 1974 considered sufficiently problematic as to need a thorough study, which the Superior Council of Education has ordered.

The same thing can be said of secondary polyvalent schools.

[447]

CONCLUSION

We have tried in this chapter to verify the propositions put forward in chapter two concerning what Smelser called the "frontal attack on the sources of dissatisfaction". We have specifically sought to show how the modernizing elite penetrated within the liberal party, gained access to the political center and sought to generate consensus on differentiation and modernization by producing a definition of the collective situation which stressed the need to adapt in the name of modernity as well as in the name of the highest national interests : the "language of adaptation" replaced the "language of cultural survival". We have also attempted to show how the modernizing elite was successful in its attempts to modernize Quebec's State and to transform the interchanges between the polity and the other subsystems. Finally, we have discussed the politics of the specification stage in order to show that it was not the debate over Bill 60 or over Bill 21, but the debate over the restructuring of the Montreal School Boards which has blocked the sequence of differentiation up to this day. As we have tried to show, differentiation is not fundamentally the issue, but it is used by change-resisters in such a manner as to indicate that the Island of Montreal is the theatre of a class-struggle opposing the Anglophone middle class — represented by the Anglophone members of Parliament and of the cabinet, the PSBGM officials, the McGill establishment, Parents' associations and the Board of Trade of Montreal — and the nationalist fraction of the new urban French Canadian middle class — represented by nationalist associations, the nationalist faction of the liberal party, the P.Q., members of the defunct M.I.S. and the intellingenstia —.

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Modernization and the Institutionalization
of Differentiation: The Quebec Case.

Chapter VII

CONCLUSION

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We have tried in this thesis to study the institutionalization of differentiation in the Quebec of the sixties. In order to do so, we have put forward a theoretical model of structural change, derived from it specific propositions and verified through an analysis of relevant historical material these propositions with Quebec society and the modernization of its fiduciary and political subsystems constituting the empirical referent. Quebec's school reform of the sixties was viewed essentially as a process involving the differentiation of religious and educational roles, collectivities and institutional norms.

One of the basic convictions which has guided our research has been the following : the post-War Quebec can be best understood within the framework of partial modernization and the so-called Quiet Revolution within that of a movement toward a more complete form of modernity. Building on Parsons' and Bellah's evolutionary writings, as well as on Rueschemeyer's exploratory essay (in press) on partial modernization, its causes and consequences, we have found it useful to define partial modernization as the "co-existence of modern and pre-modern or traditional patterns side by side within the same society". A pattern was considered modern to the extent that it increased the level of rationalization of the system in question.

Though Parsons has, in his evolutionary books (1966, 1971) paid more attention to evolutionary successes than to failures, blockages and stoppages, we have not assumed — nor does Parsons for that matter — [450] that the process of evolution in general and modernization in particular was unilinear, inevitable and irreversible. The Quebec of the nineteenth century constitutes a clear example of a process of modernization which becomes blocked and freezes. Indeed, as we have tried to show in previous chapters, the nineteenth century was a century during which Quebec society experienced strong, and deep value conflicts centering in the final analysis about the issues of differentiation. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Catholic Church, which constituted a force blocking differentiation, was stronger than at the beginning of the century : the school system was under its complete authority and the Alliance of Church and State was strong. It took some forty years before things started to change. As the discussion of the politics of the restructuration of Montreal sought to show in the previous chapter, it is certainly arguable that the deepening ethnic cleavages within the contemporary Quebec societal community are rendering problematic the consolidation of the School Reform and of the Quiet Revolution. We shall later on in this conclusion dwell longer on this issue which, we feel, carries implications for differentiation theory and especially for the conditions which facilitate increased adaptive capacity. Suffice it for the moment to repeat that we have not assumed that evolution in general and modernization in particular were irreversible and inevitable.

Nor did we assume that a "hidden force" was responsible for the movement from partial modernity to fuller modernity. Indeed, we have tried to formulate propositions which sought to identify and interrelate the variables which must be seen as crucial for a proper understanding of the realities of partial modernization and of the movement toward a more complete form of modernity. Specifically, we have associated the [451] realities of partial modernization with the following variables : a) the characteristics of a society's social environment and the place within the hierarchy of control of the patterns which are transmitted to the traditional society by the social environment ; b) the relationship between the social environment and the relatively traditional society and the interests of the social environment in the traditional society ; c) the capacity of the traditional society to resist environmental pressures to

modernize; this capacity, with regard to the case under study in this thesis, was seen as associated with the following factors : a) the inordinate importance of the Catholic Church hierarchy within Quebec's traditional elite-structure and its capacity to resist and block differentiation as well as to maintain relatively intact a stratification system which gave the greatest amount of prestige to ecclesiastical status ; b) the acceptance by the traditional political elites —whether they were members of the French Canadian haute bourgeoisie or of the upper middle classes — of a collaborative or intermediary role with the Anglo-American capitalist class, this role implying in the long run partial modernization to the extent that the Anglo-American capitalist class, in its willingness to modernize Quebec's economy did not, until recently, ask for more than an easy and economical access to the Province's natural resources and to a relatively low qualified labour force : the Anglo-capitalist class brought to the Province not only its surplus capital, but also its technology and entrepreneurship; in doing so, with the collaboration of Quebec's traditional political elites, it limited the emergence within French Canada of the necessary conmitments and skills for economic development ; c) a religious symbol system, typical of what Bellah (1964) calls historic civilizations, and which may be characterized in terms of [452] the Catholic Counter-Reformation and ultramontanist spirit.

These variables, as we have tried to show, are crucial for a proper understanding of the partial modernization of Quebec society and the failure of the nineteenth century attempts to develop Quebec society along the lines of its neighboring societies. The three sets of variables, in themselves and in interaction with one another, help understand why the modernization of Quebec society has been partial and uneven, more so than if modernization had been stimulated from within French Canada. In this regard, the relationship between French Canada and its social environment, characterized by colonial dependencies, the collaborative role played by the traditional political elites and the Church's monopoly over the cultural definition of the collective situation — definition which rejected as illegitimate differentiation, modernization and industrialization — have together retarded the modernization of Quebec societal subsystems, more so than if the Conquest had not been accompanied by the elimination of a key segment of New France's elites, than if the industrialization of the Province had not been stimulated by

Anglo-American capital, technology and entrepreneurship, and finally, more so than if Confederation had not implied centralization at the federal level of the major tools of economic development.

While partial modernization was seen in this thesis as a function of the previously discussed variables, the movement toward greater and fuller modernity was also analyzed in terms of specific propositions which sought to interrelate the following four factors : a) the ineffectiveness of the traditional agricultural system, the industrialization of the Province at the turn of the century and the state of the economy [453] after the Second World War ; b) elite-pluralization during the fifties, the challenge to the traditional political and fiduciary elites and the struggle between them for the control of the State ; c) the transformations, associated with the economic conditions, of the societal community, and especially the urbanization of the Province and the concomitant emergence of an urban middle class, committed to and having a vested interest in the development of the State apparatus ; d) the growing ineffectiveness of the traditionalized political and fiduciary subsystems in its dealing with the transformations of the other societal subsystems. As we have sought to document in chapter five, these factors, which we have analyzed within the framework of the Parsonian interchange paradigm, must be seen as crucial structural conduciveness factors for the emergence of a value- oriented movement fostering modernization and differentiation.

Value-oriented movements are not always successful in institutionalizing the changes they foster. The fact that they are value-oriented and thus seek to change components high in the hierarchy of control, is in itself an indication of the difficulties involved in value-change and value-generalization. Besides the factors indicated in the previous paragraph, the following factors we contend, are important for a proper understanding of why, for example, the Cité Libre movement was not crushed during the fifties, survived the harasment of the traditional elites and prepared the ground for the Quiet Revolution : **a**) most of the leading members of the movement were catholic 1aymen, trained and socialized within the Action Catholique movements ; they defined their activities and their platform of change in terms of the highest interests of the Catholic Church; their background was such that this could not be castigated as rhetoric ; **b**) in more than one way, they were the objective allies of [454] a Catholic Church hierarchy, or at least of a

segment of it, embarassed by the post-War consequences of the Alliance of Church, State and Anglo-American Capital, and frustrated by Duplessis' intervention in stricly religious matters (for example, the dismissal of M^{gr} Charbonneau and the harasment of Father Lévesque) ; in historic civilizations, says Bellah, the political and religious elites are differentiated; the role-incumbents are different, even if the norms and values which guide the action of both elites are less differentiated ; this means that both elites have to maintain a certain distance toward the other : it is indeed a condition of the maintenance of their respective spheres of authority; in a sense, the Catholic laymen who started in the fifties to promote differentiation and denounced the traditionalism of the State elite, helped the Church maintain its distances — or at least, the front of such a distance — toward a State elite who, as Duplessis was found of saying in private, was happy at seeing bishops eat in its hands ; **c**) the members of the value-oriented movement were pragmatic in two important ways : one, they did not reject the fundamental postulate of the traditional ideology, i.e. that French Canada constitutes a culture of which the basic characteristics— language, religion, mores and folklore —must survive; two, and this is more important, they did not simply produce an ideological discourse but jumped — at least some of them did — on the opportunity that a relatively open and strong opposition party represented in terms of the possibility of implementing their platform of structural change and modernization. Had all the members of the movement decided — like Trudeau did (Lapalme, 1970) — that the Liberal party of the fifties was not radical enough and that one could not "use" it as an instrument to modernize Quebec society, things would have been probably different : the Quiet [455] Revolution would have probably happened, but not necessarily as fast or for that matter, as quietly. Arthur Tremblay, to name one important architect of the school reform, could have stayed at Laval's School of Pedagogy teaching and writing books about the problems of Quebec's traditional school system; his association with Gérin-Lajoie certainly made a difference with regard to the specific content, pace and "radicalness" of the School Reform.

Had not the leaders of the value-oriented movement displayed these characteristics, it is quite probable that things would have been different. In other words, we have not assumed that the existence of a value-oriented movement was enough to assure that its program had a chance

of being implemented. This is why we have analyzed what Smelser (1959) called the "frontal attack on the sources of dissastisfactions" essentially in political terms. Two reasons guided us : one, the politics of differentiation are crucial for a proper understanding of the success or failure of an attempt to institutionalize differentiation ; second, it is a factor which both Parsons and Smelser have neglected; though Parsons, in his Rural Sociology (1961b) article, talks about such things as the "risks involved in cutting loose" or of the "minimal guarantees" which must be given to the units undergoing differentiation in order to secure their "consent", thus indicating that there are costs to differentiation and that they have to be negotiated so that the conflicts engendered by differentiation do not block the process or make it bounce back, he does not thoroughly and systematically analyze these issues. Smelser's book (1959) on the English industrial revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth century suffers from similar defects : Smelser was much more concerned with showing the usefulness of his seven-step model and the seven levels of [456] specificity of the components of action schema than with a complete analysis of the political transformations concomitant to the industrialization of Great Britain.

In our effort to focus on the political aspect of differentiation, we have decided to view the process of differentiation as a process involving consensus-creation and/or consensus-imposition at the level of existing institutional elites as well as at that of the masses. Parsons has acknowledged (1961b) the importance for the successful institutionalization of differentiation, of the generation of a new definition of the situation which legitimizes differentiation and the contribution of the differentiated subsystems to higher-order functioning. He had not however paid sufficient attention to the mechanisms by which this new definition is produced, diffused and accepted or imposed by those in power. Neither has he paid sufficient attention to cases where this new definition of the situation does not simply imply value-generalization, but also a shift in the dominant values of the society undergoing differentiation and modernization.

The consensus we have seen as crucial for the successful institutionalization of differentiation has very little to do with what some call "tribal consensus". In a relatively differentiated society, "tribal consensus" — i.e. specific in its reference, broad and shared by all elites and non-elites — is clearly impossible, the more so if the changes on which

consensus is needed, involve value-change. Consensus is also very difficult to generate across class and ethnic 1ines; it is almost Impossible in a situation where class and ethnic lines to some extent converge. On all these counts, our case study constitutes an interesting [457] illustration of the difficulties involved in consensus-creation, and by extension, of the difficulties involved in successfully institutionalizing differentiation. Indeed, our case study indicates that the full differentiation of the political and fiduciary subsystems not only involved the renegotiation of a pact between the State elite and the Catholic Church, but also the renegotiation of the *modus vivendi* between the two major ethnic groups inhabiting Quebec territory. As we have sought to show, the first negotiation went relatively smoothly ; the second is still going on and has mobilized most of Quebec elites' energies since the Saint-Léonard incident and the publication of the last volume of the Parent Report. If, for the successful completion of the first negotiation, the modernizers produced an ideology mixing democratic and national self-sufficiency values, they have not been able to produce for the second one an ideological discourse effective in limiting polarization. Rueschemeyer's discussion (in press) of the constraining effect of "primordial" identities and divisions, is useful here :

> "Consciousness of "primordial" identities and divisions, and even moderate tension and conflict along these lines engendered by modernization, reinforce or stimulate the containing effects of segmentation. Acceptance and spread of new patterns are under these conditions hindered because they are perceived as associated with an outgroup. Geertz speaks of a "contextual relativism which sees certain values as appropriate to context"; it both facilitates the coexistence of divergent old forms of 1ife and limits the diffusion of new ones. Such contextual relativism has to be distinguished analytically from the moral grounding of functionally differentiated patterns in modern societies. In the latter case legitimation rests on <u>common</u> ultimate orientations, while its equivalent in the former is the consciousness of deep cleavages" (Rueschemeyer, in press).

Obviously, it is matter of debate whether or not, in contemporary [458] Quebec, consciousness of deep cleavages is stronger than common ultimate orientations. In a sense, because of the Quiet Revolution and its principal manifestations, the Francophones have never been "culturally" closer to the Anglophones : they have accepted the values

of economic development, democracy and universal education. On the other hand, the same Quiet Revolution has implied a redefinition of inter-ethnic patterns of accommodation. Conflict has plagued this process. We agree with Rueschemeyer that "prolonged hostility and conflict without decisive outcome are under conditions of polarization likely to forge stable solidary subcultures and lasting enmities between conflict groups which tend to survive the original constellation and to become unresponsive to new development" (Rueschemeyer, in press). This definitively, seems to be presently the danger and the challenge.

In previous chapters, we have sought to associate consensus- creation and/or consensus-imposition with the problems of value-generalization and value-change, as well as with those of the smooth processing of the sequence of differentiation vs its bouncing back and forth. We have found it useful to view the kind of consensus we saw as essential for the institutionalization of differentiation as analogous to a language. In this respect, the production and diffusion by the modernizers in the fifties and the sixties of the "language of adaptation" was crucial for the differentiation process. It was not enough however, as we have tried to show : political indoctrination, the structuring role played by the Parent Commission, negotiations between key groups, "compromises", co-optation of some members of the traditional clerical elites within the new system, and package deals were also important ingredients of the relative success of the "frontal attack on the sources of dissatisfaction".

[459]

One comment must be made with regard to our analysis of the politics of the school reform : it is not always easy to provide the reader with all the "inside information" which supports beyond doubt a particular hypothesis and interpretation. Sometimes a more "speculative" argument is necessary, due to lack of rich data. There are many reasons for this : one, the instance of differentiation studied in this thesis is not very old — indeed, in the case of the regionalization of the educational structures of the Island of Montreal, it is still going through the specification phase — which means that it is difficult to take all the necessary distance toward it in order to fully analyze the politics that it involved; for example, it is only recently, after the publication of Canon Groulx's Memoirs (1974) and the attack on the personality of M^{gr} Charbonneau to be found in it, that a debate over what actually happened in 1949 and led to M^{gr} Charbonneau's dismissal as archibishop of Montreal , has

emerged and helped clarify the intrigues within the Church and the Duplessis government which had not before been completely analyzed and publicized; b) we are not convinced that all the "inside information" is necessary before risking an interpretation ; for example, it is somewhat puzzling to discover that the Catholic bishops of the Province of Quebec, though expressing strong reservations to the content of Bill 60 before its presentation in spring 1963, finally, in their August 29 declaration, accepted the fundamental characteristics of the Bill ; though we do not know exactly the content of the Conversations between the bishops, Cardinal Léger and Gérin-Lajoie, —we are not convinced either that Cardinal Léger, in an interview, would "tell it as it happened" — , we nonetheless felt warranted to stress the following points ; a) Gérin-Lajoie, during the simmer 1963, actively sought to reduce resistance to [460] differentiation and Bill 60 ; he invested all his political capital in the fight; though his campaign and his speeches were always at a high level of principles, the "aggressiveness" he displayed during that summer testify to a consensus-imposition strategy ; b) the Church hierarchy was divided, as the public declarations of some bishops, more conservative than others, clearly indicate (Dion, 1967) ; c) they acted as if they wanted to avoid losing the battle ; Dion (1967) concluded his analysis of the debate over Bill 60 by stating that both key groups — the Liberal party and the Assembly of bishops — had won their respective battles; there were no losers, as the liberal party salvaged its bill and the Assembly of bishops got the guarantees they wanted; Dion's interpretation can be extended it could very well be that both actors were very concerned about the strenght of the other, and did not want to stage an all-out war because of fear of the damages that could be done to both the Liberal party and the Catholic Church hierarchy and offices. The strategy of both actors indicate that if the traditional alliance between Church and State had been to some extent cimented by fear, the negotiations involving the Church hierarchy and the Lesage government, designed to renegotiate the traditional alliance, were also to some extent organized in such a fashion as to minimize the damage one could do to the other. In this sense, Dion's conclusion to the effect that there were no losers takes, we feel, all its meaning.

It may be pointed out that this kind of argument is somewhat close to Milliband's (1969) strategy of demonstration of the links between the State apparatus of advanced industrial and liberal societies and the

capitalist economic system. Milliband does not, in the final analysis, defend his thesis by presenting data on the informal relations [461] between the state elites and the economic ones, but more so on the objective consequences of the former's activities and policies on the latter's maximization of interests. Moreover, this strategy, more "speculative" than based on "inside information", gives to the book all its richness : for example, it permits Milliband to conclude that it does not really matter if a labour-oriented party is in power instead of, say, a Tory party : both act often to salvage the capitalist economic system. To document this, Milliband rests his case more on the objective consequences of say, the policies of a Labour government and the bureaucratic apparatus charged with the implementation of these policies, than on data showing with whom Wilson played golf or on data indicating who bribed whom.

We have, in our analysis of the politics of the school reform, tried to follow, when necessary, a similar kind of strategy. Specifically, we have done so with regard to the debate over Bill 60 and to the ongoing one concerning the regionalization of the educational structures of the Island of Montreal. Subsequent research, done when the debates will have "cooled" off to some extent and when the key groups will be more prone to "tell it like it was", should help substantiate or invalidate the interpretation put forward in this thesis of the regionalization issue.

One last point concerning illustrative material. In some important areas, it simply does not exist. For example, we have tried on many different fronts to uncover reliable data concerning the financial assets of the traditional Catholic Church of Quebec. This information would have been most useful for our thesis; however, it simply does not exist. When bits of information can be found, it is very difficult to use them extensively : for example, it is very difficult to distinguish [462] the finances of a classical college and that of the religious order running the college. The Dumont Commission (1971) on the state of the Catholic Church in post-Quiet Revolution Quebec, mentioned that, though for many catholics and agnostics, the richness of the Church was an object of scandal, it could not evaluate it in strictly and sound economic terms We have not been able to do so either.

We have thus felt warranted to focus our attention on the polit ical dimension of the sequence of differentiation, even though it sometime posed data collecting problems. This strategy has permitted us to show

that, under specific conditions — mainly those of a relatively tradition-alized society which has tried throughout its history to "cope" with ex-ogenous disturbances and stimuli — this partially modernized society cannot experience differentiation without simultaneously experiencing a shift in dominant values and in corresponding power groups. Thus, within the context of late modernization, differentiation often, as our case clearly indicates, involves not only value-generalization, but also value-change of importance.

[463]

Modernization and the Institutionalization
of Differentiation: The Quebec Case.

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[480]

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[481]

Modernization and the Institutionalization
of Differentiation: The Quebec Case.

APPENDIX A

LEXICON

Return to toc

[482]

Colonialized society : A society in which economic, political, social and cultural development is subjected to relationships of dependence.

Consensus-creation : Process by which an attempt is made to generate agreement of actors on a particular object through persuasion.

Economy : The functional subsystem of a society differentiated about producing and allocating fluidly disposable resources within the society. It operates through combining the factors of production — e.g., land, labor, capital, and organization — to produce the two primary categories of output : commodities and services. The economic categories are not the physical behavior involved as such, but certain ways of controlling them : in the case of commodities, essentially property rights ; in the case of services, the kind of authority or power over the performer is associated with the status of employer.

Fiduciary system : The functional subsystem which has pattern-maintenance primacy for a society. It focuses on the institutionalized culture, which in turn centres on patterns of value-orientations.

It lies in the zone of interpenetration between cultural system and society. It includes action structures and processes where cultural meaning systems articulate with special function in the societal system. These special functions are the foci of institutionalization of relevant cultural patterns in the society.

Nationalism : The ideology which legitimizes the goal of self-sufficiency.

[483]

Polity : The functional subsystem which, has goal-attainment primacy for a society. Its goal is to maximize the capacity of a society to attain its collective goals. This capacity is defined as power.

The political process is the process by which the necessary organization is built up and operated, the goals of action are determined and the resources requisite to it are mobilized.

Rationalization : An increased emphasis on rationality. Rationality is based on an active search for information relevant to action and on the conviction that things find their explanation in themselves and not in a myth or a tradition. Rationality has a double meaning : rationality in the choice of means for a given goal, comparing the characteristics of different factor combinations ; and rationality with respect to goals, considering the consequences of different goals and choosing in terms of higher order preferences.

Self-sufficiency : The capacity of the system, gained through both its internal organization and resources and its access to inputs from its environments, to function autonomously in implementing its normative culture, particularly its values but also its norms and collective goals. Self-sufficiency is a degree of generalized adaptive capacity in the sense of biological theory.

Self-sufficiency in relation to environments, means stability of interchange relationships and capacity to control interchange relatlonships in the interest of societal functioning. Such control may vary from capacity to forestall or "cope with" disturbances to capacity to shape environmental relations favorably.

Social system : The subsystem of action constituted by states and [484] processes of social interaction among acting units. It is a "reality sui generis".

It is "open", engaged in continual interchange of inputs and outputs with its environments, rt is internally differentiated into various orders of subsystems which are also continually involved in processes of interchange.

Societal community : The core structure of a society. It is the collective structure in which members are united or in some sense, associated. Its most important property is the kind and level of solidarity — in Durkheim's sense — which chararterizes the relations between its members.

The solidarity of a community is essentially the degree to which (and the ways in which) its collective interest can be expected to prevail over the unit interests of its members wherever the two conflict.

Society : The category of social system embodying at the requisite levels of evolutionary development and of control over the conditions of environmental relations, the greatest self-sufficiency of any type of social system.