



THE WESTERN BALKANS
A EUROPEAN CHALLENGE

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Introduction / The Western Balkans - A European Challenge

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THE WESTERN BALKANS

The geographic term 'Western Balkans' has become popular lately as western institutions' and politicians' main purpose was to identify the part of South-Eastern Europe which in the aftermath of Yugoslavia's disintegration, in the 1990's, experienced disastrous military confrontations. With the term »Disintegration of Yugoslavia«, other place-names of remembrance come to mind: (1) Brioni accords in 1991 gave the green light for Slovenia to break-away from the multi-ethnic Yugoslav federation; (2) Washington accords in 1994 created within Bosnia and Herzegovina the Muslim-Croat Federation; (3) Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995 stopped violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina and made way for a multi-ethnic co-existence; (4) Rambouillet/Paris accords in 1999 produced, in the case of Kosovo, a clear standpoint against mistreatment of ethnic groups, in particular, Albanians; (5) Kumanovo Peace Agreement in 1999, stands for the final military defeat of the Serbian lead Yugoslav Army (under Slobodan Milošević). The reality in the region of the Western Balkans is at present, more than a decade later, still fragile. International peace-

keepers and political and humanitarian institutions are operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the region/province of Kosovo. As the situation in Croatia, Macedonia and Albania has stabilized between 1995 and 2004, they've subsequently, left areas under their control in Croatia, Macedonia and Albania. But, Balkanization, the term to be used to identify »the breaking up into small, mutually hostile political units, as the Balkans after World War I« (Webster New World Dictionary, 1988, 103), is still in progress. Despite Belgrade's (Serbia & Montenegro's capital) strong opposition, Montenegro will gain independence in 2006. Kosovo is on the same path and therewith disregarding the nation state of Serbia's recent (2006) constitution. Republika Srpska of Bosnia and Herzegovina is threatening to follow the trend. The articles in this book are primarily focusing on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina though, as authors were asked to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Agreements.

The accords, agreed upon in Dayton in the cold and dull ambience of the Ohio barracks, stopped the bloodshed and promised to guarantee peace while carving out a unique multi-ethnic state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Dayton produced a geographically unified, but in reality a dual-state (The Croato-Bosniak Federation and The Republika Srpska), which - to some extent - was a functionally viable multi-ethnic entity, (but only) under supervision of international bodies. The Dayton accords guaranteed a relatively (!) normal, post-conflict economic and societal development. But in minds of the many Bosniak people, »Dayton« at the same time also stands as a reminder for the cruelty experienced during the 1992 – 1995 war: (1) the killing of more than 7000 Bosniak man in Srebrenica by the Serb/Yugoslav army and the Serb paramilitary, (2) the year long Serb shelling and destruction of Sarajevo, (3) the Serb concentration camps - like the one of Prijedor (Omarska), (4) the destruction of world heritage sites, like of the 16th century old Mostar bridge by Croats, (5) the mistreatment and rape of Bosniak/Croat women and men, and for (6) the massive ethnic cleansing and enforced migration (up to 2.5 million people) committed by all parties involved in the conflict. The disastrous events have taken place in the geographic hearth of Europe (not in Rwanda or Somalia, not in Iraq or the Palestinian territories, nor in Pakistan or elsewhere in Africa or Asia). The atrocities took place in an area of western dominance (industrial) civilization and in the aftermath of the joyous event of the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Croatia, the last remaining signatory, ratified in March 2004 the Agreement on FSRY – Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia's Inheritance, by which five legal entities: Slovenia, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Croatia (in the ranking of the recognition of the agreement by parliaments) »became responsible for the obligations and are bearers of rights induced by the late Federation of the Socialist Republics of Yugoslavia«. The French ambassador Badinter's 1991 observation on the breaking-apart of a state came to a conclusion. 13 years of negotiations finally materialized in a settlement. According to the document, the internationally recognized, new nation-states are sharing assets and emerging as legally responsible entities of the former multi-ethnic federation. By agreement, they've become owners of real estate (like embassies) and of financial assets, and are considered partners in internationally binding financial, social and political documents. The document, agreed upon in Vienna in 2001, remains silent in regard to post-conflict resolutions to be arranged in the new nation-states. For example on the minority rights of numerous members of ethnic communities which in former Yugoslavia migrated due to economic reasons to provinces of the then multi-ethnic state. The majority of the migrants received citizenship of the new nation-states. Some have not. Many stuck to their old provincial citizenship and become dual-citizens and identify with two passports. Some are left with no legal documents at all.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Bosnia and Herzegovina (short: BiH) was the only republic of former Yugoslavia where none of the south Slavic ethnic groups had an absolute majority. The constitutive nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina were the Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Serbs, and Croats. This situation was a result of centuries-long historic development. Censuses did not reveal the whole and exact picture of Bosnia and Herzegovina's ethnic patchwork. The definition »(Yugoslav) Muslims« and the subsequently introduction of ethnic »Yugoslavs« and »Other, nationality unknown« into census' categories blurred the picture. According to the last peacetime census in 1981, one could not ascertain larger changes in areas of settlement of individual ethnic groups. The (Bosnian) Muslims had a majority in central Bosnia (Sarajevo), in north-eastern Bosnia (Tuzla),

in north-western Bosnia (Cazin, Bihač). The Serbs had the majority in Bosanska krajina (Banja Luka), Semberija, and eastern Herzegovina (Drvar). Croats had the majority in western and central Herzegovina (Mostar), in Posavina, and in some parts of central Bosnia. According to the 1991 population census, 44 percent of the Bosnia-Herzegovina's population is Muslims, 31 percent is Croat and 17 percent is Serbs, whereas 6 percent declared themselves as »Yugoslavs.« Nationalistic ethnic politicians asked in the late 1980's for a territorial division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into its Serb, Croat, and Muslim parts. On the other hand, many residents of Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of nationality, tolerated the communist regime of Ex-Yugoslavia, which, by its dictatorship, suppressed ethnic hatred. Pictures and sculptures of the late president Josip Broz (Marshal Tito) of Yugoslavia are still popular in Sarajevo's antique shops. To a certain extent the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into national territorial units was formalized with by the Dayton Agreement in 1995.

A division of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina into more or less pure ethnic areas seemed to have been unthinkable until 1992. The only alternative for the Serbs, Croats, and (Bosnian) Muslims seemed to have been to live together in one state that would be neither Serb nor Croat nor Muslim and in which all three constituent nations would have the same rights. However, conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina worsened rapidly after the first free and multiparty elections, held on 18 November 1990. Then candidates of respective nationalistic parties won 202 out of the 240 deputy seats in the new Bosnian-Herzegovian parliament. The Muslim Party of Democratic Action (Stranka demokratske akcije, SDA) gained 87 seats; the Serb Democratic Party (Srpska demokratska stranka, SDS), 71 seats; and the Bosnian affiliate of the Croat Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ), 44 seats in the parliament. At first it seemed that the multiparty system would work hand in hand with power sharing among the individual ethnic groups, a system already introduced by the communists. Alija Izetbegović, a (Bosnian) Muslim, was elected president of the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Momčilo Krajišnik, a Serb, was elected speaker of the parliament; and Jure Pelivan, a Croat, became the prime minister. In spite of this spirit of cooperation, conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina started to worsen with the dawn of the Croatian and Slovenian declarations of independence. Both former Yugoslav autonomous provinces (republics) declared themselves to be

independent nation-states on June 25, 1991. Already in February 1991 the Bosnia-Herzegovina's president Alija Izetbegović made its intentions to declare independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina public if Slovenia and Croatia would take the lead. Following, the Bosnian Serbs declared »their right« to live in Yugoslavia (the country in which the majority of their population lives). In this sharpened political standoff, no one was ready for a compromise. The last chance for a peaceful solution disappeared in March 1991 when Slobodan Milošević, the Serb republic president and Franjo Tuđman, the president of the republic of Croatia, without including Izetbegović in their discussions, discussed the possibility of dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina between Croatia and Serbia. Consequently, Izetbegović started to strengthen ties with Islamic countries. During a visit to Turkey, he even asked for membership for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Organization of Islamic States, causing the Bosnian Serbs to accuse him of trying to make the country an Islamic republic. Under these conditions of general mistrust, the SDS parliament members began to hinder government operations. At the same time the Serb population started an operation to organize Serb Autonomous Authorities (SAOs) in regions where Serbs were, according to their estimates, a majority: SAO Bosanska Krajina with its seat in Banja Luka, SAO Romanija with its seat in Sarajevo, and SAO Eastern Herzegovina with its seat in Nevesinje. In October 1991, as the situation became more and more complicated, SDA and HDZ members of parliament made a proposal by which Bosnia-Herzegovina should become independent and a sovereign country. After a series of thunderous discussions, deputies of the SDS decided to leave the parliament, and on October 25 they established their own parliament. Bosnian Serb politicians, with the help of the Serb-dominated regime of Slobodan Milošević, started to implement a plan to forcibly prevent the international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence. In accordance with secret orders from Milošević, the Yugoslav army (JNA) ethnic Serb officers and soldiers, whose ancestors were from Bosnia and Herzegovina, moved into areas of Serb dominance in Bosnia and Herzegovina. With such support, the Bosnian Serbs declared their own Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Srpska republika Bosna i Hercegovina) on 9 January 1992 and proclaimed it to be a part of the Yugoslav federation.

By the end of 1991 it became clear that Slovenia and Croatia would achieve international recognition of their independence. On 20 De-

ember 1991, the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina also decided to ask the European Union to recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state. In a referendum on February 29 and March 1 1992, 99.45% - of those who participated (!) - voted for the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only 5,997 votes were registered against. A total of 5,070 of ballots were invalid. An estimated 1.2 million eligible voters (36.96 %) abstained! The majority of the Serb population abstained, as their ethnic political leaders had already declared their own Serb Republic. It became clear that the Bosnian crisis would not be solved peacefully. International peacemakers continued with efforts to find a compromise which would satisfy BiH national leaders: the Muslim Alija Izetbegović, the Serb Radovan Karadžić, and the Croat Mate Boban. Fighting broke out only a week after the referendum near Bosanski Brod (Posavina), Zvornik and Bjeljina (Eastern Bosnia). Tensions increased in Sarajevo. Under these tense and complicated circumstances, the European Union recognized the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 April 1992. The United States followed on 7 April 1992. However, the Bosnian Serbs continued to act independently. The »Assembly of the Serb Nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina« soon declared the independence of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (later renamed into Republika Srpska = Serb Republic). In the middle of April, President Izetbegović and the speaker of the BiH parliament Krajišnik met to talk about chances for a peaceful solution, but the military confrontation could no longer be prevented. The Serbs wanted to get rid of all the non-Serbs ethnicities on the territory controlled by them. The policy of »ethnic cleansing« started to take its shape! In the first year of the war Serbs succeeded in ousting Muslims and Croats from eastern Bosnia (Zvornik, Višegrad, Foča), Posavina (Bosanski Brod, Derventa), and Banja Luka. Most of the Croats from these regions escaped to Croatia and to the Herzegovina's part of BiH, which became exclusively controlled by the Croat nation (in July 1992 Herzegovina was renamed into Herceg-Bosna). The Muslim refugees moved to the regions around Tuzla and Sarajevo, to cities which remained to be under Muslim control. Others migrated to Croatia, Slovenia and Western Europe. By August of 1992, 1.7 million residents of Bosnia and Herzegovina had left their homes.

From the very beginning of the war, the international community tried to stop the fighting and to find a peaceful solution in particular due to the many refugees the war has resulted in. All the peace plans

suggested by the United Nations and the European Union were based on the condition that Bosnian Muslims would not be forced to leave their homes. Also the condition was that the international border of BiH should remain unchanged. There was no demand for a nationally unified state. The January 1993 plan of the former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and the former British Foreign Secretary Lord David Owen - the s. c. Vance-Owen Peace Plan - foresaw the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into ten regions/cantons - three for every ethnic group plus Sarajevo. Neither this, nor many of the later peace plans put forward were able to stop the fighting, because none of the sides involved in the war was prepared to give up its plans for an ethnically divided Bosnia and Herzegovina. Until April 1993, the Serbs were fighting the Muslims and Croats. However, in April 1993 fighting also began over territories controlled by the allied Croat and Muslim forces. Ethnic cleansing occurred in regions where it had not taken place before. Croats began to force the Muslims out of the Herzegovina's towns of Stolac, Čapljina, Ljubuški, and settlements of Central Bosnia (Busovača, Kiseljak). Muslims, on the other hand began to force Croats out of Jablanica and Konjic, as well as from the regions of Vard and Bugojno in Central Bosnia. Muslim refugees found refuge in Western European, Croat refugees found new homes in the Croat controlled Livno of Herzegovina and in Istria (Croatia). During this period fights between Croats and Serbs, who both were preoccupied with fighting against Bosnian Muslims, nearly stopped. At the same time the Bosniak Muslim factions also started to fight each other. Fikret Abdić, a regional leader in Western Bosnia, did not recognize the central Bosnian government of Alija Izetbegović and on 27 September 1993 he declared Western Bosnia (350,000 inh.) an autonomous region with Bihać as capital. He made an agreement with local commanders of the Bosnian Serbs and Croats and started to fight the army of Alija Izetbegović with a force of 6,000 soldiers.

THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT

The international community did not intervene in Bosnia and Herzegovina until May 1993, when the Serb forces surrounded some towns where the Bosnian Muslims formed a majority of the local population. The UN Security Council proclaimed the towns of Sarajevo, Bihać,

Goražde, Srebrenica, Tuzla, and Žepa to be »safe havens,« and the forces of UNPROFOR (the United Nations Protection Force) were sent to them. On 2 March 1994, international mediators practically forced the Muslims and Bosnian Croats to sign the Washington Framework Agreement, which unified the territories under their control into the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In August 1994 the international community, with the help of the Russians, forced the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to close its borders with the regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina that were under Serb control and to sever its ties with Karadžić. This, however, did not stop the war. Despite seventy-seven cease-fires from March 1992 until May 1994 and numerous diplomatic missions, in particular by Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian affairs during the Clinton administration, ethnic cleansing continued. In July 1995 the Serb forces captured Srebrenica and Žepa and executed almost 8,000 Bosnian Muslim soldiers and civilians. Consequently, NATO intervened with air raids on the Serb positions, and the Serbs agreed to start peace negotiations in August 1995. On 8 September 1995, the foreign ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, agreed in Geneva that Bosnia and Herzegovina should exist as one state, but should be divided into two entities, a Croat-Muslim and a Serb entity. In October a temporary peace was achieved and on 1 November 1995 peace negotiations started at the Wright-Patterson US Air Force base near Dayton, Ohio. Negotiations ended into a peace agreement (the Dayton Peace Agreement) to be signed Paris in December 1995.

The Dayton Peace Agreement consists of a general document, 11 annexes, and 102 maps. It states the following:

1. Bosnia and Herzegovina shall stay as a unified, internationally recognized state in its prewar borders. It will have a constitution that envisions Bosnia and Herzegovina as a federal state. It shall have a bicameral parliament, federal constitutional court, common presidency, unified currency, and central government.
2. The state shall consist of two units: the Bosniak-Croat Federation, which shall enclose 51% of the BiH territory and of the Serb Republic (Republika Srpska), which would control the remaining 49% of the state territory. The Serb part would encompass the cities of Srebrenica, Žepa, and Pale – a township near Sarajevo – which may become the capitol of the Republika Srpska. The Serb entity shall have access to the Adriatic coast.

3. The capital, Sarajevo, shall remain united within the Bosniak-Croat Federation; the Serbs of Sarajevo shall have special rights in the school system and the local self-management.
4. The territorial corridor that connects the Serb territories shall be five kilometers wide. On the status of the city of Brčko, international arbiters shall decide.
5. Members of the presidency and the parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be elected at free and democratic elections by all the citizens of voting age in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Elections shall take place under the control of the international community; citizens shall vote in places where they have permanent residence.
6. Refugees shall be permitted to return to their homes. Citizens shall be allowed a free and unhindered movement within the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
7. Convicted war criminals shall not be permitted to serve in the armed forces or occupy positions in state structures.
8. It was agreed that 60,000 peacekeeping forces will be stationed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
9. Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (later: Serbia and Montenegro) will recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina.
10. Consequently, the United States will suggest that the UN Security Council pass a resolution to end economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The signatories of the Dayton Peace Agreement were Alija Izetbegović of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slobodan Milošević of Serbia, and Franjo Tuđman of Croatia.

After three years of war, peace came to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The reactions to the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement were most euphoric in Belgrade, where the people honored Slobodan Milošević as a visionary, and in Zagreb, where Franjo Tuđman evaluated the agreement as a »victory of Croatian diplomacy«. In Bosnia and Herzegovina there were many who had doubts, though. The president of the self-proclaimed Serb parliament, Momčilo Krajišnik, was most critical claiming that the agreement did not fulfill Serb interests. He threatened that he would not respect the agreement, as the Bosnian Serbs had not signed it; Slobodan Milošević had signed it for them. In spite of doubts about the fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina ended, and conditions improved. The implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement

has been overseen by 50,000 soldiers of the IFOR (Implementation Forces) and later the SFOR (Stabilization Forces), who came to replace the United Nations Forces (UNPROFOR). Being under the command of NATO, IFOR and SFOR approval was granted from the UN's Security Council. Implementation of the agreement was not an easy task since each side respected only those points of the agreement that have been in their favor. In everyday life, each entity has lived its own, separate life. In order to stop the »life of three states in one state« the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) organized elections in September 1996. Inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina elected a three-member presidency and parliament. Citizens of each of the two constituent entities also elected regional parliaments. Bosnian Alija Izetbegović was elected the president of the three-member presidency, and the Serb Momčilo Krajišnik and the Croat Krešimir Zubak became members of the presidency.

The war entirely changed the ethnic structure of this once ethnically mixed former Yugoslav administrative unit (= republic). As a result of ethnic cleansing, on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina more or less ethnically homogeneous regions came to existence. The area of Serb settlements covers the lands of the Republika Srpska; the region of the Croat and Muslim settlement covers the lands of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The percentage of Serbs in Banja Luka rose from 52 percent in 1991 to 90 percent in 1995 and in Doboj, from 32 percent to 90 percent; in Mostar, the percentage of Serbs fell from 18 percent to 3 percent. The number of the Serbs also substantially decreased in Bihać (from 29,398 to about 1,000); in Tuzla (from 82,235 to about 15,000); in Zenica (from 79,233 to about 16,000); and in western Herzegovina and Central Bosnia (from 43,595 to about 5,000). A similar ethnic homogenization is to be experienced in Sarajevo: in the part of the municipality controlled by the Federation, the percentage of Muslims has risen from 52 percent to 85 percent. It is estimated that at least 2.5 million refugees had to leave their homes as a result of the wars on the Balkan Peninsula in the 1990's. Many settled in the successor states' of former Yugoslavia. In November 1995 there were 453,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina in Croatia, 38,600 in Montenegro, 28,000 in Macedonia, 405,000 in Serbia, and 24,000 in Slovenia. As for other European countries, most of them settled in Germany (320,000), Italy (90,000), Switzerland (33,000), Austria (20,000), France (15,000), Sweden (50,000), and the Netherlands (33,000). For

the most part, Muslims found refuge in Turkey (52,000), Saudi Arabia (7,000), and Libya (3,500). In spite of peace, most refugees had in 2005 not yet returned to their previous homes. Consequences of the war, including the changed ethnic situation, continuing ethnic hatred, lack of security, and poor economic conditions are the key reasons for not returning.

THE COMMON EUROPEAN FUTURE

The tragedy of Yugoslavia, and more particularly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, demonstrates the enduring potency of European territoriality. The temptation to see the ongoing crisis in the Western Balkans as visceral tribalism, a barbaric and primitive form of ethnic hatred which was merely held in check under communism only to be unleashed when these 'backward' peoples were at last free to massacre one another, is both intellectually lazy and morally complacent. As David Campbell demonstrates in his analysis, Yugoslavia lies at the heart of Europe. It is populated by sophisticated, highly educated, thoroughly modern peoples. It is not over there; it is here. Its problems are the problems of Europe. As Campbell shows, even before the crisis descended into the fury of warfare and ethnic bloodletting, the 'international community' had privileged a territorial solution above all other alternatives. The terms of the debate were set in advance by enduring assumptions that national identity could only be expressed by authority over space. While a territorial solution was feasible in the case of Slovenia, it condemned multi-ethnic, cosmopolitan Bosnia to a savage death of territorial attrition and attempted genocide. Most of the Yugoslav federal units were ethnically mixed; but Bosnia, in the centre of the old multi-ethnic state, was a bewildering mosaic of different communities in the rural areas. In the capital city of Sarajevo, Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats and Bosnian Muslims fused in a seamless mixture and had lived in peace for generations. A neat territorial solution would never be possible here. The quest for ethnic homogeneity simply created the worst kind of heterogeneity: small, isolated and vulnerable minorities beyond each new suggested border, the targets for those who were willing forcibly to relocate people (or worse), the practice which acquired the absurd euphemism of 'ethnic cleansing'. The belief in the inalienable right of the former Yugoslavian republics to secede and the failure to offer any kind of moral

or intellectual defense of a non-territorial alternative to the resulting crisis made territorial conflict and 'ethnic cleansing' almost inevitable. The continual attempt to establish a neat cartographic solution (the dominant objective from the Lisbon accords in March 1992 through the Vance-Owen Proposals to the Croat-Muslim Federation and the Contact Plans of 1994) played directly into the hands of those in all communities, though particularly amongst the Serbs, who were itching to seize as much territory as possible by force. Despite a half century of European debate in which sovereignty and citizenship seemed to be increasingly uncoupled from land and territory, the Yugoslavian crisis demonstrates the remarkable persistence of older forms of geopolitical reasoning both amongst the participants in the war and amongst those who sought to arbitrate. Herein lies the 'sadness of geography'.

In the early 1990s, the EU supposedly devoted to breaking down borders between European peoples, had already welcomed former communist countries into the Council of Europe, but failed to provide any kind of leadership in the Western Balkans. Despite fears that the EU had become too political, the Yugoslavian crisis demonstrated it was still primarily an economic organization. No coherent common policy was devised with respect to Yugoslavia, the different EU nation-states responding in quite separate and rather traditional ways, revealing thereby the weakness of the supposedly 'indissoluble' bonds between them. And yet, even as the war intensified, the familiar, by now rather depressing, arguments about the nature and pace of European economic integration continued. Thus Bosnia and Herzegovina is not just a symbol for the Balkan instability and the conflict nature, as Castells noted in 1998, but is the most visible expression of the fact that »nationalism, not federalism, is the concomitant development of European integration«. New boundaries emerged in the post-1990 Europe, dividing it on the horizontal level to those who are in the Schengen Zone and to the »outsiders« within or on the edge of the EU. On the vertical level the division is among the »truly« European citizens and those numerous minorities, which are segregated to a second-class status. We could say that once again Europe, the mother-land of nationalism, and the continent where borders and different territorial and cultural identities are mostly inter-related, is facing a new challenge which deals with the quest of how to best represent numerous interests within one system. As the current situation in the Western Balkans demonstrates, there are at least two contradictory processes at work. The first is the opening up of

Europe to democratic ideals and representative politics, the second one could be a conservative reaction which would seek closure, limitation and protection of the »national« character on a single territory in fear from the many »newcomers« and the »others«. Thus the association of place with particularism and *ethnos*, and space with universalism and *demos* reflects the combination of two quite distinct philosophies.

These two views are also evident in discussions of building political community in the EU, in which both supporters and critics have been concerned with its apparent lack of a strong sense of identity and political community. Analysts have noted in particular the EU's »democratic deficit«, referring in part to the common view of its bureaucratic or rather Eurocratic origins and its relatively weak connections to the general populace of Europe. On the other hand we find cultural pluralist models that consider ethnic, regional, and national communities to be the locus of personal and group attachments and political identity as well. From this point of view, Europe is a composite of particularistic places and territories, usually associated with unassimilated cultures of various scales ranging from regions to nation-states, a model that implies at best a confederalistic common future. In this perspective a unified and integrated Europe becomes secondary to the goal of ethnic, regional, or national autonomy. And these are exactly the problems we may find in the Western Balkans in its post-1990 attempts to combine the divergence processes connected with *ethnos* with the convergence processes related to *demos*.

CONTENTS OF THIS BOOK

On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords the University of Primorska and the University of Sarajevo organized in November 2005 a broadly attended international conference sponsored by the Slovene Presidency of the OSCE and the Central European Initiative. This was the only scientific conference on that topic organized in Sarajevo. Leading politicians and researchers from the field of political geography, history, law, sociology, economy and anthropology have been invited to deliver manuscripts focusing on the problems of and solutions for the Western Balkans. By mid-2006 the received papers went into an international peer-review process. The selected 33 articles are the outcrop of this process. In view of the many

different aspects and topics related to the region of the Western Balkans, the editors have tried to bundle papers with similar contents into four chapters. On several occasions the decision where to place an article was a difficult one. But, having in mind the focus of the book, where the disastrous past and the promising future should be referred to, following chapters came to existence:

1. The chapter on **POLITICAL RESTRUCTURING: DEVELOPMENT AND ISSUES** is introduced by Americans *James O'Brien* and *Gro Nystuen* who present a proposal for a new BiH constitution which would incorporate the spirit of Dayton but would help the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina to become an operational and functional self-managing entity. A more theoretical discussion of *James Anderson* deals with the ethno-national conflicts and their relation to territory. It is followed by an applied discussion written by *Anton Bebler* on the positive and negative points of past federalisms in South-Eastern Europe. In this context the discussion of *Dragan Đukanović* narrows and relates to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the light of the possible constitutional restructuring. *Srdjan Milasinović's* analysis of the neo-liberal totalitarianism provides another aspect to the ever changing reality of the Western Balkans. *Milan Bufon* continues the discussion on South-Eastern Europe by introducing the challenges Europe faces in the management of convergence and divergence processes, with special relations to the Western Balkans. In the same critical context one can see also the contribution of *Maria Paola Pagnini* and *Sargis Ghazaryan* as they focus on the mishaps of the post-crisis solutions for Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Filip Tunjić* concludes the chapter with a broader theoretical theme on Europe's stability and security as he tried to pinpoint the role of the OSCE in the »Europe-in-between«.
2. **WAR IMAGES ON THE ROAD TO DAYTON** chapter discusses the tragic developments, and in part consequences, of the long-lasting military confrontations in the Western Balkans. *Hans Blom*, *Bob de Graaff* and *Dick Schoonoord* present a shorter version of their historical research on the Srebrenica massacre becoming the final act of atrocities which have led to the serious involvement of the international community, and finally to the Dayton Peace talks. The involvement of the international community into the Yugoslav crisis is the topic of the following article where *Matjaž Klemenčič* - by analyzing several cases - enlightens historical developments.

This topic is continued in the discussion of the international policy of »carrots and sticks«, written by *Allard Wagemaker*. A presentation of historical facts which have lead to Dayton, written by *Jože Pirjevec*. The coverage of the media response to the tragic development in Bosnia and Herzegovina is analyzed in detail on the example of Polish media by *Marek Sobczynski* and *Marek Barwinski*. The reality and illusion in the political, military and public presentation of the conflict in BiH is discussed in *William R. Stanley's* contribution on the »Dayton's Potemkin Village«, which concludes the topics of this chapter.

3. The next chapter focuses on the Western Balkan's **CONFLICT RESOLUTION PERSPECTIVES AND POST-DAYTON ADAPTATIONS** which the Dayton Peace Agreements had produced in a broader and narrower sense. Participants at the Dayton conference and researchers of the document present their view on the conference and their follow-ups. *Selmo Cikotić*, a BiH participant of the conference, opens the dilemma on the substance of the Dayton Peace Accords. The University of Sarajevo's vice-rector *Nikola Kovač* expresses his predominantly negative views to solutions which Dayton has enforced. *Ivan Šimonović*, another participant of the Dayton peace conference and the former Croatian minister of foreign affairs asks himself »could and should we have done better in Dayton?« The Croatian reactions and feed-back to the Dayton Peace Agreement are also presented by *Mladen Klemenčić*. The issue on the ethnic quotas as presented on different levels of power sharing in Bosnia and Herzegovina is compared by *Nenad Stojanović* with similar policies in other European countries. In a detailed study on the geography of the minority returns *Gerard Toal* and *Carl Dahlman* ask themselves, with a little sarcasm and provocation in mind, »has ethnic cleansing succeeded in BiH?« The politics and practical solutions and failures in attempts to return forced migrants to their homes in Croatia are discussed by *Ivana Djurić*. *Damir Josipović* puts a question-mark on the suitability of the Dayton territorial divisions, if the process of the BiH integration should be our first concern.
4. The view of the last chapter is directed towards the future. Under **CO-OPERATION AND RE-INTEGRATION OUTLOOKS** the authors of 11 articles discuss, analyze and criticize the present day reality, present examples of good regional, national and transnational policies and view Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Western

Balkans in a new politico-territorial European frame. *Safet Nurković* and *Ranko Mirić* demonstrate the absurdity of the post-Dayton administrative politico-territorial arrangement and speak in favor of its restructuring, in accordance with natural/cultural/historical functional regions. *Andre-Louis Sanguin*'s discourse is associated with thoughts how to overcome the unnatural »white hole« on the European map of limited EU association perspectives, as represented by the Western Balkan's nation-states. *Anton Gosar* has focused his research and discussion on the present-day economic cooperation between Slovenia and BiH. *Nevenka Jefić* directs her attention towards the role of the Pact of Stability for South-Eastern Europe in the democratization process of the regional media, whereas *Simon Kerma* and *Jug Bebler* analyze the present day perception of Bosnia and Herzegovina on and through selected internet sources and search engines. *Tarik Kupusović* and *Selma Čengić* point out the positive sides of the environmentally conscious Mediterranean Action Plan in which Bosnia and Herzegovina participates on equal terms. *Halid Kurtović* criticizes the immediate post-Dayton conditions for traveling and sightseeing in the multitude of natural and cultural uniqueness of BiH a chance for the development of tourism and, through it, for BiH peoples the path towards reconciliation. The territorial anthropology is touched in *Monika Palmberger*'s article on memory discourses as they've changed with the making and breaking of BiH boundaries. *Antonio Violante* focuses on the antique and modern Bosnia's bridges as symbolic and real (travels and tourism) values. *Jasna Vuković* focuses on the very complex identity of the young generation in Sarajevo, as she represents major results of her field work there. *Anja Zalta* discusses the role of religion in BiH and concludes that the inter-religious dialogue is an important tool for a peaceful future in the region.

Needles to say, the authors of the manuscripts/articles are responsible for the contents of the topic, the theory, the method, the analyses, the discussion and the selected bibliography they have chosen to use. The use of words, the syntax and grammar of the English language used in each article is the responsibility of the authors themselves. Where applicable, the English language translation of the original text was authorized by authors.

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